Pabon Gonzalez, Helson v. Bliss

Filing 11

ORDER dismissing plaintiff Helson Pabon Gonzalez's 1 complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Plaintiff's motions for an extension of his legal loan, Dkt. 3 and Dkt. 5 , are DENIED. Signed by District Judge James D. Peterson on 8/27/2018. (jef),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

HELSON PABON GONZALEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BLISS,

OPINION & ORDER
17-cv-851-jdp

Defendant.
Plaintiff Helson Pabon Gonzalez, appearing pro se, is a prisoner at the Wisconsin
Secure Program Facility. In this case, one of a series of lawsuits he has recently filed, he alleges
that defendant Correctional Officer Bliss harassed him in a variety of ways, including
confiscating some of his possessions and giving him false conduct reports. Pabon Gonzalez has
made an initial partial payment of the filing fee as previously directed by the court.
The next step is for me to screen Pabon Gonzalez’s complaint and dismiss any portion
that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
asks for monetary damages from a defendant who by law cannot be sued for money damages.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. In doing so, I must read Pabon Gonzalez’s pro se complaint
generously. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972) (per curiam). I conclude that most
of Pabon Gonzalez’s allegations do not support claims, and that his allegations that he was
psychologically harmed by the harassment violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. I will
dismiss his complaint and give him a chance to file an amended complaint that better explains
his claim for psychological harm.

ALLEGATIONS OF FACT
I draw the following facts from the complaint and prison documents attached to the
complaint, Dkt. 1 and Dkt. 1-1, and I accept them as true at the screening stage.
Plaintiff Helson Pabon Gonzalez is an inmate at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility.
Pabon Gonzalez says that defendant Correctional Officer Bliss has harassed him over the last
few years. In April 2015, Bliss gave him a false conduct report. In August 2015, Bliss denied
him reentry to part of the prison. In March 2016, Bliss took his magazines and medication and
threw his blankets on the floor. In 2017, Bliss gave him false conduct reports. At some point,
Bliss confiscated his radio, fan, and book of Spanish-English translations.

ANALYSIS
Pabon Gonzalez does not articulate his own legal theories about what rights he believes
defendant Bliss violated by harassing him. This is not fatal to his case because pro se plaintiffs
are generally not required to plead particular legal theories. Small v. Chao, 398 F.3d 894, 898
(7th Cir. 2005). The bigger problem for Pabon Gonzalez is that most of his allegations do not
support constitutional claims.
None of the individual components of this alleged pattern of harassment supports a
constitutional claim. Pabon Gonzalez alleges that Bliss gave him false conduct reports, but false
conduct reports do not create a due process claim because the inmate has the ability to litigate
the truthfulness of the report through a hearing process. Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621,
624–25 (7th Cir. 2006).
Pabon Gonzalez also alleges that Bliss confiscated his books and property for the
purpose of harassing him. I do not take him to be saying that he was harmed by Bliss taking

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his medication. And courts have consistently held that due process claims for deprivation of a
prisoner’s property fail where the plaintiff has adequate postdeprivation remedies. See, e.g.,
Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 638 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Munson’s complaint also makes it clear
that he received all the process he was due in the form of a written notice explaining why he
couldn’t possess the books and a meaningful chance to be heard by a series of prison officials.”);
Tyler v. Wick, No. 14-CV-68-jdp, 2016 WL 5496631, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 29, 2016) (civil
detainee had adequate postdeprivation remedies to challenge loss of property and money); see
also Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35 (action to recover personal property after wrongful taking, conversion,
or wrongful detention), and 893.51 (action for damages resulting from wrongful taking,
conversion, or wrongful detention of personal property); cf. Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580,
585 (7th Cir. 1996) (inmate complaint review system, certiorari review under Wisconsin law,
and Wisconsin tort remedies against prison officials are adequate remedies for deprivation of
good-time credits). He does not allege that these remedies are unavailable to him. So I will
deny him leave to proceed on procedural due process claims.
As for the overarching pattern of harassment itself, harassment by a prison guard
generally is not enough by itself to implicate a constitutional right. See DeWalt v. Carter, 224
F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000). Only in certain circumstances could sustained harassment be
pervasive or severe enough that it could support an Eighth Amendment claim. One type of
allegation that could support a claim would be that the harassment caused “significant
psychological harm” to the inmate. See Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2015). Pabon
Gonzalez states, “Because I’m so very bothered with [Bliss], be I will to cut at hand’s to so that
not to come repeat the same behavior with me and with not nobody not more.” Dkt. 1, at 2.
This allegation suggests that Bliss’s harassment caused Pabon Gonzalez such severe distress

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that he harmed himself. But it is ambiguous enough that I am not sure whether this is what
Pabon Gonzalez means. I understand that English is not Pabon Gonzalez’s first language, but
he will have to more clearly explain what he means by this allegation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
(“complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”).
I will give Pabon Gonzalez an opportunity to amend his complaint to better explain
how the alleged harassment affected him. He should draft his amended complaint as if he were
telling a story to people who know nothing about his situation. In particular, he should explain
whether he was psychologically harmed by the harassment, how he was harmed, and how he
knows that Bliss meant to harass him. If Pabon Gonzalez fails to submit an amended complaint
by the deadline set below, I will dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted and I will assess him a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Pabon Gonzalez has filed two motions for an extension of his legal loan, Dkt. 3 and
Dkt. 5, that are identical to his motions in case no. 17-cv-850-jdp. I already denied his motions
in the ’850 case, see Dkt. 11 in that case, and I will deny them here for the same reason: this
court generally does not interfere with the Department of Corrections’ administration of legal
loans, and given the many filings he has submitted in his recent cases in this court, there is no
reason to think that prison officials are restricting his ability to litigate his cases.

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ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff Helson Pabon Gonzalez’s complaint is DISMISSED under Federal Rule
of Civil Rule of Procedure 8.
2. Plaintiff may have until September 14, 2018, to submit an amended complaint
that complies with Rule 8.
3. Plaintiff’s motions for an extension of his legal loan, Dkt. 3 and Dkt. 5, are
DENIED.
Entered August 27, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
_/s/_______________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge

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