Wohlrabe v. Mielricki et al

Filing 7

SCREENING ORDER signed by Judge Brett H Ludwig on 11/22/24 that Wohlrabe fails to state a claim against Runge, so the clerk's office is directed to terminate him from this action. The US Marshal shall serve a copy of the amended complaint and this order upon Charles Brown pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. (cc: all counsel and mailed to pro se party)(jad)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
NATHAN WOHLRABE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 24-cv-1321-bhl

CHARLES BROWN and
MARTIN RUNGE,
Defendants.
SCREENING ORDER
Plaintiff Nathan Wohlrabe, who is currently confined at Mendota Mental Health Institute
and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights
were violated. On November 4, 2024, the Court screened the complaint and, after identifying
various deficiencies, gave Wohlrabe the opportunity to file an amended complaint, which he did
on November 18, 2024. The Court will screen the amended complaint as required by 28 U.S.C.
§1915A.
SCREENING OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
As previously explained, the Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity and must
dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally
“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In
screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To

state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide
a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is
accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the
nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused.
ALLEGATIONS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
According to Wohlrabe, on June 10, 2022, his wife took him to the Veterans Affairs
Medical Center because he was feeling dizzy, short of breath, and fatigued. Wohlrabe explains
that he had been in a car accident four months earlier and had developed serious conditions as a
result of his injuries and the physical stress of having recently returned to work. Wohlrabe asserts
that, after not being properly treated and feeling desperate, he left his bed and ran into the hospital
lobby where Defendant Security Officer Charles Brown was located. Wohlrabe states that he was
out of breath, confused, and in a state of near delirium. He allegedly ran back towards the nurses’
station, and Brown followed him. Wohlrabe asserts that he yelled for medication. Upon noticing
that Brown was following him, Wohlrabe ran into the nurses’ station allegedly to avoid conflict.
He asserts that he was then surrounded, at which time he yelled, “Are we going to get violent?”
Wohlrabe explains that he continued to cry out for help with no response from Brown or medical
staff. He asserts that Brown and others, who are supervised by Deputy Chief Martin Runge, not
only failed to render aid but also failed to find a peaceful resolution. Dkt. No. 6.
The subsequent events are not entirely clear, but at some point Brown allegedly arrested
Wohlrabe, who was then treated with various medications overnight, and released the next day
into the custody of Milwaukee police, who transported him to the Milwaukee County Jail.

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Wohlrabe asserts that he was confined in a cell with a broken toilet for 21 days, but he does not
sue anyone in connection with those allegations. Dkt. No. 6.
THE COURT’S ANALYSIS
Wohlrabe is seeking damages based on allegations that Brown arrested him without cause
and refused to render aid to him while he was clearly experiencing a medical crisis. To prevail on
a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest, Wohlrabe must establish that he was arrested without
probable cause. Gaddis v. DeMattei, 30 F.4th 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2022). “Probable cause for an
arrest provides an absolute defense to a false arrest claim.” Id. (citing Farnik v. City of Chicago,
1 F.4th 535, 545 (7th Cir. 2021)). And “[p]robable cause to justify an arrest exists if the totality
of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest would warrant a
reasonable, prudent person in believing that the arrestee had committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime.” Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations
omitted). Courts must also assess whether an officer’s actions are “objectively reasonable in light
of the facts and circumstances confronting [the officer].” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397
(1989). Further development of the record may reveal that Brown had probable cause to arrest
Wohlrabe and that his actions in response to Brown’s medical crisis were reasonable, but at this
early stage, Wohlrabe’s allegations are sufficient to state a Fourth Amendment claim against
Brown.
Wohlrabe does not, however, state a claim against Brown’s supervisor, Runge. The
doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be used to hold a supervisor liable for the misconduct of a
subordinate. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). The only time a supervisor
will be held liable for a subordinate’s misconduct is if the supervisor directs or consents to the
misconduct. For example, the supervisor “must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve

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it, condone it, or turn a blind eye” for fear of what they might see. Id. (quoting Jones v. City of
Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir.1988)). “[S]upervisors who are merely negligent in failing
to detect and prevent subordinates’ misconduct are not liable.” Jones, 856 F.2d at 992. Wohlrabe
explains that he is suing Runge only because he supervises the security officers at the hospital.
This, on its own, is not enough for him to state a claim against Runge under §1983.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Wohlrabe fails to state a claim against Runge, so
the clerk’s office is directed to terminate him from this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Marshal shall serve a copy of the
amended complaint and this order upon Charles Brown pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4. Brown is advised that Congress requires the U.S. Marshals Service to charge for
making or attempting such service. 28 U.S.C. §1921(a). The current fee for waiver-of-service
packages is $8.00 per item mailed. The full fee schedule is provided at 28 C.F.R. §§0.114(a)(2)–
(3). Although Congress requires the Court to order service by the U.S. Marshals Service precisely
because in forma pauperis plaintiffs are indigent, it has not made any provision for these fees to
be waived either by the Court or by the U.S. Marshals Service. The Court is not involved in the
collection of the fee.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Brown shall file a responsive pleading to the amended
complaint.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may not begin discovery until after the
Court enters a scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin on November 22, 2024.
s/ Brett H. Ludwig
BRETT H. LUDWIG
United States District Judge

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