USA v. Alejandro Aplesa

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Alejandro Estrada Aplesa. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-12399
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:15-cr-00141-TJC-PDB-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA APLESA,
a.k.a. Paco,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(May 23, 2017)
Before HULL, WILSON, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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After a jury trial, Alejandro Aplesa was convicted of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more
of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B),
respectively. For these offenses, Aplesa was sentenced to a total term of 60
months of imprisonment, which was the statutory minimum. On appeal, Aplesa
contends that his convictions should be overturned because the district court
erroneously instructed the jury on both offenses and the government improperly
vouched for the credibility of a key cooperating witness.

He challenges his

sentence on the ground that the court clearly erred in determining that he did not
qualify for a minor-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. After careful review,
we affirm.
I. Jury Instructions
Aplesa argues that the district court erred in instructing the jury in two
respects. Aplesa first contends that the court omitted an essential element of the
drug-conspiracy charge—that the object of the conspiracy was to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine, and not just to possess cocaine—and therefore
constructively amended the indictment by broadening the possible bases for
conviction beyond what was alleged in the indictment. Second, he argues that the
court’s instruction on aiding-and-abetting liability is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014).
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We ordinarily review jury instructions de novo “to determine whether the
instructions misstated the law or misled the jury to the prejudice of the objecting
party.” United States v. Felts, 579 F.3d 1341, 1342 (11th Cir. 2009). We will not
reverse a conviction because of an erroneous instruction unless we are “left with a
substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its
deliberations.”

Id. at 1342–43 (quotation marks omitted).

We evaluate the

instruction as a whole and in the context of the entire trial. United States v.
Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb.
16, 2017) (No. 16-8072).
Challenges to jury instructions that are raised for the first time on appeal,
however, are reviewed for plain error only. United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d
1314, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that plain-error review applies “where the
defendant fails to object to a constructive amendment”); United States v. Schlei,
122 F.3d 944, 973 (11th Cir. 1997). “An error is plain if it is obvious and clear
under current law.” United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 948 (11th Cir. 2006).
Unless the explicit language of a statute or rule specifically resolves an issue, there
can be no plain error without precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court
directly resolving the issue. United States v. Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1325 (11th
Cir. 2015).
When a party “induces” or “invites” the district court to make an error, the
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doctrine of invited error precludes the party from seeking review of that error on
appeal, even if plain error would result. United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311,
1327 (11th Cir. 2005). While the mere failure to object to jury instructions does
not constitute invited error, United States Dortch, 696 F.3d 1104, 1112 (11th Cir.
2012), a party invites error by indicating that proposed jury instructions are
acceptable, Silvestri, 409 F.3d at 1337. See United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221,
1240 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen a party agrees with a court’s proposed
instructions, the doctrine of invited error applies, meaning that review is waived
even if plain error would result.”).
A.

Drug-conspiracy Instruction
This Circuit’s pattern instruction for a drug-conspiracy offense under 21

U.S.C. § 846 lists the elements of that crime as follows:
(1) two or more people in some way agreed to try to accomplish a
shared and unlawful plan to possess or import [substance];
(2) the Defendant, knew the unlawful purpose of the plan and
willfully joined in it; and
(3) the object of the unlawful plan was to [possess with the intent to
distribute] [import] more than [threshold] of [substance].
11th Cir. Pattern Crim. Jury Instructions (Criminal) Instruction O100 (2015)
(alteration in original). Commentary to this instruction states that “if the bracketed
language in this instruction concerning weights is made a part of the overall
instructions, followed by use of the special verdict form below, then the Third
element of the instructions defining the offense should be deleted.” Id.
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At the charge conference, the district court stated that, consistent with
commentary to the pattern § 846 instruction, it would remove a reference to the
third element because the issue of weight was discussed later in the charge and on
the verdict form. 1 Neither party objected to the court’s proposal. When the court
instructed the jury, it omitted the third element—that the “the object of the
unlawful plan” was to possess with intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine. The
court also instructed the jurors that they must “unanimously agree on the weight of
the cocaine the defendant possessed and specify the amount on the verdict form.”
Shortly after the jury retired to begin its deliberations, the district court on its
own initiative raised the issue that Aplesa advances on appeal. The court noted
that the instruction “just says a common unlawful plan to possess cocaine” and not
“to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.”

But the court expressed its

inclination to “stay with the pattern [instruction] . . . unless somebody thinks
differently.” Asked for their input, both the government and Aplesa requested that
the court stay with the pattern instruction.
Now, however, Aplesa contends that the district court plainly erred by
failing to instruct the jury that it was required to find that the object of the
conspiracy was “to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.” We conclude that
1

In contrast to the special verdict form in the commentary, however, the verdict form
used at trial referred only generally to the “amount of the cocaine involved in the offense charged
in Count One.” The special verdict form in the commentary specifically requires the jury to find
the amount that the defendant “distributed,” “possessed with intent to distribute,” or “conspired
to possess with intent to distribute.”
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Aplesa has waived review of the drug-conspiracy instruction because he agreed to
the court’s instruction and thereby invited the alleged error of which he complains.
See Frank, 599 F.3d at 1240; Silverstri, 409 F.3d at 1337.
Aplesa’s argument for why invited error does not apply here is
unconvincing. He admits that his counsel agreed to the “pattern instruction” and
that such agreement may constitute invited error. But, he contends, the district
court did not actually use the pattern instruction when it omitted the third element
of the charge, so by agreeing to the pattern instruction he “certainly did not invite
the district court not to use the pattern instruction.” Aplesa’s argument, however,
wholly ignores the context of his agreement to the “pattern instruction.”
The district court, correctly or not, characterized the instruction that it gave
to the jury as the “pattern instruction.” So when the court asked the parties
whether they wanted to “stay with the pattern [instruction]” or to include additional
language relating to the object of the conspiracy, the court clearly was referring to
the instruction that had just been given. By affirmatively requesting that the court
stay with the “pattern instruction,” Aplesa agreed with the court’s decision not to
supplement the instruction with additional language relating to the object of the
conspiracy. In other words, he agreed to an instruction which omitted the language
he now claims should have been included.

This amounts to invited error.

Accordingly, Aplesa has waived his challenge to the drug-conspiracy instruction.
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B.

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Aiding and Abetting Instruction
Next, Aplesa argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury on

aiding-and-abetting liability. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2, a person who “aids” or “abets”
the commission of a crime is “punishable as a principal.” The court instructed the
jury as follows:
It’s possible to prove the defendant guilty of a crime even without
evidence that the defendant personally performed every act charged.
Ordinarily, any act a person can do may be done by directing
another person, or “agent.” Or it may be done by acting with or under
the direction of others.
A defendant “aids and abets” a person if the defendant
intentionally joins with the person to commit a crime.
A defendant is criminally responsible for the acts of another
person if the defendant aids and abets the other person. A defendant
is also responsible if the defendant willfully directs or authorizes the
acts of an agent, employee, or other associate. But finding that a
defendant is criminally responsible for the acts of another person
requires proof that the defendant intentionally associated with or
participated in the crime, not just proof that the defendant was simply
present at the scene of a crime or knew about it.
In other words, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was a willful participant and not merely a knowing
spectator.
Aplesa argues that this instruction, which is this Circuit’s pattern instruction, is “no
longer accurate” in light of Rosemond for two reasons: (1) it does not require the
jury to find an act in furtherance of the crime; (2) it permits the jury to convict
based on mere association with a criminal venture. We disagree.
In Rosemond, the Supreme Court resolved “the Circuit conflict over what it
takes to aid and abet a § 924(c) offense.” Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1245, 1249.
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The Court began its opinion by reviewing “basics” about aiding-and-abetting
liability under § 2, explaining that, “[a]s a common law, a person is liable under
§ 2 for aiding and abetting a crime if (and only if) he (1) takes an affirmative act in
furtherance of that offense, (2) with the intent of facilitating the offense’s
commission.” Id. at 1245. The Court explained that a defendant intends to aid an
offense’s commission if he “actively participates in [the offense] knowing its
extent and character.” Id. at 1249. Applying these principles to the context of
§ 924(c), the Court stated that “[a]n active participant in a drug transaction has the
intent needed to aid and abet a § 924(c) violation when he knows that one of his
confederates will carry a gun.” Id. And that knowledge, the Court held, must be
“advance knowledge”—“knowledge that enables him to make the relevant legal
(and indeed, moral) choice.” Id. That means “knowledge at a time the accomplice
can do something with it—most notably, opt to walk away.” Id. at 1249–50.
Aplesa’s reliance on Rosemond is misplaced. Rosemond did not purport to
change the law of aiding and abetting generally, only to clarify its application to a
§ 924(c) firearm offense. Since Aplesa’s case does not involve a conviction under
§ 924(c), Rosemond has no direct application here.
Moreover, the parts of Rosemond on which Aplesa relies are wholly
consistent with the well-established law of this Circuit. Aplesa cites Rosemond’s
formulation of the two requirements for aiding-and-abetting liability, but our
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precedent has long made clear “[a]iding and abetting has two components: [a]n act
on the part of a defendant which contributes to the execution of a crime and the
intent to aid its commission.” United States v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 1429, 1434 (11th
Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original); see
also United States v. Pareja, 876 F.2d 1567, 1568 & n.10 (11th Cir. 1989)
(collecting cases and noting that the test is sometimes stated with three elements).
Aplesa also cites Rosemond’s statement of the “canonical formulation” of
the intent requirement, which is derived from an opinion by Judge Learned Hand
in 1938. See Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1348 (“To aid and abet a crime, a defendant
must not just in some sort associate himself with the venture, but also participate in
it as in something that he wishes to bring about and seek by his action to make it
succeed.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But we have never held that it is
enough for the government to prove that the defendant “in some sort associate[d]
himself with the venture.” Rather, the government must prove that the defendant
had the “criminal intent that the undertaking be successfully completed.” United
States v. Smith, 546 F.2d 1275, 1285 (5th Cir. 1977). 2 That requires proof that the
defendant “shared in the criminal intent of the principal” and “participat[ed] in the
criminal act in furtherance of the common design.”

Id. at 1284 (citing and

expanding upon Judge Learned Hand’s formulation).
2

This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1,
1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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Given our long-standing precedent, it cannot be that the pattern instruction is
“no longer accurate” in light of Rosemond in the ways advanced by Aplesa. If the
pattern instruction is erroneous after Rosemond, it was erroneous before it. But
Aplesa relies solely upon Rosemond. And we have approved substantially similar
instructions as those given by the district court in this case. See United States v.
Broadwell, 870 F.2d 594, 607 n.32 (11th Cir. 1989). In the absence of any
controlling authority, Aplesa cannot establish a “plain” error in the instruction. See
Hesser, 800 F.3d at 1325.
We also cannot conclude that the instruction, taken as a whole, prejudiced
Aplesa’s substantial rights, even if isolated clauses are “technically imperfect[] or
otherwise subject to criticism.” Seabrooks, 839 F.3d at 1333 (quotation marks
omitted).

The instruction adequately conveyed the requirements for criminal

liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2. It stated that Aplesa was guilty of aiding and
abetting if he “intentionally join[ed]” with another person “to commit a crime,”
and that the jury was required to find that he was a “willful participant” (that he
“intentionally associated with or participated in the crime”) and “not merely a
knowing spectator” (that he was “simply present at the scene of a crime or knew
about it”).
In the context of the trial, the instruction conveyed that Aplesa could not be
found guilty of aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute cocaine
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simply because he was driving a car in which cocaine was found, even if he knew
about the cocaine. Rather, Aplesa must have been a “willful participant” in the
cocaine delivery, which implies that he knew about the delivery and acted with the
intent to aid its commission. Viewing the instruction in light of the trial as a
whole, we are not “left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the
jury was properly guided in its deliberations.” Felts, 579 F.3d at 1342–43.
For these reasons, the district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury
on aiding-and-abetting liability.
II. Credibility Vouching
Aplesa next argues that the government impermissibly vouched for the
credibility of Emma Abarca-Valdovinos, a cooperating witness.

Abarca-

Valdovinos was a passenger in the car Aplesa was driving when it was pulled over
by law enforcement based on a tip that the car was involved in a cocaine delivery.
Officers conducted a traffic stop and, during the stop, a K-9 alerted to the presence
of narcotics. A search of the vehicle revealed three kilograms of cocaine in a blue
tote bag under the driver’s seat.
Abarca-Valdovinos entered into a plea agreement with the government and
testified against Aplesa at trial.

In her trial testimony, Abarca-Valdovinos

explained that the organizer of the cocaine deal, Alejandro (“Alex”) Abarca, was
her nephew. Alex, in Aplesa’s presence, had asked her to accompany Aplesa to
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deliver three kilograms of cocaine. Abarca-Valdovinos stated that Aplesa gave her
the blue tote bag later found in the car.
On direct examination, Abarca-Valdovinos admitted that she initially lied to
law enforcement, primarily about her nephew Alex’s involvement in the cocaine
delivery. Defense counsel thoroughly questioned her about the false statements on
cross-examination. She said that she lied about her nephew Alex’s involvement, in
violation of her plea agreement, because she wanted to protect him.
Later, the government called as a witness Officer Michael Kelly, a Drug
Enforcement Agency task force officer who had interviewed Abarca-Valdovinos
several times after her arrest. Kelly testified that, based on his experience as a lawenforcement officer, cooperating witnesses often initially lie when speaking to law
enforcement for reasons of self-preservation, protection of others, and lack of trust.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor in rebuttal referenced Kelly’s testimony
when discussing the factors the jury should consider in assessing AbarcaValvodinos’s credibility.
Aplesa contends that Kelly’s testimony and the prosecutor’s argument
amount to impermissible bolstering of “the credibility of the only witness who
testified that [Aplesa] knew about the drugs.” He asserts that the testimony and
argument invaded the province of the jury and violated his right to a fair trial.
Because Aplesa did not lodge a contemporaneous objection on these
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grounds either when Kelly’s testimony was elicited or during closing arguments,
we review for plain error only. See United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275
(11th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is well-settled that where, as here, a defendant fails to
preserve an evidentiary ruling by contemporaneously objecting, our review is only
for plain error.”); United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1206 & n.14 (11th Cir.
1991) (“Where the defendant does not object to comments made by the
prosecution at trial, the standard of review is plain error.”).
The Federal Rules of Evidence preclude a witness from testifying as to the
credibility of another witness. United States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247, 1268–69
(11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir.
2005). Witness credibility is the sole province of the jury. Id. Therefore, a
witness is not permitted to invade the jury’s province by testifying “that another
witness was truthful or not on a specific occasion.” Schmitz, 634 F.3d at 1268.
Also, we have indicated that it “might be improper” for the government “to use [a]
line of questioning as an indirect way of bolstering [a witness’s] credibility or
attacking that of [the defendant].” See Henderson, 409 F.3d at 1299.
Aplesa relies on our decision in Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732 (11th
Cir. 1998) (28 U.S.C. § 2254 case). In that case, we held that an expert witness’s
testimony bolstering the credibility of the victim was improper and denied the
petitioner due process in a child sexual-abuse case. Id. at 737–38. There, the
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expert had testified that 99.5% of children tell the truth and that he, in his own
experience with children, had not encountered an instance where a child had
invented a lie about abuse.

Id. at 737.

We determined that the credibility-

bolstering testimony constituted a denial of fundamental fairness because the case
was based almost entirely upon the testimony of the victim and two other children,
without any significant physical evidence, and the prosecutor relied heavily upon
the credibility testimony in closing argument. Id.
Here, Kelly’s testimony arguably amounted to improper bolstering of
Abarca-Valdovinos’s credibility. Kelly testified that cooperating witnesses often
initially lie to law enforcement for various reasons, including to protect others.
Although Kelly did not directly comment on Abarca-Valdovinos’s credibility, the
clear import of his testimony was that she was telling the truth at trial. See
Henderson, 409 F.3d at 1299. Indeed, the government on appeal does not identify
an alternative purpose for Kelly’s testimony. Accordingly, we assume that Kelly’s
testimony, like the expert’s testimony in Snowden, invaded the province of the jury
on the issue of Abarca-Valdovinos’s credibility and was improperly admitted.
Nevertheless, Aplesa has not shown that the error, even if plain, affected his
substantial rights. See Turner, 474 F.3d at 1276 (stating that defendants bear the
burden of establishing the third prong of plain-error review). For an error to affect
a substantial right of a party, it must “have a ‘substantial influence’ on the outcome
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of a case or leave ‘grave doubt’ as to whether [it] affected the outcome of a case.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1268 n.20 (11th Cir. 2004)
(en banc)).
Here, we do not have any serious doubt that Kelly’s testimony or the
prosecutor’s comment referencing that testimony did not affect the outcome of the
case. Kelly’s testimony about the credibility of cooperating witnesses was touched
on only briefly at the trial. Cf. Snowden, 135 F.3d at 738. Far from “stressing the
significance” of the challenged testimony, as the prosecutor did in Snowden, the
prosecutor in this case referenced it just once in rebuttal when discussing the
various factors the jury should consider when evaluating Abarca-Valdovinos’s
credibility.

See id.

And Kelly did not directly offer a judgment about her

credibility or the credibility of cooperating witnesses generally, so there was little
danger that the jury would “substitute [Kelly’s] judgment about [AbarcaValdovinos’s] credibility for [its own] through the contested testimony.”

See

Henderson, 409 F.3d at 1299. In short, we do not believe Kelly’s testimony and
the prosecutor’s brief reference to it swayed jurors’ assessment of AbarcaValdovinos’s credibility.
Aplesa argues that the error was prejudicial because Abarca-Valdovinos was
“the only witness who testified that Mr. Aplesa knew about the drugs before
getting into the car.” But the government’s case did not rise or fall on Abarca15

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Valdovinos’s credibility.

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Significantly, the government introduced a recorded

conversation, with an accompanying transcript, between Aplesa and AbarcaValdovinos in the back of a patrol car while the police were conducting the search
that revealed the cocaine. The transcript reflects that Aplesa knew the exact
amount of cocaine, that trafficking in cocaine carries high penalties, and that Alex
previously had served time for trafficking cocaine. Further, Aplesa told AbarcaValdovinos during that conversation exactly where he placed the cocaine in the
car, they speculated on what went wrong, and then they attempted to concoct an
innocent story about why they were driving in a car with three kilograms of
cocaine. Besides providing strong evidence of guilt, the recording and transcript
also undermined the plausibility of Aplesa’s testimony that he learned of the
cocaine only after he began driving, supposedly to take Abarca-Valdovinos to get
money from a friend.
Additionally, by testifying in his defense, Aplesa ran “a substantial risk of
bolstering the Government’s case.” United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314
(11th Cir. 1995). “[W]hen a defendant chooses to testify, he runs the risk that if
disbelieved the jury might conclude the opposite of his testimony is true.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).

And “a statement by a defendant, if

disbelieved by the jury, may be considered as substantive evidence of the
defendant's guilt.” Id. (emphasis in original).
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Here, in light of the recording of Aplesa’s conversation with AbarcaValdovinos about the cocaine, as well as Aplesa’s testimony, which the jury was
free to use as substantive evidence against him, any error in admitting Kelly’s
testimony did not prejudice him. See Turner, 474 F.3d at 1276.
III.
Finally, Aplesa argues that the district court erred by refusing to grant a
minor-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Section 3B1.2 permits a two-level
decrease to the defendant’s offense level when he had a minor role in the offense.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. The district court’s determination of a defendant’s mitigating
role for guideline-calculation purposes is a fact finding reviewed for clear error,
which the defendant bears the burden of proving. United States v. DeVaron, 175
F.3d 930, 937 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
We need not address an alleged error in guideline calculations when the
defendant correctly receives a statutory minimum sentence, because even if error
occurred, it is harmless. See United States v. Raad, 406 F.3d 1322, 1322 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Westry, 524 F.3d 1198, 1222 (11th Cir. 2008).
Here, because Aplesa received the mandatory minimum sentence, any error
in calculating his guideline range is harmless. See Raad, 406 F.3d at 1322 n.1.
Therefore, we do not address the merits of Aplesa’s arguments concerning the
denial of his request for a minor-role reduction.
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AFFIRMED.

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