Ruegg v. Hompe

Filing 28

ORDER granting 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment for defendants and close this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen L. Crocker on 11/20/09. (elc),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF W I S C O N S I N ______________________________________________________________________________________

PA U L RUEGG,
P la in tiff, v. B R A D L E Y HOMPE, Warden, Stanley Correctional Institution; T I M HAINES, Deputy Warden, Stanley Correctional Institution; C H E R Y L WEBSTER, Unit Manager, Stanley Correctional Institution; and J E A N VOEKS, Director, Health Services Unit, Stanley Correctional Institution, D e fe n d a n t s. _____________________________________________________________________________________ I n this lawsuit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff Paul Ruegg alleges that d e f e n d a n t s Bradley Hompe, Tim Haines, Cheryl Webster and Jean Voeks violated his Eighth A m e n d m e n t rights when they took away his double mattress, which a doctor had recommended f o r plaintiff's severe back and leg problems. Before the court is defendants' motion for summary j u d g m e n t on the grounds that defendants Haines and Webster had no personal involvement in t h e decision to remove plaintiff's extra mattress, that plaintiff has failed to show that the re m a in in g defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need and, in the a lt e rn a tiv e , that all of the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt. 18. Before turning to defendants' motion, I need to address a preliminary procedural matter B a c k in April, 2009, Plaintiff received instructions on filing submissions related to summary ju d g m e n t . Procedure to be Followed on Motions for Summary Judgment and Helpful Tips to F ilin g a Summary Judgment Motion in Cases Assigned to Judge Barbara B. Crabb, attached to the p r e t r i a l conference order, dkt. 14. As explained in the instructions, a party opposing summary ju d g m e n t must file a brief with opposing legal arguments, a response to the movant's proposed O R D E R AND OPINION 09-cv-22-slc

f in d in g s of fact and evidentiary materials to support the factual propositions. Procedure, II.A.1-3. T h e party is to propose each fact in a separate paragraph and supported by a reference to s u p p o rt in g evidence. Procedure, II.D.1-2. Plaintiff failed to comply with these procedural rules. H e did not file a brief with opposing legal arguments or supporting evidentiary materials and he d i d not respond to defendants' proposed findings of fact. Although plaintiff requested and re ce iv e d an extension of time to file his responsive documents, see dkts. 26 & 27, he never filed a n y t h in g. Therefore, I must conclude that the facts proposed by defendants are undisputed to the e x t en t that they are supported by admissible evidence. This leads me to conclude that, because p l a in t if f has not offered evidence to support his claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent t o his serious medical needs, the defendants are entitled to summary for judgment in their favor. F ro m defendants' proposed findings of fact and the record, I find the following facts to be m a t e ria l and undisputed.

U N D I S P U T E D FACTS P l a in t if f Paul Ruegg has been incarcerated at the Stanley Correctional Institution since N o v e m b e r 29, 2007. Defendant Bradley Hompe currently is the deputy warden at Redgranite C o rre ct io n a l Institution. Between September 2007 and April 2009, Hompe was the warden at S t a n le y Correctional Institution, where he was responsible for the overall operation and a d m in is tra tio n of the prison and the security and safety of the inmates. Defendant Jean Ann V o ek s has been employed as the Health Services Unit Manager and Nursing Supervisor at the S t a n l e y Correctional Institution since April 2007. In that capacity, Voeks oversees the delivery o f medical services and provides administrative support to physicians and other medical staff at t h e prison. Defendant Tim Haines has been the deputy warden at the Stanley Correctional I n s t it u tio n since February 2008. He assists in developing, implementing and administering the

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i n s t i t u t i o n ' s security, treatment and support services. Defendant Cheryl Webster was a unit m a n a g e r at the Stanley Correctional Institution from January 2003 to July 2008, after which she b e c a m e a program director. As a unit manager, Webster oversaw the general operations of the h o u s i n g unit assigned to her and the security, treatment and living conditions of the inmates, in cl u d in g plaintiff, who were housed on her unit. Health care practitioners at the institution rely on Policy and Procedure No. 300:07, " M e d i ca l /D e n t a l Restrictions/Special Needs" (effective August 26, 2005), to determine whether a n inmate has a special need. The policy requires the practitioners to evaluate security restrictions a n d possible alternatives where possible and refer any unresolved security concerns to the warden. P u rs u a n t to the policy, double mattresses were necessary for those inmates with the following c o n d i t i o n s : decubitus ulcer or therapy, third-degree burns, hip or knee replacement, severe d e g e n era t iv e joint disease, orthopedic injury or skeletal trauma and pregnancy of 20 weeks' g e s t a t i o n or more. Although on January 24, 2008, a physician wrote an order for plaintiff to r e c e i v e an extra mattress, the physician did not give a reason for the order or list any diagnosis m e e ti n g the state's policy criteria. Medical progress notes from the same day list plaintiff's d i a g n o s e s as plantar fasciitis and Achilles tendinitis. A month later, on February 28, 2008, p la in tif f complained of ankle, knee and back pain and had a noticeable limp. I n the spring of 2008, Hompe held a meeting with institution staff members to discuss the p r e v a l e n c e of inmates using double mattresses. In September 2007, over 400 inmates used double m a t t re s s e s because the mattresses were thin. In April 2008, Hompe directed Voeks and the health s e r v i ce s unit staff to evaluate the needs of inmates using double mattresses to determine whether e a c h had a legitimate medical need for a double mattress. Additionally, Voeks and Holly

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G u n d e rs o n , a Department of Corrections nursing coordinator, evaluated a sampling of the m a tt re s s e s being used by inmates in various housing units at the institution. Although thicker, higher quality mattresses had been distributed among the institutions i n 2002 or 2003, Stanley Correctional Institution had just opened at that time and still had thin m a ttres se s. Defendant Voeks learned that the covers of the older, thinner mattresses were

s u s c e p t ib le to tearing and the inner core was likely to break down more quickly than those in the n e w e r mattresses. This created a security concern in that inmates could hide contraband within t h e core of the older mattresses or between mattresses. As a result, in April 2008, defendant H o m p e ordered extra mattresses removed unless an inmate had a medical need for one. Defendant H a in e s was aware of this decision. Health Services Unit staff determined that the majority of in m a t e s who had double mattresses did not meet the policy criteria. The thin mattresses at the S t a n le y Correctional Institution were gradually replaced with the thicker, higher quality m a t t re s s e s . I n April 2008, defendant Voeks circulated two memos clarifying and explaining the policy r e g a r d i n g extra pillows, mattresses and other comfort items. She posted the memos for all

in m a te s to view. Gunderson created a sticker that was placed on all health service requests for c o m f o rt items. I n an August 8, 2008 order, a physician ordered that plaintiff's extra mattress be " d is co n tin u e d ." Neither defendant Haines nor defendant Webster had any personal involvement i n the decision to remove the double mattresses at the institution or the decision to replace p la in ti ff 's double mattress with a single one. On August 10, 2008, plaintiff submitted a health service request to defendant Voeks, c o m p l a in i n g that officers had removed his extra mattress. He asked to see a physician and claimed

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h e needed x-rays for his back pain. Voeks responded in writing the next day, explaining that under t h e double mattress policy, plaintiff did not have a health condition warranting an extra mattress. V o ek s scheduled an appointment for plaintiff for September 25, 2008, making clear that he might h a v e to pay for the visit and might not receive the tests that he requested. Plaintiff failed to a t t e n d the clinic visit.

O P IN IO N A . Summary Judgment Standard T h e purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether the parties have adduced e n o u g h evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2 4 2 , 250 (1986); Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 2001). Summary j u d g m e n t is appropriate if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is e n tit le d to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 1 7 , 322 (1986). In a civil suit, the plaintiff has the burden to prove his claim. It is not d e f en d a n t s ' burden to disprove it. Therefore, it is plaintiff who must show what evidence he has t h a t would convince a trier of fact to accept his version of the events. Schacht v. Wisconsin Dept. o f Corrections, 175 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1999). The court must view all facts and draw all in f ere n c e s in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Schuster v. Lucent Technologies, I n c ., 327 F.3d 569, 573 (7th Cir. 2003). However, the non-moving party may not simply rest on i ts allegations; rather, it must come forward with specific facts that would support a jury's verdict in its favor. Hunter v. Amin, 583 F.3d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 2009); Van Diest Supply Co. v. Shelby C o u n ty State Bank, 425 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2005). If the plaintiff fails to make a sufficient s h o w i n g on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof, s u m m a ry judgment must be granted to the defendant. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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B . Eighth Amendment P r is o n officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment "`to provide medical care for t h o s e whom it is punishing by incarceration.'" Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1 9 9 6 ) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). In order to survive summary j u d g m e n t on his Eighth Amendment claim, plaintiff must establish that he had "an objectively s erio u s medical need, and that [defendants were] deliberately indifferent to it." Grieveson v. A n d e rs o n , 538 F.3d 763, 779 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. A "serious medical need" may be a condition that a doctor has recognized as needing t re a tm e n t or one for which the necessity of treatment would be obvious to a layperson. Johnson v . Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 584-85 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Zentmyer v. Kendall County, 220 F.3d 8 0 5 , 810 (7th Cir. 2000)). A medical need may be serious if it causes pain, Cooper v. Casey, 97 F .3 d 914, 916-17 (7th Cir. 1996), or subjects the detainee to a substantial risk of serious harm, F a r m e r v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). "Deliberate indifference" means that the officials w e re aware that the prisoner needed medical treatment, but disregarded the risk by failing to take re a s o n a b le measures. Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, plaintiff's claims a re properly analyzed by answering three questions: 1) Did plaintiff had a serious medical need? 2 ) Did defendants knew that plaintiff needed care (or in this case, a double mattress)? 3) Despite t h e ir awareness of plaintiff's need, did defendants fail to take reasonable measures to provide the n e c e s s a r y care? P la i n t i ff alleges in his amended complaint, see dkt. 5, that he has severe back and leg p ro b l e m s and has experienced severe back pain and constant leg numbness since his extra mattress w a s removed. However, the undisputed facts show that plaintiff was given a double mattress for a n unknown reason. He has never received a diagnosis of back or leg problems or any other

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c o n d i t i o n that would require him to sleep on an extra mattress. The only reference in the record t o problems of this kind was on February 28, 2008, when plaintiff complained of ankle, knee and b a c k pain and showed a noticeable limp. However, this was after the physician had ordered him a double mattress. Given the prevalence of inmates having two mattresses at the time, it is just a s likely that plaintiff received an extra mattress for comfort purposes rather than for any serious m e d i c a l problem. In fact, defendant Voeck's survey of the institution revealed that a majority of t h e inmates with two mattresses did not have a medical need for them. E v e n assuming that plaintiff has a severe medical condition, there is no indication that d e f e n d a n t s were aware that he needed a double mattress. Under prison policy, extra mattresses w e r e provided only for specific conditions, none of which plaintiff had. Nothing in the record i n d i c a t e s that plaintiff informed defendants of his back and leg pain until after his extra mattress w a s removed in August 2008. Although plaintiff alleges that his mattress was removed without c h e ck in g with his physician, that is not true. A physician discontinued the recommendation for p la in t if f 's extra mattress on August 8, 2008. Plaintiff has not established that this decision was m e d i c a lly inappropriate. Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff must s h o w that doctor acted with such blatant inappropriateness as to imply actions or omissions were n o t actually based on medical judgment); Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996) ( p r is o n e r 's dissatisfaction with doctor's prescribed course of treatment does not give rise to c o n s t it u t io n a l claim). Nor was it unreasonable for defendants to rely on that finding in removing p l a in t if f 's extra mattress. Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 586 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming s u m m a ry judgment for health care administrator who relied on plaintiff's medical record and d o ct o r's treatment decisions); Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1015 (7th Cir. 2006)

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( a f f irm in g directed verdict for health care administrator who responded appropriately to inmate's c o m p la in t s of worsening symptoms and relied reasonably on doctor's professional opinions). F i n a lly , after plaintiff complained, defendant Voeks acted reasonably and set up a medical e v a l u a t io n for plaintiff. Plaintiff never showed up for that appointment. N o reasonable jury could find from these undisputed facts that defendants' failure to do m o r e for plaintiff was reckless. Because there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could in f er that any of the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff's serious medical n e e d s , defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to consider d e fe n d a n ts ' remaining arguments with respect to Haines's and Webster's personal involvement o r qualified immunity. Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted.

ORD ER I T IS ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Bradley H o m p e , Tim Haines, Cheryl Webster and Jean Voeks, dkt. #18, is GRANTED. The clerk of the c o u r t is directed to enter judgment for defendants and close this case.

E n t e re d this 20th day of November, 2009. B Y THE COURT: /s / S T E P H E N L. CROCKER M a g is tra t e Judge

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