Ronald Nurse v. Teleperformance Inc., et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Ronald A. Nurse. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-15062

Date Filed: 04/20/2017

Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-15062
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-00094-JRH-BKE

RONALD A. NURSE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
TELEPERFORMANCE INC.,
VERONICA WEST,
TRACEE JOHNSON,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(April 20, 2017)
Before MARTIN, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 16-15062

Ronald

Nurse,

Date Filed: 04/20/2017

proceeding

pro

se,

sued

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his

former

employer,

Teleperformance, Inc., and two former coworkers, Veronica West and Tracee
Johnson. The district court liberally construed his amended complaint as asserting
claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), and dismissed it for failing to state a
prima facie case of sex-based disparate treatment, sexual harassment, or age
discrimination.
Mr. Nurse now appeals that dismissal. His initial brief has several critical
shortcomings. First, it raises new legal claims, ranging from common-law torts to
violations of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.

Mr. Nurse’s pro se status does not entitle him to unbounded

procedural latitude, see McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993), and so,
we refuse to consider claims not raised in the amended complaint, which is the
operative pleading in this case. See Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271,
1274 (11th Cir. 2016). Our review, therefore, is limited to Mr. Nurse’s sex and age
discrimination claims under Title VII and the ADEA.
As to those claims, the brief runs into a second problem—it relies on
allegations not found in the amended complaint. Although Mr. Nurse’s initial brief
provides details depicting Ms. West and Ms. Johnson as misandrist Bond-esque

2

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Date Filed: 04/20/2017

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saboteurs, see Br. of Appellant at viii & IX, his amended complaint asserts, almost
exclusively, generalizations, labels, and legal conclusions, see D.E. 5 at 3
(accusing the defendants of misandry and a yearlong campaign of “neglect, abuse,
discriminat[ion], and mistreat[ment]”).

Such conclusory allegations cannot

withstand a motion to dismiss. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007).
The few facts that Mr. Nurse did allege in the amended complaint fail to
state a prima face case of sex or age discrimination. Disparate treatment and
harassment claims under both Title VII and the ADEA require a plaintiff to
demonstrate that he or she suffered discrimination “because of” a protected
classification. See § 2000e-2(a); § 623(a)(1). Causation, in other words, is an
element of the claim. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 576 (2009) (Title
VII); Young v. Gen. Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir. 1988) (ADEA).
The factual allegations, even when viewed favorably, at most establish that
Mr. Nurse was the subject of questionable conduct, but not that he was targeted
because of his sex or age. For instance, he alleged that the defendants, in concert,1
leveled false accusations against him and then used those falsehoods to fire him.
See D.E. 5 at 2–3. This says nothing about the defendants’ motivation. The
closest Mr. Nurse gets to stating a circumstantial case of discrimination is his
1

Or, as Mr. Nurse artfully put it, “forming Voltron.” See Voltron: Defender of the Universe
(World Events Production & Toei Animation 1984).
3

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Date Filed: 04/20/2017

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allegation that, after certain machines at work malfunctioned on every employee,
“only [he was] written up” and not the other employees, some of whom were
females. Id. at 2. But with no context, such circumstantial evidence does not state
a plausible claim of discrimination. See, e.g., Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cty., Fla.,
447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.

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