Nelson, Todd v. North Central States Regional Council of Carpenters Pension Fund

Filing 47

Transmission of Notice of Appeal, Orders, Judgment and Docket Sheet to Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals re: 45 Notice of Appeal, (Attachments: # 1 Order #33, # 2 Order #37, # 3 Judgment, # 4 Docket Sheet) (lak)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
TODD D. NELSON,
Plaintiff,

OPINION AND ORDER

v.
20-cv-585-wmc
NORTH CENTRAL STATES
REGIONAL COUNCIL OF
CARPENTERS PENSION
FUND,
Defendant.
On September 16, 2021, the court entered an order in this ERISA dispute between
plaintiff Todd Nelson and defendant North Central States Regional Council of Carpenters
Pension Fund, finding that Nelson was entitled to unreduced early retirement benefits.
North Central has since moved for reconsideration, presumably under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e).1 For the reasons given below, North Central’s motion for reconsideration
will denied and judgment entered against it.

OPINION
Parties may move for reconsideration only when they can “establish a manifest error
of law or fact.” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing LB
Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1996). A manifest error

The court had offered defendant an opportunity to submit additional evidence for its
counterclaim, which it failed to do. For that reason, the court’s sua sponte dismissal of the
counterclaim will stand. (Dkt. #33.) Additionally, although defendant never specifies on which
rule of civil procedure it is relying in bringing this motion, defendant’s reliance on cases interpreting
Rule 59 (and the fact that no other rule would appear to apply) leads the court to assess this motion
under that standard.
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exists where there is “wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling
precedent.” Id. (quoting Sedrak v. Callahan, 987 F.Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D.Ill. 1997). “The
Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or
present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” C. Wright
& A. Miller, 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2810.1 (3d ed.).

North Central requests

reconsideration on several points, which the court assesses individually.

I. Remand
North Central first argues that the court should have remanded this case to the plan
trustees so that they could interpret the plan language, which would “allow” the court to
review that decision under an “arbitrary and capricious” standard. (Def.’s Mot. (dkt. #34)
5-6.) However, the court already addressed the appropriate standard of review at summary
judgment, finding that de novo review of North Central’s decision was warranted because
defendant never made a timely decision on plaintiff’s right to unreduced early retirement
benefits. (Opinion (dkt. #33) 15) (citing Fessenden v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 927
F.3d 998, 1001 (7th Cir. 2019). While defendant now cites Pakovich v. Broadspire Servs.,
Inc., 535 F.3d 60, 6071 (7th Cir. 2008), in support of the notion that remand to the
administrator is appropriate when there is no decision to review, defendant ignores the
difference between the plan (1) failing to make a preliminary decision regarding eligibility
and (2) making an eligibility determination but failing to take it up on appeal.
At summary judgment, this court found that “the eligibility committee specifically
concluded that Nelson was not eligible for unreduced early retirement benefits, but the
executive committee failed on review to issue any decision as to Nelson’s retirement

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benefits claim.” (Opinion (dkt. #33) 16.) This is a materially different circumstance than
when the plan never made a determination in the first place. Indeed, the Pakovich court
looked to the Eight Circuit in addressing this distinction, quoting with approval language
addressing this point: “When a plan administrator denies a participant's initial
application for benefits and the review panel fails to act on the participant's properly filed
appeal, the administrator's decision is subject to judicial review, and the standard of review
will be de novo.” Pakovich, 535 F.3d 601 at 606–07 (quoting Seman v. FMC Corp. Ret. Plan
for Hourly Emps., 334 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2003)). This same language captures the
exact situation at hand: the plan denied Nelson’s initial claim to early retirement benefits
and the review panel failed to act on his claim upon appeal. In contrast, the claim actually
at issue in Pakovich never even had an initial eligibility determination. 535 F.3d 601 at
607. As such, the Pakovich decision’s application of deferential review is wholly inapposite
here, while de novo review is appropriate in Nelson’s case.
Moreover, acknowledging “under controlling precedent a remand is appropriate
unless the case is so clear cut that it would not be appropriate for the Administrator (or the
Board of Trustees in this case) to deny the claim on any ground” (Def.’s Mot. (dkt. #34)
8) (emphasis added), defendant ignores that the court specifically addressed why this case
was “clear cut” at summary judgment. (Opinion (dkt. #33) 23.) Indeed, on the facts of
this case, “the record contains more than sufficient information to confirm that Nelson
meets all of the Plan’s substantive requirements for unreduced early retirement benefits.”
(Id.) Thus, “[b]ased on the defendant’s own findings, dubious arguments for upholding
the denial and the undisputed facts of record,” the court expressly found “this to be one

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such ‘clear cut’ case,” where a direct award of benefits is warranted.2 (Id.) The court has,
thus, already addressed this argument. “Rule 59 is not a vehicle for rearguing previously
rejected motions.” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000).

II. Fillable Form
Defendant next argues that it would be reasonable for the Trustees to find that an
application for benefits required a “document with blank spaces for insertion of
information.” (Def.’s Mot. (dkt. #34) 8.) This, too, is simply a rehashing of a previously
rejected argument, and thus, improper for a Rule 59 motion. The court expressly found
that restricting applications to documents with spaces for insertion was “an overly
technical, narrow definition that would seem unworthy of a fiduciary, especially having
failed to identify an actual printed form, much less proper notice to Nelson and other
claimants of its required use. (Opinion (dkt. #33) 21.) Additionally, “if Nelson did in
fact need to complete some additional, fill-in-the-blank form, North Central was obligated
under ERISA to inform him of this,” which they did not. (Id.) As before, “the court will
not now uphold defendant’s denial of benefits on the grounds that Nelson failed to satisfy
a form requirement that was neither made available by the Plan nor communicated to
Nelson.” (Id. at 22.) And, once again, the court cannot help but raise its concern that this
ongoing dispute is now being driven by counsel’s creativite “gotchas,” rather than by the
good faith of a fiduciary trust.

Given that the court does not find remand to be appropriate, it is unnecessary to discuss
defendant’s further assertion the Trustees’ interpretation of the plan upon remand would be
enforceable. (Def.’s Mot. (dkt. #34) 12.)
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III. Time Limitation
As a final argument, defendant underscores the court’s concern by suggesting for
the first time that Nelson’s unreduced early retirement benefits should be limited to the
time period beginning in October 2019, rather than August 2017. (Def.’s Mot. (dkt. #34)
16.) Indeed, in all its past filings, North Central simply maintained that Nelson did not
qualify for this retirement benefit, with no reference to whether a start date of 2017 or
2019 would be appropriate.
Given that defendant has never raised this argument before, it is waived. “The Rule
59(e) motion may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present
evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” C. Wright & A.
Miller, 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2810.1 (3d ed.).
Accordingly,

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion for reconsideration (dkt. #34) is
DENIED and the clerk of court is directed to enter final judgment against it.
Entered this 13th day of October, 2021.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
__________________________________
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge

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