Dangerfield, Alphoncy v. Waterman et al

Filing 78

ORDER granting in part 51 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part 57 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying as moot 77 Motion to Stay. Defendants LaBelle and Willard West are DISMISSED from the case.Plaintiff Alphoncy Dangerfield� 39;s motion for the court's assistance in recruiting him counsel, Dkt. 43 , is GRANTED. All remaining deadlines are STRUCK and the case is STAYED pending recruitment of counsel for Dangerfield. Signed by District Judge James D. Peterson on 5/22/2019. (jef),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

ALPHONCY DANGERFIELD,
Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

JOLINDA WATERMAN, JAMES LABELLE,
SONYA ANDERSON, KELLI WILLARD WEST,
and CYNTHIA GRIFFIN,

17-cv-230-jdp

Defendants.
Plaintiff Alphoncy Dangerfield, a prisoner at Oshkosh Correctional Institution, alleges
that when he was housed at Wisconsin Secure Program Facility (WSPF), prison officials failed
to properly treat his diabetes and hyperglycemia and provide him with a yoga mat to perform
physician-ordered yoga.
All of the defendants except Cynthia Griffin are represented by the state, and they have
filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 51. I will refer to these defendants as the “state
defendants.” Defendant Griffin has filed her own motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 57.
Those motions are fully briefed. Dangerfield has renewed his previously denied motion for
recruitment of counsel. Dkt. 73.
For reasons stated below, I will grant aspects of defendants’ motions. But because I
conclude that Dangerfield is unable to fully litigate his claims about his treatment for
hyperglycemia, I will grant his motion for the court’s assistance in recruiting him counsel.

UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following facts are drawn from the parties’ summary judgment materials and
Dangerfield’s deposition, Dkt. 50, and are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
A. Hyperglycemia
During the events of this case, plaintiff Alphoncy Dangerfield was housed at Wisconsin
Secure Program Facility (WSPF). At some point in the past, Dangerfield was diagnosed with
type 2 diabetes. By the time of the events in question here, Dangerfield was not taking
mediation to treat his diabetes because his glucose levels had been kept under control for about
a year.
In late 2015, Dangerfield complained of shoulder pain. He received several types of
treatment, including physical therapy and ice. On three occasions, Dangerfield met with
defendant Cynthia Griffin, a nurse practitioner at Gundersen Boscobel Area Hospital and
Clinics, by “telemedicine”: Dangerfield stayed at WSPF and communicated to Griffin over
video on a computer screen. After a January 15, 2016 telemedicine appointment, Griffin
prescribed Dangerfield ibuprofen, ice packs, and muscle rub. Dangerfield continued to
complain of pain and decreased range of motion. Two weeks later, Griffin referred him for an
evaluation by an orthopedic surgeon.
On March 11, 2016, Dangerfield was taken off-site to Gundersen Hospital to be
evaluated by orthopedic surgeon Dr. Edward Riley. Riley examined Dangerfield and diagnosed
bilateral rotator cuff disease. He recommended rest, cross-training, and yoga. He also injected
Dangerfield in both shoulders with a steroid treatment. Dangerfield says that Riley told him
that his glucose levels would be monitored in prison. But Riley did not order that WSPF Health
Services Unit (HSU) staff or Griffin monitor Dangerfield’s blood-glucose levels.

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By the end of March, Dangerfield started having blurry vision, needed to urinate every
30 minutes, had dry mouth, fatigue, and joint and muscle pain, all of which are symptoms
associated with hyperglycemia. Although he submitted a series of health service requests and
medication requests about his shoulder pain and other medical issues, he did not submit a
request about his hyperglycemia symptoms until early May 2016. Dangerfield says that two or
three times before he filed a request, he spoke with defendant Nurse Sonya Anderson at his
cell about his symptoms, but she responded only by saying that he was scheduled to see a
provider at some point in the future. Anderson says that she does not informally meet with
inmates at their cells, and that Dangerfield did not report his hyperglycemia symptoms to her.
When Dangerfield filed his formal health services request about his hyperglycemia
symptoms in early May, Nurse Bethel (who is no longer a defendant) met with him, placed
him on the list to see an advanced care provider, and told him to submit a urine sample. That
sample resulted in a reading of “1000.” Dkt. 52-1, at 99. No scale of measurement was included
on that document, but I take the parties to agree that it was an exceptionally high reading.
Griffin saw Dangerfield on May 17, 2016, by telemedicine. Dangerfield mentioned his
hyperglycemia symptoms. Griffin checked Dangerfield’s blood glucose via finger poke, which
showed that his blood glucose was “578,” a “very high” result. Griffin gave Dangerfield five
units of insulin and rechecked his blood sugar twice. One of the recheck results was too high
to be measured on the meter. Griffin recommended Dangerfield be sent to the emergency room,
and he was. After speaking with the emergency room doctor, Griffin prescribed Dangerfield
medication and insulin, and ordered that his blood glucose be measured four times a day. She
also discontinued his further shoulder injections.

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In June 2016, Dangerfield filed an inmate grievance, stating that WSPF staff had
neglected his hyperglycemia symptoms until he was taken to the ER. After speaking to
defendant Health Services Manager Jolinda Waterman, the complaint examiner recommended
dismissing the grievance. Defendant James LaBelle, the regional nursing coordinator, dismissed
the grievance.
B. Yoga mat
As the DOC’s Religious Practices Coordinator, defendant Kelli Willard West regularly
reviews and recommends revisions to policies and procedures as needed to address new
information and legal precedent on inmate religious accommodations.
Dangerfield requested a mat to perform the yoga recommended by Dr. Riley. Medical
staff reviewed Dangerfield’s request and denied it. Dangerfield says that he later requested the
mat through the religious-property channel, but it was denied by a chaplain. (Dangerfield
alleged that only inmates in the “Eastern Religion” group were allowed yoga mats, but neither
side provides proposed findings clarifying that issue.) Willard West says that she did not review
any such request by Dangerfield. Dangerfield concedes that he has no personal knowledge that
Willard West was involved in the denial. Within two or three months, the property policies
changed and Dangerfield was allowed to have a mat.

ANALYSIS
A. Hyperglycemia
Defendants have combined to file two motions for summary judgment on Dangerfield’s
Eighth Amendment and Wisconsin-law negligence claims.

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The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from acting with deliberate
indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976).
A “serious medical need” is a condition that a doctor has recognized as needing treatment or
one for which the necessity of treatment would be obvious to a lay person. Johnson v. Snyder,
444 F.3d 579, 584–85 (7th Cir. 2006). A medical need is serious if it is life-threatening, carries
risks of permanent serious impairment if left untreated, results in needless pain and suffering,
significantly affects an individual’s daily activities, Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1371–73
(7th Cir. 1997), or otherwise subjects the prisoner to a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer,
511 U.S. at 847. To be considered “deliberately indifferent,” an official must know of and
disregard “an excessive risk to an inmate’s health or safety; the official must both be aware of
the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference.” Snipes v. Detella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1996).
However, inadvertent error, negligence, gross negligence, and ordinary malpractice are not cruel
and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Vance v. Peters, 97
F.3d 987, 992 (7th Cir. 1996).
Under Wisconsin law, all claims of negligence require the same four elements: “(1) a
breach of (2) a duty owed (3) that results in (4) an injury or injuries, or damages.” Paul v.
Skemp, 2001 WI 42, ¶ 17, 242 Wis. 2d 507, 625 N.W.2d 860.
Dangerfield alleges that defendants’ failure to follow Riley’s orders to check his blood
glucose led to him suffering a host of symptoms for two months, that the failure to maintain a
lower glucose level led to more chronic hyperglycemia, and that because he now suffers from
hyperglycemia he cannot receive more steroid injections, which has left him with shoulder pain.
At this point I will consider all of these problems to be serious medical needs.

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There are certain aspects of Dangerfield’s medical claims that can be dismissed. For
instance, given the care that Dangerfield otherwise received from defendant Griffin—she
prescribed him pain medication, ice, referred him to the surgeon, and then sent him to the
ER—no reasonable jury could conclude that she acted with deliberate indifference to
Dangerfield’s medical needs. Dangerfield also brings claims against defendant LaBelle, but his
involvement in these events are limited to reviewing one of Dangerfield’s grievances.
Dangerfield cannot show that LaBelle harmed him, so I will dismiss LaBelle from the case.
See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d at 609–10 (“A guard who stands and watches while another guard
beats a prisoner violates the Constitution; a guard who rejects an administrative complaint
about a completed act of misconduct does not.”).
But otherwise I am not convinced that Eighth Amendment or negligence claims against
defendants are untenable, because Dangerfield has not provided enough information to tell
who the proper defendants for his claims are. The parties’ submissions raise a strong inference
that someone should have caught the risk Dangerfield faced from the steroid injections.
Defendants contend that they could not have violated Dangerfield’s rights because
Dr. Riley did not specifically order blood-glucose testing. But discharge instructions that
Dangerfield received after his emergency-room visit state that steroids can cause hyperglycemia.
Dkt. 53-1. Presumably defendants knew or should have known about the risk facing
Dangerfield as a diabetic, regardless of Riley’s instructions. Perhaps HSU staff should have
been monitoring his blood glucose all along. Or perhaps Dangerfield has not named the correct
defendants. But these questions involve complex medical issues regarding the standard of care
for a diabetic patient that Dangerfield is not equipped to address on his own. Nor does it
appear that he is capable of performing the discovery necessary to hash out each respective

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medical official’s duty to him as part of the complex web of providers he encountered.
Following completion of the summary judgment briefing, Dangerfield renewed his motion for
the court’s assistance in recruiting him counsel. Dkt. 73. Because I conclude that the assistance
of counsel is likely necessary to address these issues, I will grant Dangerfield’s motion, stay the
case, and attempt to locate counsel for him.
If I find counsel willing to represent Dangerfield, I will advise the parties of that fact.
Soon thereafter, a status conference will be held to set a new schedule. I anticipate that it will
involve reopening discovery. Dangerfield should know that because of the large number of
requests for counsel that the court receives, the search for counsel may take several months
and there is no guarantee that the court will find counsel willing to represent him.
B. Yoga mat
Counsel is not needed to resolve Dangerfield’s Eighth Amendment claim against
defendant Willard West for ignoring his complaints about being denied a yoga mat even
though Dr. Riley recommended he perform yoga. Dangerfield does not provide any evidence
showing that Willard West was personally involved in this deprivation. It is undisputed that
Dangerfield was initially denied a mat by medical staff, and later by a chaplain. Willard West
says that she did not receive a religious-property request from Dangerfield. Dangerfield does
not address this issue in his summary judgment opposition. At his deposition, he stated that
he sent Willard West a letter about the mat, see Dkt. 50, at 27, but he does not know whether
Willard West received it. In any event, Dangerfield’s only claim against Willard West is a
medical-care claim, not a religious-freedom claim. Because Dangerfield presents no evidence
suggesting that Willard West—a religious-services official—had any control over the provision
of a mat for medical purposes or that she could countermand decisions made by medical

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personnel, he cannot show that she was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. So I will
grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim and dismiss Willard West from
the case.
C. Motion to stay
The state defendants have filed a motion to stay the current schedule pending resolution
of the summary judgment motions. I will deny that motion as moot given the stay I am granting
to recruit counsel.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Jolinda Waterman, James
LaBelle, Sonya Anderson, and Kelli Willard West, Dkt. 51, is GRANTED IN PART.
2. The motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Cynthia Griffin, Dkt. 57, is
GRANTED IN PART.
3. Defendants LaBelle and Willard West are DISMISSED from the case.
4. Plaintiff Alphoncy Dangerfield’s motion for the court’s assistance in recruiting him
counsel, Dkt. 43, is GRANTED. All remaining deadlines are STRUCK and the case
is STAYED pending recruitment of counsel for Dangerfield.
5. Defendants’ motion to stay the schedule, Dkt. 77, is DENIED as moot.
Entered May 22, 2019.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge

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