Jamarole Aldridge v. Scott Crickmar

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Jamarole Aldridge. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-10390

Date Filed: 02/21/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-10390
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-03724-AT
JAMAROLE ALDRIDGE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SCOTT CRICKMAR,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(February 21. 2017)
Before MARTIN, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jamarole Aldridge, a Georgia prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court
granted Aldridge a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the claims that the

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prosecutor engaged in misconduct and his appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate and raise the resulting prosecutorial misconduct claim during
Aldridge’s direct appeal. Aldridge argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by
allowing Mesa Copeland, Aldridge’s codefendant, to testify that she would serve
three years in prison as part of her plea deal when she actually received only five
years of probation and by failing to reveal the actual plea deal. After careful
review, we affirm.
I.
Aldridge and Copeland forced a victim into the victim’s car. They then
made the victim drive them nearby and they forced her out, stealing her car, purse,
and other belongings. Aldridge v. State, 713 S.E.2d 682, 683–84 (Ga. Ct. App.
2011). A jury found Aldridge guilty of robbery by intimidation, aggravated
assault, and kidnapping. Id. at 684. The trial court sentenced him to 40-years
imprisonment. Id.
At Aldridge’s trial, Copeland testified she had agreed to a deal with the State
to serve three years of a five-year sentence in exchange for testifying against
Aldridge. On cross-examination, Copeland revealed she would face as much as a
life sentence for her crimes if she had not taken the deal. About a month after trial
Copeland was sentenced to only five years of probation. Aldridge did not raise a
prosecutorial misconduct claim on direct appeal.
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In his state habeas petition, Aldridge alleged the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct by not revealing Copeland’s deal and by allowing false testimony
about the deal. Also, Aldridge alleged that his appellate counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to raise the prosecutorial misconduct claims on
appeal. At the state postconviction evidentiary hearing, Aldridge testified that he
called his codefendant at her home five months into his sentence and she answered
the call. He said he asked his appellate lawyer to investigate how Copeland could
answer her phone if she was serving a three-year prison sentence. Aldridge’s
appellate lawyer contradicted this, and testified that Aldridge did not bring the
issue of Copeland’s whereabouts to her attention.
The state postconviction court found the prosecutorial misconduct claims
had been procedurally defaulted because they were not raised at trial or on direct
appeal. It also found Aldridge failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel
because he offered only speculation about Copeland’s alleged deal or false
testimony. The Supreme Court of Georgia denied Aldridge’s application for a
Certificate of Probable Cause (“CPC”) without explanation.
Aldridge then filed a federal habeas petition under § 2254 that he later
amended to include the same prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance
claims. The magistrate judge found that Aldridge’s prosecutorial misconduct
claim was procedurally barred. The magistrate also found that the record was not
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sufficient to show a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194
(1963),1 or Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972),2 and thus
not sufficient to show appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue those
claims. On review of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the
district court
note[d] that it [was] troubled by the Giglio issue and in particular, the
facts relating to the purportedly new plea agreement that Copeland
received the benefit of—one for an entirely probated sentence—one
month after the Defendant’s trial. It somewhat stretches credulity to
believe that the Prosecutor did not know the terms of the plea
agreement he had agreed to or would extend to Copeland in the event
she hewed to testimony beneficial to the prosecution’s case.
However, the court was not willing to second guess the jury verdict given the
absence of evidence regarding the plea deal. The district court granted a COA on
these claims.

1

To prove a Brady violation, a petitioner must establish: (1) the evidence at issue is
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) the
evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the petitioner
suffered prejudice as a result. Downs v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 738 F.3d 240, 258 (11th
Cir. 2013).
2

“To establish a Giglio claim, a habeas petitioner must prove: (1) the prosecutor
knowingly used perjured testimony or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false
testimony; and (2) such use was material, i.e., that there is any reasonable likelihood that the
false testimony could have affected the judgment.” Guzman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 663 F.3d
1336, 1348 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted and alteration adopted).
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II.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a habeas petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Maharaj v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 304 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th
Cir. 2002) (per curiam). “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a mixed
question of law and fact subject to de novo review.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144,
1155 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) prohibits federal courts from granting habeas relief on
claims previously adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court
decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court,” or (2) “was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). In addition, federal habeas
review of a claim is typically precluded when the petitioner procedurally defaulted
the claim in state court. Pope v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 680 F.3d 1271, 1284
(11th Cir. 2012). A petitioner may overcome procedural default, however, if he
shows cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged
constitutional violation. Ward, 592 F.3d at 1156.
The state postconviction court found that Aldridge’s prosecutorial
misconduct claim was procedurally defaulted. Aldridge does not contend that he

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has established “cause and prejudice” to overcome this procedural bar. As a result,
federal habeas review of this claim is precluded.
This leaves Aldridge’s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise a prosecutorial misconduct claim on direct appeal. “Claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are governed by the same standards
applied to trial counsel under Strickland.” Brooks v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr.,
719 F.3d 1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). Thus, to succeed on his
ineffective assistance claim, Aldridge must show (1) counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced him. Nejad v. Att’y Gen., 830 F.3d 1280, 1290 (11th Cir.
2016) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984)).
“[A] defendant is prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance if there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40, 130
S. Ct. 447, 453 (2009) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). “The standards created by
Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two apply in
tandem, review is doubly so.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105, 131 S. Ct.
770, 788 (2011) (quotation and citations omitted).
We conclude that Aldridge cannot overcome this highly deferential standard.
At the state postconviction evidentiary hearing, Aldridge provided no evidence of
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Copeland’s eventual sentence other than his testimony that five months after his
conviction Copeland had answered the telephone at her home. Although Aldridge
later submitted evidence with his federal habeas petition that Copeland was
sentenced to only five years of probation, this evidence was not presented in state
court. Because our review under § 2254 “is limited to the record that was before
the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits,” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563
U.S. 170, 181, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011), we may not consider this evidence of
Copeland’s actual sentence.
The state postconviction court found that Aldridge had failed to show
ineffective assistance of counsel because he offered only speculation about
Copeland’s alleged deal or false testimony. The record is silent about what
happened between Copeland’s testimony and her sentencing. Aldridge did not
introduce evidence of Copeland’s plea deal itself or Copeland’s sentencing
hearing. Neither did he introduce evidence in state court about the sentence
Copeland actually received. Thus, the record before the state postconviction court
was insufficient to show that Copeland falsely testified about the deal she received
for testifying against Aldridge. In the absence of more specific evidence
concerning the plea deal and Copeland’s actual sentence, the state court’s
determination that any prosecutorial misconduct was purely speculative—and thus
appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue such a claim on appeal—
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was not unreasonable under § 2254. On this record, we must affirm the district
court’s denial of habeas relief.
AFFIRMED.

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