Alfred Rhiner v. Secretary, Florida Department, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Alfred Rhiner. Decision: Reversed and Remanded. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 15-15553

Date Filed: 05/24/2017

Page: 1 of 6

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-15553
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cv-14332-RLR
ALFRED RHINER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
MR. OLUGBENGA OGUNSANWO,
Director of Health, F.D.O.C.,
RANDALL TIFFT,
Regional Director, F.D.O.C.,
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,
W.C.F.,
LAWNWOOD REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(May 24, 2017)

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Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Alfred Rhiner, a Florida prisoner, appeals the sua sponte dismissal with
prejudice of his pro se civil rights complaint against various prison officials and
healthcare providers under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). He asks us to reverse the
district court’s dismissal or allow him to amend his complaint. Because Rhiner’s
complaint stated a deliberate indifference claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
certain medical professional defendants employed by the state of Florida, the
district court erred in dismissing Rhiner’s complaint. Accordingly, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
The district court dismissed Rhiner’s complaint for failure to state a claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under § 1915(e)(2), a
court must dismiss an in forma pauperis proceeding brought by a prisoner if it
determines the action is frivolous, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).1 We review de novo the district court’s determination, made
during a frivolity review pursuant to § 1915A, that an inmate failed to state a claim
against a defendant. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir.

1

A dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the
same standard as a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,
1490 (11th Cir. 1997).
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2001). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
To prevail on a civil rights action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show a
“person acting under color of state law” deprived him of a federal right. Griffin v.
City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). The Eighth Amendment
governs conditions of confinement for inmates and their treatment while
imprisoned. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical need violates the Eighth Amendment,
but not every prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical treatment rises to that level.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976).
Analyzing an inmate’s deliberate indifference claim involves two
components: whether the inmate had a serious medical need, and whether the
defendant’s response to that need was deliberately indifferent. Adams v. Poag, 61
F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995). Rhiner’s complaint was sufficient to state a §
1983 claim for deliberate indifference against medical staff at Okeechobee
Correctional Institution (“Okeechobee”) and South Florida Reception Center
(“South).2 First, Rhiner alleged facts demonstrating a serious medical need for
2

Rhiner initially filed his complaint against Julie Jones, the Secretary of the Florida
Department of Corrections; Olegbenga Ogunsanwo, the Director of Health at the FDOC; Randall
Tifft, the Regional Director of the FDOC; Wexford Health Services; Lanwood Regional Medical
Center; Rawlerson Hospital, and 17 individual medical professionals from the various facilities.
We find Rhiner’s complaint was sufficient to state a claim against only the medical staff at
Okeechobee and South, including: Dr. Lim, DMD, the head dentist at Okeechobee; Dr. Laria,
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treatment of his wounds after a brutal attack and major surgery. See Brown v.
Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1536–39 (11th Cir. 1990) (reversing grant of summary
judgment to defendant jail officials when plaintiff endured a six-hour delay in the
treatment of a broken foot). We previously allowed inmates’ Eighth Amendment
claims to proceed in situations where a delay in treatment caused the inmate
unnecessary pain, even when the injury was not life threatening or the delay lacked
long-term consequences. See Harris v. Coweta Cty., 21 F.3d 388, 393–94 (11th
Cir. 1994) (evidence of a seven-week delay in treating a hand condition created a
genuine issue of material fact about deliberate indifference); Aldridge v.
Montgomery, 753 F.2d 970, 972–73 (11th Cir. 1985) (a directed verdict in favor of
jail officials was improper for a two-hour delay in treating a 1.5 inch cut above
plaintiff’s eye).
Secondly, Rhiner alleged facts to show the medical staffs’ awareness of this
serious medical need at both Okeechobee and South. He sustained his injuries
while confined at Okeechobee. Immediately following his surgery, Rhiner
returned to Okeechobee, where the staff examined him and cleaned his wounds on
September 10. The medical records show that his wounds were not medically
treated again for almost two weeks, and only after Rhiner filed a grievance. Rhiner

DDS, the head dentist at South; Dr. Koyama, DMD, the oral surgeon; and Dr. Joffree, a dentist at
Okeechobee.
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was likewise examined upon arrival at South on September 25. Medical records
confirm he did not receive any additional treatment during his eight days there.
Although he was “escorted to the Medical Department for suture removal” on the
day he arrived at South, his sutures were still in place on October 1 and became
infected. This supports Rhiner’s allegation that South medical staff ignored
instructions to remove his sutures on September 25, leading to or exacerbating an
infection, and therefore worsening his condition. See Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588
F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (“a serious medical need is determined by
whether a delay in treating the need worsens the condition.”).
These allegations sufficiently show Rhiner’s serious medical need and that
medical staffs at Okeechobee and South were aware of this need and failed to act.
Though Rhiner’s serious medical need was follow-up wound care rather than the
original medical emergency, the unexplained lack of medical treatment he received
from September 11 to September 22 at Okeechobee and from September 25 to
October 1 at South is sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference under §
1983. Hughes, 894 F.2d at 1538 (“an unexplained delay of hours in treating a
serious injury states a prima facie case of deliberate indifference”). Thus, we
remand the district court’s dismissal with respect to medical staff at Okeechobee

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and South3 and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the district court’s
dismissal of claims against all other defendants.
SO ORDERED.

3

See supra note 2.
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