La Crosse County v. Trinity Industries, Inc. et al

Filing 56

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 36 Motion to Dismiss; denying 38 Motion to Stay. Claims 1, 2 and 3 in the amended complaint 32 are dismissed with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Signed by District Judge James D. Peterson on 3/31/2015. (arw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

LA CROSSE COUNTY,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

v.

Plaintiff,

TRINITY INDUSTRIES, INC. and
TRINITY HIGHWAY PRODUCTS, LLC,

OPINION & ORDER
15-cv-117-jdp

Defendants.
Defendants Trinity Industries, Inc. and Trinity Highway Products, LLC design and
manufacture highway safety equipment, including a guardrail end terminal system known as
the ET Plus. In 2000, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) approved the ET Plus,
which is now in widespread use on highways throughout the country. But in the years that
followed, Trinity Industries and Trinity Highway Products changed the design of the ET Plus
without informing the FHWA. The changes made the system less safe, and when they finally
came to light in 2012, Trinity Industries and Trinity Highway Products found themselves on
the wrong end of a qui tam suit in federal court. A jury ultimately returned a substantial
verdict against them, but that award compensated the United States government and not
other entities that had purchased ET Plus units. Plaintiff La Crosse County filed this class
action lawsuit on behalf of state and local highway departments that purchased ET Plus end
terminals. La Crosse County asserts claims for declaratory judgment, design defect, deceptive
trade practices, false advertising, breach of contract, breach of warranty, and unjust
enrichment.

Trinity Industries and Trinity Highway Products have moved to dismiss La Crosse
County’s amended complaint, contending that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and
that La Crosse County has failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted. The court
will grant the motion to dismiss in part. La Crosse County’s claims for breach of warranty
will survive, as will its claims for deceptive trade practices and false advertising. And La
Crosse County’s claim in the alternative for unjust enrichment will proceed for now. But the
court will dismiss the remaining claims in the amended complaint. The court will also decline
to stay this case pending an appeal in the qui tam suit.

ALLEGATIONS OF FACT
The court draws the following facts from the allegations in La Crosse County’s
amended complaint, Dkt. 32, accepting them as true for purposes of reviewing the motion to
dismiss. Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 463 (7th Cir. 2010). The parties also refer to
documents discussed in the amended complaint and to judicially noticeable materials from
the records of other lawsuits. The court can consider these materials without converting the
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy
Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012).
Trinity Industries is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Dallas, Texas. Trinity Highway Products is a Delaware limited liability company (La Crosse
County has not identified the company’s members or their citizenships). The court will refer
to both of these defendants, collectively, as “Trinity.”
Trinity manufactures and sells highway safety equipment. This case is about Trinity’s
ET-Plus system, which is a patented guardrail end terminal for which Trinity holds the

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exclusive license to manufacture. The ET Plus is designed to reduce damage or injury that
could occur when a vehicle crashes into the end of a guardrail. The system has four basic
sections: (1) an impact plate; (2) a deflector; (3) an extruder throat or extruder chamber; and
(4) a feeder chute or feeder channel. The system attaches to the end of a standard “W beam”
style guardrail, as depicted below and in La Crosse County’s amended complaint:

Dkt. 32, figure 1 (depicting an ET Plus unit installed on the left side of a road).
When a vehicle collides with the impact plate, the entire assembly is designed to move
with the car along the guardrail. The guardrail passes through the feeder channel, flattening
out of its W shape and curling into a ribbon away from the vehicle. This sliding design
absorbs the vehicle’s energy without causing a severe impact that could injure the vehicle’s
occupants. Most important, it prevents the guardrail from impaling the vehicle. The FHWA,
an agency within the United States Department of Transportation, approved the ET Plus
system in 2000. The Wisconsin Department of Transportation approved the ET Plus system
as well, once Trinity submitted proof that the FHWA had approved it. This approval meant
that the ET Plus system could be used on Wisconsin roadways.

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Between 2002 and 2005, Trinity modified the ET Plus system. Among other changes,
the new design narrowed the feeder channel from five inches to four inches. That change
saved Trinity $2.00 per unit, with an estimated total savings of $250,000 over five years. But
the changes also made the product more dangerous. The narrower (and also shorter) feeder
channel would sometimes prevent the guardrail from feeding through properly. This resulted
in “throat lock,” meaning that the impact plate would get stuck as it slid down the guardrail.
Rather than absorbing the impact of a wayward vehicle, a locked-up system would cause the
guardrail to double over on itself or spear through the vehicle and endanger its occupants.
Trinity did not seek the FHWA’s approval for this design modification, nor did
Trinity include the change in a 2005 submission to the FHWA that disclosed eight other
changes. Yet Trinity continued to certify to its customers that the ET Plus system had been
tested and approved according to the FHWA’s standards. The company has sold thousands
of modified units since 2005.
The FHWA learned of Trinity’s modifications in January 2012, and the agency
scheduled a meeting with Trinity for February 14, 2012. During the meeting, Trinity
admitted that it had narrowed the feeder channel to four inches, indicating that the change
was a “detail inadvertently omitted” from earlier submissions to the FHWA. Id. ¶ 55. But
Trinity affirmatively represented that the four-inch design had passed crash tests in 2005.
Based on these representations—which La Crosse County alleges were false—the FHWA
issued a memorandum in June 2014, indicating that the ET Plus system had an “unbroken
chain of eligibility” since 2005. Id.
In March 2012, Joshua Harman (who is not a party to this suit) filed a qui tam action
alleging that Trinity had defrauded the federal government by not disclosing its design

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changes. 1 The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found that Trinity made false claims to the
government regarding the safety of the ET Plus system. The court entered final judgment in
favor of the United States and Harman, and Trinity appealed. Since the jury’s verdict, 42
states and the province of Quebec have banned installations of the ET Plus system on their
roadways. Wisconsin did so in November 2014, but is now considering whether to re-add the
ET Plus system to its approval list. The FHWA also investigated and re-tested the system.
But the agency concluded that the four-inch design met the appropriate safety criteria and
was eligible for federal-aid reimbursement. See Federal Highway Administration, FHWA
Review of ET-Plus, https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/guardrailsafety/index.cfm (last updated Jan. 6,
2016).
Entities that purchased the modified ET Plus system, like La Crosse County, did not
recover damages as part of the qui tam action. Thus, on February 25, 2015, La Crosse County
filed a products liability suit in this court alleging claims individually and on behalf of both a
statewide class and a nationwide class. After Trinity moved to dismiss the initial complaint,
La Crosse County filed an amended complaint. Dkt. 32. Trinity has now moved to dismiss
the amended complaint. Dkt. 36.
The court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d). La Crosse County has not properly pleaded Trinity Highway Products’s
citizenship. But Trinity Industries and at least one member of the proposed plaintiff class are
citizens of different states, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. At this point,
there is no reason to decline to exercise jurisdiction under § 1332(d)(3) or (d)(4).

1

United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus., Inc., No. 12-cv-089 (E.D. Tex. filed Mar. 6,
2012). The court will refer to this case as “Harman.”

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ANALYSIS
La Crosse County’s amended complaint alleges eight claims against Trinity:
1. Declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., on behalf of a
nationwide class;
2. Strict liability design defect, on behalf of a nationwide class;
3. Breach of contract, on behalf of a statewide class;
4. Violations of the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA),
Wis. Stat. § 100.18, on behalf of a statewide class;
5. False advertising, on behalf of a statewide class;
6. Breach of express warranty, on behalf of a statewide class;
7. Breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose, on behalf of a statewide class; and
8. In the alternative, unjust enrichment, on behalf of nationwide and
statewide classes.
Trinity has moved to dismiss each of these claims, invoking Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Trinity contends that La Crosse County lacks standing to
pursue class claims on behalf of a nationwide class and that the court therefore lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over Claims 1, 2, and 8. On the merits, Trinity contends that La Crosse
County has failed to state any claim upon which relief can be granted and that the court
should therefore dismiss the entire amended complaint. As an alternative to dismissal, Trinity
moves the court to stay this case pending its appeal in Harman. Dkt. 38.
After reviewing the amended complaint and the parties’ submissions, the court will
grant Trinity’s motion to dismiss in part. Trinity’s challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is
not persuasive. But La Crosse County has failed to allege facts that would entitle it to relief
on any but its breach of warranty claims and DTPA and false advertising claims. La Crosse
County has not formally sought leave to amend its pleadings, but the court would not be

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inclined to give the county a third opportunity to plead its claims. As for Trinity’s motion to
stay, there is no reason to keep this case on hold during the appeal in Harman, and so the
court will deny the motion.
A. Standing
Trinity challenges whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the
nationwide class claims, which La Crosse County proposes to bring on behalf of “[a]ll persons
or entities who purchased one or more defective ET-Plus guardrail system[s] (as defined
herein) in the United States.” Dkt. 32, ¶ 87. Trinity contends that La Crosse County lacks
standing to represent a nationwide class because it is a Wisconsin entity alleging violations of
Wisconsin law that led to damages suffered in Wisconsin. Thus, according to Trinity, the
court should dismiss the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
“Standing” is a misnomer because Trinity is not challenging La Crosse County’s
standing in the Article III sense. Instead, Trinity is trying to preempt class certification—a
Rule 23 issue—by arguing that La Crosse County is not a suitable plaintiff to represent a
nationwide class. The point is well-taken, given the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that
“products-liability suits may not proceed as nationwide classes.” In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,
288 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002). But the fact “[t]hat a plaintiff’s claim under his
preferred legal theory fails has nothing to do with subject-matter jurisdiction.” Morrison v.
YTB Int’l, Inc., 649 F.3d 533, 536 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Indeed, “the inherent problem with the idea of ‘standing to bring a class action’ is
that it ‘conflates the standing inquiry with the inquiry under Rule 23 about the suitability of
a plaintiff to serve as a class representative.’” Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 795 (7th Cir.
2008) (quoting Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 2002)).

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Trinity relies heavily on this court’s decision in Martin v. LG Electronics USA, Inc., No.
14-cv-83, 2015 WL 1486517 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2015), to argue that the court can
consider La Crosse County’s standing to pursue class claims as “logically antecedent” to the
question of class certification. See Dkt. 37, at 15 n.4. However, the procedural posture in
Martin makes that case distinguishable: there, the plaintiff had already filed a motion for
class certification, and the court addressed that motion at the same time as the defendants’
motions to dismiss. 2015 WL 1486517, at *1.
“Plaintiffs have standing if they have been injured, the defendants caused that injury,
and the injury can be redressed by a judicial decision.” Morrison, 649 F.3d 533, 536 (7th Cir.
2011). La Crosse County has alleged each of these elements: it purchased products that were
not as safe as advertised, Trinity manufactured and sold those products, and the court can
order Trinity to compensate La Crosse County for its losses. Trinity’s challenge to class
action standing—which is actually a challenge to whether La Crosse County is a suitable class
representative—is premature. The court will deny Trinity’s motion to dismiss the amended
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
Trinity moves to dismiss all eight claims in the amended complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). In reviewing Trinity’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court
construes the amended complaint in the light most favorable to La Crosse County, accepting
the well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in La Crosse County’s
favor. Burke v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint
must contain enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.

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Trinity presents specific merits-based challenges to all eight of La Crosse County’s
claims. Trinity also presents two general challenges to the entire amended complaint,
contending that La Crosse County’s claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations
and repose, and that La Crosse County has failed to allege recoverable damages. The court
will address Trinity’s contentions in turn.
1. Claim 1: declaratory judgment
In Claim 1, La Crosse County “seeks a declaration that the ET-Plus end terminals sold
after Trinity’s undisclosed design changes are defective in their design, material, labeling, and
warranties.” Dkt. 32, ¶ 110. Trinity contends that La Crosse County has failed to allege facts
showing that there is an actual controversy between the parties and that the claim for
declaratory relief is duplicative of the strict liability design defect claim. Dkt. 37, at 17-19.
“By the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress sought to place a remedial arrow in the
district court’s quiver; it created an opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a new form of
relief to qualifying litigants.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995). This means
that district courts have discretion when deciding whether to hear claims for declaratory
relief. Id. at 288-90.
The court will exercise its discretion to decline to hear La Crosse County’s claim for
declaratory relief. Notwithstanding La Crosse Count’s lofty goal of “settling the liability issue
on a nationwide basis,” Dkt. 42, at 19, there are several reasons why this case is a poor
candidate for such sweeping declaratory relief. First, for reasons explained below, the court
concludes that La Crosse County has failed to state claims for strict liability design defect.
With these claims out of the case, it would be odd for the court to require the parties to still
address whether the ET Plus system was, in fact, defective.

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Second, as much as La Crosse County may think that it is efficient to resolve the issue
of defectiveness on a national scale, the Seventh Circuit does not appear to agree. See In re
Bridgestone, 288 F.3d at 1015 (“[P]roducts-liability suits may not proceed as nationwide
classes.”). In makes little sense to keep the claim for declaratory relief now, only to effectively
dismiss it at the class certification stage.
Third, “[a] long line of cases in Wisconsin state that courts may decline to award
declaratory relief where alternative remedies exist. . . . In this case, plaintiff has asserted a
claim for breach of contract that will resolve the same issue as [its] claim for declaratory
relief.” Aslanukov v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 888, 890-91 (W.D.
Wis. 2006). La Crosse County has not demonstrated any practical difference between
declaratory relief and a judgment in its favor on the substantive claims in the amended
complaint.
The court will grant Trinity’s motion to dismiss Claim 1.
2. Claim 2: strict liability design defect
In Claim 2, La Crosse County seeks damages for “the decreased value of the guard
rails” that it ordered, “[t]he safety and feasibility [of which] must now be studied, inspected,
tested, and potentially each unit must be replaced.” Dkt. 32, ¶ 121. Trinity contends that the
economic loss doctrine bars La Crosse County from recovering these damages in tort because
they are economic losses. The court agrees and will grant Trinity’s motion to dismiss Claim 2.
In Wisconsin, the economic loss doctrine prevents a plaintiff from claiming tort
damages (e.g., through a strict liability design defect claim) for purely economic losses when
the underlying wrongful conduct is a breach of a contract between the parties. Tietsworth v.
Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2004 WI 32, ¶ 24, 270 Wis. 2d 146, 677 N.W.2d 233. As relevant in

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this case, the doctrine precludes recovery for “the diminution in the value of the product
because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was
manufactured and sold.” Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 471 N.W.2d
179, 181 (1991). That is essentially what La Crosse County is alleging in this case: it
purchased ET Plus units expecting that they would function as promised, but the products
failed to meet those expectations.
There are three exceptions to the economic loss doctrine. First, the “fraudulent
inducement” exception exists when a party suffers a loss “extraneous” to the contract. Kaloti
Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205. For
this exception to apply, the alleged fraud cannot be interwoven with the parties’ agreement.
Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, ¶ 3, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 662 N.W.2d 652. Stated
another way, the fraud must concern a risk that does “not relate to the quality or the
characteristics of the goods for which the parties contracted.” Kaloti Enters., Inc., 2005 WI
111, ¶ 42. That is not the case here, and the exception does not apply
The second exception is the “services” exception, which applies if a service is the
predominant purpose of a mixed contract for the sale of goods and services. See Linden v.
Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, ¶ 8, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 N.W.2d 189. La Crosse County
does not dispute that it purchased goods from Trinity and not services.
The third exception is the noneconomic loss exception—sometimes referred to as the
“other property exception.” See, e.g., Hackel v. Nat’l Feeds, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 963, 974
(W.D. Wis. 2013). It, too, does not apply in this case. This exception is a narrow one: it
permits a plaintiff to recover damages when “a defect in the product has caused physical
harm to property, property other than the product itself.” Digicorp, Inc., 2003 WI 54, ¶ 41

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(citations an internal quotation marks omitted). La Crosse County contends that the costs
associated with inspecting and replacing defective ET Plus units are not damages caused by
the product’s failure; rather, these are costs incurred because the delivered product differed
from the advertised product. This argument draws a distinction where none exists. Wisconsin
courts apply “the economic loss doctrine [to] preclude[] recovery in tort for economic losses
resulting from the failure of a product to live up to a contracting party’s expectations.”
Tietsworth, 2004 WI 32, ¶ 24. La Crosse County was not satisfied with the ET Plus units that
it received, and the county has incurred (or will incur) costs to fix the problem. These are
economic losses, for which La Crosse County’s remedy lies in contract law. 2
Because none of the exceptions apply, the economic loss doctrine precludes La Crosse
County from recovering tort damages for the allegedly defective ET Plus units. The court will
grant Trinity’s motion to dismiss Claim 2.
3. Claim 3: breach of contract
In Claim 3, La Crosse County alleges that Trinity breached the parties’ sales contract
by delivering a product that was not federally approved. Dkt. 32, ¶¶ 124-25. Trinity contends
that under Wisconsin’s Uniform Commercial Code, a buyer must either reject purchased
goods or revoke its acceptance of those goods before filing a breach of contract claim. 3

2

La Crosse County analogizes this case to Triad Group, Inc. v. Vi-Jon, Inc., in which a federal
court in Wisconsin declined to apply the economic loss doctrine to bar tort claims. 870 F.
Supp. 2d 645, 650-51 (E.D. Wis. 2012). But as La Crosse County’s own recitation of the
facts of Triad Group confirms, Dkt. 42, at 24, that case did not involve a plaintiff who
“complain[ed] that the end product manufactured by [the defendant] was defective or
insufficient—in fact, the end product was simply never completed.” Triad Grp., 870 F. Supp. 2d at
651 (original emphasis). Here, in contrast, La Crosse County actually received a product,
albeit an allegedly defective product. Triad Group does not support La Crosse County’s effort
to avoid the economic loss doctrine.

3

Trinity assumes that Wisconsin law governs the parties’ sales contract. Dkt. 37, at 22 n.5.

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Because the amended complaint does not allege rejection or revocation, the court will dismiss
La Crosse County’s breach of contract claim.
La Crosse County did not reject the ET Plus units that it purchased from Trinity. See
Dkt. 42, at 16; Wis. Stat. § 402.607(2) (“Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes
rejection of the goods accepted.”). Instead, La Crosse County contends that it revoked its
acceptance after learning about the alleged defects. Under Wis. Stat. § 402.608(2),
revocation “is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.” La Crosse County does
not allege that it told Trinity that it was revoking its acceptance of the ET Plus units. To the
contrary, the amended complaint suggests that La Crosse County is still using some or all of
the units. See Dkt. 32, ¶ 72 (“Plaintiff intends to replace all ET-PLUS end terminal systems
on its roadways as soon as it has available funds to do so. Plaintiff estimates it will cost
approximately $42,255.92 to replace the fourteen ET-Plus systems installed on its roads.”).
La Crosse County argues that no notice was required in this case. The county relies on
Muehlbauer v. General Motors Corporation, which, in turn, relied on an Illinois court’s holding
that “direct notice is not required when the seller actually knows about the defect of a
particular product, or the seller is reasonably notified by the filing of the buyer’s complaint.”
431 F. Supp. 2d 847, 858 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (discussing Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d
482, 675 N.E.2d 584, 590-91 (1996)). But as Trinity correctly responds, the issue in those
cases was whether the buyer gave the seller notice of a breach of warranty, not notice of
revocation. See id. at 857-58; Connick, 675 N.E.2d at 589.
Even construing the amended complaint in La Crosse County’s favor, there is simply
no allegation that the county notified Trinity that it was revoking its acceptance of the
La Crosse County assumes so as well. Dkt. 42, at 16-17.

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defective ET Plus units. If anything, the amended complaint confirms that La Crosse County
could not have revoked its acceptance because it is still using the ET Plus units. A buyer must
revoke its acceptance of goods before suing for a breach of contract arising from
nonconforming goods. Wis. Stat. § 402.711. La Crosse County has not alleged revocation,
and so the court will grant Trinity’s motion to dismiss Claim 3.
4. Claims 4 and 5: DTPA and false advertising
In Claims 4 and 5, La Crosse County alleges that Trinity violated Wis. Stat. § 100.18
by falsely representing that the FHWA had approved the ET Plus system. Dkt. 32, ¶¶ 13536, 140-41. It is not clear that these claims are actually distinct: both claims allege violations
of § 100.18 based on Trinity’s allegedly false representations, and both claims allege that
these false representations induced La Crosse County to purchase ET Plus units. See id. The
parties appear to treat the claims as one, analyzing them together under the same standard.
The court will do so as well. 4
Claims under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 have three elements: (1) the defendant made a
representation to “the public” with the intent to induce an obligation; (2) the representation
was “untrue, deceptive or misleading”; and (3) the representation materially caused a
pecuniary loss to the plaintiff. Grice Eng’g, Inc. v. JG Innovations, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 2d 915,
922 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (citing Novell v. Migliaccio, 2008 WI 44, ¶ 49, 309 Wis. 2d 132, 749
N.W.2d 544).
Trinity contends that the court must dismiss the § 100.18 claims because: (1) La
Crosse County has not satisfied Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements; (2) La Crosse

4

Should this case proceed to dispositive motions, the court will expect La Crosse County to
explain if, and how, these claims are actually distinct.

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County was not a member of “the public,” as § 100.18 requires; and (3) a failure to disclose
is not the same as an affirmative misrepresentation, which § 100.18 also requires. The court
concludes that the amended complaint satisfies Rule 9(b). The court also concludes that, at
this point, the complaint plausibly alleges facts from which to infer that La Crosse County
was a member of the public and that Trinity affirmatively misrepresented to La Crosse
County that the FHWA had certified the ET Plus system.
a. Rule 9(b)
Rule 9(b) requires a party alleging fraud or mistake to “state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” The precise level of particularity that Rule 9(b)
requires will vary from case to case, but a plaintiff must usually describe “the who, what,
when, where, and how of the fraud.” Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 737
(7th Cir. 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Requiring this level of
particularity “force[s] the plaintiff to do more than the usual investigation before filing his
complaint.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). La Crosse County does not
dispute that these heightened pleading requirements apply to Claims 4 and 5. Dkt. 42, at 1011; see also Am. Orthodontics Corp. v. Epicor Software Corp., 746 F. Supp. 2d 996, 999 (E.D.
Wis. 2010) (applying Rule 9(b) to a DTPA claim). But La Crosse County contends that the
amended complaint gives Trinity notice of specific fraudulent actions by recounting some of
the evidence presented in Harman.
Given the unusual circumstances of this case, it makes sense to allow La Crosse
County to satisfy Rule 9(b) by generally referring to evidence from the qui tam action that
gave rise to this suit. With the benefit of this allowance, the amended complaint passes
muster under Rule 9(b).

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b. Member of “the public”
Trinity contends that La Crosse County has failed to state a claim under § 100.18
because the amended complaint affirmatively demonstrates that La Crosse County was not a
member of “the public.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court has emphasized that the “important
factor” in determining when a representation is made to a member of the public “is whether
there is some particular relationship between the parties.” State v. Automatic Merchandisers of
Am., Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 659, 221 N.W.2d 683, 686 (1974). For example, “a plaintiff is no
longer a member of ‘the public’ for the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) once he or she has
entered into a contract to purchase the offered item.” K & S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection
Mach. Sales, Inc., 2007 WI 70, ¶ 26, 301 Wis. 2d 109, 732 N.W.2d 792. 5 Thus, any
misrepresentations to La Crosse County about the ET Plus units that occurred after La
Crosse County had entered into a contract to buy them would not have been representations
to the public. See Waukesha County v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., No. 06-cv-656, 2007 WL
902243, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 21, 2007).
It is also relevant that § 100.18 has a three-year statute of repose. Wis. Stat.
§ 100.18(11)(b)(3); Kain v. Bluemound E. Indus. Park, Inc., 2001 WI App 230, ¶¶ 14-15, 248
Wis. 2d 172, 635 N.W.2d 640. This means that because La Crosse County filed its initial
complaint on February 25, 2015, it must allege misrepresentations that occurred in 2012 or
later.

5

La Crosse County relies on K & S Tool for the proposition that whether a plaintiff is a
member of the public is a question of fact. Dkt. 42, at 12. But the court in K & S Tool did
not announce a blanket rule to that effect; instead, the court held that the facts of the case,
which included only a telephone call between the plaintiff and the defendant, made the
question one of fact and not one of law. 2007 WI 70, ¶ 30.

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La Crosse County alleges that it began purchasing ET Plus units in 2011, pursuant to
a sales contract in which Trinity offered to sell federally approved ET Plus end terminals at a
specified price. Dkt. 32, ¶¶ 9, 124. But the parties have not filed copies of their sales contract
(or contracts), nor have they described the specifics of their contractual relationship.
Although the amended complaint alleges that at least one contract existed, it is not clear that
all of La Crosse County’s purchases in 2012 and 2014 were pursuant to that one contract.
The more reasonable inference is that the parties did not have an ongoing contractual
relationship and that each of La Crosse County’s purchases arose from separate contracts.
Trinity does not identify authority to support a blanket rule that once two parties
have entered into a contract, they forever have a “particular relationship” that would preclude
claims under § 100.18. Instead, Wisconsin law limits the bar on such claims to postcontractual representations about the subject of the contract. See Kailin v. Armstrong, 2002
WI App 70, ¶ 44, 252 Wis. 2d 676, 643 N.W.2d 132. This limit makes sense, given the
law’s purpose of protecting individuals from untrue or misleading promotional statements
about a product: there is no need to protect an individual from false statements about a
product once that individual has already agreed to purchase it.
Under the standards for reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the
court cannot definitively conclude that La Crosse County was not a member of the public
when Trinity falsely represented in 2012 and 2014 that the FHWA had certified the ET Plus
system. The evidence may ultimately make this issue amendable to resolution at summary
judgment. But at this point, the court will not dismiss La Crosse County’s § 100.18 claims.

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c. Misrepresentations
Trinity also contends that its failure to disclose the changes to the ET Plus system
were not “representations” that give rise to liability under § 100.18. According to Trinity, La
Crosse County has improperly premised its § 100.18 claims on Trinity’s failure to disclose its
design changes to the FHWA or to La Crosse County. And because “[a] nondisclosure is not
an ‘assertion, representation or statement of fact’ under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1),” Tietsworth,
2004 WI 32, ¶ 40, Trinity contends that the court should dismiss these claims.
Trinity misunderstands the nature of La Crosse County’s § 100.18 claims. The
amended complaint alleges that Trinity falsely certified that the FHWA had approved the ET
Plus system and that the product complied with applicable safety standards. Dkt. 32, ¶¶ 135,
141. These were affirmative misrepresentations that Trinity allegedly made to La Crosse
County each time that it sold the county an ET Plus unit. Id. ¶¶ 50, 73. La Crosse County
has adequately pleaded this element of its § 100.18 claims.
5. Claims 6 and 7: breach of warranty
In Claims 6 and 7, La Crosse County alleges that Trinity breached express warranties
and implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. These claims
arise out of Trinity falsely warranting that the ET Plus system had been approved by all
applicable regulatory authorities, was fit for its intended use, and was free from defect. Id.
¶¶ 145-46, 158, 164. Trinity’s only ground for dismissing these claims is that the amended
complaint fails to comply with Rule 9(b). But as explained above, the amended complaint
alleges how Trinity defrauded its customers, which warranties were untrue, and when the
relevant events occurred. With the benefit of all reasonable inferences drawn in La Crosse

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County’s favor, these allegations satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements. The
court will deny Trinity’s motion to dismiss Claims 6 and 7.
6. Claim 8: unjust enrichment
La Crosse County has pleaded Claim 8 in the alternative, alleging that Trinity was
unjustly enriched by its deceptive and unlawful conduct. Id. ¶ 169. But under Wisconsin law,
“an express contract [precludes] recover[y] under the quasi-contractual doctrines of quantum
meruit or unjust enrichment.” Carroll v. Stryker Corp., 658 F.3d 675, 684 (7th Cir. 2011). La
Crosse County has affirmatively alleged the existence of an enforceable contract. See, e.g.,
Dkt. 32, ¶¶ 124 (“A valid sales contract existed between Plaintiff and Defendants.”), 147
(referring to “express warranties”).
At this point in the case, dismissing Claim 8 makes little practical sense. Much like
the cases on which Trinity relies, the court would have to dismiss this claim without prejudice
and allow La Crosse County to reinstate it later, should the court determine that no contract
exists between the parties. See, e.g., Harley Marine Servs., Inc. v. Manitowoc Marine Grp., LLC,
759 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1063 (E.D. Wis. 2010). The rationale for this approach is that
dismissing non-viable claims now will set bounds on discovery and save the parties from
needlessly pursuing a claim that will eventually get dropped from the case. Id.
But dismissing Claim 8 now creates the risk that the court may have to reinstate it
later. That would likely require allowing the parties to conduct additional discovery, which
could in turn require bumping back existing deadlines and delaying this case. And that is why
this court has routinely taken a different approach to alternative unjust enrichment claims,
often refusing to dismiss them even when the complaint pleads the existence of a valid
contract. See, e.g., Seed v. Vannet, No. 09-cv-309, 2009 WL 5216937, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Dec.

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22, 2009); Diamond Ctr., Inc. v. Leslie’s Jewelry Mfg. Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1017 (W.D.
Wis. 2008). Keeping Claim 8 for now—with the understanding that the court will dismiss it
if the parties in fact had an enforceable contract—imposes minimal marginal cost; it will
require the parties to add little, if anything, to their already ongoing discovery efforts. The
court will deny Trinity’s motion to dismiss Claim 8.
7. Statutes of limitations and repose
Trinity moves the court to dismiss: “(1) all breach of contract and breach of warranty
claims accruing prior to February 25, 2009; (2) all consumer fraud claims accruing prior to
February 25, 2012; and (3) all unjust enrichment and design defect claims accruing prior to
February 25, 2009.” Dkt. 37, at 32. According to Trinity, these claims are all barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations and repose. La Crosse County responds that none of its
claims fall into these categories: it is alleging unlawful acts that occurred in 2011, 2013, and
2014. Dkt. 42, at 25. Because La Crouse County has limited its claims to these periods, there
are no claims that require dismissal because they involve conduct for which a statute of
limitations or repose has run. The court will deny this aspect of Trinity’s motion to dismiss.
8. Damages
Trinity also moves the court to dismiss the entire complaint because La Crosse
County has failed to plead recoverable damages. As Trinity views the case, none of the ET
Plus units that La Crosse County purchased have malfunctioned. Nor have they shown signs
of defect. Thus, Trinity contends that La Crosse County has not incurred any damages.
Trinity analogizes this case to In re Bridgestone, which involved class claims brought by
owners of SUVs with tires that had an abnormally high failure rate. 288 F.3d at 1015. But
the class members had not experienced these failures themselves; their tires had performed

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properly, and they sought damages for the risk of failure, which diminished the resale value of
their cars and caused emotional distress. Id. The Seventh Circuit was skeptical about the
viability of the class action claims, commenting that:
Plaintiffs describe the injury as financial rather than physical
and seek to move the suit out of the tort domain and into that
of contract (the vehicle was not the flawless one described and
thus is not merchantable, a warranty theory) and consumer
fraud (on the theory that selling products with undisclosed
attributes, and thus worth less than represented, is fraudulent).
It is not clear that this maneuver actually moves the locus from
tort to contract. If tort law fully compensates those who are
physically injured, then any recoveries by those whose products
function properly mean excess compensation. As a result, most
states would not entertain the sort of theory that plaintiffs press.
Id. at 1017. At least one district court in this circuit has cited In re Bridgestone to support
dismissing breach of warranty claims that are based on products being less valuable than
advertised. See, e.g., Jasper v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 2d 766, 774 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
(“[The plaintiff] has not adequately alleged a breach of warranty because she has not
adequately alleged that her [product] was defective.”).
The court is not persuaded that La Crosse County’s damages are unrecoverable as a
matter of law. For the breach of warranty claims, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
recognized that “plaintiffs may have contract remedies—breach of contract/warranty or
rescission and restitution—but may not pursue a tort claim for misrepresentation premised
on having purchased allegedly defective motorcycles.” Tietsworth, 2004 WI 32, ¶ 37; see also
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 592 N.W.2d 201, 216
(1999) (“When a product fails to operate as warranted or as a consumer expected, the proper
avenue for relief is a breach-of-warranty claim.”). And for the DTPA and false advertising
claims, § 100.18 permits a plaintiff to recover damages for pecuniary losses.

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La Crosse County alleges that Trinity falsely represented that the FHWA had
approved the ET Plus system and that the product complied with all applicable safety
regulations. The county also alleges that it would not have purchased the ET Plus units
without Trinity’s representations and that it must now replace the units with certified safety
equipment. Permitting recovery for the cost of replacement allows La Crosse County to
receive the benefit of its bargain. Cf. Leaf Funding, Inc. v. Cool Exp. Wis., Inc., No. 07-cv-589,
2009 WL 330157, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 9, 2009) (“If the party does not receive the
contracted-for-benefit, then the breach is material and the injured party is entitled to
damages.”). La Crosse County has alleged recoverable damages, which is all that it must do at
this point. The court will deny this aspect of Trinity’s motion to dismiss.
C. Leave to amend
Although La Crosse County has not formally moved for leave to amend, portions of
its opposition to Trinity’s motion to dismiss ask the court to grant leave to amend rather
than dismiss any claims. See, e.g., Dkt. 42, at 4 n.13, 11 n.50, 17, 27. But based on the
circumstances of this case and the reasons that the court has given for dismissing most of La
Crosse County’s claims, the court is not inclined to grant leave to amend.
This was Trinity’s second motion to dismiss, and it raised substantially the same
arguments that the first motion raised. Yet despite having the benefit of a detailed
description of the deficiencies in its initial pleadings, many of La Crosse County’s amended
claims failed to overcome those deficiencies. Trinity has pointed out fundamental legal
deficiencies in Trinity’s theory of the case. This factor weighs against granting leave to amend
the complaint again.

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Another round of amended pleadings would also delay the case. Inviting a third
complaint would likely lead to a third motion to dismiss, which would require more briefing
and jeopardize the calendar for the case. Although Trinity can hardly claim prejudice from
the delay (remember that Trinity has moved to stay the case pending its appeal in Harman),
the court is mindful of its Rule 1 obligation “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”
Additional factual allegations would not salvage the now-dismissed claims. The
economic loss doctrine bars La Crosse County’s strict liability claims, and the claims for
declaratory relief are unnecessary. Perhaps La Crosse County could allege facts showing that
it revoked its acceptance of the ET Plus units, which might revive its breach of contract
claims. But that seems highly unlikely because La Crosse County affirmatively alleges that it
is still using the units that it purchased.
Amendment would unnecessarily delay this case, and it would likely be futile. Given
that La Crosse County has twice failed to plead viable claims for strict liability, breach of
contract, and declaratory relief, the court is not persuaded that a third opportunity will yield
a different result.
D. Motion to stay
As an alternative to dismissal, Trinity moves to stay this case pending its appeal in
Harman. Dkt. 38. Trinity contends that a stay is warranted because a successful appeal will
negate the factual predicate for La Crosse County’s entitlement to relief: whether Trinity
falsely certified that the ET Plus system met federal crash test criteria and had FHWA
approval. Trinity also contends that a stay will give the Wisconsin Department of

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Transportation time to retest the ET Plus system and determine whether it is approved for
installation in Wisconsin.
Courts have authority to stay cases in the interest of judicial economy. See Landis v. N.
Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). Although the decision to stay is discretionary, there are
limits to the court’s discretion: “the general test for imposing a stay requires the court to
‘balance interests favoring a stay against interests frustrated by the action’ in light of the
court’s strict duty to exercise jurisdiction in a timely manner.” Grice Eng’g, Inc., 691 F. Supp.
2d at 920 (quoting Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)). The relevant factors to consider include whether: (1) the litigation is at an early
stage; (2) a stay will unduly prejudice or tactically disadvantage the non-moving party; (3) a
stay will simplify the issues in question and streamline the trial; and (4) a stay will reduce the
burden of litigation on the parties and on the court. Id.
Here, the stage of the litigation is a mostly neutral factor. The parties have just begun
discovery, and the court has not yet taken up the issue of class certification. But liability
expert reports are due in three months and dispositive motions are due in six months. We are
not on the eve of trial, but the case is certainly not in its infancy.
The remaining factors weigh against staying the case. La Crosse County alludes only
vaguely to the danger of losing evidence and to the fact that a stay gives Trinity a tactical
advantage. Dkt. 43, at 6. But cases can become more difficult to try as time passes because
memories fade and evidence gets misplaced. Although the prejudice to La Crosse County is
no greater than the prejudice that any plaintiff experiences when it must wait to obtain the
relief that it seeks, this factor still tips against a stay.

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The principal reason to deny Trinity’s motion to stay, however, is because it is not
clear that the appeal in Harman will have a material effect on this case. The court is
permitting La Crosse County to proceed with claims for violations of § 100.18 and breach of
warranty (and, in the alternative, unjust enrichment). These claims will turn on whether
Trinity falsely represented to La Crosse County and a statewide class of plaintiffs that the ET
Plus system was approved for installation on state highways and had been approved by all
applicable regulatory authorities. These are not the issues in Harman, which appears to be a
case about whether Trinity made misstatements to the FHWA. Moreover, any decision in
Harman would be persuasive precedent only, with no binding effect in this case. Cf. Hy Cite
Corp. v. Regal Ware, Inc., No. 10-cv-168, 2010 WL 2079866, at *1 (W.D. Wis. May 19,
2010).
As for Trinity’s arguments regarding the Wisconsin Department of Transportation,
they are irrelevant. The state agency’s determination could change the nature and scope of La
Crosse County’s possible recovery. But that would be an ancillary matter, with no effect on
the factual issues that La Crosse County’s claims present.
The court is not persuaded that a stay is appropriate in this case. Trinity’s motion is
therefore denied.
E. Conclusion
To briefly summarize, La Crosse County has standing to pursue its claims, and the
court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Those aspects of Trinity’s motion to
dismiss are denied. La Crosse County has adequately pleaded claims for violations of
§ 100.18, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranties, as well as a claim in
the alternative for unjust enrichment. La Crosse County has also adequately alleged

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recoverable damages for these claims. Trinity’s motion to dismiss Claims 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 is
denied.
The rest of Trinity’s motion to dismiss is granted. Claims 1, 2, and 3 are dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Finally, Trinity’s motion to stay is denied. This case will proceed as scheduled, with all
existing deadlines remaining firmly in place.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendants Trinity Highway Products LLC and Trinity Industries, Inc.’s motion
to dismiss, Dkt. 36, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as explained
above. Claims 1, 2, and 3 in the amended complaint, Dkt. 32, are DISMISSED
with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. Defendants’ motion to stay, Dkt. 38, is DENIED.
Entered March 31, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge

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