Nora, Wendy v. Furay, Catherine et al

Filing 11

ORDER denying 10 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge James D. Peterson on 7/28/2015. (jef),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

WENDY ALISON NORA,
ORDER
Petitioner,
v.

14-cv-527-jdp

CATHERINE J. FURAY, JEFFREY J. PETERSON,
and GREGORY J. FORSTER,
Respondents.

Attorney Wendy Alison Nora petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus under 28
U.S.C. § 1651 ordering Chief Bankruptcy Judge Catherine J. Furay to vacate her decision
remanding an adversary proceeding to state court. In that decision, Judge Furay criticized the
arguments Nora made in support of the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Nora
argued that after her client filed a notice of dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case,
Judge Furay improperly failed to dismiss the adversary proceeding immediately, and retained
the case for the sole purpose of defaming Nora in the remand decision.
In an August 25, 2014 order, I dismissed Nora’s petition as frivolous, stating that,
under Chapman v. Currie Motors, Inc., 65 F.3d 78, 81-82 (7th Cir. 1995), a bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding does not terminate automatically upon dismissal of
an underlying bankruptcy proceeding, and Judge Furay properly considered whether to
abstain from proceeding with the adversary proceeding. Dkt. 5, at 3. I also stated as follows:
Nora does not really seek to undo Judge Furay’s remand
of the adversary proceeding so that Judge Furay can address the
merits of the dispute. She clearly believes (albeit incorrectly)
that the adversary proceeding should have somehow
automatically terminated upon Bechard’s dismissal of the
bankruptcy proceedings. Instead, Nora’s objective is to get Judge
Furay to retract her criticism of Nora’s performance, or, more

precisely, to get this court to order Judge Furay to retract her
criticism. Nora contends that Judge Furay “acted in reckless
haste to place false findings on the public record in order to
support the falsely made allegations against her former client by
the state court plaintiffs Peterson and Forster, to make false
findings of fact concerning matters which had never been
adjudicated, and to damage [Nora’s] character and reputation . .
. .” Nora’s primary goal is not to achieve a substantive result for
her client, but to redeem her own reputation. Nora has thus
failed to show that her right to a writ of mandamus is “clear and
indisputable” or that the writ is “appropriate under the
circumstances.”
Id., at 4.
Currently before the court is Nora’s motion for reconsideration of the August 25,
2014 order. Nora argues that this case can be distinguished from Chapman because the
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over the adversarial proceeding in that case was based on 28
U.S.C. § 1334(b)’s grant of jurisdiction over proceedings “related to” the underlying
bankruptcy case, whereas in the present case, Nora’s client removed the adversarial
proceeding from state court under § 1334(e).1 It is dubious whether this characterization of
the basis for removal of the adversarial proceeding is accurate (the notice of removal also
invokes 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (“Removal of claims related to bankruptcy cases” (emphasis
added)), and if so, whether such a distinction matters for purposes of applying Chapman.
But in any event, Nora does not claim that either she or her client were harmed by the
procedural method by which Judge Furay disposed of the adversarial proceeding. Rather, she
states that her reputation has been harmed by the following comments about her
performance:
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Section 1334(e) states in relevant part that “[T]he district court in which a case under title
11 is commenced or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of all the property,
wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the
estate . . . .”

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●

“The Debtor makes a number of arguments that range in coherence and
quality from vague to nonsensical to suspicious.” Dkt. 1, Exh. B at 4.

●

“As this Court has instructed Attorney Nora on numerous occasions, it
is constrained by specific jurisdictional and constitutional limits and
will abstain from hearing matters to avoid violating those limits.
Counsel’s repeated disregard of these instructions leaves questions in
the Court’s mind as to the genuineness of the jurisdictional arguments
made by Attorney Nora. The Court declines to speculate on this matter
further.” Id. at 14.

Thus Nora’s action is better viewed as a request for this court to force Judge Furay to
rescind her comments that were critical of her, regardless whether the court had jurisdiction
to enter the order. As I stated in the August 25, 2014 order, Nora provided “no authority to
support her argument that these statements raise a ‘really extraordinary cause’ requiring the
exercise of mandamus power.” Dkt. 5, at 5. Now in her motion for reconsideration, Nora
belatedly cites to two cases suggesting that a mandamus action is an available remedy for an
attorney who believes she has been harmed by a judge’s comments. Bolte v. Home Ins. Co., 744
F.2d 572, 573 (1984) (“Maybe the stigma of being accused by a federal judge of
‘reprehensible’ conduct is injury enough to satisfy the standing requirement in Article III of
the Constitution . . . . If there is any remedy for the wrong that the appellants allege, it is to
seek a writ of mandamus against the district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 1651.”); see also Seymour
v. Hug, 485 F.3d 926, 929 (2007) (citing Bolte).
However, in both of those cases, the court discussed the mandamus remedy as the
alternative to litigating the propriety of a judge’s comments through direct appeal. In Bolte,
the court noted that it should not treat such issues as appealable in part because it would
create “a breathtaking expansion in appellate jurisdiction.” Bolte, 744 F.2d 572, 573 (7th Cir.
1984). Allowing Nora to proceed in a mandamus action for the type of remarks I earlier
characterized as “stern, but restrained” would similarly lead to an avalanche of mandamus

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actions over relatively tame judicial comments. This makes little sense given mandamus’s role
as a “‘drastic and extraordinary’ remedy ‘reserved for really extraordinary causes.’” Cheney v.
U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-260
(1947)). Nora’s argument that her reputation has been harmed by Judge Furay’s comments is
particularly unfounded given the cavalcade of recent decisions sanctioning her much more
harshly. See In re Nora, 778 F.3d 662, 665-67 (7th Cir. 2015) (imposing $2,500 sanction and
listing recent cases in which Nora has been criticized or assessed monetary sanctions) reh’g
denied (Mar. 18, 2015). She fails to persuade me that the particular comments in this case
come close to meeting the standard for granting a writ of mandamus.
Nora also argues that I should not have dismissed the case without “proceedings . . .
as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3).” But as I stated in the August 25, 2014 order, this
court has the inherent authority to screen and dismiss cases sua sponte. Dkt. 5, at 2 n.2 (citing
Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (in forma pauperis statute “authorizes
courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious’ action, but there is little doubt they would have
power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d
778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999) (“district courts have the power to screen complaints filed by all
litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike, regardless of fee status.”); see also Roby v. Skupien,
762 F. Supp. 813, 813 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (“There is . . . well-established authority that this
court has broad, inherent power to sua sponte dismiss an action . . . which is frivolous, sham,
vexatious or brought in bad faith.”).
Now, even with the benefit of Nora’s additional authorities, I conclude that Nora’s
petition does not meet the standard for granting a writ of mandamus.

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ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that petitioner Wendy Alison Nora’s motion for reconsideration of
the August 25, 2014 order dismissing her petition for a writ of mandamus, Dkt. 10, is
DENIED.
Entered July 28, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge

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