McNeil, Michelle et al v. Monroe County and its State Officials Known to be involved et al

Filing 7

ORDER granting plaintiff's 6 Motion for Reconsideration. Per plaintiff's request, I will direct the clerk's office to return plaintiff's case filings to her. Signed by District Judge James D. Peterson on 8/30/2016. (jef),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

MICHELLE L. MCNEIL, M.G.F., and S.E.W.F.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ORDER
MONROE COUNTY, DIRECTOR PAM PIPKIN,
ADMINISTRATOR CATHERINE SCHMIT,
CORPORATION COUNSEL ANDREW KAFTAN, and
JUDGE J. DAVID RICE,

16-cv-319-jdp

Defendants.
On May 12, 2016, pro se plaintiff Michelle L. McNeil filed a complaint on behalf of
herself and her minor children against defendants Monroe County, Pam Pipkin, Catherine
Schmit, Andrew Kaftan, and Judge J. David Rice. Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated
her constitutional rights in the course of setting and overseeing her divorce and child support
arrangement in the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Wisconsin. On August 19, 2016, I
dismissed plaintiff’s claims as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Dkt. 4.
Now plaintiff moves for reconsideration. Dkt. 6. Plaintiff contends that the RookerFeldman doctrine does not bar her claims because she alleges civil rights violations; she is not
asking for “judicial review.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff represents that she does not want this court to
reverse any state court decisions; rather, she claims that defendants denied her and her minor
children “services and protection” because they were prejudiced against her. Plaintiff suffers
from depression, is indigent, and “the town [k]new [her] ex [husband].” Id.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine primarily applies when plaintiffs directly challenge state
court judgments; I do not have jurisdiction to review state court decisions. But the doctrine
extends further, to claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with state court decisions. I

explained this important extension of the doctrine in my previous order, but I will attempt to
explain it even more clearly, so that plaintiff may understand why her claims cannot be
brought in this court.
I understand that plaintiff does not want me to reverse any state court decisions. I
understand that plaintiff wants me to find that defendants—Monroe County and its
employees—violated her constitutional rights and discriminated against her. But the
violations that plaintiff identifies are intimately related to state court decisions and
proceedings. And I cannot determine that defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights
without reviewing and questioning state court decisions and weighing whether I believe the
state court acted appropriately. The state court decisions—allegedly colored by bias,
discrimination, and due process violations—injured plaintiff. If plaintiff did not receive due
process or equal protection under the law, those injuries are inextricably intertwined with the
state court’s authorization and oversight of plaintiff’s child support arrangement. It is not
possible for this court to adjudicate plaintiff’s claims without revisiting the propriety of the
state court’s actions. Even if plaintiff is not asking me to overturn those decisions.
Plaintiff obviously feels that defendants discriminated against her and dehumanized
her, and that is unfortunate indeed. But she must raise these issues with the state court, not
here. As I explained in my previous order, “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine ‘precludes lower
federal court jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state court judgments because no
matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be, the Supreme
Court of the United States is the only federal court that could have jurisdiction to review a
state court judgment.’” Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2004)
(citation and internal alterations omitted). I am not saying that defendants did not violate

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plaintiff’s constitutional rights; I am saying that this court is not the appropriate place for
those claims. The state court appeals process is the way to correct errors in state court
proceedings.
One note about plaintiff’s claims against Judge Rice. Plaintiff contends the my
previous order did not address the fact that Judge Rice “allowed” an individual, Juwan
Wilderness, to return to his home next door to plaintiff’s after he broke into her home. I do
not think plaintiff is a bad person because she feels that she had been treated unfairly by a
judge. But I cannot give her the relief she asks for. First, although I cannot be sure what
exactly happened in the criminal proceedings that plaintiff references, I am certain that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars these claims, too. Plaintiff is challenging the way that a state
court judge adjudicated a criminal proceeding. Second, even if Rooker-Feldman did not bar
plaintiff’s claims concerning Judge Rice and Juwan Wilderness, Judge Rice is shielded by
judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (“A long line of this Court’s
precedents acknowledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages.
Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, it is a general principle
of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)).
For these reasons, I must deny plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.

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ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff Michelle L. McNeil’s motion for reconsideration,
Dkt. 6, is DENIED. Per plaintiff’s request, I will direct the clerk’s office to return plaintiff’s
case filings to her.
Entered August 30, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge

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