Jackson, Raynard et al v. Hoem, Stacey et al

Filing 130

OPINION AND ORDER granting 111 Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Defendants Flannery and Edge are dismissed from this case. Signed by District Judge William M. Conley on 12/9/22. (jat),(ps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
RAYNARD R. JACKSON,
Plaintiff,

OPINION AND ORDER

v.
18-cv-237-wmc
DANE ESSER, DARYL FLANNERY
and BETH EDGE,
Defendants.
Plaintiff Raynard Jackson, who is now represented by counsel, is proceeding in this
lawsuit against three employees of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (“DOC”)
working at its Secure Program Facility (“WSPF”) in 2013.

Specifically, Jackson is

proceeding against defendants Dane Esser, Daryl Flannery and Beth Edge on Eighth
Amendment claims arising out of the conditions of his confinement at WSPF between May
22 and 28, 2013. Currently before the court is defendants’ motion for partial summary
judgment. (Dkt. #111.) Defendants seek summary judgment as to Jackson’s Eighth
Amendment claims against Flannery and Edge, for failing to treat Jackson for dehydration
on May 27.

They do not seek summary judgment on Jackson’s claim against Esser.

Because no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Flannery or Edge consciously
disregarded Jackson’s health or safety, defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to
Jackson’s claims against them. Therefore, the court will grant defendants’ motion, and
Flannery and Edge will be dismissed from this case.

UNDISPUTED FACTS1
Raynard Jackson was incarcerated at WSPF in 2013. At that time, defendant Daryl
Flannery was working at WSPF as a Captain, and defendant Beth Edge was working as
nurse clinician in the Health Services Unit (“HSU”). Defendant Lieutenant Dane Esser
was an officer working at WSPF.
From May 22 to May 27, 2013, Jackson was held in a clinical observation cell that
did not have running water. Some five days before Jackson was placed there, the water
had been turned off in that cell because staff had to remove an inmate with force. However,
because staff did not turn the water back on after that removal, when Jackson was placed
in that on May 22nd, he had no access to running water. Jackson claims that from May
22 to May 27, he told multiple WSPF officials that he did not have running water, but to
no avail, causing him to suffer extremely uncomfortable symptoms associated with
dehydration.
Nurse Edge attests that on May 23 and 24 or 2013, she had checked on Jackson
during rounds. On May 23, Edge’s notes reflect that Jackson was standing at the front of
his cell, and on May 24 at about 2:30 p.m., Jackson had asked her about nasal spray and
was speaking to her through a vent. Jackson claims that he told Edge that he did not have
water during each of those visits, while Edge attests that Jackson did not say that his water
was cut off or that he was dehydrated. Edge further attests that Jackson presented with no

Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are material and undisputed. The court has drawn
these facts from the parties’ proposed findings of fact and responses, as well as the underlying,
record evidence as appropriate.
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symptoms of dehydration, while Jackson says that he told Edge that he was suffering from
dehydration. During similar rounds on May 23 and 24, other staff noted that Jackson was
asleep, or awake and eating, but there was no note that Jackson complained that he was
dehydrated because he did not have access to water. Jackson also claims that he did not
eat anything on either day.
According to Jackson, he also showed Edge on May 27 that he had no running water
in his cell, and Edge responded by screaming at Esser to turn the water back on, which
Jackson attributes to Edge’s effort to cover up her own failure to provide him medical
attention.2 Regardless, Esser turned the water back on May 27th.3 According to Edge, she
also attempted to examine Jackson at that time, but when she tried to provide him medical
attention at his cell door, Jackson stated, “I ain’t had H20 in this cell all week, what are
you going to do about it?” (Edge Decl. (dkt. #114) ¶ 12; Ex. 1012 (dkt. #116-1) 3-4.)
Edge further attests that she asked Jackson to come out of his cell for a physical
assessment because he had complained of chest pains, but he responded: “Bitch, I asked
you a question. What the fuck you going to do about my H2O?” (Edge Decl. (dkt. #114)
¶ 13; Ex. 1012 (dkt. #116-1) 3-4.) Edge attests that because of Jackson’s argumentative

The court granted Jackson leave to proceed against Edge only on the claim that she failed
to provide Jackson needed medical care on May 27. Nor has Jackson requested leave to
amend his complaint to broaden his claim against Edge. As a result, the court is not
inclined to grant a request to broaden Jackson’s claims against Edge at this late stage of the
lawsuit.
2

Jackson maintains that he had told Esser multiple times before May 27 that he had no running
water. While the dispute is genuine and material to Jackson’s claim against Esser, it is not material
to the pending motion.
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response and refusal to come out of his cell, she considered Jackson’s behavior to be a
refusal of care. Edge explains that HSU staff are not allowed to treat inmates who refuse
medical care unless they lose consciousness.

To this, Jackson denies that he refused

treatment and that Esser told Edge that Jackson refused to leave his cell, although he does
not deny cursing Edge and refusing to leave his cell.
Regardless, after their exchange, Edge directed Jackson to submit a Health Services
Request (“HSR”) if his symptoms did not improve. Edge also states that: she did not
observe any signs that Jackson was suffering from mild, moderate or severe hydration; she
did not believe his condition to be urgent; nor did she refer him to an advanced care
provider. Moreover, running water to Jackson’s cell was restored that same day, at which
point he could drink water again.
Still, Jackson maintains that he needed medical attention. He claims that during
third shift on May 27, he complained to defendant Captain Flannery about chest and back
pain from the lack of water. According to Jackson, Flannery responded that there was no
nurse at that time of day, so he would be seen in the morning. Flannery does not recall
this in-person interaction, but he believes Jackson likely told him during rounds in
Jackson’s unit. Flannery further maintains that if Jackson had reported severe chest pains
to him, it would have been recorded in the unit logbook by the sergeant who was working
that night. Flannery attests that because of the sergeant’s May 27 note, he called the oncall nurse at 1:00 a.m. on May 28. Flannery reported to the nurse that Jackson complained
he was dehydrated, while apparently omitting Jackson’s report of chest pain.
The nurse then responded that Jackson did not need to be seen until the following

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morning. Later, when Jackson filed an inmate complaint about Flannery’s handling of his
complaints, the nurse described her exchange with Flanner as follows:
Received call from Cpt. Flannery about [Jackson]. Patient
complained of being dehydrated. Has been yelling at staff.
Cpt. Flannery stated he denies being on a hunger strike. Cpt.
checked records and it shows patient eating/drinking. State his
mouth and tongue felt dry/swollen. Cpt. Flannery saw no
symptoms to contribute to complaints. Advised to rinse mouth
and drink water. If no improvement, call RN back.
(See dkt. #43-4, at 12.) Accordingly, Jackson received no medical attention overnight from
May 27th to May 28th.
On May 31, 2013, a doctor ordered a comprehensive metabolic panel and urine dip
for Jackson, and a nurse met with him about those orders. Jackson complained to the nurse
that he had been without water while in the observation cell and that his body was
“shutting down.” (See Ex. 1012 (dkt. #116-1) 5.) However, Jackson refused a physical
assessment by the nurse; medical staff were unable to obtain a blood or urine sample; and
Jackson was argumentative and angry.
Jackson purports to dispute this as well. Specifically, he testified at his deposition
that he sought out medical treatment from the HSU, but Edge intercepted those requests
and fabricated that he refused treatment. Even so, Jackson has submitted no evidence to
support this fabrication claim, and Jackson’s speculation on this point does not create a
genuine issue of fact. See Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008)(“It is
well-settled that speculation may not be used to manufacture a genuine issue of fact.”). In
fairness, however, no HSU records show that Jackson received follow up care for

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dehydration other than being provided fluids, which were made available to him starting
May 27th.
Ultimately, Jackson claims that because he went without fluids for five consecutive
days, he suffered psychological and physical pain and discomfort. He further claims that
when he was finally able to start drinking water again on May 27, he had to painfully sip
small amounts of water until the “swelling” caused by the dehydration subsided. As a
result, Jackson claims he dealt with dehydration-like symptoms for weeks.
OPINION
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the moving party meets this burden, then the non-moving party
must provide evidence “on which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party”
to survive summary judgment. Trade Fin. Partners, LLC v. AAR Corp., 573 F.3d 401, 406–
407 (7th Cir. 2009), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
Defendants seek summary judgment on the merits of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims
against Edge and Flannery.
The Eighth Amendment gives prisoners the right to receive adequate medical care,
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). To prevail on a claim of constitutionally inadequate
medical care, an inmate must demonstrate two elements: (1) an objectively serious medical
condition; and (2) a state official who was deliberately indifferent. Giles v. Godinez, 914
F.3d 1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2019); Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011).
First, a medical need is “serious” if it: so obviously requires treatment that even a lay-

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person could recognize the need for medical attention; carries risk of permanent serious
impairment if left untreated; results in needless pain and suffering; or significantly affects
an individual’s daily activities. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1371-73 (7th Cir. 1997).
Second, “deliberate indifference” is a high standard, requiring proof that the official was
aware a prisoner faced a substantial risk of serious harm but disregarded that risk by
consciously failing to take reasonable measures to address it. Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262,
266 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, acts of deliberate indifference requires more than negligence or
even gross negligence, but requires something less than purposeful acts. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).
The threshold for deliberate indifference is met where: (1) “the official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”; or (2) “the official [is] both
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists,” and he or she draws that inference yet deliberately fails to take reasonable
steps to avoid it. Id. at 837; see also Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“While evidence of malpractice is not enough for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment
on an Eighth Amendment claim, nor is a doctor’s claim he did not know any better
sufficient to immunize him from liability in every circumstance.”).
Here, defendants Edge and Flannery seek summary judgment as to both elements.
However, the court need not resolve the parties’ dispute about whether Jackson was
suffering from a serious medical need on May 27, because neither defendant’s response to
Jackson’s claimed need for medical attention amounted to deliberate indifference.

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I. Nurse Edge
Nurse Edge contends that she did not consciously disregard Jackson’s need for
medical attention on May 27 because he refused her attempt to examine him that day.
Jackson’s arguments in opposition are not grounded in the record. First, Jackson maintains
that he told Edge on May 23 and 24 that he had no water, but the court granted Jackson
leave to proceed against Edge with respect to their May 27th interaction only, and Jackson
has not sought leave to amend his complaint to broaden this claim. Nor does Edge’s earlier,
alleged knowledge that Jackson lacked water in his cell impact her liability for their
interactions on May 27. Indeed, there is no dispute that when Edge attempted to assess
Jackson to address his reported chest pain on May 27, he was argumentative and refused
to leave his cell. While Jackson insists that his behavior did not amount to a refusal of
medical attention, and that Edge improperly tried to assess him for his complaints about
chest pain, rather than his dehydration, he does not deny that Edge was attempting to
address his chest pain complaints. Further, Nurse Edge attests that when inmates behave
in an argumentative manner and refuse directives related to their medical care, HSU staff
are not allowed to treat absent express consent. (Edge Decl. (dkt. #114) ¶¶ 14-15.)
Moreover, no evidence indicates that Jackson’s condition was so serious that he was unable
to consent to treatment.
To the contrary, Jackson concedes that he was argumentative with Nurse Edge, and
Jackson submits no evidence indicating that he followed Edge’s directive to come out of
his cell so that she could assess his condition. Rather, he claims that defendant Esser would
not let him leave his cell. Even assuming that Esser was acting as some kind of a go-between

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between Jackson and Edge, no evidence suggests that Edge stopped him from leaving his
cell. Moreover, no evidence suggests that Edge was refusing to treat Jackson’s dehydration.
Again, to the contrary, Jackson testified in his deposition that Edge was present and
available to treat him. Thus, even assuming that Esser stood in the way of Jackson receiving
treatment from Edge, it was Esser who arguably acted improperly, not Edge. All Jackson’s
version of events suggests is that Edge was attempting to sus out whether Jackson’s chest
pain complaint was serious by examining him. Her attempts to take that step, but then to
decline to push Jackson to be assessed once he cursed at her and refused to follow her
request that he exit his cell, is not enough for a reasonable jury to find deliberate
indifference on Nurse Edge’s part. This is so even if accepting Jackson’s assertion that she
knew Jackson was gone multiple days without water and was dehydrated; Edge tried to
treat assess him on May 27, and there is no dispute that Jackson had access to water that
day.

Furthermore, no evidence indicates that Edge prevented Jackson from pursuing

further treatment after their interaction; Jackson’s own behavior, not Edge’s, prevented
him from obtaining medical attention for his dehydration.
Jackson’s alternative argument is completely devoid of support in the record.
Jackson claims that after this interaction, Nurse Edge thwarted him from obtaining needed
medical attention by (1) intercepting his requests for medical attention and (2) falsely
stating that Jackson was refusing medical attention. Jackson speculated as much during
his deposition, but he provided no actual evidence to support these serious accusations. In
fact, the only real evidence regarding Edge’s handling of Jackson’s requests for medical
attention after their interaction at his cell is that Edge responded to his later HSRs by

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attempting to arrange for Jackson to be seen and assessed. There is no evidence that Edge
or any other HSU staff mishandled these HSRs in a manner that prevented Jackson from
obtaining medical attention for dehydration or related symptoms. In short, there is no
genuine dispute as to whether Edge consciously disregarded Jackson’s need for medical
attention on or after May 27. Therefore, Edge is entitled to summary judgment.

II. Captain Flannery
Defendant Flannery is entitled to summary judgment as well. Flannery argues that
in his capacity as a Captain, his interaction with Jackson early on May 28, 2013, would
not support a jury’s finding of a conscious disregard for his need for medical attention.
Nevertheless, Jackson contends in opposition that Flannery purposefully downplayed his
symptoms to the on-call nurse by omitting the critical facts that he was experiencing chest
pains and had gone five days without water.
Although the precise details of what Flannery reported to the nurse are not in the
record, the on-call nurse later reported that Flannery told her that Jackson was complaining
of dehydration. She also noted that Flannery reported that Jackson said his mouth and
tongue felt dry and swollen, and that Flannery told her that his records showed he had
been eating and drinking.
Further, Jackson does not dispute that his records showed he had been eating and
drinking earlier that day, so Flannery cannot be faulted for reporting to the nurse that
Jackson had been eating. And although Jackson now insists that he had not been eating or
drinking, no evidence suggests that Flannery had any reason to doubt the information in

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Jackson’s records. As a result, no reasonable jury could fault Flannery for subsequently
reporting to the nurse the content of Jackson’s records.
Finally, although Jackson further maintains that Flannery intentionally downplayed
his condition and reported his dehydration symptoms, even though his “organs were likely
shutting down” (see Pl. Opp’n Br. (dkt. #123) 18), Jackson has not submitted evidence
supporting that objective finding, much less supporting a finding that he brought such a
serious matter to Captain Flannery’s attention. In fact, Jackson does not detail how he
presented to Flannery when they interacted on May 27, such that Flannery should have
known that his reported chest pains were Jackson’s primary concern, as opposed to his
dehydration symptoms, or that he needed medical attention for his chest pains that night.
And nothing in the record corroborates Jackson’s assertion about the severity of his
condition more generally.
While the record supports a finding that Jackson did immediately seek out medical
attention the next morning, by the time WSPF staff again tried to assess him on May 31st,
Jackson once again refused a nurse’s attempt to take his blood and urine to evaluate
whether he was suffering any lingering issues associated with the five-day lack of water.
Without some evidence that Flannery knew Jackson’s chest pains needed to be reported to
the on-call nurse, no reasonable jury could find that Flannery’s failure to provide more
details to the nurse demonstrated a conscious disregard of a serious medical condition. At
worst, Flannery’s omission suggests that he negligently omitted his reported chest pain, not
an intentional refusal to provide Jackson the care he needed for dehydration. See Burton v.
Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 785 (7th Cir. 2015) (“the infliction of suffering on prisoners can

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be found to violate the Eighth Amendment only if that infliction is either deliberate, or
reckless in nature in the criminal sense”). Therefore, Flannery is also entitled to summary
judgment.
As a result, this case will proceed to trial on Jackson’s Eighth Amendment claim
against defendant Esser only.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment (dkt. #111) is GRANTED.
2. Defendants Flannery and Edge are DISMISSED from this case.
Entered this 9th day of December, 2022.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
__________________________________
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge

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