USA v. Jeison Archibold

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Jeison Archibold. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 15-10636

Date Filed: 01/18/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-10636
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D.C. No. 1:11-cr-20026-KMM-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JEISON ARCHIBOLD,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(January 18, 2017)
Before MARCUS, ANDERSON, and GINSBURG,* Circuit Judges.

__________
*Honorable Douglas H. Ginsburg, United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia
Circuit, sitting by designation.

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PER CURIAM:
We have had the benefit of oral argument, and have carefully reviewed the
briefs of the parties and relevant parts of the record. For the reasons fully explored
at oral argument, and for the reasons noted below, we conclude that the judgment
of the district court should be affirmed.
I.
We conclude that the district court properly found during the § 3582
proceedings that defendant was not entitled to relief under § 3582 and amendment
782 because the “[l]arge quantity of drugs keeps [the] base offense level at 38.”
The district court necessarily found that this defendant was properly accountable
for 450 kilograms of cocaine or more such that, even under amendment 782, the
base offense level would remain at 38. This finding in turn necessarily means that
the district court found either: (1) that defendant was accountable for the drug
transaction which defendant and McField-Bent were planning in their March 15,
2010, telephone conversation (with respect to which the district court would have
inferred involved the usual 400 kilograms of cocaine); or (2) that defendant was
accountable for the drug transaction involving 400 kilograms of cocaine about
which defendant and McField-Bent were engaged in May of 2010. The district
court was probably relying on the latter. Especially with respect to the May 2010
transaction, the district court’s finding was amply supported by unobjected-to
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evidence detailed in the PSI Report which was before the district court at
sentencing.
The district court’s finding was not inconsistent with any finding at the
original sentencing, because the only finding at that time was that the quantity of
drugs was “well over 150 kilograms.” Thus, the district court in this § 3582
proceedings did precisely what this Court in Hamilton 1 directed:
[I]f the district court finds that its original findings were limited to “at
least 1.5 kilograms,” the court will need to go further. It will need to
examine the entire record before it at the time of the original
sentencing to see if it can make any further findings that will resolve
the issue of whether 8.4 kilograms or more of crack cocaine should be
attributed to Hamilton. . . . [The] court may make new findings of fact
that are supported by the record and are not inconsistent with the
findings made in the original sentencing proceedings. . . . The district
court may receive additional briefing but should not consider any new
evidence.
715 F.3d at 340. In the instant case, the district court during the § 3582
proceedings would have noted that the only finding made at the original sentencing
was that the quantity of drugs was “well over 150 kilograms.” According to
Hamilton, the district court would need to go further and the district court in this
case did in fact go further. It received briefing from the parties, but it did not
consider any new evidence that was not before it at the original sentencing. The
government’s briefing, to which it is significant to note that the defendant did not
1

United States v. Hamilton, 715 F.3d 328, 340 (11th Cir. 2013).

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respond, expressly pointed out the appropriate procedure pursuant to Hamilton.
Under Hamilton, if the defendant has been held responsible by the sentencing court
for “at least” the minimum quantity of drugs necessary to qualify for the highest
base offense level, level 38, then the § 3582 judge may determine (based solely on
the evidence that had initially been before the court at the original hearing) whether
there was enough evidence in that record to conclude, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant was only responsible for a drug amount that would
qualify him for the sentencing reduction, or, on the other hand, whether the
defendant was responsible for a drug amount (450 kilograms of cocaine in this
case) which would keep the base offense level at 38 even under the retroactive
amendment.
The government briefing then expressly pointed to un-objected-to relevant
conduct facts in the PSI – including in particular the 400 kilograms of cocaine
involved in the May 2010 transaction – which, when added to the 442 kilograms of
cocaine involved in the offense of conviction, totaled well over the 450 kilograms
of cocaine necessary to keep the base offense level at 38. The government’s brief
was filed on December 5, 2014. The district court’s ruling that defendant was
“[n]ot eligible for relief under Amendment 782” because “large quantit[ies] of
drugs keeps base offense level at 38” was not issued until January 22, 2015. Thus,
defendant, who was counseled during the § 3582 proceedings, had ample time to
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respond to the government’s briefing, but did not. The unobjected-to facts in the
PSI, and the facts and discussion during the sentencing hearing, amply support the
district court’s finding that the additional 400 kilograms of cocaine involved in the
May 2010 transaction constituted relevant conduct properly attributable to the
defendant. Consistent with Hamilton, this finding was based solely on evidence
that was already before the district court at the original sentencing, and was not
inconsistent with any finding made by the district court at the original sentencing.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the district court’s finding was erroneous.
II.
The defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the district court in the
§ 3582 proceedings violated the extradition agreement by treating as relevant
conduct the transaction involving 400 kilograms of cocaine about which defendant
and McField-Bent agreed with the confidential informant in May 2010. Because
defendant did not preserve this argument on appeal, we review the argument
pursuant to the plain error analysis. In order to establish plain error, a defendant
must show that (1) an error existed, (2) it was plain, (3) the error affected his
substantial rights, and (4) it seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. DiFalco, 837 F.3d 1207,
1220–21 (11th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).

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We need not resolve the merits of defendant’s argument, because we
conclude that it is certainly not plain or obvious that defendant’s argument would
prevail. Thus, defendant has not demonstrated plain error. The language of the
extradition agreement does not plainly or obviously prohibit consideration of the
May 2010 transaction as relevant conduct with the effect of increasing defendant’s
base offense level. That language – that the defendant “may not be tried or
convicted for a prior act different from the one that is the reason for this
extradition” – prohibits only a trial or conviction based on the May 2010
transaction. In this case, the defendant was neither tried nor convicted for the May
2010 transaction. The defendant acknowledges that no Supreme Court or Eleventh
Circuit case indicates that the district court’s ruling here would have violated the
extradition agreement. Indeed, the case law in other circuits strongly suggests that
such extradition clauses would not prohibit consideration of the May 2010
transaction as relevant conduct. However, as noted, we need not resolve the merits
of this issue because defendant’s argument cannot survive the plain error analysis.
III.
Defendant also argues that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over his offense, citing United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335 (11th
Cir. 2016), and United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir.
2012). Defendant’s challenge is outside the limited scope of a § 3582 proceeding
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because § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a general resentencing. Dillon v. United
States, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2690-91 (2010). See also United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d
778, 781-82 (11th Cir. 2000). Moreover, Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2) permits
challenges to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court at any time while the case
is pending, but defendant’s criminal case is no longer pending. Accordingly, we
will not consider defendant’s challenge to the district court’s subject matter
jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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