Reas-Mendez, Jose v. Boughton, Gary et al

Filing 16

ORDER that plaintiff Jose Reas-Mendez may have until June 2, 2017, to amend his complaint to correct the deficiencies described in this opinion. Defendants, Gary Boughton and Jermone Sweeney, are DISMISSED. Signed by District Judge William M. Conley on 5/23/2017. (jef),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
JOSE A. REAS-MENDEZ,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.
Case No. 15-cv-746-wmc
GARY BOUGHTON, et al.
Defendants.

Pro se plaintiff Jose A. Reas-Mendez brings this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated because a chunk of caulk
fell from the wall of his cell and hit him, and then after receiving treatment, he was
placed back in that cell. His amended complaint is now ready for screening under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. Reas-Mendez’s complaint does not name proper defendants, nor does it
provide sufficient detail to state a claim, but he will be permitted the opportunity to
amend his complaint to correct the deficiencies described below.
ALLEGATIONS OF FACT1
Reas-Mendez is currently incarcerated at Stanley Correctional Institution (“SCI”),
but the incidents related to his complaint occurred when he was incarcerated at the
Wisconsin Secure Program Facility (“WSFP”), located in Boscobel, Wisconsin.

He

names two WSPF employees as defendants: Gary Boughton, the warden, and Jerome
Sweeney, the security director.

In addressing any pro se litigant’s complaint, the court must read the allegations generously.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). For purposes of this order, the court assumes the
facts above based on the allegations in Reas-Mendez’s complaint.
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On October 30, 2014, plaintiff was injured in his cell. He had been lying down
when a large piece of caulk fell from the wall striking him over his left eye on the
forehead. It briefly knocked him unconscious and caused a laceration on his forehead.
Reas-Mendez pushed the emergency call button in his cell. Sergeant Jaworski
answered, and directed Officer Gilardi to report to Reas-Mendez’s cell. Reas-Mendez
told Gilardi what happened, and Officer Gilardi found the 4-inch piece of caulk that had
fallen.

Reas-Mendez was then taken to the health services unit (“HSU”). Sergeant

Lange took pictures of his face, his cell and the piece of caulk. While at HSU, ReasMendez’s left eye was irrigated, the abrasion above his left eye was cleaned and antiseptic
cream and bandages were applied. He received no follow-up treatment.
After he received treatment, Reas-Mendez was escorted back to his cell, but
apparently nothing had been done by WSPF staff to ensure that it was safe for
occupancy. He has not alleged that he suffered any subsequent injuries in his cell, nor
has he described the state of his cell when he returned to it. Nonetheless, on November
10, 2014, Reas-Mendez filed two complaints about the fact that he was placed back in an
unsafe cell after he was injured, and those complaints were dismissed.
OPINION
Plaintiff claims that the defendants violated his rights under the Eighth
Amendment, which prohibits “punishment” that is “cruel and unusual,” and imposes a
duty on prison officials to provide “humane conditions of confinement” by ensuring that
inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Prison officials also must ensure that “reasonable measures”
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are taken to guarantee inmate safety and prevent harm. Id. To state an Eighth
Amendment claim based on a failure to prevent harm, an inmate must demonstrate that
(1) the harm that befell the prisoner was objectively, sufficiently serious and a substantial
risk to his health or safety; and (2) the individual defendants were deliberately indifferent
to that risk. Id.; see also, e.g., Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing
Matos ex. Rel. Matos v. O’Sullivan, 335 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted)).
Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from two potentially fatal issues. First, plaintiff has
not properly named any defendants. Personal participation is a general requirement to
liability for a § 1983 claim.

Alejo v. Heller, 328 F.3d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 2003) (“A

plaintiff bringing a civil rights action [under § 1983] must prove that the defendant
personally participated in or caused the unconstitutional actions.”).

The named

defendants, Boughton and Sweeney, were not involved in responding to or treating
plaintiff’s injury, nor were they involved in the decisions about his cell placement. In
fact, plaintiff does not allege that they even knew about this incident.

Although

supervisors may be held liable for policies over which they have control, plaintiff is not
challenging any WSPF policy; he is challenging the fact that he was placed in an allegedly
unsafe cell. See Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir.
1997) (supervisor may be liable if he knows about and approves of conduct); see also City
of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (supervisor may be held liable if he
had control over deficient training or flawed policies).

Accordingly, Boughton and

Sweeney will be dismissed. However, plaintiff does include the names of other WSPF
staff involved in his treatment. If they or other WSPF employees were involved in the
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decision to return him to his same cell, perhaps a claim could be alleged against them.
Accordingly, plaintiff may amend his complaint to name those individuals as defendants.
The second problem with plaintiff’s complaint is even more fundamental: he does
not allege that, before the piece of caulk fell, anyone knew that his cell was in such a state
of disrepair that a piece of caulk might fall on him. Thus, he has no Eighth Amendment
claim as to the actual injury that he suffered because he does not allege that any
defendant knew his cell was unreasonably dangerous. The same is true as to his claim
that he should not have been returned to his cell following his injury. Although at that
point, some members of WSPF staff obviously knew that caulk had fallen from the
ceiling of his cell, plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to infer they knew his cell was
so unsafe after the caulk fell that it was not suitable for occupancy. Without more details
about the actual state of his cell when he was returned to it (such as sharp edges, cracks,
or other instances where other piece of the wall or ceiling fell), the court cannot infer that
plaintiff was returned to an unreasonably dangerous living environment following his
injury. If plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, it will be necessary for him to specify
that any named defendant knew that his cell was unsafe for occupancy when he was
returned to it after his injury.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff Jose Reas-Mendez may have until June 2, 2017, to amend his
complaint to correct the deficiencies described in this opinion.

2.

Defendants, Gary Boughton and Jermone Sweeney, are DISMISSED.

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3.

If Reas-Mendez does not file an amended complaint as directed, this case
will be dismissed and Reas-Mendez will receive a STRIKE pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g) for failure to state a claim upon which relief will be
granted. Any amended complaint will be screened in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 1915A.

Entered this 23rd day of May, 2017.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge

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