USA v. Glen Ray, Jr.

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Glen Edward Ray, Jr.. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

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Date Filed: 03/03/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-11602
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00184-AKK-SGC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GLEN EDWARD RAY, JR.,
a.k.a. Woo,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(March 3, 2017)
Before HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Glen Ray, Jr. appeals his conviction for possession with the intent to
distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) &

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(b)(1)(B). At trial, evidence was introduced that Anniston police officer Duston
Beal, who assisted other officers with Ray’s arrest during a traffic stop another
officer initiated, discovered drugs in Ray’s pocket. Ray sought to present to the
jury the fact that Beal was forced to resign from the police force a few months later
because of a pattern of stopping and questioning citizens without reasonable
suspicion, in violation of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). On appeal, Ray argues
that the district court abused its discretion and violated his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights when it prevented him from presenting any evidence related to
Beal’s resignation. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review questions of constitutional law de novo. United States v. Nash,
438 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006). We review evidentiary rulings for clear
abuse of discretion. United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 783 (11th Cir.
2007). To challenge the district court’s exclusion of evidence, a party must show
the error affected a substantial right, and must inform the court of the substance of
the excluded evidence by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from
the context. Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). We will reverse a district court’s erroneous
evidentiary ruling only if the error was not harmless. United States v. Bradley, 644
F.3d 1213, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011). An evidentiary error is harmless unless there is
a reasonable likelihood that it affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Id.

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The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986); see
United States v. Hurn, 368 F.3d 1359, 1362 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that “the idea
that criminal defendants must be afforded the opportunity to present evidence in
their favor” is implicit in the rights to compulsory process under the Sixth
Amendment and due process under the Fifth Amendment). A defendant’s right to
a fair trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is “violated when the evidence
excluded is material in the sense of a crucial, critical, highly significant factor.”
Hurn, 368 F.3d at 1363-64. In assessing a defendant’s claims under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to call witnesses in his defense, we engage in a two-step
analysis: (1) whether the right was actually violated; and if so, (2) whether this
error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
omitted).

Id. at 1362-63 (quotation

A district court’s exclusion of a defendant’s evidence violates the

Compulsory Process and Due Process guarantees in four circumstances:
First, a defendant must generally be permitted to introduce evidence directly
pertaining to any of the actual elements of the charged offense or an
affirmative defense. Second, a defendant must generally be permitted to
introduce evidence pertaining to collateral matters that, through a reasonable
chain of inferences, could make the existence of one or more of the elements
of the charged offense or an affirmative defense more or less certain. Third,
a defendant generally has the right to introduce evidence that is not itself tied
to any of the elements of a crime or affirmative defense, but that could have
a substantial impact on the credibility of an important government witness.
Finally, a defendant must generally be permitted to introduce evidence that,
while not directly or indirectly relevant to any of the elements of the charged
events, nevertheless tends to place the story presented by the prosecution in
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a significantly different light, such that a reasonable jury might receive it
differently.
Id. at 1363 (emphases added).
“Generally, courts should not prohibit a defendant from presenting a theory
of defense to the jury. Nevertheless, the court recognizes that some relevant
factual basis for the defense should exist under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and
402 before evidence or testimony is offered.” United States v. Thompson, 25 F.3d
1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1994). For evidence to be relevant, “(1) [t]he evidence must
be probative of the proposition it is offered to prove, and (2) the proposition to be
proved must be one that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”
United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553, 1559 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985). Irrelevant
evidence is inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. As for relevant evidence, it may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of “unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time,
or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “It is the
province of the trial judge to weigh any materiality against any prejudice and,
unless the judge’s reading is ‘off the scale,’ his discretion is not abused.” United
States v. Shelley, 405 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 2005).
Here, the district court did not violate Ray’s constitutional rights when it
excluded evidence about Beal conducting improper Terry stops in other cases since

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the evidence does not satisfy any of the four circumstances identified in Hurn. 1 As
for the first one, the evidence involved Beal’s conduct in unrelated incidents, and
thus, did not directly concern whether Ray possessed drugs in this case. As for the
second, the evidence was not relevant through a reasonable chain of inferences. As
Ray conceded, Beal did not conduct his Terry stop, and the proposed evidence did
not involve Beal allegedly or illegally planting drugs (or other evidence) on people.
Further, while the evidence involved an abuse of Beal’s authority and a violation
of citizens’ rights, it did not involve the sort of falsity, criminality, and inculpation
of innocent citizens that Ray would seek to have the jury infer may have happened
here, and of which he has no other evidence.
As for Hurn’s third circumstance, because the government never called Beal
as a witness, Ray could not introduce the evidence to impeach Beal’s credibility.
As for the fourth one, Beal did not conduct Ray’s Terry stop, the evidence had
nothing to do with Ray or his case, and other officers testified to drugs being
located in Ray’s pocket. As a result, the excluded evidence would not have placed
the government’s presentation of its evidence in a different light, so that a
reasonable jury might have received it differently. And in any event, despite the
court’s exclusion of this particular evidence, Ray was still allowed to call Beal as a
witness and question him about the events that occurred during Ray’s arrest. Ray
1

While the parties disagree on whether Ray sufficiently preserved his constitutional
claims, we need not resolve that question because even under de novo review, his claim fails.
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was even granted a continuance before trial to locate and subpoena Beal as a
witness, but ultimately chose not to call him to the stand. On this record, we
cannot say the district court violated Ray’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
Nor can we say that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the
evidence as inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence, because evidence of Beal’s
later resignation from the police force was irrelevant to the issues tried in his case.
Any evidence surrounding Beal’s resignation would have only related to how he
previously conducted improper Terry stops, which Ray conceded Beal did not
perform in his case, and would not show that Ray had drugs planted on him.
Consequently, because this evidence was irrelevant, it was inadmissible, and
properly excluded. See Fed. R. Evid. 402.
Finally, even if evidence of Beal’s resignation was somehow relevant, it
possessed minimal probative value that was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. The
focus of Ray’s trial was determining whether he possessed 28 grams or more of
cocaine, not examining the improper tactics of an assisting police officer in Ray’s
arrest. Indeed, Ray does not even challenge the validity of his Terry stop on
appeal, where the excluded evidence would have a greater probative effect.
Accordingly, the district court did not err nor abuse its discretion in excluding
evidence relating to Officer Beal’s resignation, and we affirm.
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AFFIRMED.

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