Alexander, Ricky v. Dodge Correctional Institution

Filing 26

ORDER denying 25 motion to deem the district court decision as void and request for recusal. Signed by District Judge James D. Peterson on 3/3/2016. (jef),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

RICKY N. ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER
DODGE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,
LIEUTENANT R. RASMUSSEN,
LIEUTENANT D. STRELOW, and
DCI COMPLAINT EXAMINER,

14-cv-849-jdp

Defendant.
Pro se prisoner Ricky Alexander has filed a “motion of objection to deem the district
court decision ‘void’ and request for recusal.” Dkt. 25. I will deny plaintiff’s motion.
Although plaintiff does not indicate the authority under which he seeks to set aside
the judgment in this case, I construe his motion as one pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(4).1 I cannot grant plaintiff’s motion because he essentially renews
arguments that I have already addressed and raises arguments for the first time that he could
have raised earlier. Solis v. Current Dev. Corp., 557 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2009). For
example, he contends that defendant Lieutenant D. Strelow did not include statements from
plaintiff and another inmate in a conduct report that eventually led to plaintiff receiving
discipline. But I have explained that the omitted evidence—whether omitted intentionally or
by accident—does not give rise to a due process violation because plaintiff received adequate
procedural protections. Dkt. 10, at 5 and Dkt. 17, at 2-3. I have also explained that the

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The court entered judgment on June 2, 2015. Dkt. 11. “[A]ny motion for reconsideration
filed after the deadline [for Rule 59(e) motions] must be construed as a motion to vacate.”
Williams v. Illinois, 737 F.3d 473, 475 (7th Cir. 2013).

omitted evidence was not favorable to plaintiff (it implicates him as the aggressor in a
battery), and so even if defendants did not disclose it before the disciplinary hearing, there
was no due process violation. Dkt. 21, at 2-3. Plaintiff has not presented adequate grounds
for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b).
As for plaintiff’s request for recusal, I construe it as a motion for disqualification
under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).2 Section 455(a) requires me to recuse myself “in any proceeding in
which [my] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” I have a duty to recuse when
presented with valid reasons, but I also have a duty to refuse recusal when justification is
lacking. N.Y. City Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 1986).
Here, plaintiff contends that I “displayed ‘fraud by an officer of the court’ for
displaying partiality toward the plaintiff by predetermining how [I was] going to rule, and
ignoring the Wisconsin’s prison administrative codes and case law.” Dkt. 25, at 10. These
arguments appear to suggest that I must recuse myself simply because I have ruled against
plaintiff in this case. But “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias
or partiality motion. . . . Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not for
recusal.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Plaintiff has not presented other
evidence from which a reasonable observer could conclude that I am biased against him.
Thus, I will deny his motion for recusal. See Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 299
F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 2002).
I will address one final point in closing. Plaintiff contends that there is a contradiction
in the order that I issued on June 2, 2015, and that this contradiction establishes both his
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Plaintiff cites to § 455(a) and to state cases and state statutes that address recusal. Dkt. 25,
at 10-11. This is a federal court, and so state authorities do not govern whether I must recuse
myself.

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entitlement to relief and a reason for my recusal. Specifically, plaintiff argues that I dismissed
his case even though I had concluded that “there appears to be a inadequate procedural
process during the disciplinary hearing.” Dkt. 25, at 7 (purporting to quote Dkt. 10, at 7).
Plaintiff has misquoted my earlier order and he misunderstands the statement that he has
quoted. I will clarify. Plaintiff’s initial complaint mentioned racial discrimination and invoked
the Equal Protection Clause. Dkt. 1, at 3-5. At screening, I concluded that these statements
were not part of the claim that plaintiff was pursuing, which involved due process violations
during his disciplinary proceedings. In reaching this conclusion, I wrote that “these appear to
be tangential issues in a complaint that principally alleges inadequate procedural process
during a disciplinary hearing.” Dkt. 10, at 6-7. Contrary to plaintiff’s suggestion, Dkt. 25, at
9, I did not conclude that there appeared to be inadequate procedural process during the
disciplinary hearing. Rather, I observed that the complaint principally alleged inadequate
process.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff Ricky Alexander’s motion of objection to deem the
district court decision as “void” and request for recusal, Dkt. 25, is DENIED.
Entered March 3, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge

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