Peacock Timber Company, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Labor

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Petitioner Peacock Timber Company, Inc.. Decision: Affirmed. Petition Denied. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 15-13514

Date Filed: 05/16/2016

Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-13514
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency No. 14-0497

PEACOCK TIMBER COMPANY, INC.,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
________________________
(May 16, 2016)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
An Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspector
visited Peacock Timber Company’s workplace with an order to investigate a

Case: 15-13514

Date Filed: 05/16/2016

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former employee’s complaint about unsafe work conditions there. The allegations
in the complaint proved to be unfounded, but, during her visit, the OSHA inspector
noticed violations of other federal workplace safety regulations. After a second
inspector investigated further, OSHA cited Peacock for the violations the
inspectors discovered. Peacock challenged the citations in an administrative
proceeding, but an administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed the bulk of them and
ordered Peacock to pay $3,000 in penalties. Peacock appeals that decision, raising
most of the arguments the ALJ rejected. We reject them, too, for many of the same
reasons given by the ALJ.
Peacock’s first argument is that the OSHA inspectors violated the Fourth
Amendment because they were never authorized to search the facility for
violations other than those alleged in the former employee’s complaint. The ALJ
found, however, that Peacock’s executives consented to the inspectors’ searches,
recognizing the possibility that the inspectors might observe violations beyond
those alleged in the complaint. A person’s valid consent to a search makes the
search reasonable (and lawful) under the Fourth Amendment. See Fernandez v.
California, 571 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1137 (2014). Having consented to the
searches that took place, Peacock cannot now complain about what those searches
turned up.

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Case: 15-13514

Date Filed: 05/16/2016

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Peacock calls our attention to In re Inspection of Crider Poultry, No.
MC610–001, 2010 WL 1524571 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2010), but that unpublished
district court decision does not help it. Quite the opposite, the magistrate judge in
that case acknowledged that consent to a broad inspection effectively negated the
search limitations prescribed in OSHA’s search warrant. Id. at *5. That is exactly
what the ALJ found happened in this case and we agree with that assessment.
Peacock’s next contention is that the OSHA inspectors should have notified
its executives of their Miranda rights before the inspectors began looking around
the workplace. But Miranda only applies to custodial interrogations, see J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011), and nobody at
Peacock was in custody during the investigators’ searches.
Peacock points out that it is a small business and that it is difficult to keep up
with and comply with all of OSHA’s regulations. It also notes that it has an
exemplary safety record. For better or for worse, though, there is no small
business exception to the regulations at issue in this appeal, nor is there an
exception for businesses that have good safety records. It also does not matter that
Peacock had its own policies and practices in place to deal with some of the
potential problems addressed by the OSHA regulations it was cited for violating.
Peacock might think OSHA’s regulations are unwise, unnecessary, or unduly
burdensome, but that is no excuse for failing to comply with them.
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Case: 15-13514

Date Filed: 05/16/2016

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Peacock repeatedly contends that it could not have reasonably known about
some of the violations. But the ALJ found otherwise and, because her findings
were supported by substantial evidence, we may not depart from them. See D & S
Grading Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 899 F.2d 1145, 1147 (11th Cir. 1990).
Peacock makes a few other arguments, all of which are addressed in the
ALJ’s decision. Those arguments are meritless and do not warrant further
discussion.
The petition is DENIED.

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