Herrera Hernandez v. Ruechel et al
Filing
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DECISION AND ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C Dries on 1/28/2025. IT IS ORDERED that Hernandez's motion to amend the complaint (Dkt. No. 18 ) is DENIED as moot. The clerk's office is directed to docket the proposed amended com plaint (Dkt. No. 18 -1) as the operative complaint in this action. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Ruechel, Melland, Erieau, Peterson, and Kopp's motion to review the amended complaint (Dkt. No. 21 ) is DENIED as moot. IT IS FURTHER OR DERED that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20, Bill Pusich is dropped as a party because he is not properly joined in this action. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Marshal shall serve a copy of the complaint and this order upon Roberta Lo ngsine and Dave Rosenfeldt pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Brady Erieau, Christopher Melland, Mary Ruechel, Rachel Peterson, Carol Kopp, Roberta Longsine, Dave Rosenfeldt, and Jody Maloney shall file a re sponsive pleading to the amended complaint consistent with the timeframes set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may not begin discovery until after the Court enters a scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions. (cc: all counsel and mailed to pro se party)(amb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MANUEL ANTONIO
HERRERA HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 24-cv-1251
MARY RUECHEL,
CHRISTOPHER MELLAND,
BRADY ERIEAU,
RYLEE PETERSON,
CAROL KOPP, and
JODY MALONEY,
Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Manuel Antonio Herrera Hernandez, who is currently a pretrial detainee at the
Oconto County Jail and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging
that his civil rights were violated. On October 29, 2024, the Court screened the complaint and
allowed Hernandez to proceed on various claims against Defendants Mary Ruechel, Christopher
Melland, Brady Erieau, Rylee Peterson, Carol Kopp, and Jody Maloney. Maloney answered the
complaint on November 25, 2024, and the remaining Defendants answered on January 3, 2025.
On December 26, 2024, Hernandez moved for leave to file an amended complaint “to add
new claims and parties.” Because Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 allows a plaintiff at this stage to amend the
complaint once without the Court’s permission, the Court will deny his motion as moot and will
docket the proposed amended complaint as the operative complaint. On January 3, 2025,
Defendants Ruechel, Melland, Erieau, Peterson, and Kopp filed a motion asking the Court to
screen the amended complaint. 1 Because 28 U.S.C. §1915A requires the Court to screen all
complaints filed by prisoners, the Court will also deny Defendants’ motion as moot.
SCREENING OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity and must dismiss any
complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or
malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a
complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a
cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It
must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing,
as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of
any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused.
“The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’
but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
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These Defendants have yet to indicate whether they consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction. They are required to
do so within seven days of this decision.
2
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted).
ALLEGATIONS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
According to Plaintiff Hernandez, Defendants Brady Erieau, Christopher Melland, Mary
Ruechel, Roberta Longsine, Dave Rosenfeldt, and Rachel Peterson enforce rules against him that
they do not enforce against other inmates because he is Mexican. For example, Hernandez alleges
that, on August 19, 2024, upon orders from Ruechel, Erieau took an extra tray of food from him
even though other inmates are allowed to eat as many trays of food as they want. He also alleges
that over the course of about a year, he was disciplined several times by Ruechel, Longsine,
Peterson, and Rosenfeldt for sharing phone time with others even though the handbook does not
prohibit sharing phone time and other inmates do it without consequence. Finally, he explains
that, after asking to use the toenail clippers, Peterson instructed Melland to stand at his cell door
and watch him cut his nails even though other inmates are allowed to use the clippers without
being supervised. Hernandez explains that these are only a few examples of the ways these
Defendants treated him differently from other inmates who are not Mexican. He also alleges that
these Defendants have retaliated against him by giving him conduct reports because he has filed
many grievances about their allegedly discriminatory conduct.
Hernandez also asserts that, after Peterson informed him she was sending him to
segregation in connection with a food tray incident, he told her to “suit up” because he planned to
“kill [him]self right now.” According to Hernandez, Peterson shut his trapdoor and walked away,
at which time Hernandez began to use a staple to cut his left forearm. He asserts that after about
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twenty to twenty-five minutes he began to feel dizzy because of the blood. Hernandez asserts that
he pressed his emergency call button and staff immediately responded. He further asserts that
Defendant Nurse Jody Maloney gave him only a small packet of antibiotic ointment, but no
bandage or other treatment, despite saying, “Oh, my God” when she saw his injury. Hernandez
explains that he stopped eating for about a week because he was in so much anguish, but Nurse
Maloney never once checked on him or his arm injury. Hernandez finally alleges that, despite
multiple requests, pictures were not taken of his injury until it was nearly healed.
Hernandez next alleges that, on October 4, 2024, he and another inmate were working out
when a third inmate began to act aggressively toward them. Hernandez asserts that the two other
inmates are White. He explains that the disagreement was primarily between them, but the
allegedly aggressive inmate turned his attention to Hernandez and challenged him to fight while
making racist comments. Hernandez explains that he tried to avoid a confrontation by repeatedly
closing the inmate’s door, but that was unsuccessful, so he pushed the intercom button and
explained the situation to the responding officer. According to Hernandez, Longsine then came to
his cell with two other officers, gave him tickets for fighting, and took him to segregation.
Hernandez states that he tried to explain his position, but she ignored him. He then told her that
he was going to file a grievance, and she allegedly responded, “Sue me! You’re not going to do
anything to me.” She further stated, “That’s what you do! Suing officers!” Hernandez believes
that she gave him tickets in retaliation against him for filing lawsuits. He also highlights that the
two other inmates, who are White, were not disciplined as severely as he was.
Hernandez asserts that as a result of that experience, he had a psychological breakdown
while in segregation and stopped eating for about a week. According to Hernandez, Rosenfeldt
and Peterson responded to a medical form he submitted and checked his vitals. Hernandez assumes
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they did not call a nurse because no nurse came to check on him. Peterson allegedly asked if
Hernandez wanted to speak with mental health, but Hernandez asserts that he declined the offer
and instead asked her to call the nurse, but she did not. The next day, Hernandez allegedly passed
out and afterwards, a sergeant convinced him to eat a sandwich. Hernandez alleges that a nurse
examined him that afternoon and gave him some ibuprofen.
Hernandez next alleges that, on November 4, 2024, Dave Pusich made a racist comment,
stating that “All Mexicans look the same.” Hernandez states that he felt humiliated and filed a
grievance about the incident, but Pusich continues to have access to his housing pod. Hernandez
believes Pusich is angry at him because he filed a grievance.
Finally, Hernandez asserts that Defendant Jail Administrator Carol Kopp has consistently
denied his grievances. He states that, although she responds to his grievances, she ignores his
underlying concern that he is being treated differently than other inmates because of his race.
THE COURT’S ANALYSIS
Like his original complaint, the main focus of Hernandez’s amended complaint is that he
is treated more harshly than other inmates because he is Mexican. The Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). In the context of prisons,
however, “[u]nequal treatment among inmates . . . is justified if it bears a rational relation to
legitimate penal interest.” Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867, 881 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 522–523 (1984)). Thus, in order to establish an equal protection violation,
a plaintiff must allege and prove “the existence of purposeful discrimination.” McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987)). In other words, an inmate must show that he was treated differently
than similarly situated inmates and that there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”
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Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). It is not enough for one to show only that other
prisoners were treated differently. “In order to succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff
must show intentional or purposeful discrimination suggesting that ‘the decisionmaker singled out
a particular group for disparate treatment and selected his course of action at least in part for the
purpose of causing its adverse effects on the identifiable group.’” Nkrumah v. Clark, 977 F.2d 585
(7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982)).
With the foregoing standard in mind, the Court will allow Hernandez to proceed on an
equal protection claim against Erieau, Melland, Ruechel, Longsine, Rosenfeldt, and Peterson
based on allegations that they enforced rules and procedures against him that they did not enforce
against other inmates who are not Mexican. He may also proceed on a claim that Jail Administrator
Kopp’s refusal to address his grievances about the ongoing racial discrimination by her staff was
objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir.1988)
(holding that supervisors who know about misconduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone, or turn
a blind eye for fear of what they might see may be liable). However, to the extent Hernandez seeks
to sue Jail Administrator Kopp because she denied his grievances about receiving tickets, he may
not do so. It has long been held that “[o]nly persons who cause or participate in the violations are
responsible, . . . [and] [r]uling against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or
contribute to the violation.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007).
Hernandez also states a First Amendment retaliation claim against Erieau, Melland,
Ruechel, Longsine, Rosenfeldt, and Peterson based on allegations that they issued him tickets
because he submitted grievances about their alleged mistreatment of him. See Perez v. Fenoglio,
792 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that to state a retaliation claim a plaintiff must allege
that “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation
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that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment
activity was at least a motivating factor in the defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.”).
Hernandez may also proceed on claims under the Fourteenth Amendment based on
allegations that Peterson’s response to his threats of self-harm and that Peterson and Rosenfeldt’s
refusal to get him medical attention after he stopped eating were objectively unreasonable. See
Pittman v. Madison Cnty., Ill., 108 F.4th 561, 570-72 (7th Cir. 2024) (holding that a plaintiff must
show that (1) he suffered from an objectively serious condition and (2) a defendant’s response to
his condition was objectively unreasonable). And he may proceed on a claim that Nurse Maloney’s
responses to his arm injury and first hunger strike were objectively unreasonable. The Court
reminds Herrera-Hernandez that to prevail on his claim, he must show not only that a defendant
violated his constitutional rights but that the violation caused him injury or damages. See Roe v.
Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 864 (7th Cir. 2011).
Hernandez may not, however, proceed against Pusich based on allegations that he made a
racist comment because Pusich is not properly joined in this action. Under Fed. R. Civ. P.
20(a)((2), “persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if any right to relief is asserted .
. . with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences and any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.”
This standalone incident involving Pusich does not arise out of the same transactions or
occurrences that the other named Defendants were allegedly involved in, and the questions of law
and fact underlying the purported claim against Pusich will not overlap with the questions of law
and fact underlying Hernandez’s claims against the other Defendants. Accordingly, because
Pusich is not properly joined in this action, the Court will drop him as a party. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
21; see also 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) (allowing a designated magistrate judge to hear and determine
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any pretrial matter except those specifically mentioned). The Court offers no opinion on the
viability of Hernandez’s purported claim against Pusich. If he would like to pursue that claim, he
must do so in a separate case.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Hernandez’s motion to amend the complaint (Dkt.
No. 18) is DENIED as moot. The clerk’s office is directed to docket the proposed amended
complaint (Dkt. No. 18-1) as the operative complaint in this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Ruechel, Melland, Erieau, Peterson, and
Kopp’s motion to review the amended complaint (Dkt. No. 21) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20, Bill Pusich is dropped
as a party because he is not properly joined in this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Marshal shall serve a copy of the
complaint and this order upon Roberta Longsine and Dave Rosenfeldt pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4. Herrera-Hernandez is advised that Congress requires the U.S. Marshals Service
to charge for making or attempting such service. 28 U.S.C. §1921(a). The current fee for waiverof-service packages is $8.00 per item mailed. The full fee schedule is provided at 28 C.F.R.
§§0.114(a)(2)–(3). Although Congress requires the Court to order service by the U.S. Marshals
Service precisely because in forma pauperis plaintiffs are indigent, it has not made any provision
for these fees to be waived either by the Court or by the U.S. Marshals Service. The Court is not
involved in the collection of the fee.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Brady Erieau, Christopher Melland, Mary Ruechel,
Rachel Peterson, Carol Kopp, Roberta Longsine, Dave Rosenfeldt, and Jody Maloney shall file a
responsive pleading to the amended complaint consistent with the timeframes set forth in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may not begin discovery until after the
Court enters a scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 28th day of January, 2025.
Stephen C. Dries
United States Magistrate Judge
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