Allstate Property and Casualty v. Sinatra Miller, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellants Arlene Miller and Sinatra Miller. Decision: Vacated and Remanded. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-13063

Date Filed: 06/21/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-13063
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cv-00157-TCB
ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff - Counter
Defendant - Appellee,
versus
KIM ROBERTS,
Defendant,
BOBBY J. ROBERTS,
Defendant - Counter
Claimant,
SINATRA MILLER,
ARLENE MILLER,
Defendants - Appellants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(June 21, 2017)

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Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On January 12, 2013, Bobby Roberts (“Bobby”), who was married at the
time to Kim Roberts (“Roberts”), shot Sinatra Miller (“Sinatra”), an invited guest
of Roberts’s, multiple times in the front yard of Roberts’s home. Sinatra, who
survived, and Arlene Miller (collectively, the “Millers”) then sued Roberts and
Bobby in Georgia state court.
At the time of the shooting, Roberts was insured under a policy of
homeowners’ insurance issued by Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance
Company (“Allstate”). The policy provided coverage for an “occurrence,” which it
defined as “an accident” causing bodily injury. Allstate filed this declaratoryjudgment action seeking a declaration that it owed no duty to defend its insured,
Roberts, in the underlying lawsuit because the shooting was intentional and
therefore not an “accident.” The district court agreed with Allstate and entered
judgment in its favor. The Millers appeal that determination.
The question we must resolve is whether Bobby’s undisputedly intentional
act nevertheless qualifies as an “accident” under Roberts’s homeowners’ insurance
policy. That question, in turn, depends on whether an “accident” is determined
from the perspective of the actor or from the perspective of the insured. Because
under Georgia insurance law the question of whether an event is an “accident”
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“must be asked from the viewpoint of the insured,” Rucker v. Columbia Nat’l Ins.
Co., 705 S.E.2d 270, 273–74 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010), we vacate the judgment and
remand for further proceedings.
I.
The essential facts are undisputed. Roberts owned a single family home in
Villa Rica, Georgia. On the evening of January 12, 2013, Sinatra was at Roberts’s
home as an invited guest when Bobby, then Roberts’s husband (now ex-husband),
entered the home and confronted Sinatra and Roberts. As Bobby walked into a
bedroom, Sinatra exited the home through the front door. Bobby followed Sinatra
into the front yard and shot him multiple times with a handgun.
The Millers filed suit against Roberts and Bobby, raising claims of
aggravated assault, premises liability, and loss of consortium. At the time of the
incident, Roberts was insured under a homeowners’ insurance policy issued by
Allstate (the “Policy”). The Policy provided coverage for an “occurrence,” which
it defined as “an accident.” Reserving its rights under the Policy, Allstate retained
counsel to defend Roberts in the underlying suit.
Allstate then filed this action for declaratory judgment, advancing two
claims.

First, Allstate alleged that Bobby’s shooting was not a covered

“occurrence” because it was intentional, not an “accident.”

Second, Allstate

asserted that Bobby was an unnamed “insured person” under the Policy, which
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excluded coverage for damages caused by the intentional or criminal acts of any
insured person. The district court agreed with Allstate on the first claim and did
not reach the second. The Millers now appeal.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Liebman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 808 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2015).
Summary judgment is appropriate “where there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a).
This diversity-of-citizenship case is governed by Georgia state law.
Insurance is a matter of contract under Georgia law, and “the parties to an
insurance policy are bound by its plain and unambiguous terms.” QBE Ins. Co. v.
Couch Pipeline & Grading, Inc., 692 S.E.2d 795, 796–97 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)
(quoting another source). Ambiguous provisions—those susceptible of two or
more reasonable constructions—“will be construed against the insurer,” but “if the
language is unambiguous and but one reasonable construction is possible, the court
will enforce the contract as written.” Id.
Roberts’s Policy affords coverage for damages arising from an
“occurrence.” Specifically, the Policy provides, in relevant part, that Allstate must
“pay compensatory damages which an insured person becomes legally obligated to
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pay because of bodily injury . . . arising from an occurrence to which this policy
applies.” Allstate also agreed to pay reasonable medical expenses incurred within
three years from “an occurrence causing bodily injury.” The Policy excludes
coverage of damages caused by “intentional or criminal acts or omissions of any
insured person.”
An “occurrence” is defined by the Policy as “an accident . . . resulting in
bodily injury or property damage.” The term “accident” is undefined. But, under
Georgia insurance law, the term “accident” means “an event which takes place
without one’s foresight or expectation or design.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Grayes, 454
S.E.2d 616, 618 (1995) (citing O.C.G.A. § 1-3-3(2)).
The parties agree on the general definition of an “accident,” but they dispute
whose “foresight or expectation or design” matters. The Millers contend that the
question of whether an event is an “accident” must be viewed from the perspective
of the insured.1 They assert that because the shooting was not foreseeable to
Roberts, the insured, it was an “accident” for purpose of the Policy. Allstate
maintains that the policy language does not limit “accident” to the perspective of
the insured and that, because Bobby’s shooting was intentional, it cannot be
considered an “accident.”

1

Although Allstate contended that Bobby qualified as an “insured” under the Policy, the
district court did not reach that question. We therefore assume for purposes of this opinion that
Bobby is not an insured under the Policy.
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Neither party identifies controlling authority on this specific question, but
we find that the Millers’ position is the correct one under Georgia insurance law.
In Rucker, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that, under a policy of insurance,
“[t]he question of whether an event took place without one’s foresight, expectation
or design must be asked from the viewpoint of the insured.” Rucker, 705 S.E.2d
at 273–74 (emphasis added). The Rucker court derived that statement of law from
two cases in which the Georgia Court of Appeals held that an intentional act was
an “accident” for purposes of an insurance policy because it was not foreseeable to
the insured. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Magnolia Estates, Inc., 648 S.E.2d 498 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2007); Crook v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 428 S.E.2d 802 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1993).
In Crook, the insured was sued by the parents of a child who died on the
insured’s property. 428 S.E.2d at 802–03. The insured had a homeowners’ policy
which, like the Policy at issue here, defined “occurrence” as “an accident,” but did
not otherwise define the term “accident.” Id. at 803. The insurer took the position
that the son’s death was not an “accident” because the son voluntarily committed
the acts which resulted in his own death. Id. Rejecting the insurer’s position, the
Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that the question of whether an event
constitutes an “accident” must be asked from the viewpoint of the insured:
“[I]nsofar as Crook, in his capacity as an insured, is concerned, the death of the
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[son] was clearly an ‘accident,’ because it was an unintentional event which took
place without his ‘foresight or expectation or design.’” Id. Accordingly, the court
found that the insurer was required to defend the underlying action. Id.
Then, in Cincinnati, the Georgia Court of Appeals applied and reaffirmed
the holding of Crook. In the Cincinatti case, the insured, Magnolia Estates, Inc., a
personal care home, was sued by an 80-year-old resident of the home after she was
attacked by another resident. 648 S.E.2d at 499–50. Magnolia Estates’s insurance
policy, like the Policy at issue here, defined “occurrence” as “an accident,” but did
not otherwise define the term “accident.” Id. at 500. Again, the insurer took the
position that the attack was not an “accident” because it was intentional. Id.
Relying on Crook, the Georgia Court of Appeals found that the relevant
question was whether the event at issue “occurred without the insured’s foresight
or expectation or design.”

Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Because “the attack against [the plaintiff] by a fellow patient occurred
without Magnolia Estates’s foresight, expectation, or design,” the court reasoned,
the attack was “properly characterized as accidental for purposes of coverage.” Id.
Moreover, the court explained, that interpretation was consistent with the policy’s
other provisions, specifically the exclusion for intentional or criminal acts “of the
insured.” Id. “If, as Cincinnati contends, no intentional act can ever constitute an
accident for purposes of coverage, then this exclusion is rendered meaningless.”
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Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that the underlying claim fell within the
policy’s coverage.
Cincinnati and Crook thus stand for the proposition that, at least in the
circumstances presented in this case, “[t]he question of whether an event took
place without one’s foresight, expectation or design must be asked from the
viewpoint of the insured.” Rucker, 705 S.E.2d at 273–74. These cases also
contradict Allstate’s contention that the specific language of the Policy at issue
distinguishes this case from others where Georgia courts have found that the
question of whether an event constitutes an “accident” is determined based on the
viewpoint of the insured.

Cf. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v.

Meriwether, 312 S.E.2d 823, 824 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (policy expressly defined
“occurrence” as “an accident . . . from the standpoint of the insured”). Both
Cincinnati and Crook involved policies that, like the Policy here, defined an
“occurrence” simply as an “accident.” See Cincinnati, 648 S.E.2d at 500; Crook,
428 S.E.2d at 803. So the lack of specific “language restricting the definition of an
‘occurrence’ to the standpoint of the insured,” Allstate’s Br. at 13, provides no
reason to reach a different result from Cincinnati and Crook in this case.
The other Georgia state cases on which Allstate relies likewise do not
require a different result. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Neal, 696 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2010); Grayes, 454 S.E.2d at 618. Neal and Grayes are consistent with our
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holding here because the events at issue in those cases were the intentional acts of
the insured, so the events took place with the insured’s foresight or expectation or
design. See Neal, 696 S.E.2d at 105 (insured’s intentional shooting of police
officer); Grayes, 454 S.E.2d at 618 (insured’s intentional shooting of neighbor).
Allstate’s reliance on Neal is particularly misplaced because Neal in fact supports
the Millers’ position. See Neal, 696 S.E.2d at 106 (“[C]ases concerning whether
an event is an accident under a homeowner’s liability policy have turned on
whether the event was unforeseen by the insured.”) (emphasis added).
In sum, the district court erred because it did not ask “[t]he question of
whether an event took place without one’s foresight, expectation or design . . .
from the viewpoint of the insured.” Rucker, 705 S.E.2d at 273–74. We vacate the
judgment in favor of Allstate and remand for application of the correct legal
standard. We take no position on any issue that the district court did not reach,
including whether the intentional-criminal-acts exclusion applied because Bobby,
as Allstate alleged, was an “insured person” under the Policy.
VACATED AND REMANDED.

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