Grant, Jason v. Julson et al

Filing 16

ORDER denying 13 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Barbara B. Crabb on 9/26/2017. (jef),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
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JASON GRANT,
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
17-cv-279-bbc
v.
MR. JULSON, MR. MITCHELL,
MR. DITTMAN and MR. BATE,
Defendants.
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On July 5, 2017, I entered an order dismissing the proposed complaint filed by pro
se plaintiff Jason Grant, who alleged that defendants disciplined him by confining him to his
cell for 10 days and another 22 days without first providing him an administrative hearing,
in violation of his rights under the due process clause and the Eighth Amendment. Dkt.
#11. Plaintiff has moved for reconsideration of that order, arguing that he has a liberty
interest under Wis. Admin. Code DOC Ch. 303 and that his short-term confinement in
segregation also affected his security classification, program access and parole eligibility.
Dkt. #13. I am denying the motion for reconsideration because plaintiff has not identified
any factual or legal errors in the previous order.
Wis. Admin. Code DOC Ch. 303 sets forth disciplinary procedures and penalties for
the state’s correctional institutions, but it does not create a liberty interest for purposes of
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the federal due process clause. As I explained in the order screening plaintiff’s complaint,
prisoners do not have a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general population,
Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 607-608 (7th Cir. 2005), and the violation of prison
procedures or the lack of process in assigning an inmate to segregation does not constitute
a freestanding constitutional violation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485-486 (1995).
A prisoner is entitled to due process protections only when he is subjected to an “atypical
and significant hardship,” id., and plaintiff does not allege that the conditions of either of
his short confinements to his own cell were “unusually harsh,” especially as compared to
prisoners confined to a segregation cell with more significant deprivations for longer periods
of time. Marion v. Columbia Correctional Instituion, 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir.
2009).
In addition, plaintiff did not include any allegations in the complaint or the motion
for reconsideration stating how the two short periods of cell confinement affected his
security classification, program privileges or eligibility for parole.

As explained in my

previous order, the denial of plaintiff’s usual recreational activities do not qualify as the type
of “atypical and significant hardship” subject to due process protections. Sandin, 515 U.S.
at 484-486. In addition, without a showing of atypical and significant hardship, prisoners
do not have a protected liberty interest in a particular security classification or prison
assignment, DeTomaso v. McGinnis, 970 F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir. 1992), or in rehabilitative
or educational programs offered while in prison, Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571
(7th Cir. 2000). This is true even where the successful completion of programming upon

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transfer could result in early release from custody, because it is not inevitable that the
prisoner will actually complete the program and thus be entitled to earlier release. Higgason
v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1997); Long v. Wondra, No. 12-cv-647-wmc, 2013
WL 12098999, *5 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 16, 2013), aff’d, 553 Fed. Appx. 637 (7th Cir. 2014).
Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration will be denied.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff Jason Grant’s motion for reconsideration, dkt. #13,
is DENIED.
Entered this 26th day of September, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

/s/
________________________
BARBARA B. CRABB
District Judge

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