USA v. Antoine Saint-Surin

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Antoine Fernand Saint Surin. Decision: Affirmed in part, Vacated in part, and Remanded. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-11351

Date Filed: 05/17/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-11351
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:05-cr-60078-KAM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANTOINE FERNAND SAINT SURIN,
a.k.a. Antoine St. Surin,
a.k.a. Commandante,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(May 17, 2017)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Antoine Fernand Saint-Surin appeals from the district court’s order denying
his pro se Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration, in which he
sought reconsideration of both the court’s order denying his motion for a reduction
in sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and its order denying his motion to vacate or
void sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Saint-Surin maintains that the court, in denying
both motions, wrongly relied on an incorrect finding made earlier in his criminal
proceedings that he falsely told the court that his former attorney forged his
signature on a legal services agreement. The district court did not err in denying
Saint-Surin’s Rule 60(b) motion to the extent it attacked the denial of his § 3582
motion. As § 3582 is a criminal statute, Saint-Surin cannot use Rule 60(b), a rule
of civil procedure, to challenge the district court’s decision to deny him a reduction
in sentence. Further, the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue a ruling on the
merits as to Saint-Surin’s 60(b) challenge of the denial of his § 2255 motion to
vacate. Accordingly, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
Federal courts are “obligated to inquire into subject-matter jurisdiction sua
sponte whenever it may be lacking.” Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1179 (11th
Cir. 2004). We review de novo questions concerning jurisdiction. Brooks v.
Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 1268, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002).
Where appropriate, we review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for
reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Jackson v. Crosby, 437 F.3d 1290, 1295
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(11th Cir. 2006). A district court may abuse its discretion by failing to apply the
proper legal standard or by failing to follow proper procedures. United States v.
Jules, 595 F.3d 1239, 1241–42 (11th Cir. 2010).
Rule 60(b) motions may relieve a party from a judgment due to: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence; (3) fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) a void judgment;
(5) a judgment that has been satisfied, released, discharged, reversed, or vacated;
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b).
In United States v. Fair, we concluded that a defendant could not seek
reconsideration of an order denying his § 3582 motion for a reduction in sentence
via a Rule 60(b) motion. 326 F.3d 1317, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003). We reasoned that,
while there were considerable deficiencies in Fair’s arguments on the merits, it was
not necessary to discuss them “because Rule 60(b) is a civil motion that is not
available to an individual challenging his sentence under § 3582(c)(2).” Id.
Noting that while some post-conviction relief, such as habeas corpus proceedings,
are civil in nature, we specified that § 3582 is criminal in nature and therefore
covered by rules applying to criminal cases, not civil cases. Id. We concluded that
a § 3582 motion is merely a continuation of a criminal case, and that Fair could not
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use Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to attack any alleged deficiencies in the district court’s
underlying order denying his § 3582 motion. Id.
Generally, a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) is required for the appeal
of any denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a judgment in a habeas
proceeding. Gonzalez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 366 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir.
2004) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds sub nom., Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S.
524 (2005). However, where a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
a Rule 60(b) motion, it also lacks jurisdiction to grant a COA. See Boone v. Sec'y,
Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2004).
A prisoner may file a Rule 60(b) motion on a “limited basis” to allege a
defect in the integrity of the habeas proceedings with respect to the denial of his §
2255 motion. Williams v. Chatman, 510 F.3d 1290, 1293–94. These include an
error based upon failure to exhaust, a procedural default, or a statute of limitations
bar. Id. But, a prisoner may not file a Rule 60(b) motion to challenge the
substance of the federal court’s resolution of the § 2255 claim on the merits. Id.
In Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), the Supreme Court explained
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to habeas proceedings to the extent
that they are “not inconsistent with applicable federal statutory provisions.” Id. at
529 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11) (internal marks omitted). Additionally,
the Supreme Court held that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
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(“AEDPA”) does not explicitly limit the operation of Rule 60(b). Id. Nonetheless,
the AEDPA does foreclose application of that rule where it would be inconsistent
with the restrictions imposed on successive petitions by the AEDPA. Id. at 529–
30.
The Supreme Court held in Gonzalez that a Rule 60(b) motion is treated as a
successive habeas petition if it: (1) “seeks to add a new ground of relief;” or (2)
“attacks the federal court's previous resolution of a claim on the merits.” Id. at
532. However, where a Rule 60(b) motion “attacks, not the substance of the
federal court's resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity
of the federal habeas proceedings,” the motion is not a successive habeas petition.
Id. A “claim,” as described by the Court in Gonzalez, is “an asserted federal basis
for relief.” Id. at 530. The Court described the term “on the merits” to mean a
determination whether grounds exist entitling a petitioner to relief. Id. at 532 n.2.
When a Rule 60(b) motion qualifies as a second or successive habeas petition as
defined in Gonzalez, it must comply with the requirements for such petitions under
the AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
Here, the district court did not err in denying Saint-Surin’s motion for
reconsideration, to the extent he sought to challenge the court’s denial of his
motion to reduce sentence under § 3582(c)(2). As in Fair, we need not address the
merits of Saint-Surin’s claim because relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is not
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available to an individual challenging his sentencing under § 3582(c)(2). See Fair,
326 F.3d at 1318. Because § 3582 is a criminal statute, Saint-Surin cannot use
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to challenge the district court’s
decision to deny him a reduction in sentence. Thus, the district court correctly
denied his motion for reconsideration in that respect.
Second, the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Saint-Surin’s motion
for reconsideration as to the denial of his § 2255 motion to vacate. Saint-Surin’s
motion for reconsideration, to the extent it challenged the denial of § 2255 motion,
raised a merits-related claim that was, in substance, part of a successive § 2255
motion as defined in Gonzalez. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532. In the motion for
reconsideration, Saint-Surin summarized the argument he made in his § 2255
motion that no evidence existed that he signed the legal services agreement with
his attorney DeFabio, the document was a forgery, and DeFabio worked under a
conflict of interest. The district court should have treated as successive the portion
of Saint-Surin’s Rule 60(b) motion that challenged the court’s previous resolution
of the conflict of interest and forgery claim on the merits. Because Saint-Surin was
attempting to relitigate a claim previously raised and decided in his § 2255 motion
to vacate challenging the validity of his conviction, Saint-Surin was required to
move in our Court for an order authorizing the district court to consider a
successive § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Because the court did not
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have such authorization, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the
motion, and therefore could not issue a COA with respect to his claim. See
Williams, 510 F.3d at 1294-95. Thus, we vacate and remand to the district court
with instructions to dismiss the Rule 60(b) motion, to the extent it challenged the
denial of Saint-Surin’s § 2255 motion to vacate, for lack of jurisdiction. See id.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm, in part, and vacate and remand, in part.
AFFIRMED, in part, and VACATED and REMANDED, in part.

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