Dan Schmidt v. Florida First District Court o, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Dan Schmidt. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

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Date Filed: 01/29/2016

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-10771
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cv-00460-MCR-EMT
DAN SCHMIDT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RICHARD RODRIGUES, et al.,
Defendants,
FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS,
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT,
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(January 29, 2016)
Before HULL, MARCUS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Daniel K. Schmidt, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. The district court
dismissed Schmidt’s civil rights action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as
frivolous, or in the alternative under the “three strikes” provision of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).1 In his second amended
complaint, Schmidt alleged various claims against the Florida First District Court
of Appeal (DCA), the Florida Supreme Court, and the State of Florida based on the
First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.2

1

The PLRA provides:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil
action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior
occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or
appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
2

In addition to other forms of relief, Schmidt sought: (1) a declaratory judgment stating
that “all orders, judgments, mandates and the like” of the First DCA and the Florida Supreme
Court are void; (2) an injunction “directing the state to conduct [a] new sentencing hearing in the
trial court”; and (3) a declaratory judgment saying Schmidt’s constitutional rights were violated
because: (a) he was not provided “notice and an opportunity to respond” before sanctions were
imposed, (b) the First DCA erroneously classified his forty-six prior actions as frivolous, (c) the
First DCA did not provide notice and an opportunity to litigate the frivolity determinations at the
time the appellate proceeding was pending, (d) the First DCA “hid[] behind a mere denial”
without making “findings of fact and conclusions in law,” (e) the First DCA prevented Schmidt
from seeking “meaningful discretionary review” in the Florida Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme
Court, and a U.S. district court, (f) the First DCA forced him “to properly exhaust all available
state remedies to try and obtain relief that was already ordered,” and (g) the First DCA forced
him “to serve a vacated and void sentence.”
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Schmidt argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, which he filed
before the district court dismissed his claim. He also argues that the district court
abused its discretion by denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and his motion to make
additional findings pursuant to Rule 52(b). Lastly, Schmidt contends that the
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal.
I.
Schmidt first argues that the district court erred in denying him leave to file
a third amended complaint. Under Rule 15(a), parties may amend their pleadings
once as a matter of course, but after that, a pleading may be amended only with
leave of the court or the opposing party’s written consent. Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)–(2). Courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id.
15(a)(2). However, a court need not give an opportunity to amend “where
amendment would be futile.” Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). We review for abuse of discretion a
district court’s denial of leave to amend a complaint but review de novo any legal
conclusion as to whether the amendment would have been futile. SFM Holdings,
Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010).
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Because Schmidt is a pro se prisoner, his motion for leave to amend is
deemed filed on the date he submitted it to prison authorities. United States v.
Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1205 (11th Cir. 2012). Schmidt’s motion was filed on
December 30, 2014, before the district court issued its judgment in his case on
January 7, 2015. The district court therefore erred in denying Schmidt’s motion on
the ground that “the case ha[d] been dismissed.”
However, this error was harmless because Schmidt’s amendment would
have been futile, so the district court was not required to give him an opportunity
to amend his complaint a third time. See Corsello, 428 F.3d at 1014. Schmidt’s
amendment would have been futile because his suit was properly dismissed under
the PLRA’s three strikes provision, which bars a prisoner who has filed three or
more complaints that have been dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to
state a claim from proceeding IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). After three meritless
suits, the prisoner must pay the full filing fee when he initiates suit; his failure to
do so warrants dismissal without prejudice. Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234,
1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). The only exception is if the prisoner is “under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
The magistrate judge took judicial notice of three civil actions previously
filed by Schmidt while he was incarcerated that were dismissed as frivolous or
malicious. See Schmidt v. Fauchuex, No. 5:94-cv-50258 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 1994);
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Muder v. Wooten, No. 5:95-cv-50235 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 1995); and Schmidt v.
Wade, No. 5:95-cv-50215 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 1995). Given these three dismissals,
Schmidt could not bring this civil action IFP unless he was “under imminent
danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Neither Schmidt’s
previous complaints nor his third amended complaint alleged any facts indicating
that his action fit this exception. The third amendment would have been futile and
the district court’s error in denying it was harmless. 3
II.
Schmidt also argues that the district court erred in denying his Rule 59(e)
and Rule 52(b) motions. Rule 59(e) allows the court to alter or amend a judgment
on a party’s motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule 52(b) permits the court to amend
3

Schmidt’s claims were also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fid.
Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983). This doctrine provides that “lower federal courts are precluded from
exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d
1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). It applies when the success of the federal claim
would “effectively nullify the state court judgment” or the federal claim “succeeds only to the
extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.” Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260
(11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quotations omitted). However, the doctrine will not bar a federal
claim that a party did not have “reasonable opportunity to raise . . . in state proceedings.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
The Florida First DCA affirmed the denial of Schmidt’s Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 motion and imposed sanctions in 2010. When Schmidt commenced this federal
action on August 7, 2013, state court proceedings were final for Rooker-Feldman purposes. If
Schmidt had succeeded in obtaining the relief he requested from the district court, which
included voiding all judgments of the First DCA and overturning its frivolity determinations on
his forty-six prior actions, it would have “effectively nullif[ied] the state court judgment.” Id.
(quotation omitted). In addition, Schmidt had a “reasonable opportunity” to bring his federal
claims in the state proceedings. Id. (quotation omitted). As such, the district court’s alternative
reason for dismissing Schmidt’s action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine also rendered
amendment futile.
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its findings or make additional findings on a party’s motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b).
We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) or Rule 52(b) motion for abuse of discretion.
Lambert v. Fulton Cty., 253 F.3d 588, 598 (11th Cir. 2001); Trigo v. Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., 847 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1988). “The only grounds for granting
a Rule 59 motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.”
Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quotation and
alteration omitted). “A Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to re-litigate old matters,
raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.” Id. (quotation and alterations omitted).
Schmidt pointed to no new evidence requiring alteration of the judgment or
additional findings. His complaint merely changed the defendants and then
restated similar claims for relief. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Schmidt’s Rule 59(e) and Rule 52(b) motions.
III.
Finally, Schmidt contends that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for leave to proceed IFP. In fact, the district court granted
Schmidt IFP status before it received the archived information establishing
Schmidt’s PLRA strikes. Although withdrawal of IFP status was warranted, the
district court opted not to do so because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provided an

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alternative ground for dismissal. Schmidt’s final claim is therefore not supported
by the record.
AFFIRMED.

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