Roosevelt Williams, Jr. v. Monroe County District Attorne, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Roosevelt Williams, Jr.. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

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Date Filed: 07/11/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-10282
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M

ROOSEVELT WILLIAMS, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MONROE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY,
LISA LYNAM MCDONALD, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
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(July 11, 2017)
Before JULIE CARNES, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Roosevelt Williams, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his amended complaint for failure to state a claim for relief and lack of
jurisdiction. Williams brought several claims under federal and state laws against
Monroe County (“County”), the Monroe County Courthouse (“Courthouse”), the
Monroe County Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s Department”), the Monroe
County District Attorney (“District Attorney”), and three individuals, Lisa
McDonald, Jimmy McKinley, and James McKinley. Williams argues that he is
entitled to a jury trial on his claims, which are based on his physical confrontation
with the individuals at the Courthouse and his subsequent criminal assault charge.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a claim for relief. Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2015).
In doing so, we accept all of the complaint’s factual allegations as true and
consider them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. The exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction is left to the discretion of the district court and is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. PTA-FLA, Inc. v. ZTE USA, Inc., 844 F.3d
1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2016).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The plaintiff must
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility
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when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must provide more than
labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of
action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”). A pro se pleading is
liberally construed and is held to a less stringent standard than an attorney-drafted
pleading, but the “pleading must suggest (even if inartfully) that there is at least
some factual support for a claim.” Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105,
1107 (11th Cir. 2015).
The law of the state in which the district court is located generally
determines a party’s capacity to sue or be sued. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3). A county
courthouse in Alabama is a building that is under the control of the county’s
commission. See Ala. Code § 11-14-2 (stating that the “county commission shall
have control of all property belonging to the county”); id. § 11-14-9 (stating that
the “county commission has charge of the courthouse”). “Under Alabama law, a
county sheriff’s department lacks the capacity to be sued.” Dean v. Barber, 951
F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing White v. Birchfield, 582 So. 2d 1085,
1087 (Ala. 1991)).

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The Eleventh Amendment provides sovereign immunity that prevents a
state, a state agency, or a state employee acting in an official capacity from being
sued in federal court without consent. Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1233
(11th Cir. 2016). An Alabama district attorney is a state employee. Hooks v. Hitt,
539 So. 2d 157, 159 (Ala. 1988). A prosecutor has absolute immunity from being
sued for actions undertaken while functioning as an advocate for the government.
Rowe v. Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that
absolute immunity applies to a prosecutor’s initiation of a criminal prosecution).
The district court did not err by dismissing Williams’s claims against both
the Courthouse, which is a building, and the Sheriff’s Department, which lacks the
capacity to be sued. See Ala. Code § 11-14-9; Dean, 951 F.2d at 1215. The
district court did not err by dismissing Williams’s claims against the District
Attorney because Eleventh Amendment immunity bars claims against the Monroe
County District Attorney’s Office and its District Attorneys acting in their official
capacities. See Melton, 841 F.3d at 1233. In addition, absolute immunity bars
claims against the District Attorney for charging Williams with assault. See Rowe,
279 F.3d at 1279.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a private right of action to remedy a violation
of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution and
federal laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff
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must demonstrate that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a
federal right.” Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 480 (11th Cir. 2016). “A person
acts under color of state law when he acts with authority possessed by virtue of his
employment with the state” or when the manner of his conduct “makes clear that
he was asserting the authority granted him and not acting in the role of a private
person.” Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotations
omitted).
A county in Alabama is a corporate entity that acts through its governing
body, the county commission. Cook v. Cty. of St. Clair, 384 So. 2d 1, 5 (Ala.
1980). To impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must show that the
municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to his
constitutional rights and caused a violation of those rights. T.W. ex rel. Wilson v.
Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 603 (11th Cir. 2010). A municipality’s
liability under § 1983 “is limited to action for which the municipality is actually
responsible.” Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 977 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation
omitted). “[L]ocal governments can never be liable under § 1983 for the acts of
those whom the local government has no authority to control.” Turquitt v.
Jefferson Cty., 137 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Williams did not allege facts demonstrating a plausible § 1983 claim against
the County because he did not assert that the County had a custom or policy that
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caused a violation of his constitutional rights. See T.W., 610 F.3d at 603. Williams
also did not assert that the County had any authority to control the actions of
McDonald or the McKinleys, and therefore he did not allege facts demonstrating
the County can be held liable under § 1983 for those individuals’ actions. See
Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1292. Finally, Williams did not assert that McDonald or the
McKinleys were at any time acting under color of state law, and thus he did not
allege facts demonstrating a plausible § 1983 claim against those individuals. See
Bailey, 843 F.3d at 480.
“A private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
nonprosecution of another.” Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001)
(alteration and quotation omitted). Williams also raised claims against the County,
McDonald, and the McKinleys for violations of federal criminal laws, but he lacks
a judicially cognizable interest in any of the parties being criminally prosecuted.
See Smith, 237 F.3d at 1324. The district court did not err by dismissing all of
Williams’s federal claims for failure to state a claim for relief.
A federal district court has supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that
form part of the same case or controversy as claims over which the court has
original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A district court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction. Id. § 1367(c)(3).
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Because the district court properly dismissed all of the federal claims, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Williams’s remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of the amended
complaint.
AFFIRMED.

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