Cooper, Magnolia v. Office of the Secretary (CDA)

Filing 4

ORDER dismissing plaintiff Magnolia Cooper's complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Signed by District Judge William M. Conley on 10/19/2017. (jef),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MAGNOLIA COOPER,
Plaintiff,

OPINION and ORDER

v.
Case No. 16-cv-811-wmc
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (CDA),
Defendant.

In this civil lawsuit, pro se plaintiff Magnolia Cooper contends that Community
Development Authority (“CDA”) of Madison, Wisconsin,1 violated her rights to healthy and
safe housing by renting her an apartment infested with rodents and insects. Because Cooper
is proceeding without prepayment of the full filing fee, her complaint must be screened under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) to determine whether any portion is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. After reviewing her complaint, the court concludes that Cooper’s
allegations do not implicate any federal claim over which this court has jurisdiction.
Accordingly, her complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.

ALLEGATIONS OF FACT2
Plaintiff Magnolia Cooper is a public housing tenant residing in apartments operated
by the Community Development Authority in Madison, Wisconsin.

Cooper alleges that in

The CDA operates properties that are federally funded through the Department of Housing
and Urban Development.
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In addressing any pro se litigant’s complaint, the court must read the allegations generously.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). For purposes of this order, the court assumes the
facts above based on the allegations in Cooper’s complaint.
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October 2016, her apartment became infested with rodents. She called maintenance, who
plugged holes in her wall and set out traps. After vacating the apartment for some period of
time, Cooper came back on December 2, but there were still mice in the apartment.
Cooper’s apartment also has some type of black and red insects, which Cooper thinks
may be fleas or ticks that live in the heating vents. Cooper’s daughter who stays at the
apartment sometimes contracted Lyme disease and required hospitalization. Cooper thinks
the Lyme disease may have been from insects in the apartment. She also thinks her daughter
may have been bitten by a rat at the apartment, and is worried her daughter might have kidney
failure.
Other problems in the apartment include a frayed cord connected to the refrigerator, a
broken bedroom doorknob, some peeling interior paint and three broken blinds, although
Cooper does not blame CDA for these problems.

OPINION
Cooper contends that CDA violated her right to safe and healthy housing without
identifying any specific legal basis for her claims. While Cooper was not required to identify a
particular statute or constitutional provision that she believes CDA violated, the court has an
obligation to determine whether Cooper’s allegations are sufficient to state a viable legal claim
over which this court would have jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915; Buchel-Ruegsegger v. Buchel,
576 F.3d 451, 453 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that federal courts have a duty to evaluate their
own jurisdiction, “sua sponte if necessary”) (citation omitted).
A federal district court has limited jurisdictional authority. This court may only hear a
case if Congress has authorized it. Generally, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a

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case in one of two situations: (1) the plaintiff brings a claim that arises under federal law, 28
U.S.C. § 1331; or (2) the plaintiff and defendants are citizens of different states and the
amount in controversy is greater than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Because Cooper and the
CDA are not citizens of different states, the court would have jurisdiction over Cooper’s claims
only if her claims arise under the United States Constitution or other federal law. After some
consideration, the court is unable to discern a federal law that might support Cooper’s claim
here.
Certainly, the CDA is subsidized by the federal government and must comply with the
United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq. However, the United States Housing Act
does not appear to authorize any private right of action that would permit a plaintiff to
challenge the conditions of CDA-operated housing in federal court. See, e.g., Davis v. Sellas,
580 F. App’x 467, 467 (7th Cir. 2014) (unpubl.) (holding that USHA does not “create a private
right of action for tenants to sue landlords who provide subpar maintenance”); Davis v. Raleigh
Hous. Auth., No. 5:09-cv-522-F, 2011 WL 832330, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2011) (finding no
private cause of action under Housing Act for asserting claims relating to unsanitary
apartment); Ross v. Midland Mgmt. Co., No. 02 C 8190, 2003 WL 21801023, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 1, 2003) (“The USHA does not create a warranty of habitability or a private right of
action regarding the conditions of apartments.”); Banks v. Dallas Hous. Auth., 119 F. Supp. 2d
636, 638 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (same); Thomas v. Ch. Hous. Auth., 919 F. Supp. 1159, 1164 (N.D.
Ill. 1996) (same).
Likewise, Cooper’s allegations do not state a claim under the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. § 3604, which prohibits discrimination in housing on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, familial status, or national origin. Because Cooper’s complaint contains no facts suggesting

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the CDA discriminated against her in particular, much less did so based on her membership in
a protected class, she cannot bring her claims under the Fair Housing Act. See Ross, 2003 WL
21801023, *4 (“The FHA also does not create a private right of action to ensure habitability.”)
Finally, Cooper’s allegations of unsanitary housing do not implicate any constitutional
provision. On the contrary, the Constitution does not guarantee “access to dwellings of a
particular quality,” Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972), and Cooper has not alleged that
CDA violated any other constitutional right, such as her right to due process or equal protection
under the law.
This does not necessarily mean that plaintiff has no remedy; rather, her remedy may be
in state court, or state or federal administrative proceeding. In particular, landlord-tenant law
is traditionally the province of the states, and thus, Cooper may have a cause of action under
state law concerning the conditions of her dwelling. Cooper may want to consult her local
tenant union for guidance. Regardless, even construing her complaint liberally, the court is
unable to glean a federal cause of action from Cooper’s allegations.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff Magnolia Cooper’s complaint is DISMISSED without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Entered this 19th day of October, 2017.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge

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