Collins Bey, Robert et al v. Hamblin, Gary et al

Filing 50

ORDER that defendants' motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 29 , is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants Douma and Meisner are dismissed from the case. The clerk of court is directed to set a scheduling conference with Magistrate Judge Stephen Crocker to set a new trial date for plaintiff's claims against defendants Ashworth and Trattles. Signed by District Judge James D. Peterson on 9/17/2020. (rks),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

ROBERT L. COLLINS BEY,

v.

Plaintiff,

ANTHONY ASHWORTH, GARRIE TRATTLES,
TIM DOUMA, and MICHAEL MEISNER, 1

OPINION and ORDER
17-cv-784-jdp

Defendants.
Plaintiff Robert L. Collins Bey, appearing pro se, is an inmate currently incarcerated at
Wisconsin Secure Program Facility. He alleges that officials at Columbia Correctional
Institution violated his constitutional right to due process in a disciplinary proceeding that led
to him being placed in segregation for about a year. He contends that there were numerous
procedural problems with the proceedings, such as being given insufficient time to prepare, not
being allowed to have his witnesses attend the hearing, and being convicted on insufficient
evidence. He brings claims against the hearing examiners who he says were biased against him
for holding the hearing despite those procedural problems and for falsely recounting the
evidence against him. He also brings claims against supervisory officials who reviewed his
disciplinary appeal and an administrative grievance about the hearing.
Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 29, which I will grant in
part and deny in part. There are disputed issues of fact regarding the hearing examiners’ actions
during the hearing that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the examiners were biased

1

I have amended the caption to reflect the proper spelling of defendants Ashworth’s and
Trattles’s names as reflected in their submissions.

against Collins Bey. But Collins Bey fails to show that the supervisory officials turned a blind
eye toward this potential bias, so he cannot succeed on claims against the supervisory officials.

UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
Plaintiff Robert Collins Bey is currently incarcerated at Wisconsin Secure Program
Facility (WSPF), but the events relevant to this case took place while Collins Bey was at
Columbia Correctional Institution (CCI). All of the defendants were employed at CCI:
Anthony Ashworth was a corrections unit manager, Garrie Trattles was a captain, Michael
Meisner was the warden, and Tim Douma was the deputy warden. The other prison officials
mentioned below are not defendants.
On August 28, 2011, officer Tetzlaff wrote a conduct report against Collins Bey for
violating Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.12 (“Battery”). 2 See Dkt. 33-1, at 1. In the report,
Tetzlaff stated that he heard yelling coming from a cell that housed four inmates: Collins Bey,
Mario Pineda-Gaeta, Brian Goodson, and another unnamed inmate. When Tetzlaff arrived at
the cell, he saw Collins Bey jumping into his bunk. Pineda-Gaeta had a cut on his head and
right eye and was yelling, “Get me out of here.” Id. Tetzlaff removed Pineda-Gaeta from the
cell to receive medical attention. Lieutenant Berkebill then took photos of Pineda-Gaeta’s
wounds: the photos show a bleeding cut or abrasion on Pineda-Gaeta’s head, scratches on his

2

The DOC administrative code regulations have been revised since the time of the case. All
references to the administrative code in this opinion are to the 2006 version of the code.
See Dkt. 31.

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left shoulder, and an abrasion around his left eye, with that eye bloodshot. Id. at 22–23. PinedaGaeta said that Collins Bey hit him and tried to put fingers in his eyes.
Collins Bey says that he did not attack Pineda-Gaeta. He now says that before the
incident, Pineda-Gaeta had been saying that he wanted to harm himself. The day of the
incident, Collins Bey was on his bunk resting before he heard a loud noise as if someone had
hit the cell door. He turned to see Pineda-Gaeta at the cell door yelling to unit staff that he
wanted to go to observation, and he began hitting himself and scratching his head and face.
Collins Bey asked Pineda-Gaeta what he was doing, and Pineda-Gaeta responded “that he’s
going to obs.” (Collins Bey did not offer this explanation at the time of the incident or the
hearing.)
The next day, Collins Bey was given a copy of the conduct report and a “Notice of
Major Disciplinary Hearing Rights” form. He also was assigned a staff advocate, Mary Leiser,
to help him understand the charges and to help in preparation and presentation of his defense,
including by gathering evidence and testimony. Collins Bey requested that Pineda-Gaeta,
Goodson, Tetzlaff, and Berkebill attend the hearing. Captain Donald Morgan reviewed these
requests. See id., at 5.
The parties appear to dispute exactly how Morgan responded to the requests, but I’ll
credit Collins Bey’s version because it is reasonably supported by the form Morgan used to
explain his response. Id. Collins Bey says that Morgan initially approved all four witnesses but
then, a day before the hearing, changed his mind about Pineda-Gaeta and Berkebill. Morgan
stated that Pineda-Gaeta could not attend because of a risk to Pineda-Gaeta’s safety; and
Berkebill was not available because of his work schedule. Instead, both witnesses provided
written statements to Leiser. Pineda-Gaeta’s statement was in Spanish and was signed but

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unsworn; a translator translated it into English for purposes of the hearing: it stated that Collins
Bey attacked him.
Collins Bey challenges the authenticity and admissibility of Pineda-Gaeta’s statement
both at the hearing itself and in this lawsuit. If what Collins Bey means is that there isn’t proof
that Pineda-Gaeta made the statement or that the translation is accurate, that isn’t really the
relevant issue in this case: the question is how defendants responded to the record before them.
Institution complaint examiner Ellen Ray declares that the documents submitted are an
accurate copy of the disciplinary hearing record, see Dkt. 33, so I may consider Pineda-Gaeta’s
statement for the effect that it had on defendants. Whether the statement was properly allowed
in the disciplinary hearing under DOC regulations is an issue I’ll discuss below.
Defendants Ashworth and Trattles were assigned as the Adjustment Committee
members for the disciplinary hearing on the conduct report. The hearing was held on
September 9, 2011. Among the evidence presented was Pineda-Gaeta’s translated statement,
photos showing Pineda-Gaeta’s injuries, Tetzlaff’s conduct report stating that he saw Collins
Bey jump into his bunk and his testimony that he had nothing to add to what was in the
conduct report, a written statement from Berkebill stating that he examined Collins Bey’s
hands and did not see any marks, and testimony from inmate Goodson stating that he did not
witness the incident because he was sleeping. Collins Bey was present at the hearing and he
provided a written statement and supplement to that statement. In his statements, Collins Bey
said that he didn’t attack or fight with Pineda-Gaeta. But he did not include the version of
events that he now provides in this lawsuit, about how he saw Pineda-Gaeta injure himself to
get taken to observation. He said that there was no evidence to corroborate Pineda-Gaeta’s
story, such as injuries to Collins Bey or blood on Pineda-Gaeta’s bunk. And he raised various

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procedural problems with the proceedings: that he wasn’t given enough time to get answers to
written questions for Pineda-Gaeta or Berkebill because their attendance was canceled only a
day before the hearing, advocate Leiser didn’t help him as required by the DOC regulations,
he wasn’t able to call or question Pineda-Gaeta, and the security rationale for keeping PinedaGaeta didn’t make sense because Collins Bey would be handcuffed at the hearing,
Collins Bey says that at some point during the hearing, Ashworth and Trattles told him
that he had admitted to the battery. Collins Bey says that he did not admit to the battery.
Defendants say that Ashworth and Trattles did not make this statement to Collins Bey. Collins
Bey told Ashworth and Trattles that Leiser had a conflict of interest in being his advocate and
that’s why she didn’t help him. Ashworth and Trattles told him that they didn’t think that
there was a conflict.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Ashworth and Trattles found Collins Bey guilty of
battery. They issued a written statement of their reasoning, which included a statement noting
“that the inmate admits to 303.” Defendants say that this is a typo caused by them overwriting
the report from the previous hearing, and that they did not believe that he had admitted to the
battery. Collins Bey says that after Ashworth and Trattles assessed him a 360-day disciplinarysegregation penalty, they told him, “Now you can go back to Boscobel where you belong.”
Dkt. 42, at 7, ¶ 41. WSPF is located in Boscobel.
Collins Bey appealed the disciplinary ruling to defendant Deputy Warden Douma
arguing that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, along with procedural violations at
his disciplinary hearing, including that the written decision was incorrect by stating that he
admitted guilt. But he did not include the facts he raises now about Ashworth and Trattles
telling him at the hearing that he had admitted to the battery or that he could go back to

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Boscobel where he belonged. Douma denied the appeal, stating that Pineda-Gaeta’s statement
and the photos of the injuries were sufficient to find Collins Bey guilty. Douma also stated that
there were no due process violations.
Collins Bey followed with an inmate grievance stating that Leiser refused to do anything
to help him prepare for the due process hearing, that he did not receive statements and photos
from the alleged victim prior to the hearing, and that Douma did not address all of the issues
he brought up on appeal. The institution complaint examiner rejected the grievance for failing
to asset a procedural error in the proceedings, and that rejection was upheld by defendant
Warden Meisner.
Collins Bey also says that Douma twice made threatening remarks to him: in 1999,
when Collins Bey first arrived at CCI, Douma told him that he had a “nice little hell hole in
Boscobel [where WSPF is located]” waiting for Collins Bey because Collins Bey was a “cop
killer.” 3 Dkt. 42, at 2, ¶¶ 10–11. After serving about 11 years at WSPF, Collins Bey returned
to CCI in August 2011. Within a week of his return, Douma told him “someone screwed up
sending [Collins Bey] back to CCI, and he thought that they had an understanding that he was
not wanted at CCI.” Id. at 2, ¶ 13.

ANALYSIS
Collins Bey brings Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against defendants
Ashworth and Trattles (the examiners for his conduct report hearing), defendant Douma (who

3

Collins Bey states that he was wrongfully convicted of killing two police officers.

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considered his disciplinary appeal), and defendant Meisner (who rejected his inmate grievance
about the hearing).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from
“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
Amend. XIV, § 1. To prevail on a § 1983 procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he: (1) has a cognizable property or liberty interest; (2) has suffered a
deprivation of that interest; and (3) was denied due process. Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527
(7th Cir. 2010).
The Supreme Court has explained that a prisoner’s cognizable liberty interests “will be
generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes [an] atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 483–484 (1995). A period of segregated confinement may be “atypical and
significant” “if the length of segregated confinement is substantial and the record reveals that
the conditions of confinement are unusually harsh.” Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d
693, 697–98 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that a prisoner’s confinement in segregation for 240
days may implicate a liberty interest). Defendants say that for purposes of summary judgment,
they do not dispute that Collins Bey’s sentence of 360 days of disciplinary segregation was
atypical and significant hardship. But the parties dispute whether Collins Bey received all the
process was due.
A. Disciplinary hearing
As I explained to the parties in screening the complaint, Collins Bey is entitled to only
“‘informal, nonadversarial due process.’” Dkt. 31, at 9 (quoting Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679
(7th Cir. 2012)). This means that Collins Bey is entitled to: notice of the reasons that prison

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officials seek administrative confinement; time to prepare for the administrative review; an
opportunity to present his views to a neutral decisionmaker; and a decision supported by some
evidence. Id. at 684–85; Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 845 (7th Cir. 2011). Collins Bey continues
to argue that he was entitled to more elaborate process, but he is incorrect: the Westefer line of
cases continue to be the standard by which this type of due process claim is considered. See,
e.g., James v. Pfister, 708 F. App’x 876, 879 (7th Cir. 2017) (acknowledging that a transfer to
disciplinary segregation affords inmates the informal process described in Westefer).
Collins Bey also points to various DOC procedural rules that he says were violated
before and at his hearing. For instance, he contends that his advocate Leiser did not help him
prepare for the hearing, that he got only a day’s notice that Pineda-Gaeta and Lt. Berkebill
would not be testifying in person, that he did not get a chance to have Pineda-Gaeta answer
his written questions for him, and that Pineda-Gaeta’s testimony wasn’t properly sworn or
authenticated. But even if some of these issues constituted violations of various DOC
disciplinary hearing regulations, those violations alone are not enough to not make a
constitutional claim. See, e.g., Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 935 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2004); Scott
v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003). Notably, Collins Bey did “not have a
constitutional right to call witnesses or to require prison officials to interview witnesses” in his
hearing. Westefer, 682 F.3d at 685. Nor does Westefer suggest that there is a right to help from
an advocate. And even without Pineda-Gaeta’s direct written statement, Ashworth and Trattles
already had his statement in the conduct report. See McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786
(7th Cir.1999) (conduct report alone was sufficient evidence to satisfy due process).
Despite these alleged DOC-regulation violations, any reasonable jury would conclude
that Collins Bey had time to prepare for the hearing, that he had an opportunity to present his

8

views, and that there was some evidence to uphold the verdict. This was a relatively simple case
that didn’t require complicated evidence: Pineda-Gaeta says that Collins Bey attacked him,
Correctional Officer Tetzlaff saw Collins Bey jump back into his bunk when he arrived, and
Pineda-Gaeta indeed suffered physical injuries consistent with an attack. Collins Bey denied
that he attacked Pineda-Gaeta, but the version of events that Collins Bey presents now—that
he witnessed Pineda-Gaeta harm himself—was not included in his written testimony for the
hearing. In his written testimony, Collins Bey simply said that he didn’t attack or fight with
Pineda-Gaeta; he did not present his own version of events. Berkebill’s written testimony
confirmed Collins Bey’s testimony that Collins Bey did not have any scratches or other injuries,
which the committee might have considered to be evidence that favored Collins Bey. Cellmate
Goodson was sleeping so he didn’t see what happened. Collins Bey doesn’t explain how the
evidence would have been different had he had more time to prepare or had he received better
assistance from Leiser. There isn’t anyone who would be able to vouch for either Pineda-Gaeta’s
or Collins Bey’s version of events. Ultimately, Collins Bey is correct that the guilty verdict is
not supported by overwhelming evidence, but it’s easily enough to satisfy the “some evidence”
standard.
That leaves the question whether Collins Bey received a decision from unbiased
decisionmakers. In the prison disciplinary context, adjudicators are “entitled to a presumption
of honesty and integrity,” and “the constitutional standard for improper bias is high.” Piggie v.
Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). Because Collins Bey has the burden of proving a
due process violation, he needs to provide evidence showing that there is a dispute of fact on
this question. The theory that I allowed Collins Bey to proceed with is, in part, related to the
procedural violations: Ashworth and Trattles showed their bias against him by holding the

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hearing despite multiple procedural violations, which suggests that they did not intend for him
to receive a fair hearing under the rules that the DOC has set for itself. Collins Bey also alleges
that they falsely recounted the evidence they received by falsely stating that Collins Bey
admitted to the battery and that Tetzlaff was an eyewitness to the incident.
Particularly given the presumption of honesty for hearing examiners discussed in Piggie,
the alleged procedural violations are not enough to establish Ashworth’s or Trattles’s bias. To
start with, Ashworth or Trattles can be responsible only for issues raised to them at the hearing.
Collins Bey argued to Ashworth and Trattles that Leiser had a conflict of interest leading her
to not help him. Ashworth and Trattles concluded that there wasn’t a conflict and Collins Bey
didn’t explain a rationale for there being a conflict. He did argue that Leiser didn’t help him
by gathering other evidence such as photos of Pineda-Gaeta’s bunk, but he fails to plausibly
argue how any other evidence could have helped him. As I stated above, there wasn’t
overwhelming evidence corroborating Collins Bey’s guilt. But there’s no suggestion that any
evidence Leiser could have helped him obtain would support his version of events, in which
Pineda-Gaeta harmed himself—a version of events that he didn’t even raise at the hearing.
Likewise, Collins Bey argues that Pineda-Gaeta should have testified in person and that
his unsworn, translated statement shouldn’t have been admitted. But Ashworth and Trattles
didn’t excuse Pineda-Gaeta from testifying; non-defendant Captain Morgan did. The parties
dispute whether the decisions about Pineda-Gaeta testimony complied with Wis. Admin. Code
§ DOC 303.81 (“Due process hearing: witnesses”), which explains when a witness may be
excused from live testimony and when to allow a written statement instead. Collins Bey says
that there was no security risk to Pineda-Gaeta justifying his absence, and although we do not
have a full record of Captain Morgan’s reasoning, I’m inclined to agree with Collins Bey. That

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regulation appears to be aimed at allowing confidential informants to avoid being identified at
a hearing. There’s no reason to think that Pineda-Gaeta’s safety would be jeopardized more by
being present at the hearing than by submitting a written statement—I assume that his safety
at the hearing itself could have been guaranteed. But even assuming that Ashworth and Trattles
incorrectly applied the regulation in allowing Pineda-Gaeta’s translated written statement
instead of his in-person testimony, an incorrect decision isn’t necessarily a biased one. This
evidentiary ruling doesn’t suggest that Ashworth and Trattles were biased against Collins Bey.
Regarding Collins Bey’s assertion that Ashworth and Trattles falsely called Tetzlaff an
eyewitness to the incident, Tetzlaff was indeed an eyewitness to the tail end of the incident.
Tetzlaff’s statement that he saw Collins Bey jump into his bunk when he arrived at the cell is
evidence that Collins Bey was attempting to get way from Pineda-Gaeta before Tetzlaff saw
him. So that’s not evidence of Ashworth’s or Trattles’s bias either.
But that still leaves the more direct statements from Ashworth and Trattles that Collins
Bey says shows bias on their part. It’s undisputed that the written disciplinary decision included
a note “that the inmate admits to 303.” Defendants say that this was entered on the form in
error. The contemporaneous evidence supports defendants’ position, because it was clear that
Collins Bey was denying the charge, and Ashworth and Trattles did not immediately end their
deliberations with his purported admission. Instead they went on to compare the credibility of
the disputed testimony before concluding that Pineda-Gaeta was telling the truth and that
Collins Bey was not.
Collins Bey now says that Ashworth and Trattles also stated during the hearing that he
had admitted to the battery, even though he had not. Collins Bey also says that when they
sentenced him they told him, “Now you can go back to [WSPF] where you belong.” Dkt. 42,

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at 7, ¶ 41. These statements would suggest that they held animus toward Collins Bey and that
they fabricated the admission of guilt.
Defendants argue that Ashworth or Trattles did not make these statements, but they
do not provide evidence such as supplemental declarations explicitly denying that they made
those statements. Instead, they argue that “[t]here is no evidence to support the plaintiff’s
assertion that he heard Ashworth and Trattles say that the plaintiff admitted to the charges,”
Dkt. 45, at 23–24, ¶ 35, and that the statement about Collins Bey going back to Boscobel “is
a self-serving statement with no factual support,” id. at 11–12, ¶ 18. As defendants should be
well aware, this isn’t a proper objection to affidavit testimony describing a firsthand experience.
Collins Bey supports his proposed findings with his affidavit, Dkt. 42, and “uncorroborated
self-serving testimony, if based on personal knowledge or firsthand experience, may prevent
summary judgment against the non-moving party, as such testimony can be evidence of
disputed material facts.” Montgomery v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 626 F.3d 382, 389 (7th Cir. 2010)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
Collins Bey’s affidavit statements about the comments by Ashworth and Trattles aren’t
inadmissible under the “sham affidavit” rule, which prohibits a witness from contradicting prior
sworn testimony with a later affidavit. See, e.g., Cook v. O’Neill, 803 F.3d 296, 298 (7th Cir.
2015). But any reasonable factfinder would likely apply a similar principle to the facts here.
The newly alleged statements by Ashworth and Trattles were conspicuously missing from
Collins Bey’s disciplinary appeal or grievance, in which he quite thoroughly listed his
complaints with the disciplinary hearing. I doubt that a reasonable jury would find Collins Bey
credible given that he failed to mention these statements until eight years after the events in
question. Nor did Collins Bey proffer his alternate theory of how Pineda-Gaeta harmed himself

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to get to observation status until this lawsuit. Nonetheless, this court’s role at summary
judgment is not to gauge Collins Bey’s credibility. Collins Bey has admissible evidence that
Ashworth and Trattles said these things. And if the jury believes Collins Bey’s version of events,
it could reasonably infer that Ashworth and Trattles were indeed biased against him and that
they thought he belonged in segregation no matter what the evidence showed, going so far to
fabricate an admission as part of their written decision.
Defendants argue that “the dispute is immaterial because there was enough evidence to
find Collins Bey committed the charged offense without any admission of guilt.” I agree that
there is at least “some evidence” of Collins Bey’s guilt no matter what Ashworth or Trattles
said to him. Between Pineda-Gaeta’s statement and injuries and Tetzlaff’s statement that
Collins Bey jumped into his bunk when he arrived, the contemporaneous record has ample
evidence of Collins Bey’s guilt, although the evidence is not so strong that a finding of guilt
was the only reasonable outcome. But the “some evidence” requirement is only one of the
procedural guarantees that Collins Bey receives under the informal process due to him under
Westefer. The question is whether Collins Bey was harmed by having biased decisionmakers,
using a harmless error analysis. Piggie, 344 F.3d at 678 (“harmless error analysis applies to
prison disciplinary proceedings.”). The due process violation here was not harmless: a
reasonable neutral decisionmaker could have acquitted Collins Bey on the hearing evidence.
So I will deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the merits of these claims.
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to summary judgment under the doctrine
of qualified immunity, stating that “Collins Bey appears to argue that he was entitled to
protections above and beyond informal due process. No existing precedent requires that the
Defendants provide anything more than informal due process.” Government officials are

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entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violated a federal statutory or
constitutional right, and the unlawfulness of their conduct was “clearly established at the time.”
D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018).
I’ll reject the qualified immunity argument with regard to defendants Ashworth and
Trattles because this isn’t a case about Collins Bey receiving more than informal process; it’s
clearly established that Collins Bey had the right to unbiased decisionmakers at his hearing. So
I’ll deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claims against Ashworth and
Trattles, and the case will proceed to trial on those claims.
B. Disciplinary appeal and inmate grievance
Collins Bey also brings due process claims against defendant Douma for denying his
disciplinary appeal and against defendant Meisner for denying his inmate grievance about the
hearing. In granting Collins Bey leave to proceed on these claims, I stated that these supervisory
officials could be held liable for their own complicity in Ashworth and Trattles’s decision by
approving it. Dkt 16, at 2–3 (quoting Matthews v. City of East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th
Cir. 2012) (supervisors could be personally involved in a constitutional deprivation if they
“know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear
of what they might see”)). But I warned Collins Bey to win on these claims, he would have to
show that Douma and Meisner believed that Ashworth and Trattles were biased and chose not
to intervene; it would not be enough to show that he did not commit the battery, or that
defendants were negligent in reviewing the appeal or grievance.
At summary judgment, Collins Bey fails to show that Douma and Meisner turned a
blind eye to Ashworth and Trattles’s bias. The appeal and grievance records show that Collins
Bey highlighted various procedural problems with the conduct report hearing, but he did not

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specifically highlight bias on the part of Ashworth and Trattles. Nor did he tell Douma or
Meisner that Ashworth and Trattles told him during the hearing that he had admitted to the
battery and that he was going to Boscobel where he belonged. So no reasonable jury could
conclude that Douma and Meisner squarely confronted the issue of decisionmaker bias and
ignored it.
Collins Bey states that Douma made threatening comments to him in 1999 about going
to a “hell hole in Boscobel” for being a “cop killer” and in August 2011 about him not being
wanted at CCI. That might indicate Douma’s own bias against Collins Bey, but that isn’t a
claim that I allowed Collins Bey to proceed on in this case. And in any event, under Westefer
Collins Bey has no due process right to a disciplinary appeal, much less a procedurally sound
one. So I’ll grant summary judgment to defendants on these claims.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 29, is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part.
2. Defendants Douma and Meisner are DISMISSED from the case.
3. The clerk of court is directed to set a scheduling conference with Magistrate Judge
Stephen Crocker to set a new trial date for plaintiff’s claims against defendants
Ashworth and Trattles.
Entered September 17, 2020.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge

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