Roche, Terrance v. Jordan et al
Filing
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ORDER that this case is dismissed. Federal law does not authorize a damages claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and plaintiff does not have standing to obtain injunctive relief. Signed by District Judge James D. Peterson on 1/27/2025. (rks),(ps)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
TERRANCE ROCHE, SR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
OPINION and ORDER
LIEUTENANT JORDAN, OFFICER SMALLEY and
OFFICER J. SWANSON,
24-cv-588-jdp
Defendants.
Terrance Roche, Sr., proceeding without counsel, alleges that correctional officers at the
Federal Correctional Institution in Oxford, Wisconsin, used excessive force against him, in
violation of the Constitution. The complaint is before the court for screening under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, which require the court to dismiss any claim that is legally frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages
from a defendant who by law cannot be sued for money damages. When screening the
complaint of a plaintiff without counsel, I read the complaint liberally. Arnett v. Webster, 658
F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). But Roche must still “plead a plausible claim for relief,” Balle
v. Kennedy, 73 F.4th 545, 557 (7th Cir. 2023). For the reasons below, I must dismiss Roche’s
complaint because his request for damages is not authorized under federal law, and he does
not have standing to obtain injunctive relief.
ANALYSIS
Roche contends that the correctional officers violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment and Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. Claims regarding excessive force
brought by prisoners arise under the Eighth Amendment, so the Fourth Amendment does not
apply. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015).
Regardless which amendment applies, no federal statute authorizes a damages claim
against a federal officer for constitutional violations.1 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized an “implied” damages remedy against
federal officers for certain constitutional violations. But the Court has tightly restricted the
scope of Bivens, holding that it applies in only three contexts: Fourth Amendment claims for
unreasonable search and seizure, Fifth Amendment claims for sex discrimination, and Eighth
Amendment claims for failing to provide adequate medical care. See Sargeant v. Barfield, 87
F.4th 358, 363 (7th Cir. 2023). In any other context, the court may not allow a constitutional
claim for damages to proceed against a federal officer if “there is any rational reason . . . to
think that Congress is better suited to weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action
to proceed . . . . For example, if Congress or the Executive has created a remedial process that
it finds sufficient to secure an adequate level of deterrence, the courts cannot second-guess that
calibration by superimposing a Bivens remedy.” Id. at 364 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has already held that a federal prisoner
may not bring an excessive force claim against a federal officer under Bivens. Ajaj v. Fozzard,
No. 23-2219, 2024 WL 4002912 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 2024). This is because such a claim does
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) authorizes claims against the United States for certain
wrongful conduct by federal employees who violate state tort law. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
Roche has not asserted a claim under the FTCA, he has not named the United States as a party,
and he does not allege that he has complied with the procedure in 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 for
presenting an FTCA claim to the Bureau of Prisons. So I do not construe Roche’s complaint as
including an FTCA claim.
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not fall within the claims already permitted under Bivens, and the Bureau of Prisons has an
Administrative Remedy Program, which provides an avenue for federal prisoners to file
complaints about things like excessive force. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10–15. Id. at *2. So Roche may
not proceed on a claim for damages under the Constitution.
The limitations on damages claims do not apply to claims for injunctive relief. See White
v. Sloop, 772 Fed. Appx. 334, 336–37 (7th Cir. 2019). Roche asks for injunctive relief in the
form of an order requiring the officers to complete more training. But a plaintiff has standing
to sue for injunctive relief only when there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendants will
harm the plaintiff again. Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 924 F.3d 375, 395 (7th Cir.
2019). Roche has been transferred to a different prison in Oregon, so he cannot make that
showing. See Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2009).
Roche cannot obtain damages or an injunction, so I must dismiss his claim. Roche
cannot fix the problems with his complaint by adding new allegations, so I will not give him
leave to amend. See Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d
510, 519–20 (7th Cir. 2015).
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. Federal law does not authorize a
damages claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and plaintiff does not
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have standing to obtain injunctive relief. The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment and
close the case.
Entered January 27, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge
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