Prude, Terrance v. Meli, Anthony et al

Filing 103

ORDER that Plaintiff Terrance Prude's third motion for reconsideration (dkt. 97 ) is GRANTED. Prude's motion to supplement his complaint (dkt. 99) is GRANTED. Prude may proceed against defendant Meli on the theory that Meli was a biased decision-maker, as provided above. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen L. Crocker on 8/6/2019. (rks),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
TERRANCE PRUDE,
Plaintiff,
v.

OPINION AND ORDER
17-cv-336-slc

ANTHONY MELI, et al.,
Defendants.
Pro se plaintiff Terrance Prude is proceeding in this lawsuit against defendants
Anthony Meli and Gary Boughton on Fourteenth Amendment due process claims related
to Meli’s alleged withholding of exculpatory evidence (namely, a letter from an attorney
named Meyeroff) at Prude’s conduct report hearing, as well as against Meli on a First
Amendment claim related to Meli’s alleged interference with Prude’s mail. I did not grant
Prude leave to proceed against Meli on the theory that Meli withheld other exculpatory
letters from two other individuals, Jones and Nistler, or that he was a decision-maker that
found him guilty and imposed a punishment, since Meli did not preside over the conduct
report hearing, did not find him guilty, and did not impose a punishment. (11/19/18 Order
(dkt. 41) at 9.) Prude has sought reconsideration of this decision twice, and I have denied
both requests.
Now Prude seeks reconsideration for a third time, this time proposing to amend his
complaint to add additional, more specific, allegations about Meli’s involvement in the
resolution of the conduct report. (Dkt. 97, 99.) While I am skeptical that Prude can
succeed on this claim, I am now persuaded that he may proceed against Meli on the theory
that he was essentially a biased decision-maker because, while Meli was not the hearing

officer, Prude’s new allegations permit an inference that Meli improperly influenced the
hearing officer in a manner that made him a de facto decision-maker.
OPINION
Up to this point, I have declined to allow Prude to proceed on his theory that Meli
was actually a decisionmaker because this theory was based solely on Prude’s personal
belief, unsupported by any factual allegations. See Martin v. Zatecky, 749 F. App’x 463,
466 (7th Cir. 2019) (“We presume the honesty and integrity of adjudicators, and the
burden for proving impermissible behavior is high.”). Now Prude’s proposed supplement
and attachments add allegations of fact that, if true, have the potential to create a triable
question as to whether Meli impermissibly involved himself in the conduct report hearing.
In particular, Prude now alleges that in addition to writing the conduct report against
Prude, Meli also sent an email on January 25, 2017 to the officer who helped Meli
investigate the charges, stating that he had offered Prude “180 DS and seize $10,000 to
the state general fund.” (Pl. Ex. 9 (dkt. 98-3).) This offer came over a week before the
February 2, 2017, hearing before Westra. Prude further alleges that Meli was present at
the hearing, and that during the hearing, Westra stated that his hands were tied, and he
had to issue him this same punishment.
While I have not located any decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit discussing this fact situation, for leave to proceed purposes, I conclude that Prude
now has alleged facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that Meli had an
inappropriate influence on Westra’s resolution of the charges against Prude. While there
could be another explanation for Westra’s comment that his hands were tied with respect

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to Prude’s punishment, one plausible explanation is that Meli had required this outcome.
The State’s opposition to allowing Prude’s proposed amendment confirms that Prude’s
theory warrants fact-finding at the very least.

The State’s argument is based on its

characterizations of Prude’s factual assertions, namely that the email Prude submits does
not establish that Meli ordered Westra to impose the punishment Prude eventually
received, that Meli’s initial offer to Prude was a “prehearing offer” to Prude, and that the
fact that Westra imposed the same punishment is not evidence that Meli was a
decisionmaker. To accept defendants’ responses would be to draw multiple inferences in
their favor, which is not the way it works at the screening stage. Ultimately, the parties
will have to flesh out their own arguments and characterizations of Meli’s actions through
discovery, dispositive motions and at trial.
Accordingly, I will grant Prude’s motions and allow him to proceed on this theory
of his due process claim against Meli. I will also allow the parties to file one additional
motion for summary judgment, limited to Prude’s new theory in support of his due process
claim. While the parties recently completed their summary judgment briefing on Prude’s
other claims, given that the summary judgment deadline in this case is in December of
2019, there is room in the schedule to allow the parties to litigate this issue.

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ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff Terrance Prude’s third motion for reconsideration (dkt. 97) is
GRANTED.
2. Prude’s motion to supplement his complaint (dkt. 99) is GRANTED.
3. Prude may proceed against defendant Meli on the theory that Meli was a biased
decision-maker, as provided above.

Entered this 6th day of August, 2019.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
_______________________
STEPHEN L. CROCKER
Magistrate Judge

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