Williams, Roosevelt v. Fry, Sara et al

Filing 82

ORDER denying plaintiff's 53 , 67 renewed motions for sanctions, granting defendants' 40 Motion for Summary Judgment. The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment in defendants' favor and close this case. Signed by District Judge James D. Peterson on 3/30/2017. (jef),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

ROOSEVELT WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
SARA FRY and TRAVIS HAAG,

ORDER
15-cv-212-jdp

Defendants.
Plaintiff Roosevelt Williams, a prisoner at the Columbia Correctional Institution,
brings claims that defendant prison officials violated his due process rights by confiscating his
wedding ring and funds from his release account, and violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by denying him a lower bunk restriction. Defendants have filed a motion for summary
judgment, to which Williams responded by filing a series of motions alleging that prison
officials engaged in various misconduct, including withholding disclosure of documents until
Williams’s summary judgment response deadline passed, and tampering with pieces of
evidence. In a September 20, 2016 order, I denied his various motions for sanctions for the
time being but gave him a chance to submit supplemental materials in opposition to the
summary judgment motion and supporting his assertions that defendants tampered with
evidence. Dkt. 76.
Williams has submitted supplemental materials and defendants have responded. After
considering the parties’ submissions, I see no reason to reconsider my previous rulings
denying his motions for sanctions. I also conclude that defendants’ motion for summary
judgment should be granted on all of Williams’s claims.

A. Sanctions
In the September 20 order, I stated that Williams made two arguments about prison
officials tampering with evidence:


Ms. Pafford “deliberately and intentionally alter and purposely made different [a
health service request] form Williams sent to [the Health Services Unit],” Dkt. 53,
at 1, but he does not explain how the document was altered, and how it affects
any of his claims in this lawsuit.



prison official Kim Carl “tampered with evidence,” and that she has opened some
of his legal mail and prevented a copy of his interrogatories from reaching the
court, Dkt. 67 but it is unclear whether he means that Carl has altered documents,
or he is referring to Carl blocking the mailing of the interrogatories.

Dkt. 76, at 3-4. I instructed Williams that to prevail on renewed motions for sanctions he
would have to “explain what he means by ‘tampering’ in detail, how he knows the evidence
has been tampered with, what accurate copies of the evidence looked like before they was
tampered with, and how his claims have been affected by this evidence.” Id. at 4.
Williams now says that Pafford added her writing onto his copies of “authenticated
HSU forms.” He says that he has submitted two copies of a form—one with her writing and
one without—but those documents do not seem to be included in his supplemental
submissions, because there are no documents fitting his description. He does not identify the
document with enough particularity to even guess at which document he is referring to. This
does not address my concerns with his previous motions for sanctions.
Williams says that Carl intercepted a set of interrogatories he intended to send to the
court in June 2016, presumably along with his summary judgment response, but he does not
explain how he knew this intentional tampering happened, other than that she was working
in the mail room when it allegedly disappeared. This speculation cannot be the basis for
sanctions. He does not cite to these interrogatories in his proposed findings of fact or brief, so

2

it is unclear how the interrogatories would have made a difference in his litigation of the case.
He later submitted a set of unanswered interrogatories dated October 12, 2016, Dkt. 78, but
he does not explain whether these were a copy of what went missing earlier, or provide any
other reason for submitting them. Because Williams falls far short of fulfilling my
instructions for supporting his renewed motions for sanctions, I will deny his motions.
B. Summary Judgment
To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “A genuine issue
of material fact arises only if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists to
permit a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Brummett v. Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc., 414
F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2005). All reasonable inferences from the facts in the summary
judgment record must be drawn in the nonmoving party’s favor. Baron v. City of Highland
Park, 195 F.3d 333, 338 (7th Cir. 1999). If the nonmoving party fails to establish the
existence of an essential element on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,
summary judgment for the moving party is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
1. Findings of fact
Plaintiff Roosevelt Williams is a state of Wisconsin prisoner incarcerated at the
Columbia Correctional Institution (CCI), a maximum security institution located in Portage,
Wisconsin. During the time relevant to this case, defendant Sara Fry was a corrections unit
supervisor at CCI. While at CCI Fry was a member of the “Special Needs Committee,” which
meets weekly to consider inmate complaints and accommodation requests related to inmates’
physical conditions. Defendant Travis Haag is a correctional sergeant at CCI.

3

a. Ring and release account funds
Under Division of Adult Institutions policy 309.20.03, for security reasons, only
inmates that can document they are married or widowed are permitted to wear a wedding
ring. This rule is in place to limit the use of personal property as a status symbol or as
currency in gambling within the prison.1
In July 2012, Williams was transferred from the Waupun Correctional Institution to
the Oshkosh Correctional Institution. The property inventory form associated with that
transfer showed that Williams possessed a wedding ring. Inventories from his November 19,
2013 transfer to the Dodge Correctional Institution and November 21, 2013 transfer to CCI
had this field blank, although the state concedes that “[i]t is possible that the ring was on
Williams’s finger at the time the inventories were completed and not properly included on
the Property Inventor(ies).” Dkt. 58, at 2. The CCI inventory also shows that a wedding ring
was added to his list of possessions at some point.
Even though Williams had a wedding ring at CCI, he did not possess documentation
(such as a marriage license) that he was authorized to possess it as of July 10, 2014. In July
2014, defendant Haag told Fry that Williams had a ring on but had no documentation that
he was married. Fry “looked into this further and found no evidence that [Williams] was
married.” On July 10, Fry told Haag to confiscate the ring. Williams gave the ring to Haag.2

Williams says that the officers did not take his word that he was married, because of his
race, but he was not allowed leave to proceed on equal protection claims. Likewise, he
contends that Fry retaliated against him for filing grievances, but he was not allowed leave to
proceed on a retaliation theory.
1

The parties dispute the exact location and officers present when Williams gave the ring to
Haag, but the dispute is immaterial. Williams also says that Haag used a racial slur while
telling him to hand over the ring, but again, he is not proceeding on equal protection claims.
At best, his theory of racial discrimination suggests that defendants’ decision violated due
2

4

Fry says that she told Williams that she would keep it in her desk pending receipt of his
proof of marriage. Williams says that Fry never told her this.
Williams filed an inmate grievance stating that Fry and Haag took his ring without
permission and threatened punishment if he did not comply with their orders. The inmate
complaint examiner recommended dismissal because Williams did not have proof of his
marriage. The inmate complaint examiner also recommended that staff follow up with
Williams because under prison rules, his ring could be disposed of after 30 days if the prison
did not receive proof of the marriage. The warden affirmed the dismissal of Williams’s
complaint and Williams appealed. On appeal, corrections complaint examiner Charles
Facktor obtained a letter from the Dane County Register of Deeds office, which he accepted
as sufficient proof of Williams’s marriage. On August 12, 2014, he recommended affirming
Williams’s appeal with the modification that the ring should be returned and a copy of the
letter be placed in Williams’s social services file.
While this was happening, Williams was trying to get the documentation of marriage
himself. On August 12, 2014, presumably before he received Facktor’s ruling, Williams
completed a form seeking disbursement of release account funds to pay for a copy his
marriage certificate (Williams had no money in his regular account). Because of the
importance of the wedding ring, Fry says that she requested special permission from the
warden to use release account funds for this purpose.3 Two days later, $20 were transferred to
Williams’s regular account, and a check for $20 was sent to the state office of vital records.

process because it was made in violation of prison rules. I address that argument below.
Williams disputes that Fry made any attempt to help him, but he does not have personal
knowledge of Fry’s efforts.
3

5

On August 26, 2014, DOC secretary-designee Deirdre Morgan ruled on Williams’s
grievance appeal, stating the following:
The
attached
Corrections
Complaint
Examiner’s
recommendation to AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION this
complaint is not accepted as the decision of the Secretary. My
decision is to affirm this appeal.
Dkt. 42-2, at 7.4
Fry says that she gave the ring back to Williams when the corrections complaint
examiner’s recommendation was issued (by this time Haag did not work on Williams’s unit,
so he was not involved in the decision to return the ring). She does not say what day she
returned the ring, but her declaration makes clear that it was before Morgan’s ruling on
August 26. Williams disputes Fry’s version, saying that Fry did not give him his ring back
when she claims to have. He cites to a “property receipt/disposition” form showing that he
received the ring back on September 3, 2014. I will credit Williams’s version.
On August 27, 2014, Williams submitted an “Interview/Information Request” form
asking Lindsay Walker to stop payment on the check. I take it to be undisputed that this did
not happen.

This ruling is ambiguous—defendants argue that Morgan did not agree with Facktor’s
ultimate outcome, which was to give the ring back to Williams. This has support because
Morgan said she did “not accept[]” that decision. But as discussed below, the institution
complaint examiner handling Williams’s next grievance seemed to interpret Morgan’s ruling
as being in favor of Williams—perhaps because it used the term “affirm,” which in the ICRS
setting is usually associated with a ruling in the prisoner’s favor, see Wis. Admin. Code
§§ 310.12 (the institution complaint examiner either dismisses or affirms a prisoner’s
complaint), and 310.15 (“The department shall implement an affirmed decision within 30
working days from the date of decision.”) (emphasis added). Moreover, Morgan states that
she affirmed “the appeal,” which makes it sound like she agrees with the person appealing, as
opposed to affirming the previous ruling to dismiss the complaint. I will resolve this
ambiguity in Williams’s favor and assume for purposes of this opinion that Morgan meant to
give the ring back to plaintiff.
4

6

Williams filed another inmate grievance (dated August 28 and received September 2,
2014), alleging that Fry had failed to comply with instructions to return his ring. The
institution complaint examiner recommended dismissing the new grievance because Wis.
Admin. Code § DOC 310.15(1) allows staff 30 working days from an affirmed complaint to
implement that decision, and this complaint was filed only six working days after Morgan
issued her final order. The warden dismissed the complaint on September 12, 2014. Williams
did not appeal this decision. Nor did Williams file a later grievance about the ring.
On September 19, 2014, Williams filed a third grievance, this one alleging that the
business office violated policy by deducting $20 from his release account without the proper
authorities’ consent. Defendants say that this grievance was dismissed because Williams
intended to use those funds to pay for a copy of his marriage certificate. That is not quite
true. Williams’s complaint was “affirmed with modification.” The institution complaint
examiner’s decision, which was adopted by all subsequent reviewers, was that although
marriage certificates were not an approved use of release account funds, and thus should not
have been approved, Williams indeed asked for the disbursement and received a copy of the
certificate.5 The examiner concluded that under these circumstances, Williams should not be
reimbursed, but that staff should be instructed about the proper use of release account funds.
b. Special Needs Committee
Williams suffers from lower back pain, in part caused by buckshot lodged in his back
after being shot “years ago.” On October 16, 2014, Williams submitted a health service
request complaining of throbbing and aching discomfort in his back. He was scheduled to be
The examiner also incorrectly stated that the certificate was used by Williams in prevailing
on his earlier grievance, when the document actually used in that proceeding was the letter
procured by Facktor.
5

7

seen in the Health Services Unit (HSU). The next day, Williams met with Nurse Campbell.
In her notes Campbell stated that Williams ambulated to the HSU without difficulty,
showed no distress, and was sitting in his chair comfortably with fluid movement. 6 Campbell
counseled Williams to work through back stretches and exercises, use ice and topical pain rub
as needed, continue with the pain medication, and decrease his weight.
On October 26, 2014, Williams submitted a health service request requesting a back
brace, wondering why his request for a lower bunk restriction was not granted, and wanting
to know when he was going to Madison for a colonoscopy. On October 31, 2014, Williams
submitted another health service request requesting a back brace and wanting to know the
status of his colonoscopy appointment. Williams filed inmate grievance no. CCI-2014-23168
on November 25, 2014, complaining he was not being treated for back pain issues.
The institution complaint examiner had Nurse Mashak review the medical record.
Mashak stated that Williams’s requests received prompt replies telling him that he was
scheduled to see a doctor. The grievance was dismissed.
In early December 2014, Williams submitted a request to the Special Needs
Committee seeking a low bunk restriction due to chronic low-back pain. DOC medical staff
follow Health Services Policy 300:07, “Medical/Dental Restrictions/Special Needs” when
inmates request special restrictions. Under this policy, requests for special needs and
restrictions are addressed by a Special Needs Committee, including at least one staff member

Williams disagrees with Campbell’s assessment. He states that she did not see him
“ambulate” to the meeting and that he was openly in pain. But because this case involves
defendant Fry’s interpretation of the medical notes, the relevant fact is what is contained in
the notes.
6

8

from the Health Services Unit, two supervisory staff members, and the institution’s
Americans with Disability Act coordinator.
The Committee applies guidelines set forth in the policy and nursing protocols to
determine whether medical restrictions or special needs should be authorized. During the
Committee meetings, one of the Committee members would read the criteria for a specific
restriction, and the HSU staff member would review the inmate’s medical records. Under this
policy, prescribing practitioners generally refer items to the Committee for review of special
needs rather than write orders themselves for specific items. As seen below, some of the items
can still be prescribed directly. The decision of the Committee cannot be appealed.
According to the guidelines in Appendix 1 of the policy, the Committee could approve
low bunk restrictions for the following conditions:


Acute injury: a temporary restriction that can be authorized directly by a nurse
or prescriber.



Significant functional limitations in mobility secondary
musculoskeletal disorders or neurological disorders.7

to

arthritis,

The list included in defendants’ proposed findings of fact is incomplete. It omits “significant
functional limitations in mobility secondary to arthritis, musculoskeletal disorders or
neurological disorders,” which is the condition most closely aligned with Williams’s
symptoms. See Dkt. 45, at 10-11. Williams points this out in his response, and defendants
double down on their mistake by objecting to Williams’s proposed finding as argumentative
and conclusory. They are incorrect. If this were a closer case or I thought that defendant Fry
and the Committee actually ignored this category, it could be grounds to deny their motion
or even grant Williams summary judgment. But it is clear that the error originated in the
declaration of Nurse Kristine DeYoung, a non-defendant, Dkt. 46, at 2-3 (whose citation to
the policy is also to a non-existent exhibit number). The actual version of the policy provided
by defendants and cited by Fry herself includes the missing category, so I will disregard the
error in defendants’ proposed findings and instead I will work with the policy as stated in the
exhibits. There is no reason to think that Fry or the Committee used a version of the policy
as stated by DeYoung. This means that I will disregard any fact proposed by DeYoung relying
on this incorrect version, however. I expect all parties, but especially the state, to be accurate
in their statements of the facts, particularly those facts on which the case might turn.
7

9



Significant symptomatic cardiovascular disease.



Obesity: a body mass index of greater than 40, and significant mobility issues.



Older than 65.



Post-operative: a temporary restriction that can be authorized directly by a
nurse or prescriber.



A current seizure diagnosis.



Pregnancy at 20 weeks and later.



Blindness.

Dkt. 44-1, at 9.
Williams was seen in HSU for a “Special Needs Committee evaluation” on December
10, 2014. Nurse Whalen reported that Williams attended recreation two times a week,
participating in weightlifting and bike riding, and also performed weekly back exercises. His
gait was straight, his range of motion was good, and he could sit and stand without difficulty.
On December 11, 2014, the Committee (including Fry, Nurse Thorne, ADA
Coordinator Schmidt, and Captain Morgan) met to discuss Williams’s request for a low bunk
restriction. After consulting the policy and considering the criteria for a low bunk restriction,
the Committee denied the request. The Committee sent Williams a memorandum stating,
“You do not meet the medical criteria for this restriction.”
Williams received further examinations, including a March 2015 appointment with
Dr. Syed in which he told Williams that he did not meet any of the criteria for a low bunk
restriction, and a March 2015 x-ray showing an intact lumbar spine. He was issued a back
brace in August 2015. In September 2015, the Committee denied another request by
Williams for a lower bunk. In May 2016, the Committee again denied him the restriction
(Williams does not explain if Fry was on that Committee). But later in May 2016, a

10

“Prescriber’s Order” granted Williams a bottom bunk restriction for one year. I take this to
have come from a medical doctor.
2. Analysis
a. Due process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from
“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
Amend. XIV, § 1. To prevail on a § 1983 procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he: (1) has a cognizable property interest; (2) has suffered a deprivation of
that interest; and (3) was denied due process. Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir.
2010).
There are three aspects to Williams’s due process claims: (1) defendants Fry and Haag
took Williams’s wedding ring; (2) Fry kept the ring even after a ruling stating to give it back;
and (3) Fry told the business office to deduct funds from Williams’s release account without
proper authorization.
It is undisputed that Williams has a protected property interest in his wedding ring
and the money in his trust fund accounts. It is also undisputed that Fry and Haag confiscated
Williams’s ring. Defendants shift between arguing that they should be granted summary
judgment because (1) it was proper for them to confiscate the ring; and (2) and that their
actions were “random and unauthorized” such that predeprivation process was unavailable
under Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533
(1984). The analysis is somewhat complicated by the ambiguous ruling of the secretarydesignee. It is unclear whether she meant to say that defendants properly followed the DOC’s

11

jewelry policy, or that they violated the policy. Defendants’ actions were not random and
unauthorized if they followed the prison’s policy.
But Williams’s claim fails either way. From my review of the DOC’s policy on
possession of jewelry, it looks like defendants properly confiscated Williams’s ring. As harsh
as it seems, Williams did not have documentation that he was married or widowed. Williams
does not contend that the state’s policy of restricting the possession of rings is
unconstitutional, and “the due process rights of prisoners are not absolute, but must be
accommodated to the legitimate security needs of a corrections institution.” Caldwell v. Miller,
790 F.2d 589, 609 (7th Cir. 1986).
Williams instead contends that he indeed had proof of marriage: the 2012 property
inventory sheet. But that shows only that he possessed a wedding ring in 2012, not that he
was authorized to wear it then, or that he was still authorized to wear it in 2014. And the
more recent property inventories did not include a wedding ring.
If one assumes that the secretary-designee ruled that Williams should be allowed to
have the ring, the most reasonable interpretation of the rationale for that ruling is not that
defendants violated the policy. Rather, it is that defendants properly confiscated the ring but
that Williams’s lack of proof of marriage was rectified by the correction complaint examiner’s
acquisition of proof of marriage. Under this interpretation, the system worked: Williams
received his ring, but only after the deficiency of proof-of-marriage was rectified.
But if the secretary-designee meant to say that defendants violated the policy by
confiscating the ring, that means the confiscation was random and unauthorized. Courts have
consistently held that due process claims for that type of a deprivation of a prisoner’s
property fail where the plaintiff has adequate postdeprivation remedies. See, e.g., Munson v.

12

Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 638 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Munson’s complaint also makes it clear that he
received all the process he was due in the form of a written notice explaining why he couldn’t
possess the books and a meaningful chance to be heard by a series of prison officials.”);
Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 1993) (due process requires “a
meaningful opportunity to be heard on” whether an item is contraband); see also Tyler v. Wick,
No. 14-CV-68-jdp, 2016 WL 5496631, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 29, 2016) (civil detainee had
adequate postdeprivation remedies to challenge loss of property and money), aff’d, No. 163792, 2017 WL 951593 (7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017).
And even beyond the administrative grievance process, Williams had or perhaps still
has meaningful postdeprivation remedies. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35 (action to recover
personal property after wrongful taking, conversion, or wrongful detention), and 893.51
(action for damages resulting from wrongful taking, conversion, or wrongful detention of
personal property); cf. Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1996) (inmate
complaint review system, certiorari review under Wisconsin law, and Wisconsin tort remedies
against prison officials are adequate remedies for deprivation of good-time credits). Therefore,
I will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claim regarding the initial
confiscation of the ring.
Defendant Fry raises a threshold argument with regard her refusal to comply with the
secretary-designee’s decision: she contends that Williams failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, because his grievance about her refusal to return the ring was dismissed as
premature, and then he never filed another grievance about the issue. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a), no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until available administrative

13

remedies are exhausted. Prisoners must file their complaints and appeals in the place and at
the time the prison’s administrative rules require. Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025
(7th Cir. 2002).
It is perhaps understandable that Williams did not try again once the 30-day window
for Fry to comply with the secretary-designee’s ruling had passed, because he had gotten relief
by then. But exhaustion under the PLRA is necessary even if the prisoner is requesting relief
that the relevant administrative review board has no power to grant, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.
516, 532 (2002), or if the prisoner believes that exhaustion is futile, Booth v. Churner, 532
U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). There are reasons to exhaust even when a particular kind of relief
is not open to a prisoner: the Supreme Court has stated, “In some instances, corrective action
taken in response to an inmate’s grievance might improve prison administration and satisfy
the inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation. . . . And for cases ultimately brought to
court, adjudication could be facilitated by an administrative record that clarifies the contours
of the controversy.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 525.
I will dismiss this claim without prejudice for Williams’s failure to exhaust it. Ford v.
Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004) (dismissal for failure to exhaust is always without
prejudice). He can refile the claim if he can successfully exhaust it, but he will likely find it
impossible to file a proper grievance because those events happened so long ago.
The final deprivation was defendant Fry’s deduction of funds from Williams’s release
account without proper authorization. This claim almost fails at the outset because Fry
argues that Williams approved the release of funds himself. If all Williams was arguing was
that Fry let him take money out of his release account in contravention of state releaseaccount regulations, I would dismiss the claim because Williams would not have shown that

14

he was deprived of a property interest. Instead, he would have shown that he got to use his
funds for the purpose he wanted.
But Williams suggests that Fry coerced him into spending the $20 on a marriage
certificate by taking his ring and telling him that it would be disposed of unless he produced
proof of marriage. However, this claim rises and falls with his first claim about Fry and Haag
taking the ring. If defendants were properly applying the jewelry regulation, then it was
Williams’s choice to either produce proof of marriage or get rid of the ring. If defendants
violated the jewelry regulation, Williams had postdeprivation remedies available to rectify the
problem. For instance, he could theoretically file a certiorari or tort claim about the loss of his
$20, although his odds of recovery seem scant given that he actually received the item he
paid for. I will grant summary judgment to defendants on this claim.
b. Eighth Amendment
Williams brings a claim that defendant Fry, as a member of the Special Needs
Committee, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him a lower bunk restriction
in December 2014.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from acting with deliberate
indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04
(1976). A “serious medical need” may be a condition that a doctor has recognized as needing
treatment or one for which the necessity of treatment would be obvious to a lay person.
Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 584-85 (7th Cir. 2006). To be considered “deliberately
indifferent,” an official must know of and disregard “an excessive risk to an inmate’s health or
safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn

15

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Snipes v.
Detella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1996).
Williams suffers from chronic back pain. He still has shotgun pellets lodged in his
back after being shot in the back “years ago.” It is unclear whether the shotgun blast is the
only cause of his pain. He states that on the outside he received social security disability
benefits. Williams’s medical records show a long history of treatment for back pain.
Defendants do not appear to be disputing whether Williams had a serious medical need.
There is more than enough in this record to conclude that he does.
As for the deliberate indifference prong, it is somewhat unusual type of claim. Most
prison Eighth Amendment medical care claims are against medical professionals for failing to
properly treat a problem, or against non-medical professionals for failing to obtain medical
assistance in a timely fashion. But here, Fry, who is not a medical professional, was part of a
deliberative body making decisions about accommodations related to medical needs. From
statements made in the Special Needs Committee policy, I can infer that DOC officials
created the policy at least in part because they believed that medical professionals
overprescribed accommodations in the past and they decided that doctors and nurses alone
should not be the sole decision makers on requests for accommodations. See “Medical/Dental
Restrictions/Special Needs” policy, Dkt. 44-1, at 2-3. (“Prescribing practitioners shall refer
items to the committee/nurse for review of special needs rather than write orders for specific
items.”; “The security level and physical environment of the facility must be considered when
authorizing special needs/restrictions. Alternatives shall be considered”; “Comfort Items shall
not be approved by HSU. The most common incorrect assumption about such items is that
they are medically necessary for proper medical care. This is not the case for the vast majority

16

of medical conditions. Requests for these types of items are not medical issues. HSU staff is
encouraged to allow only those treatment items which have been scientifically shown to
provide solid medical benefit, and to treat significant medical conditions.”).
It makes a certain amount of sense to have security staff involved in decisions that
affect cell assignments, the objects allowed in cells, and the like. But the injection of nonmedical professionals into the treatment of medical problems opens those officials up to
Eighth Amendment liability.8 Fry could be liable under the Eighth Amendment if she took
part in countermanding recommendations by medical professionals (including those on the
Committee), ignoring the rules for how they were supposed to make decisions, or blindly
following a policy that clearly harmed prisoners. But here, it is clear from the medical record
that no reasonable jury could conclude that she and the rest of the Committee acted with
deliberate indifference.
The Committee concluded that Williams did not have one of the medical conditions
listed in the “Lower Bunk” section of the guidelines for determining special accommodations.
The only category that could arguably apply to Williams is “Significant functional limitations
in mobility secondary to arthritis, musculoskeletal disorders, or neurological disorders.”9 But

Eighth Amendment claims against non-medical staff are often dismissed because nonmedical officials are generally allowed to defer to the recommendations of medical
professionals. See, e.g., Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010) (“As . . . a host of
. . . cases make clear, the law encourages non-medical security and administrative personnel
at jails and prisons to defer to the professional medical judgments of the physicians and
nurses treating the prisoners in their care without fear of liability for doing so.”).
8

Williams alternately describes his back pain as “chronic” and “acute,” but it is clear that he
is saying that he has suffered from bouts of sharp pain for a long time—he had a chronic
condition. So there is no reason for the Committee to have considered Williams under the
“Acute injury (temporary restriction of 6 weeks or less)” category.
9

17

the nurses examining Williams before the Committee’s determination clearly thought that he
did not have significant mobility problems.
In October 2014, Nurse Campbell stated that Williams walked to the HSU without
difficulty, showed no distress, and sat in his chair comfortably with “fluid movement.” At his
December 2014 examination in preparation for the Special Needs Committee, Nurse Whalen
stated that Williams’s gait was straight, he had good range of motion, and he could sit and
stand without difficulty. Neither Campbell nor Whalen recommended a low bunk for
Williams. Instead, they explained other ways Williams could cope with pain: using
medication, ice, pain rub, and performing stretches and exercises.
Williams disputes Campbell’s and Whalen’s reports, says that he is “challenging [the]
special needs committee’s medical care system as a whole,” and points to events far predating
the Committee’s decision (he says that at some point he received Social Security disability
benefits for his back) and postdating the decision (he eventually received a back brace in
August 2015 and low bunk restriction in May 2016). But he is not proceeding on claims
against Campbell, Whalen, or the officials who created or maintain the Special Needs
Committee policy. He brought this Eighth Amendment claim against Fry.
And Fry and the Committee were entitled to make their decision on the medical
record before it. That record showed that in the months immediately preceding the
December 2014 decision, the medical professionals examining Williams clearly did not think
that Williams had “significant functional limitations in mobility.” They said his gait was
straight, his range of motion was good, he could sit and stand without difficulty, and they
noted that he regularly exercised by lifting weights and riding a bike. Given these facts, no
reasonable jury could conclude that the Committee acted with deliberate indifference by

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denying the lower bunk restriction. All the later decisions by other medical professionals
giving Williams a back brace and lower bunk do is create a disagreement between medical
professionals about the scope of Williams’s problems, which is not enough to show deliberate
indifference. See, e.g., Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Disagreement
between a prisoner and his doctor, or even between two medical professionals, about the
proper course of treatment generally is insufficient, by itself, to establish an Eighth
Amendment violation.”). Some later change in treatment does not retroactively make earlier
treatment decisions unconstitutional.
Williams also suggests that Fry had a conflict of interest or personal animus toward
him (as evidenced by the ring incident), or that prison official in general meant to retaliate
against him or discriminate against him, but he does not support any of these theories with
anything other than his speculation that Fry (and the Committee) based the decision on
something other than the medical records. He argues that his medical problem is so obvious
that a layperson would know he needs a low bunk restriction. I take him to mean that
because the problem was so obvious, Fry must have based her decision on an impermissible
rationale. But that is simply not borne out by the record: no reasonable jury could think this
is the case given the results of the medical examinations Williams had immediately preceding
the Committee’s determination, which showed that he did not have problems with mobility.
Finally, Williams points to his gout diagnosis as another reason for the restriction, but
none of the complaints or requests he filed leading up to the Committee’s decision refer to
that malady, so no reasonable jury could conclude that the Committee was deliberately
indifferent by failing to give him the restriction based on that problem.

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Because no reasonable jury could conclude that Fry and the Committee acted with
deliberate indifference in denying Williams’s request for a low bunk restriction, I will grant
defendant Fry summary judgment on this claim.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff Roosevelt Williams’s renewed motions for sanctions, Dkt. 53 and 67, are
DENIED.
2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 40, is GRANTED.
3. The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment in defendants’ favor and close this
case.
Entered March 30, 2017.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge

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