USA v. Eneshia Carlyle

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Eneshia Carlyle. Decision: Vacated and Remanded. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 15-12977

Date Filed: 10/18/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-12977
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:14-cr-00123-CEH-MAP-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ENESHIA CARLYLE,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(October 18, 2017)
Before MARCUS, JORDAN, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Defendant Eneshia Carlyle appeals the forfeiture money judgment entered
against her on the ground that she cannot be held jointly and severally liable for the
entire amount of proceeds from a wire-fraud scheme, and that even if she could be
held jointly and severally liable, the forfeiture money judgment violates the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
While Defendant’s appeal was pending in our Court, the Supreme Court
decided Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017). Addressing a
forfeiture statute related to drug crimes, the Supreme Court rejected joint and
several liability, holding that a coconspirator-defendant can be liable only for the
property he acquired from the criminal activity. 137 S. Ct. at 1635. Given that
decision and the Government’s concession that the district court erred by holding
Defendant jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the wire-fraud
proceeds, we vacate the forfeiture money judgment entered by the district court
and remand for that court to reconsider its forfeiture ruling in light of Honeycutt.
I.

BACKGROUND
Defendant and her husband, James Cobb, were indicted for one count of

conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, four counts of wire fraud, and four
counts of aggravated identity theft. These counts arose out of a scheme in which
the couple used stolen identities to file fraudulent tax returns and receive the tax
refunds for their personal benefit. Defendant signed a plea agreement in which she
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pled guilty to one count each of wire fraud and aggravated identity theft, though
she did not plead guilty to the conspiracy charge. The agreement included a
provision that Defendant agreed to a forfeiture money judgment of “not less than
$610,000.00, representing the amount of proceeds obtained as a result of the
scheme.” 1 Defendant also agreed to waive any challenges to the forfeiture,
including that the forfeiture constituted an excessive fine. The district court
accepted Defendant’s guilty pleas and adjudged her guilty of both counts.
The Government filed a motion for a forfeiture money judgment against
Defendant, arguing that it was entitled to “$1,820,759.00, representing the
proceeds obtained as a result of the wire fraud scheme to which she pled guilty.”
The Government stated that Defendant would be held jointly and severally liable
with Cobb for the full amount of the judgment. Defendant made several objections
to the Government’s motion, including that she had only agreed to a forfeiture
money judgment amount of $610,000, and that the amount the Government was
seeking violated the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause because it was
grossly disproportionate to her offenses and the amount contemplated in the plea
agreement.
The district court found that “at least $1,820,759.00 in proceeds was
obtained from the wire fraud scheme to which [Defendant] pled guilty,” and,
1

At the time Defendant signed the agreement, the Government knew the scheme had brought in
at least $610,000, but did not yet know the full amount of the proceeds of the scheme.
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holding Defendant jointly and severally liable with Cobb, granted the
Government’s motion for a forfeiture money judgment in the greater amount.2
Defendant was also sentenced to 138 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’
supervised release.
After filing a notice of appeal of the conviction, forfeiture order, and
sentence, Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and
submitted an accompanying brief, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), arguing that there were no issues of arguable merit for appeal. This Court
denied counsel’s Anders motion and ordered further briefing as to whether the
forfeiture money judgment violated the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause.
II.

DISCUSSION
Whether a forfeiture order is excessive under the Eighth Amendment is an

issue we review de novo. United States v. Seher, 562 F.3d 1344, 1370 (11th Cir.
2009). Forfeiture orders imposed at the end of a criminal proceeding solely
because of a conviction are considered fines subject to the Eighth Amendment’s

2

In Cobb’s appeal, this Court affirmed the district court’s finding that the amount paid out by
the IRS was $1,820,759. United States v. Cobb, 842 F.3d 1213, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 2016).
Defendant notes in her reply brief that she accordingly abandons her challenges to the factual
basis for calculating $1,820,759 as the overall loss calculation of the scheme.
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prohibition of excessive fines. 3 Id. at 1371. “A forfeiture order violates the
Excessive Fines Clause if it ‘is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a
defendant's offense.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337
(1998)). Whether a particular forfeiture is “grossly disproportional” is determined
through looking principally at three factors: “(1) whether the defendant falls into
the class of persons at whom the criminal statute was principally directed; (2) other
penalties authorized by the legislature (or the Sentencing Commission); and (3) the
harm caused by the defendant.” Id. (quoting U.S. v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1281
(2007)). The impact of the fine on the individual defendant is not considered, and
it is strongly presumed that the forfeiture is constitutional if the forfeiture amount
is within the rage of fines prescribed by Congress. Id.
The constitutionality of the particular forfeiture amount is not our immediate
concern, however. Instead, we focus on whether the forfeiture imposed by the
district court complied with the appropriate statutory authority. Defendant
contends that the district court erred in holding her jointly and severally liable with
Cobb. Before the district court, Defendant argued that she played a lesser role in
the offense than did her husband and that she had only agreed to a forfeiture
amount of $610,000 in her plea agreement.

3

“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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Since the filing of Defendant’s reply brief, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Honeycutt, and Defendant has filed supplemental authority, relying on
that decision to support her argument that the district court erred in applying joint
and several liability as to the forfeiture imposed.4 In Honeycutt, the Supreme
Court concluded that the statutory language of 21 U.S.C. § 853—which addresses
forfeiture in the context of drug crimes—limits forfeiture under that provision to
property the defendant himself actually acquired as a result of the crime, and so a
defendant who did not receive any of the proceeds of the crime cannot be subject
to joint and several liability on the entire forfeiture amount. Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct.
at 1630, 1635. Defendant argues that the same reasoning applies here, and because
she did not plead guilty to the conspiracy, she should only be liable for the
$610,000 she admitted to receiving rather than the full proceeds of the conspiracy.
Citing Honeycutt, the Government now likewise concedes that Defendant
cannot be held jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of proceeds from
the wire-fraud scheme simply because she was a coconspirator. The Government
therefore asks us to vacate the forfeiture money judgment and remand to the
district court to make factual findings regarding the amount of proceeds directly
obtained by Defendant.

4

Defendant also argued in her brief that the cases the Government relied on in support of joint
and several liability are inapposite.
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Although the forfeiture statute at issue in Honeycutt, 21 U.S.C. § 853, is not
the same forfeiture statute at issue here, 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), the two statutes
are largely the same in terms of their pertinent language, and so it appears that the
Supreme Court’s decision would apply to the statute at issue in the present case.
Compare 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) (“Any person convicted of a violation . . . shall
forfeit . . . any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation.”) with 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(C) (“The following property is subject to forfeiture to the United
States . . . Any property, real or person, which constitutes or is derived from
proceeds traceable to a violation.”). Indeed, the Third Circuit has so held. See
United States v. Gjeli, 867 F.3d 418, 427–28 & n.16 (3d Cir. 2017) (concluding
that Honeycutt applies with equal force to a forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(C), and remanding to the district court to reconsider its forfeiture
ruling).
At any rate, given the Honeycutt decision and its likely applicability to the
statute at issue here, we vacate the forfeiture judgment as to Defendant and remand
to the district court to determine in the first instance the applicability of
Honeycutt to the present case and to conduct any fact-finding necessary to
determine the appropriate amount of monetary forfeiture to be imposed on
Defendant.
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VACATED AND REMANDED.

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