USA v. Zachary Chandler

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Zachary Chandler. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

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Date Filed: 06/22/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-12099
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:15-cr-60318-BB-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ZACHARY CHANDLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(June 22, 2017)

Before JULIE CARNES, JILL PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Zachary Chandler appeals his convictions for 8 counts of Hobbs Act
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15), 1
count of discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (Count 10), and 1 count of brandishing a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)
(Count 12). Chandler also appeals his total sentence of 480 months’
imprisonment, imposed after he pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to the
above 10 counts. Chandler raises three issues on appeal, which we address in turn.
After review, we affirm Chandler’s convictions and total sentence.
I. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
Chandler asserts the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea, where he had close assistance of counsel, but received
incorrect advice from his attorney as to the sentence that could be imposed, and felt
pressured by the impending jury panel.
A defendant may withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing if he can show
a “fair and just” reason for the withdrawal. United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291,
1298 (11th Cir. 2006). We determine whether the reason is fair and just by
considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea, specifically
inquiring into whether: (1) the defendant had close assistance of counsel, (2) the

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plea was knowing and voluntary, (3) judicial resources would be conserved, and
(4) the government would be prejudiced if the withdrawal was granted. Id.
There is a strong presumption that the defendant’s statements during the plea
colloquy are true. United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d 796, 800 n.8 (11th
Cir. 1987). Once the court determines the defendant received close assistance of
counsel and entered a knowing and voluntary plea, the third and fourth factors are
not given considerable weight. Id. at 801.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Chandler’s motion
to withdraw his guilty plea, especially where the court conducted lengthy and
thorough Rule 11 inquiries for each of Chandler’s charges before accepting his
guilty plea. See Brehm, 442 F.3d at 1298 (reviewing a district court’s denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion and explaining there is no
abuse of discretion when the district court conducts extensive Rule 11 inquiries
before accepting the guilty plea). The district court, moreover, explicitly found at
the hearing on his motion to withdraw that: (1) Chandler was properly advised by
his counsel and received extended time to consult with his counsel in regards to his
plea; and (2) his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, where the court at the plea
colloquy asked Chandler if he had questions as to the potential minimum and
maximum penalties, the court explained those potential penalties in detail, and

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Chandler indicated that he understood those potential penalties and the
consequences of his plea. See id.
The record also reveals Chandler conceded at his plea colloquy he
understood the court’s authority to impose a sentence above or below the
Guidelines range, he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation, and he was
pleading on his own free will rather than under force or threat. Chandler’s
statements during the extensive colloquy are strongly presumed to be true, and thus
we give little weight to the remaining factors. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d at 800
n.8, 801. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining
Chandler failed to demonstrate a “fair and just” reason for requesting withdrawal
of his guilty plea, and we affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. See Brehm, 442 F.3d at 1298.
II. § 924(c) Counts
Chandler also contends the district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss seven § 924(c) counts of brandishing or discharging a firearm during the
Hobbs Act robberies. He asserts the offense of Hobbs Act robbery does not
qualify as a “crime of violence” under the “force clause” of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(3)(A), and Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) rendered the
“residual clause” of § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague. However, a
defendant’s voluntary, unconditional guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional
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defects in the proceedings against him. United States v. Brown, 752 F.3d 1344,
1347-49 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining the failure of the indictment to state an
offense is a non-jurisdictional defect). Chandler voluntarily and unconditionally
pled guilty to two of the § 924(c) counts and the remaining counts were dismissed
on the Government’s motion, and thus he cannot challenge the validity of the
indictment on appeal. Id.
III. Physical-Restraint Enhancement
Chandler contends the district court erred in imposing a two-level
enhancement against him for physically restraining his victims during the
robberies, pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), because he did not tie, bind, or lock up his
victims. Whether a particular guideline applies to a given set of facts is a legal
question subject to de novo review. Jones v. United States, 32 F.3d 1512, 1518
(11th Cir. 1994).
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for the application of a two-level
enhancement for a robbery where “any person was physically restrained to
facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). The commentary to § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) provides the enhancement
applies when the victim was “physically restrained by being tied, bound, or locked
up.” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1, comment. (backg’d). The phrase “physically restrained” is
also defined in the commentary to § 1B1.1, which provides that the phrase means
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“the forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.”
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1, comment. (n.1); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment. (n.1(K)).
We have made clear the enhancement goes beyond the three listed examples
and applies whenever “the defendant’s conduct ‘ensured the victims’ compliance
and effectively prevented them from leaving’ a location.” United States v. Victor,
719 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jones, 32 F.3d at 1518-19). In
Victor, we held that Victor physically restrained his victim within the meaning
provided by the Guidelines by threatening his victim with what she believed to be
a gun to prevent her from escaping, such that she was forced to comply with
Victor’s directions. Id.
The district court did not err in imposing the physical-restraint enhancement
because our precedent squarely forecloses Chandler’s argument on appeal and
because his undisputed conduct—holding or pointing a gun at the victims and
directing them to get on the ground so that he could complete his robberies and
flee—triggers the enhancement. Id. Thus, we affirm the district court’s imposition
of the physical-restraint enhancement against Chandler.
AFFIRMED.

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