Theo Farnsworth v. Social Security Administration

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Theo Farnsworth. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. Motion to take judicial notice filed by Appellant Theo Farnsworth is DENIED. [7578299-2]. (See 02/26/2016 opinion)(FMH/BBM/RLA) The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-11059
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cv-00506-CJK

THEO FARNSWORTH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(February 26, 2016)
Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Theo Farnsworth appeals pro se the denial of his application for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”), filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). On appeal, Farnsworth, who has
ADHD and Autism Spectrum Disorder, argues that the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) failed to properly weigh the opinions of two of his mental health
counselors, a non-treating medical consultant, and a disability analyst. After
review, we affirm.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
We review the ALJ’s “decision to determine if it is supported by substantial
evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). We may not reweigh the
evidence or decide facts anew, and must affirm if the ALJ’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence, even if the evidence preponderates against it. Dyer v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted).
To receive DIB and SSI benefits, the claimant must prove that he is disabled.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), 1382(a)(1)-(2), 1382c(a)(3)(B); Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d
1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). A claimant is disabled if he is unable to “engage in
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any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Social Security regulations
provide a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(1),
416.920(a)(1). If the ALJ finds a claimant disabled or not disabled at any given
step, the ALJ does not go on to the next step. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
Under this process, the ALJ assesses whether the claimant: (1) is unable to engage
in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe medically determinable physical or
mental impairment; (3) has such an impairment that meets or equals a listed
impairment and meets the duration requirements; (4) can perform his past relevant
work, in light of his residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (5) can make an
adjustment to other work, in light of his RFC, age, education, and work experience.
Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
II. ALJ’S FINDINGS
Here, the ALJ found, at step one, that Farnsworth was not disabled from July
1, 2011 through the March 2012 hearing date because Farnsworth admitted at his
hearing that he had been working full time since July 1, 2011 as a contract
employee for a government contractor that collects data for the Department of
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Labor. As for the 12-month period before July 1, 2011, the ALJ found, at step
four, that Farnsworth was not disabled because, despite his severe impairments of
autism, ADD, and narcissistic personality disorder, he had the RFC to perform his
past relevant work as a cook.
With regard to Farnsworth’s RFC, the ALJ found that he could “perform a
full range of work at all exertional levels” with the non-exertional limitations that
he avoid: (1) “production-paced work with hard-target quotas”; (2) “work around
heights or hazardous substances”; and (3) “interaction with the general public.” In
reaching this RFC finding, the ALJ evaluated various medical and non-medical
source opinions.
Relevant to this appeal, the ALJ gave “significant weight” to the opinions of
Dr. Jessy Sadovnik, a state consulting psychologist, who reviewed the medical
evidence and completed a mental RFC assessment and psychiatric review
technique in November 2010. According to Dr. Sadovnik, Farnsworth had
moderate limitations in his ability to concentrate, perform activities within a
schedule, complete a normal work day or week without interruption from his
psychologically based symptoms, accept instructions, get along with co-workers,
maintain socially appropriate behavior, set realistic goals, and respond
appropriately to changes in the workplace. However, Farnsworth’s “overall mental
health status and his reported [activities of daily living] suggest[ed] that he [was]
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capable of performing simple and repetitive activities that would allow him to
function in a workplace environment.”
Although Farnsworth has “social difficulties related to his Asperger’s
condition,” Dr. Sadovnik opined that Farnsworth also has “the ability to relate
effectively when he chooses to do so.” Dr. Sadovnik concluded that Farnsworth is
“capable of performing routine tasks independently” based on Farnsworth’s history
of employment over several years, and his ability to perform activities of daily
living, high average intelligence, overall mental health status, “with some
concentration problems noted.” The ALJ explained that he gave Dr. Sadovnik’s
“comprehensive assessment” significant weight because it “was based on a review
of the objective medical evidence contained in the file.”
The ALJ discounted the opinions of Linda Buckland and Nancy Shue, two
licensed mental health counselors who had counseled Farnsworth. On June 21,
2011, just before Farnsworth began working for the government contractor in July
2011, Buckland and Shue each completed a “Medical Source Statement (Mental)”
form. Buckland and Shue agreed that Farnsworth had: (1) “extreme” impairments
in his ability to get along with co-workers, maintain attention and concentration for
extended periods, complete a normal workday or workweek without interruptions
from psychologically based symptoms, perform at a consistent pace without an
unreasonable number and length of rest periods, and respond appropriately to
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supervision; and (2) marked impairments in his ability to understand, remember,
and carry out complex instructions, and sustain a routine without special
supervision.
The ALJ acknowledged Buckland’s and Shue’s Medical Source Statements
indicating extreme impairments, but found that these “reports [were] not
substantiated by many corresponding treatment notes and they [were] contradicted
by the fact that [Farnsworth] has in fact been able to function appropriately enough
at work to sustain his job for eight months.” The ALJ concluded that Farnsworth’s
“recent work activities would [not] have been possible if he had ‘marked/extreme’
impairments” as noted by Buckland and Shue.
The ALJ also gave no weight to the opinion of Mark Laufer, a disability
analyst who completed a comprehensive vocational evaluation in June 2009 at the
request of the Florida Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. In the 2009
evaluation, Laufer opined that Farnsworth was not a good candidate for vocational
rehabilitation services because, although he had high aptitudes and academic skills,
Farnsworth had “an inability to sustain employment for more than a few months at
a time,” and “currently appears to be capable of identifying and securing
employment but not maintaining it.” In discounting Laufer’s opinion, the ALJ
explained that Laufer was “not an acceptable medical source,” and that his opinion

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was inconsistent with Farnsworth’s hearing testimony “that he has worked full
time at the same position since July 2011 . . . .”
The ALJ concluded, based on the evidence, that although Farnsworth’s
“limitations due to his impairments have resulted in significantly decreased
residual functional capacity, he is not precluded from all work in the enormous
economy of the United States” and that the RFC finding accommodated
Farnsworth’s autism and ADD. The ALJ stressed, “It is most important to note
that the claimant is currently working full time and he has been working at the
same job with the same company since July 2011.”
III. FARNSWORTH’S CLAIMS
A.

Claims Not Properly Raised on Appeal
As an initial matter, we note that Farnsworth’s pro se brief is difficult to

follow. Farnsworth’s statement of the issues contains a list of 14 issues, many of
which are not addressed further. The summary of the argument covers over 40
pages and consists mostly of citations followed by brief statements about each case
cited, but does not summarize Farnsworth’s own appellate arguments. The
argument portion of his brief lists 23 alleged errors by the ALJ and the district
court, many without further elaboration or substantive legal argument. Throughout
his brief, Farnsworth makes numerous arguments that he did not raise in the
district court, including, inter alia, whether the ALJ improperly discredited his
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hearing testimony, failed to fully develop the record, misapplied the vocational
grids, or should have taken testimony from a vocational expert, whether the ALJ’s
RFC finding was supported by the record, and whether Farnsworth received
effective assistance of counsel and a full and fair hearing.
We generally do not address arguments that were not raise in the district
court. Stewart v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 115, 115 (11th Cir.
1994) (“As a general principle, this Court will not address an argument that has not
been raised in the district court.”); see also Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228
(11th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we limit our appellate review to the issues
Farnsworth argued before the district court. Construed liberally, the crux of
Farnsworth’s argument is that the ALJ did not give proper weight to the medical
opinions of Sadovnik, Buckland, and Shue or to the opinion of Laufer, the state
disability analyst.1
B.

Medical Source Opinions
We find no reversible error in the ALJ’s decision to give significant weight

to Dr. Sadovnik and to discount the opinions of Buckland and Shue as to the

1

Farnsworth also contended that the transcript of his ALJ hearing contained typographical
errors and that he was denied a copy of the recording of the hearing. Farnsworth, however, has
not explained how any of these typographical errors prejudiced him either in the administrative
proceedings or on judicial review. Therefore, we find no reversible error on this point and do not
address this issue further.
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degree of Farnsworth’s mental limitations. 2 Dr. Sadovnik opined that Farnsworth
had only moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace and in
maintaining socially appropriate behavior, with only mild limits in ADLs. The
ALJ adequately explained that she gave Dr. Sadovnik’s opinion great weight
because it was a comprehensive assessment based on the objective medical
evidence in the record. See Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176,
1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to
different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.”). The ALJ also adequately
explained that she discounted Buckland’s and Shue’s assessments of more severe
(i.e., marked or extreme) limitations because they were not supported by many
treatment notes and were contradicted by the fact that Farnsworth was actually
working for the last eight months. Moreover, the ALJ’s stated reasons are
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Farnsworth had received mental health treatment and medication
management from the Bridgeway Center for the past ten years. According to
Bridgeway Center’s medical records, Farnsworth responded well to medication
(ADHD medication and an antidepressant) and generally had GAF scores in the 65
2

Our review is limited to whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence
and based on proper legal standards. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178
(11th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as
a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Under this limited standard of review, we do not make findings of fact, reweigh
the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. Id.
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to 80 range.3 During his visits, Farnsworth was reported as pleasant and
cooperative, with logical thought and good insight and judgment. Farnsworth
occasionally reported losing a job, but he did not report significant problems
concentrating or behaving in a socially appropriate way. At the Bridgeway Center,
Shue conducted a coping-skills group for people with ADHD, which it appears
Farnsworth attended between 2005 and 2008. The record, however, does not
contain any progress notes from Shue.
Farnsworth was not diagnosed with Asperger’s Disorder until 2009, when
Dr. Julie Harper, a licensed psychologist at Bridgeway Center, performed a
psychological evaluation as part of state vocational rehabilitation services.
Farnsworth reported speaking bluntly at work and having difficulty understanding
“corporate language.” Farnsworth also reported a tendency to become bored and
easily distracted, which led to his being fired, and that he had lost his last job after
six months. Testing revealed Farnsworth had a high average IQ and excellent nonverbal abilities, but was limited in his ability to concentrate over fifteen minutes.
In addition to confirming Farnsworth’s ADHD diagnosis, Dr. Harper determined
that Farnsworth’s social difficulties extended beyond his ADHD. Dr. Harper
3

Global Assessment of Functioning, or GAF, is a standard measurement of an
individual’s overall functioning “with respect only to psychological, social, and occupational
functioning” using a 1 to 100 point scale. American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 30-32 (4th ed. 2000) (DSM-IV). A score between 51 and
60 indicates moderate symptoms or difficulty in functioning, a score between 61 and 71 shows
mild symptoms or some difficulty in functioning, while a score between 71 and 80 represents no
more than slight impairment. Id. at 32.
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concluded that Farnsworth’s difficulties showing emotion and recognizing
boundaries were consistent with Asperger’s Disorder “with Narcissistic Features.”
Dr. Harper opined that Farnsworth would be best suited for work that offered
variety, emphasized non-verbal activities, did not require keen attention to detail,
and provided clear standards for work relationships. Dr. Harper did not opine that
Farnsworth’s mental impairments made him unemployable.4
Between October 2009 and July 2010, Farnsworth attended seven
counseling sessions with Buckland. Buckland engaged in role-playing and other
exercises to help Farnsworth recognize others’ social cues and learn to respond
more appropriately during interpersonal interactions. Buckland’s treatment notes
indicate, however, that these sessions dealt primarily with trying to improve
Farnsworth’s relationship with his estranged wife. There was no explicit mention
of difficulties at work. During this period, Farnsworth discontinued taking his
medications, explaining that he had been taking them for his wife, rather than for
himself.
Similarly, in August 2010, Farnsworth and his estranged wife visited Dr.
Nelson Handal at Dothan Behavioral Medicine for Farnsworth’s difficulties
communicating with his wife. During this visit, Dr. Handal found that Farnsworth
4

In a 2010 follow-up evaluation, Dr. Harper reached essentially the same conclusions, but
noted also that Farnsworth spoke with an unusually loud voice and had a personality disturbance
that reached the level of narcissistic personality disorder. Dr. Harper also gave Farnsworth a
GAF score of 77.
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exhibited appropriate behavior and was cooperative, with logical thought process
and fair insight and judgment. Dr. Handal gave Farnsworth a GAF score of 51 to
60, one of the only times Farnsworth received a score below 60. Dr. Handal
prescribed Abilify, which is sometimes used to treat irritability in autistic patients,
and advised Farnsworth to continue couples therapy.
In October 2010, Dr. Alexander Kolevzon at Mt. Sinai Medical Center
evaluated Farnsworth as part of an autism study. Dr. Kolevzon noted that during
the evaluation Farnsworth was restless, had trouble staying on topic, and
sometimes interacted inappropriately, but that he also had good eye contact and
used facial expressions well. After performing diagnostic tests, Dr. Kolevzon
opined that Farnsworth tested in the autism range. As to verbal communication,
Farnsworth’s speech was communicative and complex, but he also spoke loudly
and often used odd language, such as invented words. Farnsworth’s non-verbal
communication, however, was strong, especially his use of appropriate gestures.
With respect to social skills, Farnsworth showed strengths in his use of facial
expressions and in describing his own emotional states and the emotional states of
others, but he had difficulties engaging in appropriate and two-sided conversations,
and understanding his role in social relationships such as friend, spouse or coworker. Dr. Kolevzon found that Farnsworth was “quite invested” in his
Asperger’s diagnosis “as a means to explain the difficulties he has had in his life,
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particularly around relationships and vocational problems.” Dr. Kolevzon
confirmed Farnsworth’s high-average IQ with superior abstract reasoning skills.
Dr. Kolevzon noted that Farnsworth had reported losing many jobs, which he
thought was the result of “what [Farnsworth] called the ‘creep factor’” and
“speaking about sex with co-workers before he understood how inappropriate that
was.” Dr. Kolevzon did not opine that Farnsworth’s difficulties prevented him
from working. Rather, Dr. Kolevzon concluded that Farnsworth would benefit
from, among other things, resuming his medication, individual psychotherapy,
social skills and vocational training, and job coaching.
In a March 2012 letter, Buckland stated that she continued to provide
counseling to Farnsworth as part of his state vocational rehabilitation services, but
there are no progress notes from Buckland after July 2010. Buckland’s letter
stated that Farnsworth had been employed since June 2011 with an employer that
provided accommodations and a supportive supervisor.5 Buckland explained that
the focus of their sessions was to help Farnsworth “adjust to the demands of his
current job.” Buckland opined that Farnsworth’s was “making progress,” but
would continue to need support, such as “job coaches, therapy with someone who

5

Although Buckland’s letter states that Farnsworth began working in June 2011,
Farnsworth testified that he began working July 2011.
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understands and works with those who have Autistic Spectrum Disorders or
accommodations provided by a workplace.” 6
Dr. Sadovnik’s assessment of the severity of Farnsworth’s mental limitations
is consistent with this medical evidence, including the longitudinal treatment
records at Bridgeway Center and the opinions and testing results of Drs. Harper
and Kolevzon, two examining medical sources. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err
in concluding that Dr. Sadovnik’s opinion, like the opinions of Drs. Harper and
Kolevzon, was entitled to significant weight. See Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d
580, 584-85 (11th Cir. 1991) (concluding that an ALJ may rely upon the opinion of
non-examining medical source when it does not conflict with those of examining
sources).7
Furthermore, the ALJ properly discounted the medical source statements
completed by Buckland and Shue. There is no merit to Farnsworth’s contention
that, as treating sources, their opinions should have been given controlling weight.
Buckland and Shue were mental health counselors, not physicians or

6

At the hearing, the ALJ asked about the lack of progress notes from Buckland and Shue,
and Farnsworth’s counsel replied that he had tried to obtain them. The ALJ also asked for
documentation of the accommodations Farnsworth’s current employer had made, and was told
the current employer was unwilling to provide them for legal reasons.
7

The record belies Farnsworth’s claim that the ALJ should not have relied on Dr.
Sadovnik’s assessment because it was completed “before many reports were even done.” The
only medical evidence that post-dated Dr. Sadovnik’s psychiatric review technique and mental
RFC assessment was the conclusory medical source statements from Buckland and Shue.
Moreover, Farnsworth does not explain why any “reports” completed after Dr. Sadovnik’s
assessment rendered his opinion unreliable.
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psychologists, and thus were not “acceptable medical sources” under the
regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a), 416.913(a) (providing that acceptable
medical sources include licensed physicians and psychologists). Instead, Buckland
and Shue were other medical sources. SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *1-2
(Aug. 9, 2006) (explaining that medical sources include both acceptable medical
sources and other health care providers who are not acceptable medical sources).
While the ALJ was required to consider the opinions of Buckland and Shue as
other medical sources, the ALJ was not required to give their opinions controlling
weight over the opinions of acceptable medical sources, such as Dr. Sadovnik. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d)(1), 404.1527(c), 416.913(d)(1), 416.927(c); SSR 06-03p,
2006 WL 2329939, at *2, *6 (explaining that “only ‘acceptable medical sources’
can be considered treating sources . . . whose medical opinions may be entitled to
controlling weight).
Furthermore, the ALJ provided a sufficient reason for discounting the
opinions of Buckland and Shue as to the severity of Farnsworth’s mental
impairments. See Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th
Cir. 2004) (explaining that even a treating physician’s opinion may be discounted
if “it is not accompanied by objective medical evidence or is wholly conclusory”
(quotation marks omitted)); see also SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *4 (stating
that factors in considering “other sources” evidence, such as other medical source
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opinions, include “[h]ow consistent the opinion is with other evidence,” the
“degree to which the source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion,” and
“[h]ow well the source explains the opinion”).
And, the ALJ’s reason is supported by the record. There were no treatment
or progress notes from Shue. The few progress notes from Buckland suggest that
the primary focus of their sessions was Farnsworth’s relationship with his wife.
Buckland’s progress notes do not explicitly address Farnsworth’s workplace
limitations. Notably, neither Buckland nor Shue provided any additional
information on their completed forms about Farnsworth and his mental
impairments to support their opinions. Indeed, despite the fact that the forms
themselves state that the information given is “[i]n addition to the information
provided in your narrative report,” neither Buckland’s form nor Shue’s form was
accompanied by a narrative report. Buckland’s subsequent 2012 letter indicates
that Farnsworth began working at about the same time she and Shue completed
their forms. The ALJ found that Farnsworth’s “recent work activities would [not]
have been possible if he had ‘marked/extreme’ impairments” as Buckland and
Shue had opined.
C.

Laufer’s Vocational Evaluation
The ALJ also properly rejected disability analyst Laufer’s opinion. In his

vocational evaluation, Laufer opined that Farnsworth was not a good candidate for
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vocational services because he “currently appears to be capable of identifying and
securing employment but not maintaining it.” The ALJ gave Laufer’s opinion no
weight because Laufer was “not an acceptable medical source,” and Farnsworth
had testified at the hearing that he was currently working “full time at the same
position” he had held for the last eight months.
As a disability analyst, Laufer is not a medical source at all, much less an
“acceptable medical source.” See SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *1. Rather,
Laufer is a “‘non-medical source’ who has seen the individual in his or her
professional capacity.” Id. at *5; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d)(3),
416.913(d)(3). Although the ALJ should consider evidence from non-medical
sources, the ALJ is not required to assign the evidence any particular weight. SSR
06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *3-4. Instead, whether and how much weight the
ALJ should give this kind of evidence depends upon the particular facts of the case
and a variety of factors, including whether the opinion is consistent with other
evidence in the record. Id. at *4.
Here, the ALJ concluded that Laufer’s opinion that Farnsworth would be
unable to maintain employment for more than a few months was not consistent
with Farnsworth’s testimony. We agree. Farnsworth’s testimony, as well as other
record evidence, seriously undermines Laufer’s opinion. The record shows that
with Buckland’s job coaching, paid for by Florida’s Division of Vocational
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Rehabilitation, Farnsworth was able to maintain his employment with the
government contractor for about ten months in 2011 and 2012.8 Furthermore,
Buckland’s 2012 letter suggests that, while the path for Farnsworth has not been an
easy one, he continues to make progress and is able to maintain employment for
extended periods with supportive counseling.
As the government correctly points out, other information in Laufer’s
vocational evaluation also contradicts his opinion that Farnsworth could not
maintain employment. Specifically, the evaluation states that, at the time of
Laufer’s 2009 interview with Farnsworth, Farnsworth had been working for a year
as a commission salesperson selling credit card processing equipment to
businesses. In addition, Farnsworth’s reported work history shows he managed to
work as a cook in a hotel for eight months in 2008. Under the circumstances, the
ALJ’s decision to assign no weight to Laufer’s opinion is supported by substantial
evidence.

8

According to a separation letter filed after Farnsworth’s hearing, he continued to work
for the government contractor for about two more months, until May 2012, which was when
Farnsworth testified his employment contract would end. Thus, it appears Farnsworth was never
fired from this job.
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For all these reasons, we conclude that the ALJ committed no error in
weighing the medical and non-medical source opinions and that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Farnsworth was not disabled. 9
AFFIRMED.

9

Farnsworth’s motion seeking to order the government to provide copies of the caselaw
cited in its appellate brief, or alternatively, striking those citations from the brief, is DENIED.
Farnsworth’s request for a 60-day extension to file a second reply brief is also DENIED.
19