USA v. Yvonne Hall

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Yvonne Wiley Hall. Decision: Vacated and Remanded. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.--[Edited 01/26/2017 by DC]

Case: 15-15096

Date Filed: 01/26/2017

Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-15096
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-00052-CB-B-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
YVONNE WILEY HALL,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
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(January 26, 2017)

Case: 15-15096

Date Filed: 01/26/2017

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Before WILSON and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and BARTLE, ∗ District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Yvonne Hall appeals her sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment, imposed
after revocation of her supervised release. She raises a procedural reasonableness
claim, arguing that the district court erred by considering an impermissible
sentencing factor: religion. After thorough review of the record and the parties’
briefs, and having had the benefit of oral argument, we vacate Hall’s sentence and
remand to the district court for resentencing.
I
While under supervised release for bank fraud and identity theft convictions,
Hall again committed bank fraud. The offense triggered revocation of Hall’s
supervised release, with a guidelines range of 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment.
Hall requested a sentence at the lower end of the range, noting that she has three
children. The government asked for the statutory maximum—36 months—based
on Hall’s criminal history. Hall and the district court then engaged in the
following colloquy:
Hall: I’m very much content with . . . your decision,
whatever it is. That’s saying—you know, like he said,
it’s over and over and over. I just have an addiction [to
money] and there’s no help for me. . . .

∗

Honorable Harvey Bartle III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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Court: Why do you say there’s no help for you?
Hall: Because there’s nothing. What help do you have
for someone like me? The only people that get help is
people that’s on drugs. . . .
Court: Have you thought of finding something else to
satisfy your addiction?
Hall: You know, when you have an addiction that goes on
for so long[.]
...
Court: And I’m not going to lecture you because I believe
you can be saved. . . . Have you ever picked up the Bible?
Hall: Yes, I have.
Court: What have you done with it?
Hall: I mean, I read it. It’s nothing—I don’t think it’s a
spiritual thing.
...
Court: And I’m going to sentence you to 36 months’
custody . . . . But I just wish that you would give yourself
time to reflect on the self, that you have turned into a
demon and you’ve known it. You’re not sick. You’ve
turned yourself into a demon and you need not have done
that.
Hall lodged no objections to the district court’s ruling. This appeal followed.
II
Because Hall did not object to her sentence, we review her claim for plain
error. Hall must show “(1) that the district court erred; (2) that the error was plain;
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and (3) that the error affected [her] substantial rights.” United States v.
Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “If all three conditions are met, we then decide whether the error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
III
Although plain error is a demanding standard, the unique circumstances in
this case warrant relief.
First, the district court erred, and its error was plain. Religion is an
impermissible sentencing factor. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10; see also Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 885, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2747 (1983). And the court’s colloquy with
Hall makes clear that its sentencing decision was “substantially affected by the
consideration of” religion. See United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 745 (11th Cir.
2007). Religion was a focal point of the colloquy, and the court, in explaining its
sentencing decision, twice called Hall a “demon,” thus indicating that its
“imposition of a lengthy prison term . . . reflected the fact that [its] own sense of
religious propriety had somehow been betrayed.” See United States v. Bakker, 925
F.2d 728, 740–41 (4th Cir. 1991).
Second, the court’s error affected Hall’s substantial rights. Given that
religion was a focal point of the court’s colloquy with Hall, a “reasonable
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probability” exists that, but for the court’s error, the result of Hall’s proceeding
would have been different. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1299
(11th Cir. 2005).
Finally, the court’s error “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” See Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1307 (internal
quotation marks omitted). We “cannot sanction sentencing procedures that create
the perception of the bench as a pulpit from which judges announce their personal
sense of religiosity and simultaneously punish defendants for offending it.”
Bakker, 925 F.2d at 740.
IV
We conclude, therefore, that Hall’s sentence was based in part on an
impermissible sentencing factor—religion—and we remand to the district court for
a new sentencing hearing.
VACATED AND REMANDED.

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