Whitford, William et al v. Nichol, Gerald et al
Filing
182
OPINION and ORDER. Signed by Judges Kenneth F. Ripple, Barbara B. Crabb and William C. Griesbach on 1/27/2017. (voc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
----------------------------------------------------------------WILLIAM WHITFORD, ROGER ANCLAM,
EMILY BUNTING, MARY LYNNE
DONOHUE, HELEN HARRIS, WAYNE
JENSEN, WENDY SUE JOHNSON, JANET
MITCHELL, ALLISON SEATON, JAMES
SEATON, JEROME WALLACE and DONALD
WINTER,
OPINION and ORDER
Plaintiffs,
15-cv-421-bbc
v.
BEVERLY R. GILL, JULIE M. GLANCEY,
ANN S. JACOBS, STEVE KING, DON MILLIS,
and MARK L. THOMSEN,
Defendants.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
On November 21, 2016, we issued our opinion and order holding that the
redistricting plan embodied in Act 43 constituted an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander. We also solicited the views of the parties as to the appropriate
2
remedy. Having received and considered the parties’ submissions, we now address
the issue of remedy.
OPINION
The parties agree that the appropriate remedy in this case is to enter an
injunction prohibiting the use of Act 43’s districting plan in future elections.1 The
parties dispute, however, who should draft a remedial map, how that map should
be drafted, and when it should be implemented.
It is the prerogative of the State to determine the contours of a new map
setting forth the electoral districts of the Assembly. The Supreme Court has made
it clear that “[w]hen a federal court declares an existing apportionment scheme
unconstitutional, it is … appropriate, whenever practicable, to afford a reasonable
opportunity for the legislature to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a
substitute measure rather than for the federal court to devise and order into effect
its own plan.” Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978).2 The plaintiffs
nevertheless urge that providing the Legislature an opportunity to enact a remedial
plan is impracticable here because Wisconsin’s elected branches have compiled an
1
See R.169 (Defendants’ Brief on Remedies) at 5 (“The proper remedy is for the Court to enter an injunction
directing the Legislature to draft a new map consistent with its opinion.”); R.170 (Plaintiffs’ Brief on Remedies) at
2 (“To begin with, as soon as possible, the Court should enter an injunction barring any further use of the Current
Plan.”).
2
See also R.170 at 5 (citing same).
3
“objectionable” record of defending its unconstitutional plan. 3 In some cases, such
an exception to the general rule may be appropriate. 4 The record in our case,
however, contains no evidence of the malice or intransigence that would justify our
abrogating such a fundamental principle. Although the state actors in this case
certainly intended the partisan effect that they in fact produced, the record does not
permit us to ascribe to them an unwillingness to adhere to an order of this Court or
to conform the allocation of seats in the state legislature to constitutional
requirements.
The plaintiffs further submit that, if we permit the Wisconsin legislature to
redistrict, we should give it “[d]etailed [i]nstructions.”5 Several considerations
militate against such a course. Consistent with our approach to remedying other
constitutional violations, our only interest in the redistricting of the State is to
“correct … the condition that offends the Constitution.” Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). “[A] state’s freedom of choice
to devise substitutes for an apportionment plan found unconstitutional, either as a
whole or in part, should not be restricted beyond the clear commands of the Equal
Protection Clause.” Wise, 437 U.S. at 540 (alteration in original) (quoting Burns v.
3
Id. at 7.
See Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F. Supp. 360, 372 (W.D. La. 1996) (refusing to give the Louisiana legislature an
opportunity to pass a third remedial plan); Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp. 828, 838–39 (W.D. Tex. 1991) (noting
the “unusually lethargic” pace of the state legislature’s actions).
5
R.170 at 10.
4
4
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 85 (1966)). This very basic principle is grounded not
only on the constitutional limitations of federal authority but also on the practical
reality that it is the state legislature, not the federal court, that is “the best
institution ‘to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the
constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population equality.’” Gorin v.
Karpan, 775 F. Supp. 1430, 1445–46 (D. Wyo. 1991) (quoting Connor v. Finch,
431 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1977)). The record in this case makes abundantly clear that
the drafters of the 2010 reapportionment labored intensely over their project.
Although, in the end, they produced what we have found to be an unconstitutional
result, they wrestled along the way with many legitimate political considerations.
Indeed, the record reveals that they produced many alternate maps, some of which
may conform to constitutional standards. In any event, with the benefit of our
ruling, state officials should be able to produce a map that, while conforming to the
Constitution, will allow them to attain their legitimate political objectives. In our
ruling on the merits, we set forth, at length, the nature of the constitutional
violation at issue and the basis for our determination.6 Within this framework, it is
the prerogative of the State to reapportion as it sees fit. It is neither necessary nor
appropriate for us to embroil the Court in the Wisconsin Legislature’s
deliberations.
6
See R.166.
5
Whether we should set a deadline for the State to enact a remedial plan is a
question for which there are only imperfect answers. The plaintiffs ask us to set a
“[s]trict [d]eadline” of April 1, 2017.7 They invite our attention to examples of
courts giving state legislatures little time within which to pass remedial plans. See,
e.g., Larios v. Cox, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2004). All of those
situations occurred during election years when “time [wa]s of the essence.”
Johnson v. Mortham, 926 F. Supp. 1460, 1494 (N.D. Fla. 1996). For their part, the
defendants maintain that, given “the uncertain nature of the law on partisan
gerrymandering,” we should not require the Legislature to act until after the
Supreme Court has ruled on this case.8
In a perfect world, the defendants’ suggestion would make sense and would
permit us to remove ourselves even further from the State’s deliberative process.
But there are several countervailing considerations that we must consider.
Members of the Wisconsin Assembly are elected for a term of two years. Under
the prevailing view in this Court, the people of Wisconsin already have endured
several elections under an unconstitutional reapportionment scheme. If they are to
be spared another such event, a new map must be drawn in time for the preparatory
steps leading up to the election, such as candidate petition circulations in
7
8
R.170 at 10.
R.169 at 1.
6
mid-Spring 2018. At the same time, the defendants’ right of appeal must be
protected. We also must take into consideration the drain on legislative resources
and energy in enacting a new plan and be cognizant that the Supreme Court has
many other important issues on its docket and may well need a significant amount
of time to finish its work on this case.
We think that all of these competing considerations can best be
accommodated by requiring that the Legislature enact, and the Governor approve,
a new redistricting map by November 1, 2017. This deadline affords the
Legislature ample time to enact a plan contingent on the Supreme Court’s
affirmance of our judgment. While it allows the defendants and the candidates to
make plans for the November 2018 election only on a contingent basis, at least
they will be able to prepare for that contingency in the context of a concrete
alternate map.
The considerations that we just have discussed make it clear that we do not
believe that we ought to stay our judgment pending appeal, as the defendants
request. In assessing the probability of success on the merits, while the majority of
the Court remains firm in its belief of the correctness of the decision, “the absence
of a well-trodden path”9 is no doubt of some relevance in considering the
appropriateness of a stay. See, e.g., Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of the U.S.
9
R.166 at 31.
7
Trade Representative, 240 F. Supp. 2d 21, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2003) (considering,
among other factors, that “this case presents an issue of first impression”). We
also must take into respectful consideration the dissent of our number on the
merits. Nevertheless, the defendants also must establish irreparable injury absent a
stay. See, e.g., Larios, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1336–37. Here, we must balance the
harm to the defendants against the harm to the plaintiffs. Much of our earlier
discussion is pertinent here. In setting a November 1, 2017 deadline for the
enactment of at least a contingent replacement map, we considered the State’s
burden in enacting even a contingent remedial plan and have concluded that the
State’s thorough earlier work may significantly assuage the task now before them.
Additionally, by choosing to enact a plan contingent on the Supreme Court’s
affirming our judgment, the defendants will retain easily the present map if the
Supreme Court does not agree with our disposition.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants are enjoined from using the districting
plan embodied in Act 43 in all future elections.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants have a remedial
redistricting plan for the November 2018 election, enacted by the Wisconsin
Legislature and signed by the Governor, in place no later than November 1, 2017.
8
This plan must comply with our November 21, 2016 order but may be contingent
upon the Supreme Court’s affirmance of our November 21, 2016 order.
The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
Entered this 27th day of January, 2017.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
KENNETH F. RIPPLE
Circuit Judge
/s/
BARBARA B. CRABB
District Judge
/s/
WILLIAM C. GRIESBACH
District Judge
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