Luis Luciano, Jr. v. Secretary, Department of Corre, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Luis Alfredo Luciano, Jr.. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-13447

Date Filed: 07/06/2017

Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-13447
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:15-cv-00232-RBD-GJK

LUIS ALFREDO LUCIANO, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(July 6, 2017)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 16-13447

Date Filed: 07/06/2017

Page: 2 of 5

Luis Luciano, Jr., a Florida prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s denial
of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He
argues that the Supreme Court’s procedural-default exception in Martinez v. Ryan,
132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), should be extended to claims of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel; otherwise no court will ever consider his underlying ineffective
assistance claim. We issued a certificate of appealability on the following issue:
Whether the district court erred in determining that the
procedural default of Mr. Luciano’s claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel was not excused under
Martinez v. Ryan, [132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).]
We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions in § 2254
proceedings, and its findings of fact for clear error. Osborne v. Terry, 466 F.3d
1298, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 2006).
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), a federal court may not grant habeas relief until the petitioner
exhausts state court relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Pursuant to the procedural
default doctrine, if a state prisoner defaults his federal claims in state court
pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas
review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the
default and actual prejudice. Lambrix v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 756 F.3d
1246, 1260 (11th Cir. 2014). Additionally, a claim is procedurally defaulted if the
petitioner failed to exhaust his state remedies, and the court to which he would
2

Case: 16-13447

Date Filed: 07/06/2017

Page: 3 of 5

have to present his claims in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement would find
the claims procedurally barred. Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 736 (11th
Cir. 1998). As a general matter, the lack of an attorney or attorney error in state
post-conviction proceedings does not establish cause to excuse a procedural
default. Lambrix, 756 F.3d at 1260 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
757 (1991)).
In Martinez, the Supreme Court announced an equitable and nonconstitutional exception to Coleman’s holding—that ineffective assistance of
collateral counsel cannot serve as cause to excuse a procedural default—in these
limited circumstances: (1) a state requires a prisoner to raise ineffective-trialcounsel claims at an initial-review collateral proceeding; (2) the prisoner failed to
properly raise ineffective-trial-counsel claims in his state initial-review collateral
proceeding; (3) the prisoner did not have collateral counsel or his counsel was
ineffective; and (4) failing to excuse the prisoner’s procedural default would cause
the prisoner to lose a substantial ineffective-trial-counsel claim. Martinez, 132
S. Ct. at 1318. The Supreme Court noted that the rule in Coleman governed in all
but these limited circumstances. Id. at 1320. The decision did not concern
attorney errors in other kinds of proceedings, including appeals from initial-review
collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, and petitions
for discretionary review in a state’s appellate courts. Id. The Supreme Court noted
3

Case: 16-13447

Date Filed: 07/06/2017

Page: 4 of 5

that its limited qualification in Martinez reflected the right to the effective
assistance of trial counsel and the prisoner’s inability to raise his ineffective-trialcounsel claims on direct appeal. Id. Subsequently, the Supreme Court extended
Martinez’s “narrow exception” to cases where state law technically permits
ineffective-trial-counsel claims to be presented on direct appeal but state
procedures make it virtually impossible to actually raise the claim on appeal.
Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918-21 (2013).
We have “repeatedly underscored [Martinez’s] narrow scope.” Chavez v.
Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 940, 945 (11th Cir. 2014). In Arthur v.
Thomas, we held that Martinez explicitly relates to excusing a procedural default
of ineffective-trial-counsel claims, and does not apply to AEDPA’s limitations
period or any potential tolling of that period. 739 F.3d 611, 631 (11th Cir. 2014).
We stated that any broadening of Martinez would ignore the Supreme Court’s
emphatic statements that Martinez creates only a narrow exception to Coleman’s
general rule. Id. We also stated that the narrow exception in Martinez is designed
to be difficult to meet in order to ensure that state court judgments are accorded the
finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within
our system of federalism. Id.
Similarly, in Chavez, we emphasized that the equitable rule established in
Martinez applies only to excusing the procedural default of ineffective-trial4

Case: 16-13447

Date Filed: 07/06/2017

Page: 5 of 5

counsel claims. 742 F.3d at 945. Accordingly, we held that Chavez could not
present a freestanding Martinez claim for ineffective assistance of his state
collateral counsel. Id. In Gore v. Crews, we did not extend Martinez to include a
claim that state collateral counsel was ineffective for failing to exhaust in state
court that the prisoner was mentally incompetent to be executed, because it was not
a claim that trial counsel was ineffective, and because the claim was not
procedurally barred. 720 F.3d 811, 814-17 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming the district
court’s dismissal without prejudice of Gore’s § 2254 petition and denying a stay of
execution).
We find no error in the district court’s determination that Martinez does not
apply to Luciano’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We have
repeatedly underscored Martinez’s narrow scope, and emphasized that Martinez
applies only to excusing a procedural default of ineffective-trial-counsel claims.
Chavez, 742 F.3d at 945. Any broadening of Martinez to excusing a default of
ineffective-appellate-counsel claims would ignore the Supreme Court’s emphatic
statements that Martinez creates only a narrow exception to Coleman’s general
rule.
AFFIRMED.

5