Woodland v. Meisner

Filing 27

ORDER signed by Judge Brett H Ludwig on 3/12/25 that Woodland's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 1 is DENIED. Woodland's Motion for Evidentiary Hearing 15 is DENIED. Woodland's Motion to Reconsider 17 is DENIED. A certificate of appealability is DENIED. (cc: all counsel and mailed to pro se party)(jad)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
COREY WOODLAND,
v.

Petitioner,

Case No. 24-cv-0482-bhl

WARDEN MICHAEL MEISNER,
Respondent.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING § 2254 HABEAS PETITION
______________________________________________________________________________
On May 14, 2018, Petitioner Corey Woodland was charged in Milwaukee County with
three counts of armed robbery in connection with a string of robberies that occurred on the morning
of May 9, 2018. After a series of delays, some attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, others to
the State, and still others to Woodland himself, the case proceeded to trial on April 5, 2021, and a
jury ultimately convicted Woodland on all three counts. After unsuccessfully challenging his
convictions in state court, Woodland filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) He has also moved for an evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 15.)
Because Woodland has not established that he is entitled to either habeas relief or to an evidentiary
hearing, his petition and motion will be denied.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
On May 14, 2018, the State of Wisconsin charged Woodland with three counts of armed
robbery, all as a habitual criminal repeater. (ECF No. 9-3 ¶2.) The charges related to the May 9,
2018 robberies of two GameStop stores and an AT&T store. (Id.) According to the criminal
complaint, a male wearing a gray sweatshirt that was turned inside out, a black T-shirt, and wornout blue jeans entered each of the stores on the morning of May 9, 2018, carrying a gun wrapped
in a plastic bag, and demanded money from the employees. (Id.) The suspect was seen leaving
1
In deciding a habeas petition, the Court must presume the facts set forth by the state courts are correct. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1). The petitioner has the burden of rebutting that presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id.
The background facts are based on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision affirming Woodland’s convictions.
(ECF No. 9-3.) Additional procedural facts are taken from the state court records provided by Respondent.

one of the robberies in a Nissan with an Illinois license plate. (Id.) Woodland had rented a similar
vehicle two days before the robberies. (Id.)
Woodland pleaded not guilty and was bound over for trial at a May 22, 2018 preliminary
hearing. (Id. ¶3.) The Court initially set Woodland’s trial for November 26, 2018. (ECF No. 1919 at 2.) Over the next several years, his trial was delayed for a variety of reasons. The first trial
date was adjourned at the State’s request because a witness was unavailable and because Woodland
had recently retained new counsel. (Id. at 3.) The State requested, and Woodland’s counsel did
not oppose, a second adjournment based on the discovery of a new witness. (ECF No. 19-3 at 2.)
A conflict on the trial court’s calendar led to a third adjournment. (ECF No. 19-19 at 5.) Although
he was represented by counsel, on April 30, 2019, Woodland filed a pro se speedy trial demand.
(ECF No. 19-4.) A few months later, the case was delayed further when, on August 16, 2019,
Woodland’s counsel requested, and was granted, substitution of the assigned trial judge, with trial
then being rescheduled for December 16, 2019. (ECF No. 19-19 at 5.) Court congestion then led
to Woodland’s trial being further postponed until April 13, 2020, with Woodland’s attorney
indicating that his client was “okay with pushing [the trial] out.” (ECF No. 19-6 at 5–8.) On April
1, 2020, Woodland’s trial was postponed again, this time due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (ECF
No. 19-19 at 6.) In early June 2020, Woodland made a formal request for prompt disposition under
Wis. Stat. § 971.11, and, at a July 27, 2020 hearing, the trial court noted Woodland’s request and
set trial for October 26, 2020. (ECF Nos. 19-8 & 19-9.) Court congestion led to a further
rescheduling of the trial date to December 14, 2020, this time over Woodland’s objection. (ECF
No. 19-10 at 6–8.) That date then also fell through, however, after Woodland contracted COVID19. (ECF No. 19-19 at 7.) In the end, Woodland’s trial finally began on April 5, 2021. (Id.)
At trial, the State presented testimony from store employees, the investigating officers, and
Woodland’s probation agent. (ECF No. 9-3 ¶4.) It also introduced surveillance video of the
robberies and from a Dollar Tree store where Woodland purchased blue latex gloves like those
worn by the suspect in each of the armed robberies. (Id.) The jury found Woodland guilty on all
three counts of armed robbery, and the court sentenced him to a total of eight years of initial
confinement followed by six years of extended supervision, to be served consecutive to any other
sentence. (Id. ¶5.) Woodland filed a motion for postconviction relief, which the trial court denied
without a hearing. (Id. ¶¶6–7.) Woodland then appealed and, on October 3, 2023, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions in an unpublished decision. (Id. at 1–16.) Woodland’s

petition for review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court was denied on January 23, 2024. (ECF No.
9-4 at 34.)
On April 22, 2024, Woodland filed a petition for federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. §
2254. (ECF No. 1.) On August 9, 2024, Woodland filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing and
for court-appointed counsel for that hearing. 2 (ECF No. 15.)
LEGAL STANDARD
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) limits a federal
court’s ability to grant habeas corpus relief. To obtain relief under AEDPA, a petitioner must
show that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1040 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). With
respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court, a habeas petition can be granted only if
the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180–81 (2011). This
standard is “highly deferential” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (citations omitted). It is intentionally very
difficult to meet. See Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351, 357–58 (2013).
A state court decision is “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law” within the
meaning of § 2254(d)(1) if the state court “applie[d] a rule different from the governing law set
forth” by Supreme Court precedent or when the state court “decides a case differently than [the
Supreme Court] on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693–
94 (2002). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable” application of established precedent
within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1) when the “state court identifies the correct governing legal
principle . . . but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). Under either

On June 20, 2024, Woodland also filed a motion to compel Respondent to supplement the record with the full state
court record. (ECF No. 10.) Respondent agreed to produce all available documents but noted that two of the
transcripts Woodland requested were not part of the record on appeal. (ECF No. 12.) Accordingly, the Court granted
Woodland’s motion except as two those two transcripts. (ECF No. 13.) On August 19, 2024, Woodland filed a motion
for reconsideration as to the two transcripts at issue. (ECF No. 17.) Because Woodland has not established that those
transcripts exist or were a part of the state court record on appeal, and because they are irrelevant to the Court’s
analysis in any event, his motion to reconsider is denied.
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prong, it is not enough that “a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect”
or erroneous. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). Rather, the state court’s application
of clearly established law must be “objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error
will not suffice.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (quoting White v. Woodall, 572 U.S.
415, 419 (2014)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that “a federal habeas court may
overturn a state court’s application of federal law only if it is so erroneous that ‘there is no
possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the
Supreme] Court’s precedents.’” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 508–09 (2013) (quoting
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)).
ANALYSIS
Woodland raises four grounds for relief. In ground one, he contends that his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated by the nearly three-year delay before his trial
began. (ECF No. 1 at 4–6.) In ground two, Woodland claims that one of his robbery convictions
was not supported by sufficient evidence and thus violates due process. (Id. at 6–7.) Woodland’s
third and fourth grounds are for ineffective assistance of his trial counsel based on counsel’s
alleged failures to object to testimony that Woodland was on probation and to the authenticity of
a video from a Dollar Tree showing Woodland purchasing a pair of gloves that matched the
description of the gloves worn during the robberies. (Id. at 7–9.) The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
considered and rejected each of these claims.
I.

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals Reasonably Rejected Woodland’s Speedy Trial
Claim.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial and that

right is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1967). In Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514 (1972), the Supreme Court recognized that courts have discretion in controlling their
calendars and established a four-factor balancing test for resolving speedy trial claims. In
determining whether a defendant’s speedy trial rights have been violated, courts must consider:
(1) the length of the delay in starting trial; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion
of his right; and (4) any prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530.
In considering and rejecting Woodland’s speedy trial claim, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals identified and applied the Barker factors. (ECF No. 9-3 ¶¶11–17.) The court of appeals

began by addressing the length of the delay, noting that Woodland’s trial was adjourned several
times and that the State had conceded that a thirty-five-month delay in starting trial was
presumptively prejudicial. (Id. ¶¶12–13.) The court then turned to the reasons for the delays and
concluded that the adjournments were attributable to a variety of reasons, some attributable to the
State, some to Woodland, and some to neither party. (Id. ¶¶13–14.) In particular, the Court
explained that Woodland was responsible for delays resulting from his demanded replacement
counsel and his request for a judicial substitution. (Id. ¶13.) It noted that neither party was
responsible for delays caused by the pandemic. (Id. ¶14.) With respect to Woodland’s assertion
of his speedy trial rights, the court held that Woodland did not make a formal demand for a prompt
disposition until June 2020, more than two years after charges were filed and after his trial had
already been adjourned multiple times. (Id. ¶15.) It noted that Woodland’s trial was adjourned
only twice following his speedy trial demand, and one adjournment was due to Woodland himself
contracting COVID-19. (Id. ¶15 n.5.) The court refused to consider Woodland’s April 2019 pro
se demand for a speedy trial, because it was made while he was represented by counsel. (Id. ¶15
n.6.) With respect to prejudice, the court noted that Woodland was incarcerated while awaiting
trial primarily as a result of a sentence from a prior case and would have remained incarcerated
even if his trial had started sooner.

(Id. ¶16.)

Based on Barker and the totality of the

circumstances, the court of appeals concluded that Woodland’s right to a speedy trial was not
violated. (Id. ¶17.)
Woodland contends that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unreasonably applied the last
three Barker factors to the facts of his case. With respect to the reasons for the delay in his trial,
Woodland disagrees with the state court’s characterization of the delays and argues that the state
court unreasonably attributed the majority of the delays to the pandemic. (ECF No. 14 at 17–18.)
This does not accurately describe the state court’s decision. The court did not conclude that the
COVID-19 pandemic was responsible for the majority of the delays; it noted that the delays were
attributable to the State, Woodland and to external factors, like the COVID-19 pandemic. (ECF
No. 9-3 ¶¶13-14.) There is nothing erroneous about the court’s determinations and its analysis of
the causes for the delays was entirely reasonable. That Woodland disagrees with the state court’s
descriptions of the various delays is not a basis for faulting the reasonableness of the state court’s
balancing of this factor.

As for the third Barker factor, Woodland faults the Wisconsin Court of Appeals for
refusing to consider his initial pro se speedy trial demand. (ECF No. 14 at 18.) He notes that the
trial court credited his April 30, 2019 written demand in denying his postconviction motion, (ECF
No. 19-18 at 3), and cites United States v. Cross, 962 F.3d 892, 899 (7th Cir. 2020), for the
proposition that trial courts have discretion to consider pro se filings by represented litigants. But,
as Cross establishes, under federal law, “[a] defendant does not have a right to represent himself
when he is also represented by counsel.” Id. (citing United States v. Patterson, 576 F.3d 431, 436
(7th Cir. 2009)). Thus, the state appellate court’s refusal to consider Woodland’s pro se speedy
trial demand (made while he was represented by counsel) did not violate any federal right, and that
is the sole focus of federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Moreover, as the state court
noted, even Woodland’s disregarded pro se demand was a delayed speedy trial demand, coming
nearly a year after proceedings began in his case. (ECF No. 9-3 ¶15.) Woodland has not shown
that the state court’s analysis of the third factor was an unreasonable application of Barker.
With respect to the fourth and final Barker factor, prejudice, Woodland argues that the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals overlooked evidence in the record establishing that he was prejudiced
by the delay. (ECF No. 14 at 18–22.) He points to testimony from an October 20, 2020 hearing
in which he told the trial court that the delays were preventing him from seeing his children and
participating in prison programming and argues that “three years incarceration in a Covid infested
jail without a trial” caused him anxiety and high blood pressure. (Id. at 19–21.) Woodland cites
to Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969), a pre-Barker decision in which the Supreme Court that a
defendant’s speedy trial right can be violated even while he is serving a prison sentence imposed
by another jurisdiction. (Id. at 20.) While Woodland is correct that a criminal defendant may be
prejudiced by a long delay even when he is serving another sentence during that delay, see Barker,
407 U.S. at 532; Smith, 393 U.S. at 378–79, he not shown that the prejudice he claims entitles him
to habeas relief. His prejudice arguments are largely underdeveloped and conclusory. And they
are just one part of the Barker analysis. Given the state court’s citation and application of Barker,
and its fulsome balancing of all four factors, Woodland has not shown that its analysis was
unreasonable sufficient to warrant habeas relief.

II.

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals Reasonably Concluded There Was Sufficient
Evidence to Convict Woodland of Robbery.
Woodland’s second ground for habeas relief is a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence on one of the robbery counts. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals addressed the merits of
this claim by stating the relevant standard:
[A]n appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
trier of fact unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state
and the conviction, is so lacking in probative value and force that no
trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. If any possibility exists that the trier of fact could
have drawn the appropriate inferences from the evidence adduced at
trial to find the requisite guilt, an appellate court may not overturn a
verdict even if it believes that the trier of fact should not have found
guilt based on the evidence before it.
(ECF No. 9-3 at 8 (alterations omitted) (quoting State v. Poellinger, 451 N.W.2d 752, 757–58
(Wis. 1990).) While this is the state law standard, it mirrors the controlling United States Supreme
Court precedent, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979).
Woodland argues that the state court’s decision was contrary to clearly established federal
law as set forth in Jackson and Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650 (2012). He contends the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish several elements of armed robbery. (ECF No. 14
at 23–25.) The record and the state court of appeals’ analysis defeat this claim.
Woodland highlights that the State only presented testimony from employees of two of the
three stores that were robbed. He also points out that the surveillance video of the third robbery
did not establish who the owner of the property taken was, whether the owner consented to the
property being taken, or whether the suspect threatened anyone. (Id. at 23–24.) The Wisconsin
Court of Appeals considered and rejected this argument. (ECF No. 9-3 ¶¶18–24.) It noted that
the State introduced surveillance video of the third robbery, which matched almost exactly the
circumstances of the other two robberies, along with testimony from employees of the other stores
confirming that the suspect appeared to have been holding a gun covered with a plastic bag in his
right hand, just like the suspect in the surveillance video at the third store. (Id. ¶¶21–22.) It also
noted that each of the robberies occurred on the same morning, minutes apart, and the suspect from
the surveillance video of the third robbery wore clothing that matched the description of the suspect
from the first two robberies. (Id. ¶22 & n.7.) And it explained that the Nissan seen driving away
from the first robbery was found to have been rented to Woodland, and Woodland was identified

as having purchased blue latex gloves similar to those worn during the robberies. (Id. ¶22.) Based
on all this evidence, the state court thus determined that the jury could have reasonably concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that Woodland was the individual in the video of the third robbery and
had entered the GameStop holding a gun and took money from the cash register without
GameStop’s consent under the threat of using his gun if the employees did not comply. (Id. ¶23.)
Woodland argues the state court’s decision was contrary to federal law because the video
did not show a gun or that any threats were made, and no witness identified Woodland as
perpetrating the third robbery. (ECF No. 14 at 24.) He cites United States v. Pacente, 503 F.2d
543, 548 (7th Cir. 1974), and Wisconsin Jury Instruction 484, both of which require that juries
consider charges separately. (Id. at 24–25.) Woodland also points to a pretrial statement made by
the prosecution that the State would not move forward on the third charge if it could not present
witnesses from the third robbery. (Id. at 25 (citing ECF No. 19-13 at 2–3).) None of these
arguments, whether considered separately or together, warrants habeas relief. A pre-trial statement
by the prosecution is irrelevant to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. And Jackson
does not stand for the proposition that the evidence to sustain a conviction requires witness
testimony establishing each or any element of the charged crime. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court held that the purely circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s intent was sufficient to
sustain his first-degree murder conviction. 443 U.S. at 324–25. As the state court of appeals
concluded, the circumstantial evidence against Woodland was sufficient for the jury to reasonably
infer that Woodland committed all three armed robberies. (ECF No. 9-3 ¶22.) And contrary to
Woodland’s assertion, neither Pacente nor the cited jury instruction precluded the jury from
considering evidence from the other robberies as circumstantial evidence of his guilt in the third
robbery. Woodson has not shown that the state court’s conclusion on the sufficiency of the
evidence was an unreasonable application of federal law.
III.

Both of Woodland’s Ineffective Assistance Claims Depend on State Law Evidentiary
Rulings Not Cognizable on Federal Habeas Review.
Woodland’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims stem from his trial counsel’s failure

to object to evidence introduced at trial. First, he argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to testimony from Woodland’s probation officer that established that he was on probation
at the time of the robberies. (ECF No. 14 at 28.) Second, he argues that counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to the admission of a surveillance video from a Dollar Tree store that showed

him purchasing gloves immediately prior to the robberies because it was not properly
authenticated. (Id. at 30–31.) The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected both claims, concluding
that Woodland’s trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object on either issue, because both
the probation officer’s testimony and the video were admissible evidence. (ECF No. 9-3 ¶¶25–
37.)
“The admissibility of evidence is generally a matter of state law.” Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d
693, 702 (7th Cir. 1994). A federal court may grant habeas relief based on a state court evidentiary
ruling only when the ruling violates a specific constitutional guarantee or when the probative value
of the admitted evidence was so greatly outweighed by its prejudice to the defendant that its
admission denied the defended a fundamentally fair trial. Id. Woodland’s claims that his counsel
was inefficient for failing to object to evidence admitted at his trial necessarily depend on the
inadmissibility of that evidence. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined that both his
probation officer’s testimony and the Dollar Tree video were admissible and, therefore, his counsel
was not deficient for failing to object to their admission.
This Court can only disturb that ruling if it was so erroneous as to deprive Woodland of a
fair trial in violation of due process, or otherwise violated his constitutional rights. In regard to
both claims, Woodland cites to federal cases concerning the admissibility of similar evidence, as
well as to the Federal Rules of Evidence. (ECF No. 14 at 26–31.) These arguments are misplaced.
The admissibility of evidence in his case was not governed by the Federal Rules, but rather by the
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence.

Likewise, federal cases examining whether evidence was

admissible in a federal trial have no relevance to his claims. Woodland does not cite to any federal
cases that support a finding that the admission of either his probation officer’s testimony or the
Dollar Tree video was an error of constitutional magnitude. Woodland cites Estelle v. Williams,
425 U.S. 501 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held that a state violates due process when it
compels a criminal defendant to stand trial dressed in identifiable prison clothes, and argues that
the admitted references to his probation status are analogous. (ECF No. 14 at 26.) But, under
AEDPA, a federal court may only grant habeas relief when a state court’s decision is contrary to
clearly established federal law.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Woodland cannot establish

entitlement to habeas relief by pointing to substantially different Supreme Court precedent on a
separate and distinct issue. Because Woodland’s ineffective assistance claims depend on the state

court’s evidentiary rulings, he is not entitled to habeas relief. 3 See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S.
74, 76 (2005) (“We have repeatedly held that a state court’s interpretation of state law . . . binds a
federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”)
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Under Rule 11(a) of the rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court must consider
whether to issue a certificate of appealability. A court may issue a certificate of appealability only
if the applicant makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitution right. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). The standard for making a “substantial showing” is if “reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
declines to issue a certificate of appealability because reasonable jurists could not debate the
Court’s decision to deny the petition on the merits.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Woodland’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF
No. 1, is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Woodland’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, ECF No.
15, is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Woodland’s Motion to Reconsider, ECF No. 17, is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED because the
Court does not find that a reasonable jurist could conclude that the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner, Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin on March 12, 2025.
s/ Brett H. Ludwig
BRETT H. LUDWIG
United States District Judge

The Court will also deny Woodland’s motion for an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance claims because
his claims challenge the state court’s determination of the admissibility of evidence under state law and are, therefore,
not cognizable on federal habeas review.

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