Kirsha Brown v. Orange County Corrections Dept, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Kirsha Brown. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-12283

Date Filed: 10/27/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-12283
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:16-cv-00706-RBD-TBS
KIRSHA BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ORANGE COUNTY CORRECTIONS DEPT.,
FEMALE DETENTION CENTER MENTAL HEALTH DEPT.,
FEMALE DETENTION CENTER MEDICAL DEPT.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(October 27, 2017)
Before MARCUS, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kirsha Brown, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte dismissal
of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against the Orange County Corrections

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Department, and medical and mental health departments of the female detention
center, alleging that her constitutional rights had been deprived based on her
treatment and prison conditions during her incarceration. On appeal, Brown argues
that the district court erred in dismissing her complaint since her constitutional
rights had been violated pursuant to an unofficial municipal custom.

After

thorough review, we affirm.
A district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint filed in forma paurperis
if the court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A district court’s dismissal for
failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo, using the same standards that govern
dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,
1490 (11th Cir. 1997). To properly state a claim, a plaintiff must file a complaint
containing “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations
omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
We liberally construe pro se pleadings, but the “pleading[s] must suggest (even if
inartfully) that there is at least some factual support for a claim; it is not enough
just to invoke a legal theory devoid of any factual basis.” Jones v. Fla. Parole
Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015).
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In making a § 1983 claim against a municipality or other governmental
entity, a plaintiff must allege the deprivation of a federal right caused by a policy
or custom of the entity that constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289-90 (11th Cir.
2004). A custom is a practice “so pervasive, as to be the functional equivalent of a
policy adopted by the final policymaker,” and demonstrating a “custom generally
requires the plaintiff to show a persistent and wide-spread practice.” Goodman v.
Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1335 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted).
Here, the district court did not err by dismissing Brown’s complaint because
Brown failed to state a claim for relief against the named governmental entities.
Among the arguments in her brief, the only context in which Brown specifically
discussed the concept of a governmental custom or policy concerned her claim that
she had been held for a third involuntary hospitalization as a result of an unofficial
governmental custom. Namely, when discussing the Baker Act,1 Brown said that
she “had been hospitalized in two different Mental Health Hospitals for eight
months and had been deemed . . . competent twice,” including a release “one
week” before February 14, 2017. On that day, Brown claims she was involuntarily
admitted for a “third hospitalization” that was “not ordered” by any court, which
1

The Florida Mental Health Act of 1971, or Baker Act, permits the involuntary
examination for up to 72 hours of an individual where the person (1) is or is likely to be a harm
to others or self or to be self-neglectful, and (2) has refused voluntary examination or is not
competent to consent to examination. See Fla. Stat. § 394.463 (2013). See generally id. §§
394.451-394.47892 (2013).
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had instead “[o]rdered a permanent release to the public.” She asserted that she
had been deprived of her rights that day “pursuant to governmental ‘custom.’” But
Brown did not provide any supporting facts about the nature of that custom.
Because the allegations concerning the governmental custom were insufficient to
raise her claim above the speculative level, she did not state a proper claim against
the Orange County Corrections Department or departments of the female detention
center concerning her hospitalization.
Brown also described in her brief other instances in which her rights were
allegedly violated -- offering more details than she provided in her complaint -claiming, for example, that correctional officers had used a stun gun, a chemical
agent, and restraints on her, that she had received extended disciplinary
confinement, that she had been denied specialized meals for her medically required
diet, and that she had been denied her daily basic needs, her request for medical
screening or treatment, and adequate protection from other inmates. However,
even construing these facts liberally, they do not amount to an allegation of any
persistent or widespread practice that resulted in her injuries. Indeed, she makes
no suggestion that these violations were caused by a policy or custom of Orange
County Corrections Department or departments of the female detention center.
Accordingly, the district court was correct in dismissing Brown’s complaint for

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failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.

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