Dye, John v. Bartow, Bryn et al

Filing 43

ORDER that defendants may have until February 7, 2017, to respond to this order regarding plaintiff's amended medical authorization. Plaintiff John Dye's renewed motion for the court's assistance in recruiting him counsel, Dkt. 42 , is DENIED. Signed by District Judge James D. Peterson on 1/25/2017. (jef),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

JOHN L. DYE, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

ERIC, DR. GAANAN, LOYDA LORIA,
and DR. ANDRADE,

14-cv-76-jdp

Defendants.
Plaintiff John Dye brings Eighth Amendment medical care and First Amendment
retaliation claims against defendant prison officials for failing to adequately address his severe
neck pain and his mental health needs while he was housed at the Wisconsin Resource
Center. The parties have previously litigated issues about Dye’s authorization of health care
records in this case and his other current case, 13-cv-284-jdp. The parties have come to an
agreement on authorization of records in the ’284 case, but Dye objects to the scope of
defendants’ amended authorization form in this case. See Dkt. 27.
Dye objects to defendants’ request for health and medical records dating back to
2010, because the treatment discussed in the operative complaint dates back to 2013 at the
earliest. But Dye’s medical history obviously did not start on the day he first received
allegedly subpar treatment. Records predating that treatment could be relevant to Dye’s
claims. In the previous order, I acknowledged that defendants had the right to obtain records
for 2013 to 2014, but noted that defendants might want to obtain information about earlier
treatment, and that they “may do so as long as the records are relevant to plaintiff’s claims
and proportional to the needs of the case.” Dkt. 41, at 4. I concluded that “[s]hould the
parties dispute the time periods for authorization, defendants will need to explain the basis

for the dates they request.” Id. Accordingly, I will have defendants explain why they believe
records back to 2010 are required.
Dye also objects to the renewed mention of juvenile, social service, or Division of
Community Corrections records. I have already explained that the relevance of a record is not
determined by the department making that record. Id. at 5. But I noted that it seemed
unlikely that his juvenile records would be of any use. Id. at 5 n.2. According to his trust fund
account statement, Dkt. 8, Dye was born in 1963, so it is difficult to see how anything in his
juvenile file could be relevant, particularly given that defendants seek records from 2010 on.
If defendants have a reason for continuing to reference Dye’s juvenile records, they should
explain that in their response to this order. Otherwise, they should remove the reference to
juvenile records from the authorization form. There is no reason to remove references to
social service or Division of Community Corrections records, but defendants will still be
limited to obtaining records concerning Dye’s neck problem and his mental health problems
that also correspond to the dates I conclude are appropriate after I receive defendants’
response.
Dye states that he is also concerned about the redisclosure provision of the form,
which suggests that if a person not covered by federal privacy laws obtains this information,
those parties could disclose the information with Dye’s permission. I addressed this language
in the ’284 case:
But even assuming that his objection to the language is that he
perceives it as giving defendants extra permission to redisclose
his protected health information, I conclude that objection is
unwarranted. The language merely informs plaintiff of the
consequences of his health care information being used in the
case. It is possible that someone involved in this litigation who is
not covered by federal health privacy laws will obtain the records
plaintiff discloses. Given the facts of this case, it is difficult to

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envision a scenario where this occurs, but the authorization
includes this language to inform plaintiff of the possibility.
Dkt. 68 in the ’284 case, at 3. Dye does not persuade me to depart from my prior reasoning.
The disclosure warning can remain in the authorization form.
Finally, Dye renews his motion for the court’s assistance in recruiting him counsel. I
will deny the renewed motion for largely the same reasons I denied his earlier request: he has
not provided the court with letters from attorneys showing that he has asked them to
represent him and that they have turned him down, and the factual record has not been
developed to the point where it is clear that the complexity of the case will outstrip his
abilities.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendants may have until February 7, 2017, to respond to this order as discussed
above.
2. Plaintiff John Dye’s renewed motion for the court’s assistance in recruiting him
counsel, Dkt. 42, is DENIED.
Entered January 25, 2017.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge

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