Sheppard, Charles v. Schultz et al

Filing 78

ORDER denying defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. 50), in Case No. 14-cv-797-slc. Plaintiff Charles Sheppard's motions for assistance in recruiting counsel Case No. 14-cv-797-slc, dkt. 75, and Case. No. 14-cv-863-slc, dkt. 40, are GRANTED.. All deadlines in both cases are STRICKEN. Upon recruiting an attorneyto represent Sheppard, the court will re-set the schedule at a telephonic conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen L. Crocker on 4/21/2017. (jef),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

CHARLES SHEPPARD,
v.

Plaintiff

OPINION AND ORDER
14-cv-797-slc

OFFICER SCHULTZ, et al.,
Defendants.

CHARLES SHEPPARD,
v.

Plaintiff

ORDER
14-cv-863-slc

BLOYER, et al.,
Defendants.

Pro se plaintiff Charles Sheppard is proceeding in Case. No. 14-cv-797-slc on claims that
Officer Tarah Schultz, Judy Schaefer, Dr. Paul Sumnicht and Belinda Schrubbe violated his
rights under the Eighth Amendment and state law by denying him his prescription seizure
medication and causing him to suffer severe seizures and injury. Defendants filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment in that case (dkt. 50).
In Case No. 14-cv-863-slc, Sheppard is proceeding on claims that prison staff ignored his
threats of self-harm. That case is proceeding to trial. In both cases, Sheppard filed motions for
assistance in recruiting counsel.
For the reasons stated below, I am denying the motion for summary judgment in Case
No. 14-cv-797-slc, granting Sheppard’s requests for assistance in recruiting counsel in both cases
for the purpose of attempting a global mediated settlement, and striking all remaining dates in
both cases, to be reset once counsel has been recruited.

UNDISPUTED FACTS1
I. The Parties
Sheppard was an inmate at Waupun Correctional Institution (Waupun) during all times
relevant to this lawsuit. Defendants were Waupun employees during this time: Dr. Paul
Sumnicht was a physician; Belinda Schrubbe (who is a registered nurse) was Waupun’s Health
Services Unit (HSU) manager and supervisor of Waupun’s nursing staff; Judy Schaefer was an
HSU nurse; and Tarah Schultz was a correctional officer.
II. Dr. Sumnicht’s Order to Stop Carbamazepine Prescription
On September 26, 2011, Sheppard was placed in Temporary Lockup (TLU) in Waupun’s
segregation unit. When an inmate is placed in TLU, someone on the nursing staff reviews the
inmate’s medications and then reissues these medications to the TLU. Pursuant to this practice,
a nurse inspected the bag of medications that accompanied Sheppard to the TLU, listed the type
and quantity of each medication in Sheppard’s medical chart, then flagged this list for review by
Dr. Sumnicht. According to this list, Sheppard’s medication bag contained 67 carbamazepine
pills, which were prescribed to Sheppard to control his seizures. (Ex. 1000 to Sumnicht Decl.,
dkt. 53-1, at 18.) Sheppard disputes that all the pills were his because the nurse’s note did not
explicitly state that the “bag” of pills was his, and because he claims that all the pills never were
actually found in his possession. (Sheppard Decl., dkt. 65, ¶ 68.)

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Unless otherwise noted, these facts are material and undisputed. The facts are drawn from the
defendants’ proposed findings of fact, as well as underlying evidentiary support submitted by both sides,
viewed in the light most favorable to Sheppard.

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On September 30, 2011, Dr. Sumnicht reviewed the nurse’s note.

At 1:00 that

afternoon, Dr. Sumnicht discontinued Sheppard’s carbamazepine prescription. Dr. Sumnicht
did not speak to or examine Sheppard before canceling this prescription. Dr. Sumnicht canceled
Sheppard’s prescription because he believed Sheppard was hoarding his medications and faking
his seizures. He came to this conclusion, in part based on his experience as a doctor, but also on:
(1) a conversation he remembers having had with HSU manager Schrubbe, and (2) his review
of Sheppard’s Seizure Flow Sheet, a record that Dr. Sumnicht created in June of 2011 to track
Sheppard’s seizure history and treatment plan. (Sumnicht Decl., dkt. 53, ¶¶ 7, 10, 11.)
In Dr. Sumnicht’s experience, inmates hoard medications for a number of reasons, and
it is not uncommon for inmates to feign illness to obtain medications. Dr. Sumnicht does not
claim to have experience assessing whether inmates actually are hoarding, and he does not claim
to have knowledge about how other staff members collect and transfer medications when inmates
are transferred from their regular unit to TLU. Rather, Dr. Sumnicht states that after he
reviewed the nurse’s note about Sheppard, he had a discussion with Schrubbe about the
significance of the note, and this conversation led him to conclude that Sheppard had been
hoarding several of his medications, including the carbamazepine. (Id., dkt.53, ¶ 6.) Dr.
Sumnicht’s declaration does not describe the details of this conversation, but he stated in a
discovery response that Schrubbe told him that Sheppard “indicated that he did not really need
doses of Carbamazepine because he was not taking them.” (See PPFOF, dkt. 73, at 30-31.)
Sheppard disputes that this conversation took place, citing to defendants’ discovery
responses in which Schrubbe stated that she does not deny that the conversation took place but
cannot recall the conversation and only investigated Sheppard’s medication after he filed a

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grievance about the incidents leading up to the discontinuation of his medication. (Def.’s Resp.
to Pl. Second Request for Interrogs., dkt. 65-32, at 6.)
Sheppard’s Seizure Flow Sheet, which Dr. Sumnicht reviewed, includes: (1) a note
stating “2005 - Neurology - most likely pseudo seizure”; (2) a comment that Sheppard suffered
a seizure in 2007; and (3) a note that Sheppard was receiving 400 mg of carbamazepine to treat
his seizures. (Ex. 1 to Sumnicht Decl., dkt. 53-1, at 1.) Dr. Sumnicht explains that a pseudo
seizure is a seizure-like episode that is not epileptic in nature, but can be difficult to diagnose
because the patient either could be faking seizure-like symptoms or actually could be
experiencing unexplained but actual neurological symptoms. Dr. Sumnicht further explains that,
although seizure medication likely is not appropriate if a patient is faking seizure symptoms,
“seizure medication may be appropriate for a patient who has real seizure symptoms.”
(Sumnicht Decl., dkt. 53, ¶ 9.)

III.

Sheppard’s Requests for Carbamazepine
On the evening of October 4, 2011, a few days after Dr. Sumnicht cancelled the

prescriptions, Officer Schultz conducted a medication pass in TLU, and Sheppard asked Schultz
for his seizure medication. Schultz does not recall the details of the conversation; Sheppard
claims that she told him that the medication had been discontinued, it wasn’t her problem, and
she did not have time to call HSU for him. According to Sheppard, he responded “Can you
please get a nurse down here or call a doctor cause that’s a huge mistake because I’ve been taking
these meds for years and there’s no way that they’d discontinue them without me being
examined or notified, or having a replacement in place.” (Sheppard Decl., dkt. 65, ¶ 2.) Again,

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Schultz does not remember how she responded to this; Sheppard states that she still refused to
contact HSU on his behalf.
After Schultz left, Sheppard pushed his medical alert button and was told to talk to an
officer, so Sheppard again called Schultz. Sheppard claims that she ignored him at first, but then
came to his cell, at which point he told her that he had not taken his seizure medication in over
24 hours, that he could not afford to miss taking them, and that he was already not feeling well.
(Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) Once again, Schultz did not call HSU on his behalf or take any other action on his
behalf.
As a correctional officer, Schultz’s authority was limited to distributing medications as
directed by the medication log created by HSU. The standard practice when an inmate believes
that a medication has been improperly discontinued is for the correctional officer to offer the
inmate an HSU request form and to direct the inmate to HSU for help. Schultz states that she
did not believe an HSU request form would have helped Sheppard because only a doctor could
change his prescription, and the only medical personnel available at that time of day were nurses.
Sheppard did not have any other interactions with Schultz that night or the next morning.

IV. Sheppard’s Seizures and Follow-up Treatment
At 11:00 a.m. on October 5, 2011, Sheppard suffered a seizure. According to Sheppard,
he lost consciousness and hit his head against concrete. When he woke up, C.O. Fischer was
present and asking him if he was okay. Fischer and other correctional officers escorted Sheppard
to an exam room. Nurse Schaefer evaluated Sheppard at 11:10 a.m. and reported the event as
an “unwitnessed seizure.” Sheppard disputes this, claiming that Officer Fischer told Schaefer that

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he saw Sheppard seize for at least three minutes and that Sheppard hit his head on the ground.
Schaefer does not recall hearing the officer who brought Sheppard to the examination room tell
her this.

Schaefer then told Sheppard that she would check into restarting his seizure

medication. Sheppard was escorted back to his cell without receiving any carbamazepine or
further attention from Schaefer. As he was leaving the room, Sheppard nearly fell and required
the help of the officers to get back to his cell.
At 11:45 a.m. that same day, Dr. Sumnicht restarted Sheppard’s carbamazepine
prescription, coding his order with a “1” and a circle around it, which indicates that the order
should be processed as soon as “reasonably possible.” Schaefer processed the order at 12:00 p.m.
that day, but Sheppard did not receive the dose at that point.
At 12:50 p.m. still on October 5, 2011, an officer brought Sheppard to Schaefer because
Sheppard had pushed the medical alert button and complained about not receiving his seizure
medication. Schaefer telephoned Dr. Sumnicht, who ordered that Sheppard receive one dose of
carbamazepine “now” – which apparently means as soon as “reasonably possible” – and that
Sheppard receive a second dose at bedtime to increase his blood level of carbamazepine.
Schaefer entered Dr. Sumnicht’s order into Sheppard’s medical chart.
According to Schaefer’s declaration, the appearance of her initials on Sheppard’s
Medication/Treatment Record two rows above the “HS” (“bedtime”) row indicates that she gave
Sheppard his first dose of carbamazepine the afternoon of October 5, 2011, but the note does
not indicate what time she provided it. (Schaefer Decl., dkt. 55, ¶¶ 15-17; Schaefer Decl. Ex.,

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dkt. 55-1, at 1.) Sheppard disputes this, averring that Schaefer never gave him a dose of
carbamazepine on October 5. (Sheppard Decl., dkt. 65, ¶¶ 7-9, 60.)2
Sheppard suffered a second seizure at approximately 8:00 p.m. on October 5, 2011. After
this seizure, a nurse Larson (not a party to this lawsuit), evaluated Sheppard. At 8:30 p.m.
Larson administered him some carbamazepine, but the parties dispute how much. While
defendants claim that the medical records show that Sheppard only received one dose in the
evening because he received the first dose in the afternoon, Sheppard remembers receiving one
dose when Larson first treated him, and a second dose five minutes after he was returned to his
cell. (Sheppard Decl., dkt. 65, ¶¶ 8-9.)

After October 5, Sheppard continued taking

carbamazepine as it had been prescribed prior to September 30. Sheppard did not have any
more seizures.
It is unclear when Dr. Sumnicht learned of Sheppard’s second seizure, but he did order
head and neck scans, which were taken on October 7, 2011, and showed nothing abnormal. Dr.
Sumnicht did not personally examine Sheppard until October 12, 2011. At that point, Dr.
Sumnicht prescribed pain medication and a muscle relaxer to address Sheppard’s headaches and
other pain he was experiencing due to the seizures. (Ex. to Sumnicht Decl., dkt. 53-1, at 19.)

2

Sheppard claims that Schaefer “falsified” his medical records, and he has leveled other
accusations of falsehood in his filings. Sheppard has submitted no evidence to support his accusations
beyond his own differing recollection of events. For the purposes of summary judgment, it is enough for
the court to note that the parties dispute material facts.

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OPINION
I permitted Sheppard to proceed on Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and
Wisconsin negligence and malpractice claims against Schultz, Schaefer, Dr. Sumnicht, and
Schrubbe. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires the state to
“provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 103 (1976). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment when his conduct demonstrates deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s
serious medical needs, thereby constituting an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Defendants do not
dispute that Sheppard’s need for carbamazepine constitutes a serious medical need. They argue
instead that Schultz and Schaefer were neither deliberately indifferent nor negligent, and that
Dr. Sumnicht and Schrubbe were not deliberately indifferent to Sheppard’s need for his
medication. Defendants argue in the alternative that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Deliberate indifference constitutes more than medical malpractice; the Eighth
Amendment does not codify common law torts. See King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th
Cir. 2012) (“[M]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because
the victim is a prisoner.”). In particular, an inmate’s, or even another doctor’s, disagreement
with a medical judgment, incorrect diagnosis or improper treatment resulting from negligence is
insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1374 (7th
Cir. 1997). While deliberate indifference requires more than negligent acts, it also involves
something less than purposeful acts. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). The point
between these two poles lies where “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

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inmate health or safety” or where “the official [is] both aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he . . . draw[s] the inference.”
Id. at 837. A jury may “infer deliberate indifference on the basis of a physician’s treatment
decision [when] the decision [is] so far afield of accepted professional standards as to raise the
inference that it was not actually based on a medical judgment.” Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d
392, 396 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014) (“A prisoner
may establish deliberate indifference by demonstrating that the treatment he received was
‘blatantly inappropriate.’”) (citing Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Allegations of delayed care may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation if the
delay caused the inmate’s condition to worsen or unnecessarily prolonged his pain. Estelle, 429
U.S. at 104-05; McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he length of delay
that is tolerable depends on the seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing
treatment.”) (citations omitted). Even a few days’ delay in addressing a severely painful, but
readily treatable condition suffices to state a claim for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Smith
v. Knox County Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 2012); Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311,
314 (7th Cir. 2011).
The Wisconsin standard for negligence is less rigorous, requiring a showing of (1) a duty
of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a causal connection between the breach and the plaintiff’s
injury, and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the injury. Brenner v. National Cas. Co., 2015
WI App 85, ¶ 19, 365 Wis. 2d 476, 872 N.W.2d 124. Because the record before the court
requires a trial on both the deliberate indifference and the negligence claims against each
defendant, my analysis will focus on the more demanding Eighth Amendment standard.

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I.

Officer Schultz
Officer Schultz does not remember the details of her interaction with Sheppard. Instead,

defendants’ position is that Officer Schultz’s regular practice would have been to respond to
Sheppard’s October 4 requests for carbamazepine by telling him to submit a written request to
HSU. Officer Schultz opines, however, that filling out an HSU request form at that time of day
would not have helped Sheppard. Sheppard provides a different version of events, claiming that
he told Officer Schultz repeatedly that he was feeling ill and needed to take his carbamazepine,
but that Schultz told him that she did not have time to call HSU for him. At the summary
judgment stage, the court cannot choose between competing sworn statements about what
happened. If a jury were to accept Sheppard’s version of events, then the jury could conclude
that Schultz’s failure to take any action amounts to deliberate indifference.
This is so even though Officer Schultz is not a medical professional. Prison staff may be
held liable under the deliberate indifference doctrine in a situation where it would be clear even
to a nonprofessional that the prisoner is not receiving adequate care. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d
516, 527-28 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[N]on-medical defendants [are] entitled to rely on the
professional judgment of medical prison officials” so long as nothing makes it obvious that the
care prisoners are receiving is inadequate). Sheppard’s sworn statement claims that Officer
Schultz refused to take any action even though Sheppard told that he felt sick and needed his
seizure medication right away. If a jury were to accept Sheppard’s version of events, then the
jury could conclude that Schultz acted unreasonably when she failed to alert any medical

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personnel about Sheppard’s complaints. Accordingly, I am denying defendants’ motion as to
Schultz.

II.

Nurse Schaefer
Schaefer acted appropriately when she called Dr. Sumnicht on October 5 to report that

Sheppard suffered a seizure and needed his medication. Even so, I cannot grant summary
judgment in her favor because Sheppard’s version of events creates a factual dispute about
whether Schaefer actually gave him his first dose of carbamazepine as she claims. Further, a
jury–with the benefit of hindsight–could conclude that Schaefer’s decision not to monitor
Sheppard after his first seizure demonstrated deliberate indifference to Sheppard’s medical needs
that afternoon and evening.
Defendants claim that Schaefer gave Sheppard carbamazepine on the afternoon of
October 5. Sheppard disputes this, averring that Schaefer never gave him carbamazepine on
October 5, even though she was aware of Dr. Sumnicht’s two orders directing that Sheppard
receive a dose as soon as reasonably practicable. Sheppard claims that a different nurse gave him
his first dose of carbamazepine on October 5, but not until after he had suffered a second seizure.
Thus, there is a genuine dispute whether Schaefer provided carbamazepine to Sheppard on
October 5.
Moreover, Sheppard has asserted that Schaefer mishandled Sheppard’s examination
following his first seizure. Although Schaefer does not remember this, Sheppard claims that
Fischer told Schaefer that he saw Sheppard hit his head and seize for three minutes. Sheppard
claims that Schaefer sent him back to his cell after examining even though he almost fell and

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required assistance from the officers escorting him. These assertions, if accepted by a jury, would
allow the inference that Sheppard may have suffered a concussion and his condition was
observably unstable. If the jury takes this path, then it could conclude that Schaefer should have
done more, such as monitoring Sheppard in case of another seizure. Accordingly, I am denying
defendants’ request for summary judgment as to Schaefer.

III.

Dr. Sumnicht
The parties do not dispute that Dr. Sumnicht discontinued Sheppard’s seizure medication

without speaking to or examining Sheppard. A jury will have to evaluate the justifications for
this decision because it involves disputed facts. If a jury were to view this interaction/lack of
interaction in the light most favorable to Sheppard, then it could conclude that Dr. Sumnicht
was deliberately indifferent to Sheppard’s medical needs. Let’s break it out a bit:

First, with regard to Dr. Sumnicht reading the note about the 67 carbamazepine pills in
the bag that accompanied Sheppard to TLU, the parties dispute the facts Dr. Sumnicht relied
on to conclude that the note meant that Sheppard was hoarding the pills. While Dr. Sumnicht
states that his conversation with Schrubbe led him to conclude that Sheppard was hoarding,
Schrubbe doesn’t remember speaking with Dr. Sumnicht about this, and the record does not
include specific details about this conversation beyond the vague statement that Sheppard
“indicated” that he wasn’t taking his carbamazepine. Even though Dr. Sumnicht knows that
inmates sometimes hoard their medications, he does not have experience identifying signs that
an inmate is hoarding medications. True, a cache of 67 pills would be a pretty solid indication

12

of hoarding, but Sheppard claims that the “bag” of pills was never found in his possession, and
he alleges that not all of the pills were his. If a jury were to accept Sheppard’s claims, then it
could conclude that Dr. Sumnicht erred when he conclude that Sheppard was hoarding.
Contrariwise, if the jury credits Dr. Sumnicht’s version of events–including his conversation
about this with Schrubbe–then the jury could conclude that Dr. Sumnicht reached a justifiable
conclusion. The bottom line is that a jury will have to see, hear and evaluate the witnesses in
order to determine which version of events is more credible.
Second, even if Dr. Sumnicht had a reasonable basis to conclude that Sheppard was
hoarding his carbamazepine, there is room to question Dr. Sumnicht’s decision to stop the
prescription without hearing Sheppard’s side of the story. Add to this the fact that Dr. Sumnicht
did not examine Sheppard until October 12. Part of the basis for Dr. Sumnicht’s decision was
the note in the Seizure Flow Sheet that Sheppard “most likely” suffered from pseudo seizures
following a 2005 neurology exam.

But Dr. Sumnicht knew that (1) a pseudo seizure could

involve actual neurological symptoms warranting medication, (2) Sheppard had been consistently
prescribed 400 mg of carbamazepine, and (3) the sheet listed a 2007 seizure that was not
characterized as a pseudo seizure (see Ex. 1 to Sumnicht Decl., dkt. 53-1, at 1). Regardless, Dr.
Sumnicht stopped the carbamazepine prescription medication without either running a blood
test to confirm that there was no carbamazepine in his system, or conducting any
contemporaneous examination to assess whether Sheppard was actually faking the symptoms of
a seizure.
Dr. Sumnicht personally examined Sheppard on October 12, when he prescribed
medications and a muscle relaxer to ease the pain Sheppard was experiencing following his

13

seizures. Although it is not clear when Dr. Sumnicht learned about the seizures, the head and
neck scans that he ordered had taken place on October 7, so Dr. Sumnicht knew about it that
day at the latest. Still, Dr. Sumnicht did not personally examine Sheppard for another five days.
The fact that Dr. Sumnicht wrote Sheppard a prescription for pain management on October 12
indicates that Sheppard had been suffering pain in the week since the October 5 seizures. Even
so, all of this might be within the realm of an acceptable treatment modality, and a jury might
be convinced by Dr. Sumnicht’s explanation that he was neither deliberately indifferent nor
negligent. But that will be the jury’s prerogative. The court cannot conclude that Dr. Sumnicht
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, I am denying defendants’ request for
summary judgment as to Dr. Sumnicht.

IV.

HSU Manager Schrubbe
Defendants argue that Schrubbe cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference because

she was not involved in the decision to discontinue Sheppard’s carbamazepine. Sheppard has
responded that Schrubbe should held liable because Dr. Sumnicht claims that she told him that
Sheppard indicated to her that he was not taking his carbamazepine. Again, because there is a
genuine dispute about whether this conversation occurred, summary judgment is inappropriate.
If Schrubbe did have this conversation with Dr. Sumnicht about Sheppard’s medications,
it would not have taken a giant leap in logic for her to conclude that Dr. Sumnicht would stop
his carbamazepine medication. While defendants claim that if this conversation took place, her
failure to act could only amount to negligence, I disagree. The record is unclear as to what
Schrubbe actually said to Dr. Sumnicht, or whether she actually took any steps to confirm that

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Sheppard was, in fact, hoarding his carbamazepine. At most, Schrubbe told Dr. Sumnicht that
Sheppard was hoarding his pills and did nothing else, such as reviewing his medical records to
determine whether he had a history of seizures.

On this record, a jury could infer that

Schrubbe’s failure to confirm that Sheppard was hoarding his carbamazepine constituted
deliberate indifference because reporting this conclusion to Dr. Sumnicht without adequately
verifying it triggered a foreseeable series of events that could cause–perhaps did cause–Sheppard
to suffer seizures unnecessarily. Accordingly, I am denying defendants’ request for summary
judgment as to Schrubbe.

V.

Qualified Immunity
Finally, defendants argue that each of them is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified

immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Defendants contend that
it was not clearly established that their actions violated plaintiff’s rights. That would be true
under defendants’ version of events. Under Sheppard’s version of events, however, the decision
to stop his carbamazepine prescription and the timing of restarting his prescription indicate that
the defendants ignored the foreseeable risks attendant to stopping Sheppard’s seizure medicine,
then ignored his reports of seizure symptoms, then responded inadequately and inappropriately
to the two seizures that resulted. Sheppard’s version of events precludes a finding of qualified
immunity as to each of the defendants.

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VI.

Renewed Motion for Assistance in Recruiting Counsel or an Expert
Sheppard has renewed his request for court assistance in recruiting counsel in both of his

cases. (Dkt. 75.) Now that both lawsuits are on course for a jury trial, I conclude that it is time
to find a volunteer attorney to assist Sheppard. I am granting Sheppard’s renewed requests, and
striking the remaining dates in both schedules. At this point, I will attempt to recruit one
attorney on Sheppard’s behalf, for the sole purpose of mediating both cases. Upon finding a
volunteer attorney–which sometimes takes several months–I will set a telephonic scheduling
conference. If mediation does not result in a global settlement of both cases, then I will set a
status conference to address next steps.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. 50), in Case No. 14-cv797-slc, is DENIED.

2.

Plaintiff Charles Sheppard’s motions for assistance in recruiting counsel
Case No. 14-cv-797-slc, dkt. 75, and Case. No. 14-cv-863-slc, dkt. 40, are
GRANTED.

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3.

All deadlines in both cases are STRICKEN. Upon recruiting an attorney
to represent Sheppard, the court will re-set the schedule at a telephonic
conference.

Entered this 21st day of April, 2017.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
STEPHEN L. CROCKER
Magistrate Judge

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