Jose Santiago v. Dale Sanders, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Jose Santiago. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 15-13452

Date Filed: 08/08/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-13452
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:14-cv-61505-FAM

JOSE SANTIAGO,
individually and on behalf of himself
and all other similarly situated employees,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
DALE SANDERS,
individually,
DALE'S WHEELS AND TIRES DIRECT, INC,
Florida Corporation a.k.a Dale's Wheels,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(August 8, 2017)

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Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and SILER, * Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Jose Daniel Santiago worked as a tire technician and
wheel-rim painter for Defendant-Appellee Dale Saunders’s1 garage business,
Dale’s Wheels and Tires Direct, Inc. (“Dale’s Tires”).

He sued Dale2 and

Defendants-Appellees Dale’s Tires and Dale’s Properties and Investments, Inc.
(collectively, “Defendants”), claiming that Defendants failed under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) to pay him required overtime during his employment.3
Following a one-day trial, the district court granted Defendants’ Rule 50 motion
for judgment as a matter of law. Santiago appeals the district court’s grant of
Defendants’ Rule 50 motion. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. 4
Santiago began working as a tire technician and wheel-rim painter for Dale’s
Tires in July 2011, and he left his employment with Defendants in April 2014. He
testified that he worked Monday through Friday when the shop was open, and he
*

Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting
by designation.
1
The docket spells the Defendants’ name as “Sanders,” but the briefs and transcripts
spell it as “Saunders.” We use the spelling for which the briefs and transcripts show a
preference.
2
Both Dale Saunders and his wife Linda Saunders are referenced in this opinion. To
avoid confusion, we refer to the Saunderses by their first names.
3
Santiago also filed a retaliation claim, but he voluntarily dismissed it during trial.
4
Under Rule 50(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., we review the trial evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d 891, 902 (11th Cir.
2004). For this reason, we do not recount all evidence of record.
2

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worked one full Saturday each month. Although Santiago provided testimony
regarding the hours and days he was supposed to and did in fact work, he could not
recall the exact days and hours for which he was missing pay.
Defendants did not keep all required FLSA records of the hours that
Santiago worked. Nevertheless, they did maintain weekly payroll registers that set
forth the number of hours Santiago was paid for each week, including regular and
overtime wages. These records show that for most of the weeks during which
Santiago worked, he was paid for 50.5 hours of work from Monday through
Friday—40 of regular time and 10.5 of overtime. Based on the payroll-register
records, the parties agreed that during the entirety of his employment, Santiago
was paid for less than 50.5 hours during 47 weeks.5 Of these 47 weeks, the records
reflect that for five of these weeks, Santiago was paid for 0 hours. For the
remaining 42 weeks, he was paid for between 21 and 46.5 hours.
Santiago conceded that he did not bring the alleged deficiencies in—and in
five of the 47 weeks, complete absences of—his paychecks to Defendants’

5

Counsel for Santiago referred to the parties’ having agreed that Santiago was paid for
less than 50.5 hours in 49 weeks. But in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3, Santiago identified the specific
weeks in which he was paid for less than 50.5 hours. Only 47 weeks are identified. Nor do
Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1 and 2, Defendants’ payroll-register records, show that Santiago was paid
for less than 50.5 hours for 49 weeks. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 88 appears to include fewer than all the
payroll-register records for the period it purports to cover (though each page of the document
identifies the document as containing a total of 28 pages, pages 14-16, 19-20, and 23-24 are not
contained in the exhibit). Indeed, the payroll-register records show only 32 weeks where
Santiago was paid for less than 50.5 hours. And we have found no evidence in the record to
support the conclusion that Santiago was paid for less than 50.5 hours for more than 47 weeks.
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attention. When asked why, Santiago testified that he had been without work for a
year before joining Dale’s Tires, and he needed to provide for his family. He also
said that he “didn’t want any confrontation with [Dale],” that Dale used to get
“very angry” and Santiago “didn’t want to deal with that.”
Despite the concerns Santiago testified he had about Dale, one to two weeks
near the end of Santiago’s employment with Defendants, Santiago approached a
supervisor, Erik Oliphant, and told him that he was not getting paid overtime.
After Oliphant reported this information to Linda, the Saunders who was actually
responsible for payroll matters, she approached Santiago and told him “that’s not a
problem.” Linda instructed Santiago to write down his hours if he needed to stay
late, and Santiago understood that she would pay him. Despite this direction,
Santiago failed to keep such a record and provide it to Linda.
Linda recounted one occasion when Santiago informed her that she made a
mistake in calculating his pay and that he was owed an additional $35.00. After
acknowledging the error, Linda immediately handed over to him $35.00 in cash.
The record is unclear whether this interaction occurred at the same time Linda told
Santiago to maintain a list of his overtime. Nevertheless, Santiago offered no
testimony to explain why he was able to bring this error to Linda’s attention during
this particular week but no others. Nor did he explain why, in advising her of the
short, he did not also tell her about the purported shorts for the prior weeks.
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Santiago described Linda as “approachable” and as somebody [he] could talk to,”
and he conceded that she did not have a temper.
II.
After the jury was released to conduct its deliberations, Defendants moved
again for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, Fed. R. Civ. P.6 The
following day, the district court granted a mistrial in the case and took under
advisement Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. A week later, the
district court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Santiago now appeals.
III.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law,
applying the same standard as the district court. Thosteson v. United States, 331
F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003). Under Rule 50, a court should render judgment
as a matter of law when no legally sufficient evidentiary basis exists for a
reasonable jury to find for the opposing party on that issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.
We can affirm on any ground supported by the record. See, e.g., Trustees of
Atlanta Iron Workers, Local 387 Pension Fund v. S. Stress Wire Corp., 742 F.2d
1458, 1459 (11th Cir. 1983).

6

The district court denied Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, made at
the close of Santiago’s presentation of his case but left the door open to reconsidering it after
hearing Defendants’ case.
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On review of judgment as a matter of law, an appellate court reviews all of
the evidence in the record and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, taking into account that “[c]redibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts
are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod.,
530 U.S. 133, 148-151 (2000); Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d
713, 724 (11th Cir. 2012). “[A]lthough the court should review the record as a
whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is
not required to believe.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151. Judgment as a matter of law is
appropriate “only if the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of one
party, such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Ash v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 664 F.3d 883, 892 (11th Cir. 2011).
IV.
The FLSA requires employers to pay their employees at least one-and-a-half
times their regular wage for every hour worked in excess of forty per week. 29
U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Under the FLSA, the employee-plaintiff must shoulder the
burden of proving that he did not receive proper compensation for work that he
performed. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-87 (1946),
superseded by statute, 29 U.S.C. § 254 (West 1996), as recognized in Integrity
Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, __U.S.__, 135 S. Ct. 513, 516-17 (2014); see 29 U.S.C.
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§ 216(b). To make a prima facie showing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he
was employed by the defendant; (2) the defendant was engaged in interstate
commerce; (3) he worked more than 40 hours in a week; and (4) the defendant
knew of the plaintiff’s work and failed to pay him overtime wages for such hours.
See Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1277 n.68 (11th Cir.
2008) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 207(a)); Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495
F.3d 1306, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2007). The parties here stipulated to the first two
elements.
Because Santiago has not established the fourth element, we do not need to
address the third element. Here, Santiago failed to demonstrate that his employers
knew or should have known he was owed overtime pay. Santiago admitted that he
never told either of the Saunderses that they owed him overtime, except on a single
occasion, just before he resigned. At that time, Linda told him it was not “a
problem” to pay him overtime and instructed him to write down and keep track of
his hours owed. But Santiago failed to do so and never followed up. 7

7

It is not clear whether Santiago’s testimony and Linda’s testimony about their
discussion of overtime pay reflect two reportings of a single conversation or whether Linda’s
testimony that she paid Santiago $35 on one occasion when he complained he had been shorted
allegedly occurred in a second discussion. Under Rule 50(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to Santiago, as the non-movant. In an abundance of caution,
therefore, we assume only one conversation occurred. Of course, if two happened and Linda told
Santiago twice to advise her if he worked unpaid hours, our conclusion would be the same. In
any case, it is clear that Santiago never subsequently informed Linda of any money owed and
even failed to follow up about his pay after he resigned.
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Nor did Santiago present evidence from which a jury could infer that
Defendants should have otherwise known that Santiago was allegedly owed
overtime pay. Accordingly, Defendants neither knew nor had any reason to know
that Santiago was owed overtime. As a result, Santiago did not satisfy his burden
under the FLSA, and the district court did not commit reversible error in granting
judgment on the pleadings.
V.
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.

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