Sarah Peterson v. University of Alabama Health S
Filing
Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Sarah M. Peterson. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.
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Date Filed: 03/02/2016
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-14932
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cv-00605-SLB
SARAH M. PETERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA,
Defendant,
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA HEALTH SERVICES FOUNDATION, P.C.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(March 2, 2016)
Before WILSON, MARTIN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
Sarah Peterson, an African-American woman, sued her former employer, the
University of Alabama Health Services Foundation, P.C. (“UAHSF”), for racial
discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 1981, and 1983, as well
as for workers’ compensation retaliation under Alabama Code § 25-5-11.1. She
appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment against her. First, Peterson
argues that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting as hearsay portions
of a coworker’s affidavit. Second, she contends that she proved UAHSF’s reasons
for firing her were pretexts for racial discrimination. Third, she claims that she
showed a causal connection between her protected activity and her termination,
and thus she presented a prima facie case of retaliation. Finally, she asserts that
she presented a prima facie case of workers’ compensation retaliation under state
law. After careful consideration, we affirm.
I.
At the time of the events in question, Peterson was a check-out receptionist
in UAHSF’s dermatology clinic. In late 2011, she began reporting to a new
supervisor, Erika Sanso. Sanso says she almost immediately began receiving
complaints from customers and coworkers about Peterson’s behavior and job
performance. Sanso also determined that Peterson mistakenly gave one patient
another patient’s discharge summary, which violated federal law as well as
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UAHSF’s policies.1 Sanso issued Peterson a written warning on May 18, 2012.
The warning addressed Peterson’s breach of patient confidentiality as well as other
concerns about her overtime accrual, productivity, customer service, teamwork,
and communication.
Shortly after Peterson began reporting to Sanso, Peterson complained to a
superior about Sanso. Peterson stated that Sanso was “very short and rude” and
this behavior created a “hostile environment.” Peterson’s complaint was motivated
by her perception—allegedly shared by some of her African-American
colleagues—that Sanso, a white woman, treated white employees better than she
treated African-American employees. Sanso claims not to have learned of this
concern, however, until a meeting on May 22, 2012. During this meeting, Peterson
shared her concerns with Sanso. The meeting “ended with [Peterson and Sanso]
agreeing to work with each other.”
On June 4, 2012, Peterson was issued a final warning for a second patient
privacy violation. Once again, she had given a discharge summary to the wrong
patient during check-out. Peterson did not deny making this mistake, though she
disagreed with the way she was disciplined.
On June 19, 2012, Peterson went on medical leave to have surgery on her
shoulder, which she had injured when she fell from her office chair. With Sanso’s
1
According to Joan Wilson, a human resources administrator at UAHSF, this violation could
have independently justified Peterson’s termination.
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permission, Peterson had been visiting the doctor and doing physical therapy
several times a week. When she returned from leave in early July, she was
eventually moved from the check-out station to light duty in the medical records
department. Peterson continued her follow-up doctor’s visits and physical therapy.
Around the same time, Peterson filed an EEOC charge against UAHSF. In
the charge, she accused Sanso of disparate treatment of black and white
employees, specifically referencing her discipline for the discharge summary mixup and how Sanso reacted to her taking breaks.
Peterson continued to experience problems with her coworkers. On August
22, 2012, she e-mailed Sanso about “offensive” treatment by other employees,
which she said created a “hostile environment.” Sanso responded by arranging
one-on-one meetings between Peterson and each of the allegedly offensive
employees. After the meetings, Peterson said she “would do [her] best to get along
with everybody,” but she felt that nothing changed.
In October 2012, Sanso completed Peterson’s performance evaluation. She
rated Peterson as having met only “some expectations” in various categories—such
a rating is “less than satisfactory.” Peterson mostly disagreed with these ratings
and with Sanso’s written comments accompanying them, though Peterson admitted
to the two patient privacy violations and to having disagreements with coworkers.
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In December 2012, Sanso claims to have received another complaint about
Peterson from an African-American employee named Ashley Carter. Carter
complained that Peterson generally shirked her duties, creating an unfair
distribution of work. The next month, Sanso claims to have received further
reports that Peterson’s performance was inadequate. For instance, a secret
shopper 2 as well as an employee in another department notified Sanso that
Peterson was still not verifying patient identity at check-out, sometimes resulting
in the clinic getting bad checks. Carter continued to complain about Peterson’s
relative lack of productivity. Sanso verified that Carter seemed to be processing
significantly more payments than Peterson.
On January 11, 2013, Sanso had a final meeting with Peterson. Peterson
was warned that she was the common denominator in all the coworker conflicts,
and future problematic behavior “would not be tolerated.” On January 28, 2013,
Sanso noticed that the check-out desk was unattended during Peterson’s shift for
approximately 10 minutes. Two days later, Sanso terminated Peterson’s
employment at UAHSF based on “ongoing interpersonal conflicts, patient
complaints and job performance.”
2
“Secret shoppers” are persons paid to visit a business like an ordinary customer and then rate
their experience, usually providing their review to the business being rated.
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II.
Peterson challenges several aspects of the district court’s grant of summary
judgment against her. We address each in turn.
A.
Exclusion of Hearsay
A district court’s rulings on the admissibility of hearsay evidence are
reviewed for abuse of discretion. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158
F.3d 548, 556 (11th Cir. 1998). The district court excluded portions of an affidavit
from one of Peterson’s coworkers as hearsay. In the relevant paragraphs, the
affiant repeated complaints about Sanso that she had allegedly heard from other
African-American employees. These secondhand statements were offered as
evidence of Sanso’s racist behavior, but they were not corroborated by any direct
testimony from the people who purportedly complained. The statements were
merely based on conversations that the affiant claimed to have had with different
people.
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant, offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Peterson has not
advanced any argument or evidence to suggest why the statements here—which
the affiant repeated secondhand as evidence of Sanso’s alleged racism—do not
squarely qualify as inadmissible hearsay. Instead, she simply discusses the
probative value of the evidence. This is irrelevant if the statements are
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inadmissible hearsay. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
these portions of the affidavit as hearsay.
B.
Racial Discrimination Claim
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment,
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Rioux v.
City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008). The party moving for
summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct.
2548, 2553 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who “must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Eberhardt v.
Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted).
Title VII and §§ 1981 and 1983 prohibit employers from discriminating
against employees on the basis of their race. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 1981,
1983. Claims under §§ 1981 and 1983 have the same elements of proof and
analytical framework as claims under Title VII. See Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d
1431, 1433 (11th Cir. 1985). A plaintiff may attempt to show intentional
discrimination under these statutes through either direct or circumstantial evidence.
Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999). In evaluating singlemotive discrimination claims supported by circumstantial evidence, we use the
framework provided by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.
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Ct. 1817 (1973). 3 Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir.
2004).
Under McDonnell Douglas, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
the employer must articulate one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
its actions. Id. Next, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must offer
evidence that the employer’s reasons are pretexts for illegal discrimination. Id. To
show pretext, the plaintiff must demonstrate both that the employer’s stated reason
for the employment decision was false and that discrimination was the real reason.
Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir.
2007) (per curiam). The plaintiff must present “significant probative evidence” of
pretext to avoid summary judgment. Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d
3
Peterson argues for the first time on appeal that the district court should not have applied
the McDonnell Douglas framework because this is a mixed-motives case. Peterson claims that
she can proceed under a mixed-motives theory because the district court found an issue of fact as
to whether Sanso’s concern about her productivity was sufficient to motivate her termination.
This Court recently decided that the McDonnell Douglas framework is not appropriate
for examining mixed-motives claims at the summary judgment stage. Quigg v. Thomas Cty.
Sch. Dist., No. 14-14530, 2016 WL 692177 (11th Cir. Feb. 22, 2016). Instead, we should
determine whether the plaintiff “has presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that her protected characteristic was a motivating
factor for an adverse employment decision.” Id. at *7 (quotation omitted) (alterations adopted).
Peterson has not carried this burden. Even assuming without deciding that she properly
preserved this issue, she misreads the district court’s finding. While the court speculated that
Peterson’s apparently lesser performance in processing payments may have been due to a change
in her job responsibilities, the court did not further find that this reflected evidence of
discrimination by Sanso. The court merely found that this reason, standing alone, may have been
“insufficient to motivate Sanso to terminate Peterson.” But Sanso had other reasons to question
Peterson’s job performance, including complaints from customers and coworkers. Without other
evidence of discrimination, Sanso’s possibly mistaken assessment of Peterson’s performance in
processing payments is not proof that “illegal bias played a role in [UAHSF’s] decision.” Id. at
*8. The assessment may have been a mistaken input in the decisional process, but Peterson has
not shown that it was a discriminatory input. See id.
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1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). Importantly, when an employer
offers more than one legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision, the
plaintiff must rebut each reason. Crawford v. City of Fairburn, 482 F.3d 1305,
1308 (11th Cir. 2007).
Peterson failed to present evidence that UAHSF’s proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons for firing her were pretextual. UAHSF listed Peterson’s
two patient privacy violations as reasons for terminating her, and Peterson
admitted to these violations. Nor does Peterson deny that a number of her
coworkers complained about her and that she repeatedly met with management to
address interpersonal conflicts in the workplace. And Peterson presented no
evidence to rebut UAHSF’s assertion that several checks she processed were
returned because she had not gotten proper identification. Thus, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Peterson’s Title VII and §§ 1981
and 1983 racial discrimination claims.
C.
Retaliation Claim
The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII forbids an employer from
retaliating against an employee because she has opposed “an unlawful employment
practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Retaliation claims are also cognizable under
§ 1981. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 451, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1958
(2008). To establish a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged
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in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse employment
action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the two events. Goldsmith
v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008). Whereas very close
temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action may
indicate causation, a substantial delay between the two events—with no other
evidence of causation—means no causal connection has been shown. See Clark
Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74, 121 S. Ct. 1508, 1511 (2001)
(per curiam); see also Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“A three to four month disparity between the statutorily
protected expression and the adverse employment action is not enough.”).
Peterson failed to make out a prima facie retaliation case because she did not
present evidence of a causal connection between her protected activity and her
termination. Peterson was terminated over six months after she filed her EEOC
charge and over a year after she first complained to superiors about Sanso.
Without other evidence showing a causal connection, this extended delay was fatal
to Peterson’s retaliation claim. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. We affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim.
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D.
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Workers’ Compensation Retaliation Claim
Under Alabama law, “[n]o employee shall be terminated by an employer
solely because the employee has instituted or maintained any action against the
employer to recover workers’ compensation benefits.” Ala. Code § 25-5-11.1. To
make out a prima facie claim under this statute, a plaintiff must prove: (1) an
employment relationship; (2) an on-the-job injury; (3) her employer’s knowledge
of the injury, and (4) termination based solely on her injury and her filing of a
workers’ compensation claim. Flint Constr. Co. v. Hall, 904 So. 2d 236, 247 (Ala.
2004). To prove the final element—causation—the Alabama Supreme Court has
identified several factors that can be considered as circumstantial evidence. See
Ala. Power Co. v. Aldridge, 854 So. 2d 554, 564–65 (Ala. 2002). These include
the temporal proximity between the filing of the claim and the termination, an
employer’s negative attitude toward the employee’s injury, an employer’s failure
to adhere to company policy, sudden changes in an employee’s evaluations after
the claim, and evidence that the stated reason for discharge was false. Id.
Peterson failed to establish that her termination was based solely on her onthe-job injury and her filing of a workers’ compensation claim. She did not present
evidence of any of the probative factors—to the contrary, Sanso seems to have
approved Peterson’s weekly treatments and moved her to light duty to
accommodate her condition. And as previously discussed, Peterson did not show
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that the reasons offered for her termination were pretextual. Thus, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on Peterson’s workers’ compensation
retaliation claim.
After careful consideration of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
AFFIRM.
AFFIRMED.
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