USA v. Davier Diaz

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Davier Diaz. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-10349

Date Filed: 04/10/2017

Page: 1 of 2

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-10349
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-20693-UU-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVIER DIAZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 10, 2017)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 16-10349

Date Filed: 04/10/2017

Page: 2 of 2

Davier Diaz appeals his sentence of imprisonment for 80 months following
his guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Diaz contends that the district court erred in calculating his sentencing range when
it relied on the residual clause of section 4B1.2(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines to
conclude that his prior convictions in Florida of burglary of an unoccupied
dwelling qualified as crimes of violence. He argues that the residual clause of
section 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague. We affirm.
The district court committed no error. Diaz’s argument is foreclosed by the
recent decision of the Supreme Court in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886,
890 (2017), and our earlier decision in United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185,
1194‒95 (11th Cir. 2015). In Beckles, the Supreme Court affirmed this Court and
ruled, as we had in Matchett, that the residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2) was not
unconstitutionally vague because the Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to
challenges for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 890, 895. In Matchett, we also determined that a prior
conviction for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling under Florida law, Fla. Stat.
§ 810.02(1)(b), (3)(b), was a “crime of violence” under the residual clause of
section 4B1.2(a)(2). 802 F.3d at 1196‒97. We affirm Diaz’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.

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