USA v. Annette Trujillo

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Annette Teresita Trujillo. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
___________________
No. 13-10432
___________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20156-UU-5

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANNETTE TERESITA TRUJILLO,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
___________________

(March 31, 2014)
Before ANDERSON and GILMAN, ∗ Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON, ∗∗ District
Judge.
∗

Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
∗∗

Honorable Inge Prytz Johnson, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Alabama, sitting by designation.

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PER CURIAM:
Annette Trujillo appeals her conviction for bank fraud and wire fraud.
Trujillo was charged with bank fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit to both,
and obstruction of justice in connection with two real estate closings she facilitated
in 2007. A jury found Trujillo guilty of bank and wire fraud, and the district court
sentenced her to sixty-five concurrent months’ imprisonment followed by three
years of supervised release. On appeal, Trujillo contends that the district court
committed the following errors: (1) allowing the government to introduce two
prejudicial newspaper articles, (2) refusing to issue a jury instruction on Trujillo’s
theory of defense and urging the Government to request a deliberate-ignorance
instruction, (3) denying Trujillo’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and (4)
considering three uncharged transactions as relevant conduct in calculating the
total fraud-loss amount. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment
of the district court.
I.

ADMISSION OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Dortch, 696 F.3d 1104, 1110 (11th Cir. 2012). Hearsay is defined
as an out-of-court statement admitted for the truth of the matter stated therein. FED.
R. EVID. 801(c). Generally, an out-of-court statement admitted to show its effect on
the listener is not hearsay. United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1478 (11th Cir.
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1986). Moreover, a district court’s evidentiary-ruling error warrants reversal only
if “there is a reasonable likelihood that it affected the defendant’s substantial
rights.” United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1323 (11th Cir. 2011). In other
words, “[n]o reversal will result if sufficient evidence uninfected by any error
supports the verdict, and the error did not have a substantial influence on the
outcome of the case.” Id. (quoting United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1292
(11th Cir. 2007)). The district court admitted two emails from Appellant. In the
first email, Appellant forwarded from her work address to her personal address an
article concerning the criminalization of mortgage fraud in Florida. In the second
email, Appellant forwarded her fiancé, Juan Godoy, an article regarding arrests of
several individuals for participating in a mortgage-fraud scheme. In the latter
email, Appellant wrote: “Read below . . . . It’s AMAZING and SCARY!!!!” We
find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the newspaper
articles, because the articles were not admitted for their truth and, therefore, were
not hearsay. Rather, they were admitted to show their effect on Trujillo—that she
was scared to see that people were going to jail for participating in mortgage-fraud
schemes. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the article’s effect on Trujillo did not
depend on whether or not its contents were true. Additionally, the district court
gave an adequate limiting instruction directing jurors not to consider the newspaper
articles for their truth. In any event, Trujillo cannot establish that admitting the
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emails and article attachments affected her substantial rights. Aside from the
articles, the government introduced a mound of circumstantial evidence concerning
Trujillo’s involvement in the bank-fraud scheme. Accordingly, Trujillo cannot
establish that the admission of these two newspaper articles had a substantial
influence on the outcome of her case.
II.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.

Theory-of-Defense Instruction

We review a district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Ariaz-Izquierdo, 449 F.3d 1168, 1185 (11th
Cir. 2006). A court abuses its discretion in refusing to give a requested jury
instruction where “(1) the requested instruction was substantively correct, (2) the
court’s charge to the jury did not cover the gist of the instruction, and (3) the
failure to give the instruction substantially impaired the defendant’s ability to
present an effective defense.” United States v. Culver, 598 F.3d 740, 751 (11th Cir.
2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Trujillo requested the following jury
instruction on a finder’s fee:
You have heard testimony regarding the payment of a “finder’s fee” in
connection with a real estate transaction. You are hereby instructed that you
may not draw any negative inference against that person who or the
Company which received the “finder’s fee,” because mere payment of a
“finder’s fee” is not prohibited by law.

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As Appellant recognizes in her brief, however, under §475.41 of the Florida
Statutes, unlicensed brokers or sales associates may not receive finder’s fees. FLA.
STAT. § 475.41. Thus, mere payment of a finder’s fee is prohibited by law under
certain circumstances. Therefore, Trujillo’s requested instruction was not
substantively correct and the district court did not err in finding that it was
misleading. Moreover, an instruction concerning the legality of finder’s fees would
concern no factual or legal defense of Trujillo’s. Juan Godoy, not Trujillo, received
the finder’s fee. Thus, whether or not Godoy’s doing so was prohibited by law was
simply irrelevant to Trujillo’s factual or legal defense for bank and wire fraud.
Rather, the fact that Trujillo disbursed funds from the Marco Island property
closing to Godoy, her admitted fiancé and an unauthorized third party, provided
evidence of her knowledge and intent to defraud a financial institution. Clearly,
then, the district court’s failure to give an instruction on the legality of finder’s fees
did not substantially impair Trujillo’s ability to present an effective defense.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the
requested instruction.
2.

Deliberate-Ignorance Instruction

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When an appellant objects to a jury instruction on different grounds than the
appellant objected at trial, we review those instructions for plain error. 1 See United
States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1148 n. 5 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that because
defendants objected to the deliberate-ignorance instruction on different grounds on
appeal, the plain-error standard of review applied).To establish plain error, an
appellant must demonstrate that: “(1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3)
it affected his substantial rights; and (4) it seriously affected the fairness of the
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137, 1151 (11th Cir. 2012).
The burden of persuasion rests with the appellant on the third prong, “which
almost always requires that the error must have affected the outcome of the district
court proceedings.” Id. (quoting United States v. Pantle, 637 F.3d 1172, 1177 (11th
Cir. 2011)). Moreover, trial courts enjoy broad discretion in formulating jury
instructions as long as the instructions comprise correct statements of law. United
States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000, 1014 (11th Cir. 2012).

1

At trial, Appellant objected to the deliberate-ignorance instruction on the grounds that
deliberate ignorance was not the Government’s theory of prosecution, that the deliberateignorance instruction would result in burden shifting, and that it was tailored for a drug case and
does not apply in a case like this. On appeal, Trujillo argues that in giving the deliberateignorance instruction, the district court violated her due process rights by urging the prosecutor
to request the instruction and that the instruction should not have been given in this case where
the level of mens rea is specific intent or willfulness. Appellant’s arguments against the
deliberate ignorance instruction before this court are markedly different from the arguments
made before the district court.
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Although Appellant argues that the district court violated her due process
rights by suggesting the deliberate-ignorance instruction, Appellant cites no
precedent for such a holding. Appellant also cites no authority for her argument
that the deliberate-ignorance instruction is applicable only in cases where the sole
mens rea at issue is knowledge. Rather, in United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944
(11th Cir. 1997), this court specifically discounted Appellant’s argument that by
giving the deliberate ignorance instruction, the district court converted the
willfulness element to mere knowledge. Id. at 974. In that case, we found that the
deliberate-ignorance instruction, which greatly mirrored the one given in this case,
“permitted the jury to substitute conscious avoidance for knowingly, but not
willfully, and, the summary portion of the instruction required the jury to find
either actual knowledge or ‘deliberate avoidance.’” Id. Accordingly, Trujillo fails
to establish that the district court’s deliberate-ignorance instruction was an
inaccurate reflection of the law or constituted error.
Moreover, Trujillo cannot demonstrate that the court’s instruction affected
her substantial rights. Because the district court gave a separate instruction on
willfulness and explicitly acknowledged that the deliberate-ignorance instruction
went only to the knowledge element, the court’s instruction permitted the jury to
substitute conscious avoidance for knowingly, but not willfully. Thus, the
instruction did not, as Appellant contends, dilute the mens rea of the crimes
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charged. In Schlei, we concluded that “[t]he court’s deliberate ignorance
instruction did not constitute plain error because it did not affect Schlei’s
substantial rights.” Id. We find the same here, where Trujillo has failed to establish
that the district court’s deliberate-ignorance instruction affected her substantial
rights.
III.

JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
We review de novo the denial of a motion for acquittal based on the

sufficiency of the evidence, resolving all inferences and credibility determinations
in the government’s favor. United States v. Anderson, 326 F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2013). To support Trujillo’s conviction of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344,
the Government had to show that Trujillo knowingly executed or attempted to
execute a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud a financial institution or (2) to obtain a
financial institution’s money or property by false or fraudulent means. 18 U.S.C. §
1344. Similarly, to prove that Trujillo committed wire fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1343, the Government had to establish that Trujillo devised or intended to
devise a scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain money or property, and that
Trujillo used, or caused to be used, wires in furtherance of the scheme or artifice.
18 U.S.C. § 1343. Evidence supporting a conviction is sufficient unless “no
reasonable trier of fact could find guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Langford,

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647 F.3d at 1319 (11th Cir. 2011). Moreover, we judge sufficiency of the evidence
by the same standard “whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial.” Id.
We have no doubt that a reasonable jury could have found sufficient
evidence to support Trujillo’s guilt of bank and wire fraud. Contrary to Appellant’s
assertion, Trujillo’s discredited testimony was not the only evidence supporting her
conviction. In conducting the Marco Island property closing, Trujillo knowingly
used wires to disburse proceeds from the property sale to unauthorized third
parties, namely her fiancé, Walk the Line Properties, and Larrinaga Music
Publishing, Inc. She did so despite the fact that testimony from Deborah Martin
and Scott Jackson indicated that Trujillo should have known that disbursing funds
to third parties was both frowned upon and potentially illegal. Trujillo also knew
that Diaz did not bring cash to close the purchase of the Marco Island property,
despite the fact that the HUD-1 indicated that he had a $69,493.14 cash-to-close
responsibility. Rather than securing a cashiers check or wire transfer from Diaz at
the closing, as Martin testified was the normal practice, Diaz executed a
disbursement form. After Trujillo had already gotten the HUD-1 statement
approved by Chase, she permitted Diaz’s cash-to-close payment to be deducted
from money she disbursed to Walk the Line Investments for “Repairs and
Remodeling.” Chase’s underwriter also testified that he would not have approved
the loan had he known that Diaz was not in fact providing the cash to close.
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Additionally, Trujillo conducted closings of both the Marco Island and
Miami properties. Thus, Trujillo knew that Diaz had just purchased the Marco
Island Property, claiming that it was to be his primary residence, a mere month or
so before she facilitated the closing of his purchase of the Miami property.
Moreover, Trujillo tried to disburse money to Walk the Line and RII Contractors in
the Miami property closing as well, which First Magnus prohibited her from doing.
When First Magnus instructed Trujillo to remove the third-party distributions from
the HUD-1 statement, she disbursed two payments to the seller for $72,000 and
$164,000, of which the seller used the $164,000 to pay Walk the Line Investments
and RII Contractors. Diaz also testified that he could not read English and that
Trujillo did not translate the closing documents for him. Instead, Trujillo instructed
him to sign the forms quickly so that they could finish faster. First Magnus’s
underwriter testified that they would not have approved the loan had they known
that Diaz was a straw buyer, that he did not plan to occupy the property as his
primary residence, or that he did not plan to provide any of cash at the closing.
Although the jury could not consider the newspaper articles for their truth, one
email demonstrated that Trujillo was amazed and scared by the arrest of eleven
people in Miami-Dade County for involvement in mortgage-fraud schemes.
The preceding facts provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
determine that Trujillo did in fact knowingly execute a scheme or artifice to
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defraud Chase and First Magnus of loan money and that she used the wires in
doing so. We, therefore, affirm the jury’s verdict and the district court’s denial of
Trujillo’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
IV.

SENTENCING CALCULATION
We review the district court’s determination of the amount of loss for clear

error. United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1305 (11th Cir. 2009). “Clear error
will be found only if [we are] left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.” Id. (quotation omitted). The district court retains broad
discretion in calculating loss, and may rely on all relevant conduct, including
uncharged conduct, that the government proves by a preponderance of the
evidence. See United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1336, 1338 (11th Cir.
2006) (considering predecessor U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1). Where § 3D1.2(d) requires
grouping of multiple counts, relevant conduct includes all acts or omissions by the
defendant “that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or
plan as the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G § 1B1.3(a)(2). Offenses are part of a
common scheme or plan if they are “substantially connected to each other by at
least one common factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common
purpose, or similar modus operandi.” Id., § 1B1.3 cmt. n.9(A).
The district court did not clearly err by considering the three uncharged
transactions, which the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence
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through Lewis Sellars’ testimony, as relevant conduct in calculating the total fraudloss amount and increasing Trujillo’s offense level by a total of 18 for the loss
amount. The three transactions were part of the same course of conduct or common
scheme or plan as the offenses of conviction. All five transactions involved had a
common purpose of defrauding mortgage lenders and the same modus operandi,
namely the use of straw buyers to purchase properties and distribute the loan
proceeds to co-conspirators. The transactions were highly similar and all occurred
between February and May 2007. Trujillo signed three HUD-1 statements and
conducted the closings. In doing so, Trujillo failed to obtain the cash-to-close
checks from buyers as represented in those HUD-1 statements and disbursed part
of the sellers’ proceeds to third parties without informing the lenders. The record
therefore supports the court’s finding that Trujillo knew or was willfully blind to
the fact that the buyers were not providing the required cash-to-close. We therefore
affirm Trujillo’s sentence.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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