Corliss, Melissa v. Colvin, Carolyn

Filing 18

ORDER reversing and remanding action to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Signed by District Judge James D. Peterson on 11/25/2015. (jls)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

MELISSA CORLISS,

v.

Plaintiff,

ORDER
15-cv-32-jdp

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

Plaintiff Melissa Corliss seeks judicial review of a final decision of defendant Carolyn
W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, finding Corliss not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act. On November 19, 2015, the court heard oral argument in
this case. For reasons explained during the hearing and summarized here, the court will
remand this case to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
When determining Corliss’s residual functional capacity (RFC), the ALJ afforded all
medical opinions concerning Corliss’s mental limitations little weight. R. 16. 1 The ALJ cited,
but discounted, mental impairment opinions by Dr. Kennedy, Dr. Pierner, Dr. Rattan, and
Dr. Johnson. Id. The ALJ discounted the opinions because: (1) Corliss did not identify any
disabling mental symptoms or limitations in her initial application, her application for
reconsideration, or her appeal and request for hearing; (2) Corliss began receiving mental
health counseling only after the Social Security Administration denied her application upon
reconsideration; and (3) treating sources, consulting sources, and individuals who
administered functional capacity evaluations noted inconsistencies between Corliss’s alleged

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Record cites are to the administrative transcript, located at Dkt. 7.

symptoms and objective medical findings. Id. The ALJ specifically discounted the state
agency psychologist’s opinions (Dr. Rattan) because he evaluated Corliss only once. R. 17.
The ALJ discounted the treating source opinions (Dr. Kennedy and Dr. Pierner) because
nothing in the record corroborated their opinions. Id.
The ALJ may have had reasons to discount the mental impairment opinions, but the
ALJ did not adequately justify his decision, cite to specific inconsistencies in the record, or
identify and apply the pertinent regulatory factors, as required under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
See Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000), as amended, (Dec. 13, 2000) (citing 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). The ALJ did not appear to regard the treating source opinions with
any degree of deference and instead lumped all of the mental impairment opinions into one
category and dismissed them.
The bottom line is that the ALJ did not provide a careful analysis of the mental
impairment opinions before affording them little weight. Corliss’s failure to mention any
mental limitations in her original applications may diminish her credibility, but the mental
impairment opinions were still evidence of record, and the ALJ should have evaluated them
in accordance with section 1527. The ALJ cannot brush off an entire category of medical
opinion evidence without acknowledging and engaging the pertinent regulatory factors.
Several medical opinions in the record acknowledged that Corliss suffers from moderate to
marked mental limitations that impact various aspects of her life. Even Dr. Johnson, a
medical professional whose opinions were uncharitable toward Corliss, opined that she had
moderate limitations in understanding instructions and in social interactions. R. 752-53. On
remand, the ALJ must provide a careful evaluation of the mental impairment opinions in the
record and identify and apply the pertinent regulatory factors.

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Corliss also contends that the ALJ erred when evaluating her credibility. The ALJ
determined that Corliss’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of her pain were “not entirely credible.” R. 15. The ALJ based this determination, in
part, on the fact that Corliss collected unemployment benefits during the alleged period of
disability. R. 17. But the ALJ’s consideration of Corliss’s unemployment benefits was cursory,
and he failed to acknowledge that in her unemployment applications Corliss disclosed her
limitations. Corliss represented that she would be able to work only subject to restrictions.
R. 209-10. In a January 21, 2011, statement provided to Wisconsin’s Department of
Workforce Development, Unemployment Insurance Division, Corliss represented that she
would be able to work four hours per day and to lift no more than 20 pounds. R. 211. Maybe
the fact that Corliss presented herself as totally disabled at the hearing before the ALJ but
capable of performing some work in her unemployment benefits applications undermined her
credibility. But the ALJ did not explain how the unemployment records factored in to his
credibility analysis. The court is unable to follow his reasoning from his conclusory
explanation. On remand, the ALJ should explain his treatment of these records and articulate
how he used them when evaluating Corliss’s credibility.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the decision of defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security, denying plaintiff Melissa Corliss’s application for disability
benefits and supplemental security income is REVERSED AND REMANDED under
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment for plaintiff and close this case.
Entered November 25, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge

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