Deon Jones v. LMT, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Deon D. Jones. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 14-15010

Date Filed: 01/07/2016

Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-15010
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-01591-CAP

DEON D. JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee,
LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(January 7, 2016)

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Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Deon Jones filed this pro se appeal of the district court’s dismissal of his
discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and
state law against his former employer, Lockheed Martin Corporation
(“Lockheed”). The district court dismissed Jones’s claims with prejudice for
repeated failure to obey a court order requiring him to properly file an amended
complaint. Jones argues on appeal that the district court erred because his
amended complaint presented a prima facie claim of discrimination under the
ADA. Upon careful consideration, we affirm.
“We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Shotz
v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1079 (11th Cir. 2001). To survive a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) the complaint must provide
sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A court may
draw reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff, but need not accept any
legal conclusions in the complaint. Id.
To state an ADA discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege that he was
disabled, qualified to perform the job, and discriminated against because of his
disability. Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th
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Cir. 2004). A district court has discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over state-law claims that relate to a federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). If a
district court dismisses all of a plaintiff’s federal claims, we encourage it to also
dismiss any remaining state claims. Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086,
1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
We review for abuse of discretion a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b), which allows a district court to dismiss an action for failure
to comply with local rules. Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 192 (11th Cir. 1993).
Local Rule 41.3 for the Northern District of Georgia authorizes a court to dismiss a
civil case if the plaintiff “fail[s] or refuse[s] to obey a lawful order of the court.”
N.D. Ga. Civ. R. 41.3(A)(2). A dismissal under this rule operates as a dismissal
with prejudice unless the court specifies otherwise. Id. R. 41.3(B).
Because dismissal with prejudice is a drastic remedy, it is appropriate only
where there is a clear record of delay or willful contempt and lesser sanctions
would be insufficient. Kilgo, 983 F.2d at 192. Dismissal with prejudice is
appropriate “where a party, as distinct from counsel, is culpable” for the failure to
comply. Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir.
2005). It is generally not an abuse of discretion for a district court to dismiss a suit
for disregard of an order if the litigant was warned and still failed to comply.
Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).
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The district court did not err in finding that Jones failed to state a
discrimination claim under the ADA. Jones properly identified his disability in his
amended complaint. However, he never alleged with sufficient facts that
Lockheed discriminated against him because of this disability. See Cleveland, 369
F.3d at 1193. Jones only alleged with sufficient facts that Lockheed terminated
him for reasons unrelated to his disability.
Because Jones failed to state a claim as necessary to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing his
ADA and state-law claims with prejudice under Rule 41(b). After Jones failed to
state a claim in his initial complaint, the district court noted the deficiencies in
Jones’s complaint and dismissed his ADA claim without prejudice to allow him to
file an amended complaint. The court warned Jones after he filed several
extraneous exhibits instead of an amended complaint that it would dismiss his
claims if he failed to adhere to the court’s orders regarding how to file his amended
complaint.
Jones then amended his complaint, but he again failed to state a claim or
follow the district court’s orders regarding which claims to include in the
complaint. The court allowed Jones yet another opportunity to file his amended
complaint, and again warned that it would dismiss his claims if Jones failed to
follow the court’s orders. Instead of filing a second amended complaint, Jones
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moved for the district court judges involved in his case to recuse themselves and he
filed an improper appeal to this Court of the district court’s non-final order.
Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Jones’s claims under Rule 41(b) based on his failure to obey a lawful
court order in accordance with Local Rule 41.3. See N.D. Ga. Civ. R. 41.3(A)(2).
The district court properly warned Jones twice that his failure to comply with its
orders would result in dismissal of his claims. See Moon, 863 F.2d at 837, 839.
Also, the district court determined that no lesser sanction would suffice, because it
had already attempted the lesser sanction of dismissal without prejudice to no
avail. See Kilgo, 983 F.2d at 192. The district court also properly dismissed
Jones’s remaining state-law claims when it dismissed his ADA claim. See Raney,
370 F.3d at 1089.
After careful review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.

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