Brainstorm Interactive, Inc. v. School Specialty, Inc.

Filing 96

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 42 Motion to Strike errata sheets ; granting 68 Motion for Leave to File an opposition brief; granting 24 Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; denying 28 Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge William M. Conley on 12/5/14. (rep)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
BRAINSTORM INTERACTIVE, INC.,
Plaintiff,

OPINION AND ORDER

v.
14-cv-50-wmc
SCHOOL SPECIALTY, INC.,
Defendant.
In this civil action, plaintiff Brainstorm Interactive, Inc. asserts various claims
against defendant School Specialty, Inc., including federal claims for copyright and
trademark infringement, and state law claims for conversion and violations of Wisconsin
Statute § 101.18, Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act. School Specialty admits
infringing Brainstorm’s trademark by marketing and selling approximately $5,000 worth
of products with that trademark after the licensing agreement between the parties had
expired. In all other respects, defendant disputes plaintiff’s claims. Before the court are
the parties’ cross-motions for partial summary judgment. (Dkt. ##24, 28.) For the
reasons that follow, the court will grant defendant’s motion, entering judgment in favor
as to all of Brainstorm’s claims except for the trademark infringement claim.

PRELIMINARY MATTER
Upon receipt of the transcripts of two depositions taken in this case, plaintiff
submitted lengthy errata sheets signed by the deponents Michelle Robinette and David
Zasada. In response, defendant moved to strike these changes as going beyond the scope
of revisions permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e). (Dkt. #42.) Plaintiff

failed to respond timely to defendant’s motion to strike, but moves the court to accept its
late-filed response. (Dkt. #68.) Plaintiff’s counsel represents in the motion that his
opposition to the motion to strike was completed on the due date and that counsel
believed he had filed the brief on that date, only realizing his failure to do so after
defendant filed a reply brief noting the absence of any opposition. (Id.) Defendant then
opposed plaintiff’s motion to accept the late filing, but also submitted a revised reply if
the brief were accepted. (Def.’s Reply (dkt. #71.) The court will grant plaintiff’s motion
for leave to accept its late opposition brief, finding any prejudice ameliorated by
defendant’s amended reply, but will be unsympathetic to any further lapses on the part
of plaintiff’s counsel.
As for the substance of defendant’s motion to strike the errata sheets, Rule 30(e)
provides in pertinent part:
(e) Review by the Witness; Changes.
(1) Review; Statement of Changes. On request by the deponent
or a party before the deposition is completed, the deponent
must be allowed 30 days after being notified by the officer
that the transcript or recording is available in which:
(A) to review the transcript or recording; and
(B) if there are changes in form or substance, to sign a
statement listing the changes and the reasons for making
them.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e).
In Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh
Circuit considered the scope of Rule 30(e)(1)(B), especially in light of the Rule’s
allowance for changes in both “form or substance.” The court held that “a change of
2

substance which actually contradicts the transcript is impermissible unless it can
plausibly be represented as the correction of an error in transcription, such as dropping a
‘not.’” Id. at 389.1 In addition to the scope of the change allowed, Rule 30(e) also
requires that the deponent state the “reasons” for the change. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e); see
also Duff v. Lobdell-Emery Mfg., Co., 926 F. Supp. 799, 804 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (striking errata
sheet where deponent failed to provide “a reason for every change”).
With these nuances in the law, the court is not prepared to strike the errata sheets
as a whole, but will consider specific challenges where relevant in the discussion of the
facts below.

Even where the court denies defendant’s motion to strike, the original

deposition testimony remains part of the record, and defendant is free to cross-examine
Robinette or Zasada at trial about their failure, for example, to remember key details
during their respective depositions, to the extent revisions in their testimony may be
material to the remaining damages issue resulting from defendant’s admitted trademark
infringement.

1

In shaping this rule, the Thorn court relied on cases holding “that a subsequent affidavit may not
be used to contradict the witness’s deposition.” 207 F.3d at 389. Here, the circumstances are
arguably different, in that the errata sheets were signed before motions for summary judgment
were filed by the parties, meaning this is not quite as transparent and blatant of an attempt to
drudge up a genuine dispute of material fact as with a so-called “sham affidavit.”

3

UNDISPUTED FACTS2
A.

The Parties

Plaintiff Brainstorm Interactive, Inc. is an Illinois corporation with its principal
place of business in Cary, Illinois. David Zasada is its sole owner, having acquired the
company in September 2008.
Resources Inc. (“RRI”).

Brainstorm is the successor-in-interest to Robinette

Brainstorm is in the business of developing and distributing

educational products, all of which are sold under the name “KnowItAll,” which is the
subject of this lawsuit.
Defendant School Specialty, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in Greenville, Wisconsin. School Specialty is one of the leading providers of
education products to teachers and schools, which it markets and sells through both a
paper catalog and online store. School Specialty is the successor-in-interest to Sunburst
Visual Media (“SVM”). Brainstorm’s owner, Zasada, is a former employee of defendant
School Specialty.

B. Development of KnowItAll Products
The KnowItAll products were developed in part by Michelle Robinette, the sole
owner of Brainstorm’s predecessor company, RRI. The KnowItAll product line consists
of 147 products, identified as the “KnowItAll product list” and attached to the parties’
joint stipulation of facts.

(Joint Stip. (dkt. #21) ¶ 8; id., Ex. 5 (dkt. #21-1).) The

2

Unless otherwise noted, the court finds the following facts material and undisputed based on the
parties’ submissions on summary judgment.

4

products cover 41 titles, consisting of 17 literature titles and 24 curriculum titles. For
each title, there is an interactive DVD and certain print products, such as literature
guides, graphic organizers and “talk about/write about” cards, as well as card games, the
number and type of which vary by title.
The DVD products are interactive quiz games in a programmed format.
Development of the KnowItAll DVD products included formation of at least the
following components: (1) the quiz game questions themselves; (2) images; (3) voice over
sounds; (4) software coding and production of the interactive DVD master; and (5) the
product packaging. Development of the KnowItAll print products (the literature guides,
graphic organizers, talk about / write about cards, and card games) included creation of at
least the following components: (1) text in each product; (2) images; and (3) packaging.
Among other contributions to the KnowItAll DVD products, Robinette wrote the
quiz questions and answers. Robinette did not create the images or graphics used in the
DVDs; rather, they were either royalty-free or from Corbis, a stock photo agency. The
voice-over sounds were prepared by an individual named Steve Summers, though
Robinette provided the script and edited the content.

The software coding and

preparation of the interactive DVD master was done by ZOOtech. The packaging for the
DVDs was prepared by SVM, School Specialty’s predecessor. As for the print products,
Robert Williams with “dpi Graphic Design” designed at least some of the print products
at Robinette’s direction.3

In addition, a company called Screenlife LLC was also an

3

There seems to be no dispute that Robert Williams is the owner of dpi Graphic Design, so the
court need not consider defendant’s motion to strike ¶ 4 of Robinette’s errata sheet where she
purports to now “understand” that Robert Williams is the owner of dpi Graphic Design. If

5

author of the KnowItAll products, although the record does not reveal in what capacity.
The collaborative nature of the development of these products is perhaps best
demonstrated by the fact that the first time Robinette saw some of the KnowItAll
products was at her deposition on July 22, 2014.4

C. Work-For-Hire Agreements
During her deposition, Robinette testified that she had written agreements with
the individuals and entities who contributed to the development of the KnowItAll
product line, including those described above, which transferred any rights or interests
that they had in their work to Robinette and RRI. (Deposition of Michelle Robinette
(“Robinette Depo.”) (dkt. #23) 54-55, 59, 66-67, 136-38.) While these agreements no
longer exist (id.),5 Robinette secured “Confirmation of Work for Hire” agreements in
September 2014 -- after summary judgment motions were filed by the parties -- from
Williams (on behalf himself and dpi Graphics), Screenlife LLC (signed by Charles
material, however, the court would strike this “correction” because Robinette’s explanation for the
change is too vague to satisfy the requirement that the deponent provide a reason for the change.
See Duff, 926 F. Supp. at 804. Indeed, it appears wholly based on hearsay.
4

In paragraph 8 of her errata sheet, Robinette organizes her deposition testimony in such a way
as to emphasize her central role in the development of the KnowItAll product line. (Robinette
Errata Sheet (dkt. #37) ¶ 8.) To the extent that the errata sheet contains new testimony, it
simply expands on that provided at her deposition, and does not contradict her deposition
testimony. Accordingly, the court will not strike ¶ 8 of her errata sheet, so far as it goes. In any
event, the errata testimony is largely immaterial in light of the court’s grant of summary judgment
to defendant on plaintiff’s copyright claim.
5

At the time Brainstorm Georgia was transferred from Robinette and RRI to Zasada, the only
physical items Robinette provided Zasada were versions of certain KnowItAll DVD products and
certain files. In particular, no copies of agreements with any third parties were provided from RRI
to Brainstorm.

6

Harper, V.P. of Business Development), ZOOtech, Inc. (signed by Clynton Hunt, V.P. of
Business Development), and Summers. (Supplement Affidavit of David Zasada (“Zasada
Suppl. Aff.”), Exs. 57-60 (dkt. ##45-3 to 45-6).) In these agreements, the other authors
attest that they each remember signing “Work for Hire” contracts in 2005 or 2006,
around the time their work was completed, which assigned all interests and rights to RRI
in consideration for the work completed.

(Id.)

The court will address defendant’s

challenge to these late-created agreements in the opinion below.

D. Licensing Contracts between Brainstorm and School Specialty
Through their respective predecessor companies, RRI and SVM, the parties here
entered into a series of contracts in which Brainstorm licensed the 147 KnowItAll
products to School Specialty for production and sale.

These licenses were initially

entered into in 2005, with certain amendments in 2006 and 2008. (Joint Stip. (dkt.
#21) ¶¶ 9, 13; id., Ex. 11, parts 1 and 2 (dkt. ##21-2, 21-3).)6 While the contracts are
primarily written, the parties agree that some portions of the contracts may have been
modified verbally or by course of dealing.
The contracts provided that School Specialty would pay Brainstorm royalties
consisting of guaranteed minimums paid annually plus additional payments for sales
above a certain threshold. The minimum annual royalties were $5000 for each of the

6

From 2005 to 2008, “Sunburst Visual Media” was a tradename of Global Video, LLC, which
was a subsidiary of School Specialty, Inc. In 2008, School Specialty sold most of the assets of
Global Video, LLC, and School Specialty assumed direct ownership of the KnowItAll license
agreements.

7

products with a literature title and $6000 for each of the products with a curriculum title.
Combined, the total annual minimum royalty payment from School Specialty to
Brainstorm across the 147 products was $229,000 per year.
On June 11, 2013, all contracts between the parties terminated, and School
Specialty no longer had a license to use Brainstorm’s trademarks or copyrights (assuming
such existed).7

E. Trademark Registration
In July 2006, RRI applied for a federal trademark registration of the following
logo:

(8/15/14 Declaration of Jennifer L. Gregor (“8/15/14 Gregor Decl.”), Ex. 5 (dkt. #25-5).)
The U.S. Trademark Office issued Registration No. 3,286,333 for the KNOWITALL
logo on August 28, 2007. (7/3/14 Declaration of Jennifer L. Gregor (“7/3/14 Gregor
Decl.”), Ex. H (dkt. #17-8).)

7

The actual unwinding was not quite as clean as this sentence might suggest, although the legal
effect as of June 11, 2013, is. In January 2013, School Specialty filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
School Specialty’s debts were reorganized, and the company emerged from the Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding effective June 11, 2013. During the course of the Chapter 11
proceedings, a number of School Specialty’s contracts were rejected, including the licensing
contracts with Brainstorm concerning the KnowItAll products. (8/15/14 Gregor Decl., Ex. 17
(dkt. #45-17).) All claims for payment owed to Brainstorm for amounts accrued prior to the June
11, 2013, were settled and released by way of a stipulation entered into in May 2014 and filed
with the bankruptcy court. (Id., Ex. 18 (dkt. #25-14).)

8

As required by the parties’ licensing agreements, School Specialty used the
KNOWITALL logo (Registration Number 3,286,333) and the term KNOWITALL
(collectively the “KNOWITALL Marks”) in advertising and selling Brainstorm products
from 2008 through June 11, 2013. School Specialty also used the KNOWITALL Marks
after June 11, 2013, including sales through at least December 16, 2013, and
advertisement through at least early January 2014.
In addition to the KNOWITALL Marks, School Specialty also displayed the
following “School Specialty Exclusive” image with some of the KnowItAll products it sold
after June 11, 2013:

(Pl.’s PFOFs (dkt. #32) ¶ 39.) School Specialty does not dispute that the use of this
image in the sale of KnowItAll products after June 11, 2013, was untrue, deceptive and
misleading because School Specialty was not a licensee -- and certainly not an exclusive
licensee -- at that time.

F. Lack of Copyright Registrations
Neither Robinette, RRI, nor Brainstorm Interactive, Inc. ever applied for or
obtained copyright registrations relating to any of the KnowItAll products. Material to
plaintiff’s claim that it has been estopped from obtaining copyright registrations by

9

defendant’s actions, it is undisputed that Brainstorm does not have a single copy of some
of the products in the KnowItAll series.
Despite the lack of copyright registration, the licensing agreements provided that
the products should bear a copyright notice. (See, e.g., Joint Stip., Ex. 11 (dkt. #21-2) ¶
23 at p.133.) When advertising, displaying for sale, and selling Brainstorm products
after June 11, 2013, at least some of the time, School Specialty included a copyright
notice naming the owner as Brainstorm (or its predecessor-in-interest, RRI).

G. Zasada’s Purchase of Brainstorm Interactive, Inc.
In 2008, while Zasada was employed at the defendant School Specialty, Robinette
approached Zasada about buying the KnowItAll product line from her. To prepare to sell
the KnowItAll product line, Robinette formed Brainstorm Interactive, Inc., a Georgia
corporation (“Brainstorm Georgia”), which was incorporated on June 5, 2008. (8/15/14
Gregor Decl., Ex. 6 (dkt. #25-6).) On September 2, 2008, Zasada and Robinette entered
into a Stock Sale Agreement, selling the stock of Brainstorm Georgia to Zasada. (Id., Ex.
1 (dkt. #25-1).) The Stock Sale Agreement lists the assets of Brainstorm Georgia in
Paragraph 3, but does not identify any copyrights. (Id.) On September 4, 2008, Zasada
(on behalf of Brainstorm Georgia) and Michelle Robinette (on behalf of herself or RRI)
executed a written agreement assigning the KNOWITALL trademark to Brainstorm
Georgia. (Id., Ex. 7 (dkt. #25-7).) On October 14, 2008, Robinette (on behalf of RRI)
and Zasada (on behalf of Brainstorm Georgia) executed another written agreement,
transferring certain “ownership rights” in certain KnowItAll products from RRI to
10

Brainstorm Georgia. (Id., Ex. 8 (dkt. #25-8).) The latter agreement also provided that
RRI retained certain rights to the KnowItAll literature titles, including half of all royalties
paid to Brainstorm on those products and a right of first refusal concerning future
product development of those titles. (Id.) None of the 2008 agreements purported to
transfer copyrights to Brainstorm Georgia.
On March 16, 2009, Robinette (on behalf of RRI) and Zasada (on behalf of
Brainstorm Georgia) executed a written amendment to the October 14, 2008, agreement,
adjusting the payment schedule for the transfer of “ownership rights.” (Id., Ex. 9 (dkt.
#25-9).) On March 27, 2009, Zasada formed plaintiff Brainstorm Interactive, Inc., an
Illinois corporation (which will continue to be referred to as “Brainstorm” as it has
throughout this opinion, or “Brainstorm Illinois” where the distinction from Brainstorm
Georgia is important). At the time Zasada formed Brainstorm Illinois, no documents
were executed to transfer assets of Brainstorm Georgia to Brainstorm Illinois, although
Brainstorm Georgia was formally dissolved on May 13, 2009. (Id., Ex. 6 (dkt. #25-6).)
On January 28, 2014, the Hanson Law Firm recorded the September 4, 2008,
trademark assignment in the United States Trademark Office, and listed the current
owner and assignee of the KnowItAll Logo as Brainstorm Illinois, even though the
September 4, 2008, assignment was to Brainstorm Georgia. (Id., Ex. 11 (dkt. #25-11).)
Plaintiff, somewhat incredulously, continues to contend that the September 4, 2008,
“assignment was to Brainstorm Illinois,” in the face of undisputed evidence that
Brainstorm Illinois was not even formed until March 2009, some six months after the

11

assignment executed by Robinette (for RRI) and Zasada (for Brainstorm Interactive,
Inc.). (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s PFOFs (dkt. #44) ¶ 61.)

H. Agreements Executed after the Filing of this Action
This case was filed in January 2014. In May 2014, apparently attempting to
clarify the transfer of rights, Robinette and Zasada actually managed to further
complicate the paper trail (if that were possible) by executing a “Bill of Sale,” which
purports to confirm an “assignment” of rights that occurred by March 16, 2008.
(8/15/14 Gregor Decl., Ex. 12 (dkt. #25-12).) As described above, this, too, makes little
sense, since Robinette did not even approach Zasada about purchasing the KnowItAll
product line until June 2008, making any assignment of rights impossible by “March 16,
2008.”
Likely recognizing the error in the date of this May 2014 agreement, Robinette
and Zasada executed a second “Bill of Sale” on August 28, 2014, after summary judgment
motions were filed in this case. This agreement signed by Zasada, for himself and as
President of both Brainstorm Georgia and Brainstorm Illinois, and Robinette, for herself
and as President of RRI, purports to assign and transfer certain rights and interests to
Brainstorm Georgia, as of March 16, 2009, and then transfer those same rights and
interests from Brainstorm Georgia to Brainstorm Illinois on March 31, 2009. (Zasada
Suppl. Aff., Ex. 56 (dkt. #45-2).)8

8

The court will obviously address the import of this late-created Bill of Sale in the opinion below.

12

I.

School Specialty’s Activities After June 11, 2013

Following the June 11, 2013, termination of its license agreements with
Brainstorm, School Specialty continued to market and sell its educational products
through a print catalog and online, including KnowItAll products.

In particular,

KnowItAll products were included in the 2013 School Specialty Education Essentials
“Big Book” catalog, which was printed and distributed in late 2012. KnowItAll products
did not appear in any other print catalog.
School Specialty uses Oracle E-Business Suite software to control both how and if
individual products are presented for sale to customers.

Typically, School Specialty

discontinues a product by phasing-out the product through various status changes in the
Oracle system. At a certain point in this process, the discontinued product will no longer
be available for sale to customers and will be removed from School Specialty’s website.
In early July 2013, after receiving an invoice from Zasada seeking payment for the
second quarter of 2013, Curtis Rohr, the Assistant Corporate Controller of School
Specialty at that time, followed up with the merchandising team with responsibility for
the KnowItAll products to see if they were properly discontinued and no longer for sale
on the company’s website. In response, the merchandising team performed a review to
verify that the products were in a status that made them no longer available for sale.
Despite this action, Rohr learned in late August 2013, that the KnowItAll
products were still on School Specialty’s website. On August 28, 2013, Rohr contacted
the merchandising team again concerning the status of the KnowItAll products and asked
to have them removed. Rohr represents that the merchandising team then placed all of
13

the KnowItAll products on a “hold” status in Oracle, effective September 9, 2013, which
should have made them no longer available for sale and removed them from the website.
Despite this alleged change in status, sales of these products were made on October 17,
October 21, and October 25, 2013. (Def.’s PFOFs (dkt. #29) ¶ 85; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s
PFOFs (dkt. #44) ¶ 85.)
In early December of 2013, School Specialty’s Oracle data management team
performed a back-end sweep audit which caused some of the KnowItAll products to
switch from an “unsaleable” status to a “saleable” one. On December 19, 2013, Zasada
wrote to Rohr complaining that School Specialty continues to “market/promote”
KnowItAll products. In response, Rohr again investigated the status of the KnowItAll
items, and represents that School Specialty took steps to “remove” the KnowItAll
products from the website, including changing the Oracle status of the KnowItAll
products and removing them from the internal price lists.

As a result, all of the

KnowItAll products were taken off the School Specialty website by about January 10,
2014.
Based on sales figures from the Oracle system, after June 11, 2013, School
Specialty transacted $5,021.81 in sales of KnowItAll products for a gross profit of
$3,608.44.9 As part of those sales, Zasada himself purchased $333.35 worth of product
in December 2013, which yielded a gross profit of $230.96.

9

Plaintiff claims that School Specialty underreported its sales, relying on a discrepancy between
the royalties report and other sales data. (Pls.’ Suppl. PFOFs (dkt. #46) ¶ 62.) As defendant,
explains, however, the discrepancy appears due to the Oracle reporting system; more importantly,
School Specialty did not withhold any royalty payments based on the lower sales reported in the
2013 fourth quarter royalty statement. (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Suppl. PFOFs (dkt. #53) ¶ 62.)

14

J. KnowItAll Masters
One of Brainstorm’s claims in this case is captioned “Copies and Masters:
Conversion and Injunctive Relief,” which asserts that School Specialty holds the masters
for making copies of the KnowItAll products. Brainstorm contends that the masters are
the physical equipment necessary to make the KnowItAll products.

For the DVD

products, the masters consist of Digital Linear Tapes (“DLTs”) and digital files in Quark
Express file format on CDs for the DVD case packaging, user’s manuals, label art, and
teacher’s guides. For the print products, the masters consist of digital files in Quark
Express file format on CDs.

Between about June 19, 2006, and March 24, 2008,

Brainstorm apparently sent School Specialty masters of the KnowItAll products.
Packaging slips shipped with the physical masters read in part:
DAT tapes and digital files and all intellectual property
remain the property of Robinette Resources [predecessor in
interest of Brainstorm] and SVM [Sunburst Visual Media,
predecessor in interest to School Specialty] must return all
DAT tapes and files upon termination of the license
otherwise SVM will be responsible for all related replacement
costs.
(Declaration of Kyle Hanson (“Hanson Decl.”), Ex. 21 (dkt. #35-4).) In a June 16,
2006, email to Robinette, Michelle Yannes, an employee of SVM, stated “I have
informed our purchasing team of the need to track the status of the masters and we
understand that these are to be returned to you or their replacement will be at our
expense.” (Id., Ex. 22 (dkt. #35-5).) Based on this, Brainstorm contends that it owns

15

these masters, despite never having been in physical possession of them.10

At some

unknown date -- presumably after June 11, 2013 -- Brainstorm demanded return of the
masters.
School Specialty obtained the KnowItAll products it sold from third-party
suppliers. It neither produced those products for itself nor obtained them from RRI or
Brainstorm. School Specialty’s suppliers for the KnowItAll DVD products was Allied
Vaugn, and its supplier for the print products was QP. The last time School Specialty
ordered KnowItAll DVD products from Allied Vaughn was November 25, 2008; the last
time it ordered print products from QP was January 18, 2009.

School Specialty

contacted both companies and asked for any masters, receiving none from Allied Vaughn,
but QP returned a disc of files to School Specialty. School Specialty also searched its
own offices and located a box of DLT tapes and discs bearing labels for many of the
KnowItAll product titles.

Curiously, Brainstorm has so far refused to inspect these

returned materials to confirm that they constitute at least some of the physical masters.
Other than those returned materials, School Specialty believes it does not have any
masters for the KnowItAll products.
Plaintiff maintains that without the physical masters, Brainstorm cannot make
copies of the products or contract with another distributor to secure royalties. Defendant
challenges Zasada’s belief that the only way to secure source code is from the physical

10

Defendant also disputes the proposed fact that Brainstorm Illinois owns the masters
based on the lack of any agreement transferring assets from Brainstorm Georgia to
Brainstorm Illinois. (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s PFOFs (dkt. #39) ¶ 19.) In reply, plaintiff
relies on the August 28, 2014, Bill of Sale. (Pl.’s Reply to Pl.’s PFOFs (dkt. #57) ¶ 19.)
16

masters, pointing out Zasada’s lack of experience working with DLT technology. (Def.’s
Resp. to Pl.’s Suppl. PFOFs (dkt. #53) ¶ 58.)

K. Zasada’s Business Plan
Relevant to plaintiff’s conversion claim and claim for damages, Zasada’s business
plan for Brainstorm is to “develop new products for the school market in different
formats.” (Deposition of David Zasada (“Zasada Depo.”) (dkt. #23) 112.) The only
product Brainstorm has “in development,” however, is a software application, and Zasada
conceded during his deposition that “no work has been done” on the software
application, including that no one has started to write software. (Id. at 115.) Zasada also
testified that he had no customers lined up for Brainstorm’s software application product.
Still, plaintiff maintains that there is “substantial, unmet demand” for the
KnowItAll products. (Pl.’s Suppl. PFOFs (dkt. #46) ¶ 57.) In support, plaintiff cites to a
supplemental affidavit of Zasada, in which he bases this conclusion on “(a) my
knowledge and years of experience in the area of production and distribution of
education products, including but certainly without limitation the KNOWITALL
Products; (b) the emails from potential customers . . . ; [and] (c) my negotiations with
production and distribution companies seeking quotes for the reproduction of the
KNOWITALL Products and seeking potential new licensing partners.” (Zasada Suppl.
Aff. (dkt. #45) ¶ 6.)
During his July 21, 2014, deposition, Zasada testified to receiving over 100 emails
from customers inquiring about the KnowItAll products, some as recently as a month
17

before his deposition.

(Zasada Depo. (dkt. #22) 116-17.)11

Defendant’s attorney

requested the emails during the deposition (id. at 118), and sent a follow-up letter and emails requesting the same (8/15/14 Gregor Decl., Exs. 13, 14 (dkt. ##25-13, 25-14)).
Moreover, these emails were also the subject of requests for production served in April
2014, well before Zasada’s deposition.

(10/3/14 Declaration of Jennifer L. Gregor

(“10/3/14 Gregor Decl.”), Ex. B (dkt. #51-2) RFPs ¶¶ 42-43.)

Instead of timely

responding to defendant’s request, plaintiff submitted approximately nine “[e]mails
showing demand for products” in a supplemental affidavit in opposition to defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. (Zasada Suppl. Aff., Ex. 55 (dkt. #45-1).) The court
will disregard these emails due to plaintiff’s failure to produce them timely. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 37(d)(3).
Even without the emails purportedly showing customer demand, Zasada may rely
generally on his own experience in this industry and specifically with respect to his
negotiations with third parties about potential licenses of the KnowItAll product line to
demonstrate its continued value.
11

In an errata sheet, Zasada states that he has received 100 email and verbal requests, explaining
that he thought the question asked concerned all requests (both email and verbal). (Zasada
Errata Sheet (dkt. #36) ¶ 2.) If one were to view in isolation the question posed during his
deposition, “How many requests for the KnowitAll product line have he received in the past
year?,” Zasada’s explanation in his errata sheet would make sense. (Zasada Depo. (dkt. #22)
116.) However, in response to Zasada’s answer “Probably just over 100,” Attorney Gregor asked,
“100 different e-mails asked for products in the KnowitAll products line?,” to which Zasada
replied, “Yes,” without clarifying that the 100 requests purportedly covered both email and verbal
requests. (Id. at 116-17.) To make matters worse, counsel then engaged in a lengthy discussion
about these 100 e-mails, including whether the failure to preserve them constituted spoliation of
evidence, without any acknowledgement from Zasada that “most requests were verbal” (as he now
maintains in his errata sheet). (Id. at 117-18; Zasada Errata Sheet (dkt. #36) ¶ 2.) In light of all
of this, the court finds Zasada’s errata sheet explanation conflicts with his actual deposition
testimony and will strike ¶ 2 for purposes of summary judgment.

18

OPINION
Based on defendant’s alleged actions after the licensing agreement was terminated
on June 11, 2013, plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: (1) copyright
infringement; (2) conversion; (3) trademark counterfeiting; (4) Wis. Stat. § 100.18; and
(5) trademark infringement. The court will consider the parties’ respective arguments as
to each claim in turn.

I. Copyright Claim
Plaintiff contends that defendant infringed its copyrights by reproducing,
distributing and publically displaying KnowItAll products after the termination of the
licensing agreements. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3), (5). To establish such a claim, plaintiff
must prove “(1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) unauthorized copying of
constituent elements of the work that are original.” Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 620, 632
(7th Cir. 2012). Moreover, as a threshold requirement, 17 U.S.C. § 411 also provides
that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be
instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in
accordance with this title.”
Defendant asserts two challenges to plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim: (a)
the claim fails because Brainstorm does not have a federal copyright registration; and (b)
Brainstorm lacks standing to sue on or register such copyrights because plaintiff, as a
non-author, cannot demonstrate transfer of copyright ownership through a written

19

document. Both of these challenges are independently dispositive of plaintiff’s copyright
claim.

A. Written Transfer of Copyright Ownership
A copyright “vests initially in the author or the authors of the work.” 17 U.S.C. §
201. Here, the authors of the KnowItAll products were Robinette and RRI and the other
third-party contributors. Plaintiff Brainstorm Interactive, Inc., an Illinois corporation,
must, therefore, demonstrate the transfer of title from the original authors to itself.
Foamation, Inc. v. Wedeward Enters., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 676, 683 (E.D. Wis. 1997)
(“[W]hen a plaintiff . . . is not the author of the copyrighted work, the plaintiff must
prove a proprietary right through a change of title in order to have standing to sue.”).
Moreover, and particularly problematic for Brainstorm, any transfer of a copyright “is not
valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in
writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized
agent.” 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (emphasis added); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (requiring parties
to “expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that a work shall be
considered a work made for hire”).
As described in the facts section above, plaintiff must demonstrate the following,
written chain of title:
1) Other authors of KnowItAll products to Michelle Robinette/RRI;
2) Michelle Robinette/RRI to Brainstorm Georgia (Robinette owned);
3) Brainstorm Georgia (Robinette owned) to Brainstorm Georgia (Zasada owned);
and
20

4) Brainstorm Georgia to Brainstorm Illinois.
Defendant argues that plaintiff lacks standing because it cannot prove that
Michelle Robinette obtained the necessary transfer of copyright from the other authors
(the 1st transfer), and even assuming Brainstorm Georgia owned the copyrights (in other
words, all of the transfers occurred as 1 through 3 listed above), there is no written
document demonstrating the transfer of copyrights from Brainstorm Georgia to
Brainstorm Illinois (the 4th transfer).
As for the first challenge, plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the four other authors of the KnowItAll
product line transferred their ownership interests in written, work-for-hire agreements at
the time the work was completed in 2005 and 2006.

Defendant raises two core

challenges to the late-created agreements between Robinette on behalf of RRI and the
four other authors involved in the creation of the KnowItAll products. First, defendant
contends that the court should strike the September 2014 work-for-hire agreements
because they were not produced timely in response to requests for production. (Def.’s
Reply to Def.’s PFOFs (dkt. #52) ¶ 31 (citing 7/3/14 Gregor Decl., Ex. D (dkt. #17-4);
Schell-Baggs v. Bank of Am., No. 07-cv-671-bbc (W.D. Wis. May 13, 2008) (dkt. #38)
(“[T]he court does not require parties to disclose information they do not have; on the
other hand, it will not allow a requesting party to be sandbagged during summary
judgment or other pretrial procedures by an opposing party’s use of information that
previously was requested but not disclosed.”)).) While the court agrees with defendant
that plaintiff’s tactic of creating material documents after summary judgment motions
21

were filed constitutes a kind of sandbagging, the agreements did not exist until right
before plaintiff’s opposition to defendant’s motion was filed, and their production is
similar to obtaining affidavits in response to a motion for summary judgment, which no
one would view as sandbagging, unless there were evidence that the moving party was
misled as to the affiant’s existence, knowledge or the averred facts. Since defendant
offers no evidence of that kind, these documents were timely produced. Finding no other
basis to strike these documents, the court declines to do so.
Second, defendant contends that even if these nunc pro tunc documents were
admissible, plaintiff must put forth evidence demonstrating that the purported copyright
transfers actually occurred in connection with the KnowItAll products, and plaintiff has
failed to do just that. (Pl.’s Reply to Pl.’s PFOFs (dkt. #52) ¶ 31 (citing Barefoot Architect,
Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 830 (3d Cir. 2011) (“For a writing to ‘validate a past
transfer, the past transfer must have actually occurred.”)).) While the court agrees with
defendant on the law, plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
jury could find the first necessary transfer in the list above. Each of the third-party
authors or contributors to the KnowItAll products avers that he signed a work-for-hire
agreement transferring rights at the time the work was completed. Moreover, Robinette
also testified at her deposition that she had obtained work-for-hire or copyright transfer
agreements from each of these third parties during the development of the KnowItAll
products.12 As such, the court finds that plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material

12

The court acknowledges that Robinette’s testimony is weak, especially in light of her testimony
that the terms of the agreements she signed with each of the authors were consistent with the
terms in Exhibit 9 to Zasada’s deposition (the October 14, 2008 agreement between RRI and

22

fact as to whether Robinette secured written transfer agreements at the time the four
other authors created the KnowItAll product line.
Unfortunately for plaintiff, proof of the fourth transfer from Brainstorm Georgia
to Brainstorm Illinois, is still lacking.

It is undisputed that there were no written

documents transferring assets from Brainstorm Georgia to Brainstorm Illinois at the time
Brainstorm Illinois was created. Recognizing this defect, plaintiff attempted to cure it in
a document executed approximately eight months after this case was filed. The law is
clear, however, that standing is evaluated at the time suit is filed. See, e.g., Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000) (“[W]e have an
obligation to assure ourselves that [Friends of the Earth] had Article III standing at the
outset of the litigation.”); Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 577 F.3d 736, 743 n.2 (7th Cir.
2009) (“[A] plaintiff must establish standing at the time suit is filed and cannot
manufacture standing afterwards.”); Perry v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 186 F.3d 826, 830
(7th Cir. 1999) (“The requirements of standing must be satisfied from the outset.”).
Indeed, courts routinely dismiss claims for lack of standing where the plaintiff
attempts to cure the defect after filing of suit. For example, in Pollack, the court held that
the plaintiff could not establish standing to bring an environmental challenge to the
government’s practice of discharging bullets into a lake by visiting the park where the
lake was situated after filing the suit. 577 F.3d at 742-42 & 743 n.2. Similarly, in Perry,

Brainstorm Interactive), which does not contain any express work-for-hire provision. Still, she
testified that each of the four contributors to the KnowItAll products signed agreements
transferring their respective copyright interests to Robinette/RRI at the time the work was
completed, testimony now corroborated by the contributors.

23

the Seventh Circuit rejected plaintiff’s “attempt to satisfy the requirements of standing as
the case progressed,” by purchasing a vehicle after filing his complaint so as to challenge a
law authorizing the seizure and disposal of abandoned vehicles. 186 F.3d at 830. So,
too, here. At the time the lawsuit was filed, whatever oral understanding existed, there
were no written documents transferring any copyright interest (or any other interest for
that matter) from Brainstorm Georgia to Brainstorm Illinois.13
Normally the court would not reach other arguments if a party lacked standing to
bring a claim, but here, there is at least some question as to whether School Specialty as a
non-transferee may raise a challenge under 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). See Billy-Bob Teeth, Inc. v.
Novelty, Inc., 329 F.3d 586, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[W]here there is no dispute
between the copyright owner and the transferee about the status of the copyright, ‘it
would be unusual and unwarranted to permit a third-party infringer to invoke section
204(a) to avoid suit for copyright infringement.’” (quoting Imperial Residential Design, Inc.
v. Palms Dev. Grp., Inc., 70 F.3d 96, 99 (11th Cir. 1995)). As such, the court will also
consider defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim fails for lack
of registration.

B. Copyright Registration Requirement
While courts previously construed the pre-suit registration requirement under 17
U.S.C. § 411 as a jurisdictional one, the United States Supreme Court in Reed Elsevier,
13

This is distinct from the work-for-hire agreements, where Robinette and the other authors all
aver that they executed agreements at the time the work was completed, even though these
agreements no longer exist.

24

Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010), held that registration was a claims processing rule,
not a jurisdictional bar to suit. Id. at 166. Except in instances where a defendant may be
willing to waive any challenge under § 411, the practical impact of this distinction seems
limited.

See 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §

7.16[B][2][c] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.) (“After all, whether denominated a
requirement for subject-matter jurisdiction or a rule required to process the claim,
plaintiff must comply or face dismissal. The major difference, presumably, is that the
latter requirement falls away if not challenged, whereas the former can never be
waived[.]”).

Still, plaintiff contends, relying on cases from other contexts, that a

nonjurisdictional bar to suit -- like the registration requirement -- is susceptible to certain
doctrines, like waiver and equitable estoppel. (Pl.’s Reply (dkt. #55) 4 (citing Lewis v.
Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[N]on-jurisdictional prerequisites to
suit in federal court are typically subject to equitable estoppel.”)).)
The application of waiver makes sense. There might be instances where defendant
wants to reach the merits rather than dismiss without prejudice to only refile after
registration is obtained. Indeed, that was the situation in Reed Elsevier itself, where the
Court considered a class action settlement and found that the lack of registration -- an
issue raised by class objectors -- was not a jurisdictional bar. Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at
166. Similarly, there may be even instances where the defendant simply fails to raise this
defense timely. See Paycom Payroll, LLC v. Richison, 758 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir.
2014) (relying on holding in Reed Elsevier to find defendant waived any challenge to lack
of copyright registration).
25

Equitable estoppel, however, proves a harder fit. When would an author or owner
of copyrightable work not be able to register (or even preregister) the copyright before
filing suit?

Still, plaintiff contends that it has support for this theory:

“Albeit in a

different context, the Supreme Court also recently confirmed that equitable estoppel
applies over and above the text of the Copyright Act. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1977 (2014).” (Pl.’s Opening Br. (dkt. #33) 7.) A party’s general
citation to a brand new Supreme Court case in support of its theory without any detail or
even providing a parenthetical raises red flags and, indeed, Petrella does not support
plaintiff’s theory. Instead, the case stands for the well-established use of the doctrine to
estop a claim “when a copyright owner engages in intentionally misleading
representations concerning his abstention from suit, and the alleged infringer
detrimentally relies on the copyright owner's deception.” Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1977.14
Even if equitable estoppel could apply in this context -- as an excuse for plaintiff’s
failure to register its copyright as required before bringing an infringement suit -- the facts
do not support its application here. Plaintiff contends that it (or rather RRI) could not
have obtained copyright registrations earlier, because “[i]t was [School Specialty’s] job []
to make copies and publish the works, leaving Brainstorm without any copies of its own,
save any copies that [School Specialty] provided to Brainstorm.” (Pl.’s Reply (dkt. #55)
6.)

14

As far as this court could identify, the only court willing to consider whether equitable estoppel
applies to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to register a copyright before filing suit, also refused to apply
it. See Jones v. West Plains Bank & Trust Co., No. 1:12CV00052–SWW, 2014 WL 4232391, at *2
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 27, 2014) (rejecting plaintiff’s request that the court apply estoppel to waive the
registration requirement).

26

To

establish

misrepresentation

by

equitable
the

estoppel,

opposing

a

party;

party
(2)

must

demonstrate:

reasonable

reliance

“(1)
on

a

that

misrepresentation; and (3) detriment.” Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir.
2002) (citing LaBonte v. United States, 233 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 2000)).

In

contrast, plaintiff’s estoppel theory rests not on a misrepresentation by defendant, but
rather on defendant’s alleged failure to return the physical masters. Perhaps recognizing
this, the parties both point to Wisconsin law where the first element is “action or
nonaction on the part of one against whom the estoppel is asserted.” (Def.’s Reply (dkt.
#54) 6 (citing In re Estate of Alexander, 75 Wis. 2d 168, 183-84, 248 N.W.2d 475, 483
(1977)).) While the court sees no basis to apply Wisconsin’s equitable estoppel doctrine
to a federal claim, given the parties’ agreement in this case, the court is willing to extend
the federal doctrine beyond misrepresentations to other inequitable actions or inactions
by the defendant.
But this does not save plaintiff’s claim. First, contrary to plaintiff’s argument that
the merits of its equitable estoppel defense should be tried to a jury, the application of
this doctrine is an issue for the court. See Jennings Water, Inc. v. City of N. Vernon, Ind.,
895 F.2d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Whether facts proven are sufficient to constitute an
estoppel is a question of law properly before this court for review.”). Second, and more
importantly, plaintiff has failed to offer evidence permitting any reasonable trier of fact
to find that: (a) defendant’s alleged refusal to return the physical masters bars (at least
entirely) its ability to register the KnowItAll products for copyright protection; and (b) its
reliance on a contractual term to give away its only copies of a purported valuable master
27

to a licensee was reasonable. On the first point, plaintiff (or its predecessor) could have
either produced the materials itself to obtain copies for copyright registration purposes or
it could have actively sought copies of the products produced by School Specialty to
secure registration. The fact that School Specialty produced the KnowItAll product line
or that one of the licensing agreements provided that School Specialty would provide
RRI up to 50 copies for promotional purposes does not excuse plaintiff (or its predecessor
company) from actively seeking and registering copies of those products.
Even if both of those efforts had failed, the undisputed record demonstrates that
Brainstorm has at least one copy of some of the products, and it could have registered
those products, or preregistered those products even if the copyright office had demanded
a second copy. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(i)(F) and (j) (requiring only one copy of
multimedia kits and two-dimensional games).

Brainstorm’s utter failure to take any

action to register the copyrights shows a complete lack of diligence on its part until after
it brought suit, upending its reliance on defendant’s alleged failure to return the physical
masters to excuse its lack of registration. See Shropshear v. Corp. Counsel of City of Chi.,
275 F.3d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 2001) (requiring plaintiff invoking equitable estoppel
doctrine to exercise due diligence in filing suit).
As for the second point, assuming plaintiff could somehow blame defendant for its
complete failure to register the copyrights, it is patently unreasonable for a company to
give its only copy of an alleged valuable physical masters to a licensee for safekeeping. At
the very least, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that its actions were reasonable. See
Prestwick Capital Mgmt., Ltd. v. Peregrine Fin. Grp., Inc., 727 F.3d 646, 665 (7th Cir. 2013)
28

(rejecting equitable estoppel claim where plaintiff’s claimed lack of knowledge was not
reasonable); Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283
F.3d 877, 885 (7th Cir. 2002) (“An unsuccessful gamble is not a form of reasonable
reliance.”).

Plaintiff had a range of reasonable options available to it:

(1) secure

copyright registrations before handing off its only copy of the physical master to
defendant; (2) make a second copy of the physical masters; or (3) specifically require
their return after the initial production run to register the copyrights at that time.
For all these reasons, the court will grant defendant summary judgment on
plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim.

II. Conversion Claim
Plaintiff also brings a claim of conversion based on defendant’s alleged failure to
return the physical masters. To demonstrate conversion under Wisconsin law, plaintiff
must prove: “(1) intentionally controlling/taking property belonging to another; (2)
controlling/taking property without the owner’s consent; and (3) those acts resulting in
serious interference with the rights of the owner to possess the property.”

Bruner v.

Heritage Cos., 225 Wis. 2d 728, 736, 593 N.W.2d 814, 818 (Ct. App. 1999).
As an initial matter, plaintiff concedes that: (1) its claim of conversion only
applies to tangible property (Pl.’s Opp’n (dkt. #43) 4); and (2) to the extent its claim
sought to bar defendant from unauthorized use of the masters, such a claim would be
preempted by the Copyright Act (id. (discussing Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489
(7th Cir. 2011))).

Defendant contends that plaintiff’s conversion claim is barred by
29

Wisconsin’s economic loss doctrine.

Under this doctrine, “contracting parties are

generally precluded from pursuing tort recovery for ‘purely economic’ or ‘commercial
losses’ associated with their contract relationship.” Hackel v. Nat’l Feeds, Inc., 986 F.
Supp. 2d 963, 973 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (quoting Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI
54, ¶¶ 33-35, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 662 N.W.2d 652). “Recognizing that the parties had a
chance to allocate the economic risks at the time of contracting, the ‘doctrine generally
requires transacting parties in Wisconsin to pursue only their contractual remedies when
asserting an economic loss claim.’” Hackel, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74 (quoting Tietsworth
v. Harley–Davidson, Inc., 2004 WI 32, ¶ 24, 270 Wis. 2d 146, 677 N.W.2d 233).
While this court has found Wisconsin courts’ broad application of the economic
loss doctrine troubling at times, see Hackel, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 981, the doctrine proves
an easy and fair fit where the parties expressly contracted for the return of the physical
assets. Indeed, absent this contractual provision, defendant would arguably have had no
duty to maintain the masters provided by plaintiff.

Still, plaintiff contends that the

economic loss doctrine does not bar plaintiff’s conversion claim because (1) the contract
was for services, not goods; and (2) plaintiff’s injury is not an economic loss. (Pl.’s Reply
(dkt. #55) 8.)
As to plaintiff’s first argument, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Insurance
Company of North America v. Cease Electric Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 52, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 688
N.W.2d 462, “the economic loss doctrine is inapplicable to claims for the negligent
provision of services,” but the contract at issue here is not one for the provision of
services.

Rather, the contract provides for School Specialty’s use of Brainstorm’s
30

intellectual property and trademark to manufacture, market and sell goods in return for
School Specialty’s payment of a royalty fee. While Brainstorm certainly benefits from
Brainstorm’s successful sale efforts in the form of a royalty, this contractual relationship
is not one for services like that contemplated in Insurance Company of North America.
Plaintiff’s second argument -- that the injury it suffered is not an economic loss -depends on its reading of H.A. Friend & Company v. Professional Stationery, Inc., 2006 WI
App 141, 294 Wis. 2d 754, 720 N.W.2d 96. In that case, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals declined to apply the economic loss doctrine to a conversion claim, but that
holding depends on a distinct set of facts, which that court draws itself. In H.A. Friend, a
former franchisee withdrew funds from bank accounts in violation of the parties’
franchise termination agreement. 2006 WI App 141, ¶¶ 4-6. In denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss a conversion claim as barred by the economic loss doctrine, the court
explained that defendant “did not simply fail to turn over the purchased assets to
[plaintiff], which is a risk [plaintiff] could have reasonably anticipated and addressed in
the contract, but depleted the accounts by spending funds that belonged to [plaintiff].”
2006 WI App 141, ¶ 16 (all caps removed). Here, the defendant allegedly refused to
turn over the physical masters, which is a risk the parties not only could have reasonably
contemplated, but did contemplate in their licensing agreements. Moreover, the court in
H.A. Friend also relied on the fact that the defendant there “had a duty, regardless of the
existence of the contract, not to retain or use money that belonged to [plaintiff] without
[plaintiff’s] consent or authorization.” Id. at ¶ 17. Here, plaintiff has identified no other

31

basis requiring defendant to preserve, much less return, the physical masters, except for
the contractual provision itself.
Defendant also seeks summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate a “serious interference” with its rights to possess the masters, because
plaintiff has no viable plans to use them in the future. On that point, the court disagrees.
Plaintiff has put forth sufficient, though hardly overwhelming, evidence -- through
Zasada’s deposition testimony and supplemental affidavit -- to infer that it could use the
masters to license with a different company to produce the KnowItAll DVD and print
product lines, or at least that the physical masters could play some role in creating a
software application.
What proves more troubling at this late stage of the litigation is plaintiff’s failure
to demonstrate which physical masters, if any, defendant still controls or possesses. In
other words, it is plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate this first element of a conversion
claim and its failure to review the returned DLT tapes and other materials and attempt to
catalog these materials against the list of KnowItAll products is inexcusable. The court,
however, need not determine whether summary judgment is warranted on plaintiff’s
failure to put forth evidence demonstrating that defendant still controls or possesses
certain physical masters in light of its finding that the conversion claim is barred by the
economic loss doctrine.15

15

Even if this were not the case, there is another troubling aspect to plaintiff’s claim: its apparent
failure to assert it at the time of the defendant’s reorganization in bankruptcy, where all creditors
could assert a right to this allegedly valuable asset. Indeed, any obligation to release this asset to
plaintiff would presumably be discharged, along with any royalty payments owed as of June 11,

32

Finally, in a footnote, Brainstorm indicates that if the court holds that the
economic loss doctrine bars its conversion claim, it “would seek leave to amend its
complaint to add whatever contract claim the Court determines would be permitted in
the circumstances.” (Pl.’s Reply (dkt. #55) 9 n.10.) The court is generally sympathetic
to such motions, but plaintiff could have -- and should have -- sought leave to amend its
complaint at the time defendant challenged its conversion claim as barred by the
economic loss doctrine.

By sitting on this request to amend while the motions for

summary judgment were pending, plaintiff failed to act diligently. See Airborne Beepers &
Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir.2007) (listing “undue
delay” as one basis for denying leave). Still, the court will at least entertain a motion for
leave to amend the complaint, provided plaintiff brings it promptly and addresses (1)
which of the physical masters defendant has failed to date to return; and (2) the potential
impact of the May 2014 bankruptcy settlement on this claim.

III. Trademark Counterfeiting Claim
Plaintiff asserts a trademark counterfeiting claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1116. 16
Unlike infringement claims, a counterfeiting claim is limited to those marks which have
been registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

15 U.S.C. §

116(d)(1)(B)(i). Somewhat half-heartedly, defendant raises a challenge to standing on
2013, or certainly by the date of the parties’ May 2014 stipulation entered into in the bankruptcy
court.
16

In its complaint, plaintiff also asserted a counterfeiting claim under Wisconsin law, Wis. Stat.
§132.001, but stated in its opposition brief that it has withdrawn this claim. (Pl.’s Opp’n (dkt.
#43) 11.)

33

the basis that Brainstorm Illinois was never assigned the registered KNOWITALL
trademark. (Def.’s Opening Br. (dkt. #30) 23.)
Like copyrights, assignments of registered trademarks must also be in writing. 15
U.S.C. § 1060(a)(3) (“Assignments [of a registered trademark] shall be by instruments in
writing duly executed.”). As described above, the undisputed record demonstrates that at
the time of Brainstorm Illinois’ formation (or at least by the time plaintiff filed suit), no
documents were executed to transfer assets of Brainstorm Georgia to Brainstorm Illinois.
Moreover, the January 2014 recording of the September 2008 assignment of the
KNOWITALL trademark cannot fix this standing issue, since it is undisputed that the
assignment of the trademark was to Brainstorm Georgia, not Brainstorm Illinois. While
plaintiff attempted to correct these defects in its second Bill of Sale on August 14, 2014,
that document was not executed until after this lawsuit was filed and cannot cure the
standing issue. See Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 180; Pollack, 577 F.3d at 743 n.2;
Perry, 186 F.3d at 830; Gaia Technologies, Inc. v. Reconversion Technologies, Inc., 93 F.3d 774,
780 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reversing entry of judgment for plaintiff in trademark claim where
plaintiff lacked standing because trademark was not assigned to plaintiff in a written
document prior to plaintiff filing suit). However, because this argument was not fully
developed by defendant, nor was it maintained in its reply brief in support of its motion
for summary judgment, the court will also consider the merits of the claim.17

17

At least Friends of the Earth would suggest that this is a jurisdictional hurdle, which would
prevent the court from proceeding to the merits, but at least one court has described this
requirement as a “statutory standing” requirement. See Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. SPI
Spirits Ltd., 726 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2013).

34

“Counterfeiting is the act of producing or selling a product with a sham trademark
that is an intentional and calculated reproduction of the genuine trademark.”

4 J.

Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition § 25:10 (4th Ed. 2014).
Because these cases typically involve efforts to imitate a well-known product to deceive
customers, “counterfeiting is ‘hard core’ or ‘first degree’ trademark infringement and is
the most blatant and egregious form of ‘passing off.’” Id. (quoting Jed S. Rakoff & Ira B.
Wolff, Commercial Counterfeiting and the Proposed Trademark Counterfeiting Act, 20
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 145 (1982)). In light of the especially egregious characteristic of a
counterfeiting claim, a successful plaintiff may seek treble actual damages, together with
attorney’s fees, or opt for statutory damages of “not less than $1,000 or more than
$200,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or
distributed, as the court considers just.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b), (c).
A Lanham Act counterfeit trademark claim does not cover
any mark or designation used on or in connection with goods
or services of which the manufacture[r] or producer was, at
the time of the manufacture or production in question
authorized to use the mark or designation for the types of
goods or services so manufactured or produced, by the holder
of the right to use such mark or designation.
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B). At the time defendant manufactured or produced the alleged
KnowItAll products or website content, School Specialty was an authorized licensee of
that mark. Indeed, the record demonstrates that (1) School Specialty last manufactured
or produced KnowItAll products in 2008 and 2009, and (2) School Specialty was
authorized to use the trademark as a licensee from 2008 through June 11, 2013.

35

Plaintiff attempts to manipulate the language of the Lanham Act to argue that
“[a]n infringing incident (manufacture or production) may be whenever a mark is used
‘in connection with goods’ -- and if (and only if) authorized at the time of that incident
would the infringer be excused from counterfeiting liability.” (Pl.’s Opp’n (dkt. #43) 9.)
This interpretation is nonsensical. By describing the manufacture or production of the
goods in question, the statute expressly demarcates those activities from any subsequent
marketing or sale.
As defendant persuasively argues, this case involves “overrun goods,” which do not
support a trademark counterfeit claim. “If a licensee manufactures overruns during the
course of a valid license, the marks on those goods will remain noncounterfeit for the
purposes of [the Lanham Act], whatever changes may later occur in the relationship
between the trademark owner and the licensee.” All Star Championship Racing, Inc. v.
O’Reilly Auto. Stores, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 850, 866 (C.D. Ill. 2013). While the court in
All Star used certain language suggesting that the counterfeiting exception does not apply
if the “incident or product alleged to be infringing occurred or was manufactured after the
alleged infringer no longer had authorization to use the mark,” the court held that the
content created with the marks after termination of the sponsorship agreement was
counterfeit, but that the website content created before the termination of the agreement
was not. Id. at 866-67, 871 (emphasis added). The latter constitute the undisputed facts
here.18

18

The other case cited by plaintiff similarly fails to provide the support claimed, since it, too,
involved use of a mark in the production or manufacture of a good after a license had been
revoked. See Idaho Potato Comm’n v. G&T Terminal Packaging, Inc., 425 F.3d 708, 711-12, 720-22

36

In reply, plaintiff also attempts to shift the focus of its counterfeiting claim to
School Specialty’s use of the “School Specialty Exclusive” image in conjunction with the
KnowItAll products. The “School Specialty Exclusive” image -- even assuming it is a
trademark – is decidedly not plaintiff’s mark, nor can plaintiff claim that it registered this
mark or has any ownership interest in it. While it is undisputed that the use of the
image in conjunction with the KnowItAll products after June 11, 2013, was untrue and
misleading, there is no claim that fits within the counterfeiting framework nor even
within the trademark framework.

IV. Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act Claim
Plaintiff also relies on defendant’s use of the “School Specialty Exclusive” image in
conjunction with its sale of KnowItAll products after June 11, 2013, to assert a claim
under Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade Practice Act, Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). To prove a
claim under this statutory provision, plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) the defendant made
a representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) the
representation was ‘untrue, deceptive or misleading,’ and (3) the representation
materially induced (caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.”

MBS-Certified Pub.

Accountants, LLC v. Wis. Bell Inc., 2013 WI App 14, ¶ 19, 346 Wis. 2d 173, 828 N.W.2d
575 (quoting Novell v. Migliaccio, 2008 WI 44, ¶ 49, 309 Wis. 2d 132, 749 N.W.2d 544).
Defendant seeks summary judgment on this claim because Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1)
“does not provide a cause of action for one vendor against a competitor for
(holding that potatoes produced (or packaged) in bags containing “Idaho” and “Grown in Idaho”
certification marks after license had been revoked constituted counterfeiting).

37

representations the competitor made to third parties.” (Def.’s Opening Br. (dkt. #30) 25
(quoting Grice Eng’g, Inc. v. JG Innovations, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 2d 915, 922 (W.D. Wis.
2010)).)

Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Novell construed the statute to

require proof by the plaintiff that the misrepresentation materially induced the plaintiff
to sustain a loss to state a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18. Novell, 2008 WI 44, ¶ 51. In
either case, plaintiff generally must be a member of the “public” or, at least, of the
audience to whom the misrepresentation is directed to bring a claim under Wis. Stat. §
100.18(1). See also Spacesaver Corp. v. Marvel Grp., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (W.D.
Wis. 2009) (dismissing § 100.18(1) claim where plaintiff had not alleged that it was
induced to act because of defendant’s misrepresentation); Thermal Design, Inc. v. Am. Soc.
of Heating, Refrigerating & Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1090
(E.D. Wis. 2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s § 100.18 claim where plaintiff did not allege that it
relied on defendant’s alleged misrepresentation). Here, plaintiff has not alleged that it
was misled by defendant’s “School Specialty Exclusive” image, nor could it make such a
claim in light of the undisputed record that the licensing contracts were terminated and
Brainstorm was aware of that termination.

Rather, its claim rests on its (potential)

customers’ alleged confusion by the statement.
Even if this construction of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) is in error, plaintiff has failed
to come forward on summary judgment with any evidence that consumers were induced
by the “School Specialty Exclusive” image in purchasing KnowItAll products, much less
that Brainstorm was injured by that reliance. On the contrary, the undisputed record
demonstrates that School Specialty was the only entity selling KnowItAll products even
38

after the licensing agreement was terminated. In that way, even if consumers relied on
the “School Specialty Exclusive” image in deciding to purchase the KnowItAll products
from School Specialty, there was no other KnowItAll option for consumers at the time.
In other words, defendant did not divert sales away from plaintiff or even another third
party offering KnowItAll products. Not only has Brainstorm failed to prove any injury
because of School Specialty’s use of that image, it appears plaintiff received royalty
payments from those post-termination sales, which is likely the best approximation of its
purely theoretical loss anyway. Accordingly, the court will grant defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on plaintiff’s § 100.18 claim as well.

V. Trademark Infringement
As described above, defendant has admitted that it infringed plaintiff’s
KNOWITALL trademarks by marketing and selling products after June 11, 2013, in
violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125. In an attempt to narrow the remaining
issues, defendant seeks summary judgment, however, on the issue of whether plaintiff is
entitled to attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act. For infringement claims, attorneys’
fees may only be awarded in “exceptional cases.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
In Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958 (7th
Cir. 2010), the Seventh Circuit considered the meaning of “exceptional cases” in §
1117(a), holding that an award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff is warranted if the
defendant “had no defense yet persisted in the trademark infringement or false
advertising for which he was being sued, in order to impose costs on his opponent.” Id.
39

at 963-64. From the undisputed facts, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to put
forth any evidence demonstrating that defendant persisted in the trademark infringement
in order to impose costs on plaintiff. Rather, the record shows that while defendant
mismanaged the discontinuation of its KnowItAll product line, its continued marketing
and sales for approximately six months after the licensing agreements were terminated
was not willful, but merely negligent, and certainly does not support a finding of
“exceptional case” warranting an award of attorneys’ fees.19 While plaintiff urges the
court to delay a ruling on this issue, the court sees no basis for waiting. AA Sales &
Assocs., Inc. v. Coni-Seal, Inc., 550 F.3d 606, 612-13 (7th Cir. 2008) (“As we have often
observed, summary judgment is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in the life of a case.”).
Accordingly, the court will also grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment that
plaintiff’s infringement claim is not exceptional under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
All that remains unsettled for trial is the remedy for defendant’s admitted
trademark infringement lasting approximately six months after June 11, 2013, and
resulting in approximately $5000 worth of sales and $3000 in profits.

The court

questions whether damages need or even should be tried to a jury, especially since the
best (if not the only reliable) approximation of plaintiffs’ injury would seem to be the
parties’ agreed upon royalty payment schedule. The court will await plaintiff’s proffer at

19

Plaintiff relies on the fact that the Oracle status was changed for some of the KnowItAll
products in connection with a liquidation process. (Pl.’s Opp’n (dkt. #43) 7 (citing Def.’s PFOFs
(dkt. #29) ¶¶ 83-84).) This acknowledgement, however, does not support a finding that
defendant acted intentionally in selling the KnowItAll products. To the contrary, the record
reflects that defendant attempted to remove the KnowItAll products from sale, but was sloppy in
its efforts for approximately six months, for which it paid in the form of continued royalties.

40

or before the final pretrial conference on January 6, 2015, as to other kinds of damages
before determining how best to proceed.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1) defendant School Specialty, Inc.’s motion to strike errata sheets (dkt. #42) is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART for summary judgment
purposes only as described above;
2) plaintiff Brainstorm Interactive, Inc.’s motion for leave to file an opposition to
defendant’s motion to strike (dkt. #)68 is GRANTED;
3) defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment (dkt. #24) is GRANTED;
4) plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (dkt. #28) is DENIED; and
5) at the close of conclusion of this case, the clerk of court is directed to enter
judgment (a) in defendant’s favor on plaintiff’s claims for copyright
infringement, trademark counterfeiting, conversion, and violation of Wis. Stat.
§ 101.18(1); and (b) in plaintiff’s favor on trademark infringement. The only
remaining issue is the appropriate remedy for defendant’s admitted trademark
infringement.
Entered this 5th day of December, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
__________________________________
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge

41