USA v. Charles Richard

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Charles Andrew Goss Richards. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. Motion to dismiss appeal due to appeal waiver filed by Appellee USA is DENIED. [8019264-2]. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-15303
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00246-WS-B-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHARLES ANDREW GOSS RICHARDS,
a.k.a. Junior,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(December 7, 2017)
Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Charles Andrew Goss Richards appeals his convictions and total sentence of
630 months of imprisonment after pleading guilty to one count of conspiring to
distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and two counts of
discharging a firearm during and in relation to and in furtherance of a crime of
violence or drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). After
careful review, we affirm.
I.
On September 20, 2015, Richards and his girlfriend arrived in a stolen van at
“Kelly’s Clay Pit” near Foley, Alabama, to sell another couple $25’s worth of
methamphetamine ice. After the exchange, Richards accosted one of the buyers
for “talking bad” about him in the county jail. Richards then pulled out a gun and
shot the man in the arm. As the man began to run away, Richards shot at him
again but missed. Turning to the other buyer, Richards told her he was going to
take her car and grabbed the keys from her hand. Richards and his girlfriend then
drove away in the two cars, leaving the two buyers.

Eventually, Richards’s

girlfriend picked him up in the stolen van. They were later apprehended after
leading police on a high-speed chase.
After his arrest, Richards was indicted on five counts: (1) conspiring to
distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) distributing
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (3) discharging a firearm
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during and in relation to and in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime (distributing
methamphetamine), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); (4) carjacking, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119; and (5) discharging a firearm during and in relation
to and in furtherance of a crime of violence (carjacking). Under a written plea
agreement, Richards agreed to plead guilty to the drug-conspiracy offense (Count
1) and the two firearms offenses (Counts 3 and 5). The government agreed to
dismiss the remaining counts.
At the change-of-plea hearing, Richards was informed that he faced up to 20
years of imprisonment on Count 1, a mandatory consecutive term of at least 10
years on Count 3, and a mandatory consecutive term of at least 25 years on Count
5. After confirming that he understood the penalties he faced and the elements of
the offenses, Richards admitted to the facts of his offense conduct summarized
above and then pled guilty to Counts 1, 3, and 5 of the indictment. The district
court accepted the plea as knowing and voluntary.
Richards’s presentence investigation report calculated an advisory guideline
range of 210 to 240 months for the drug-conspiracy offense, plus mandatory
consecutive terms of 10 and 25 years for the firearms offenses.
At his sentencing, Richards argued that it violated the Fifth Amendment’s
Double Jeopardy Clause to impose multiple terms of imprisonment for a single act
of discharging a firearm.

The district court rejected this argument and then
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sentenced him to 210 months on Count 1, 120 months on Count 3, and 300 months
on Count 5, with all terms to be served consecutively. Richards now appeals.
II.
On appeal, Richards offers two reasons why, in his view, the district court
could not have imposed multiple, consecutive punishments for the two § 924(c)
convictions. First, he asserts that Count 5 lacks a sufficient evidentiary basis
because he was not convicted of the predicate crime of violence (carjacking),
which the government dismissed as part of his plea. Second, he maintains that his
§ 924(c) convictions and corresponding sentences violate the Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee of protection against multiple punishments for the same offense because,
in his view, both firearm convictions were based on the same predicate offense.1
1

The government contends that Richards has waived his right to raise these arguments
on appeal for two distinct reasons. First, the government cites the plea agreement’s limited
waiver of Richards’s right to file a direct appeal challenging “his guilty plea, conviction, or
sentence.” After Richards filed his initial brief on appeal, the government filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal as barred by the waiver. That motion was carried with the case, and the
government then filed its response brief. We find that the wavier does not apply because
Richards primarily challenges his convictions and, to the extent the waiver applies to such
arguments, the district court did not specifically address that aspect of the waiver during
Richards’s plea colloquy. See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.3d 1343, 1350–51 (11th Cir.
1993). Accordingly, we DENY the government’s motion to dismiss. In any case, even if the
waiver applies, the government has already addressed the merits of the appeal, so we will not be
depriving the government of the central benefit of its bargain by deciding the merits. See United
States v. Buchanan, 131 F.3d 1005, 1008 (11th Cir. 1997).
Second, the government argues that Richards waived his arguments by pleading guilty.
See United States v. Smith, 532 F.3d 1125, 1127 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The general rule is that a
guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional challenges to a conviction”). The government is likely
correct in this regard. See United States v. Fairchild, 803 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a guilty plea waived the argument that “there was an insufficient factual basis to
support the indictment”); Smith, 532 F.3d at 1127–28 (holding that a guilty plea waives some,
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We review claims of double jeopardy and questions of statutory
interpretation de novo. United States v. Bobb, 577 F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir.
2009); United States v. Rahim, 431 F.3d 753, 756 (11th Cir. 2005).
The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause protects against, among
other things, multiple punishments for the same offense. Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1371.
The multiple-punishment inquiry focuses on congressional intent.

See id.

(“Congress, of course, has the power to authorize multiple punishments arising out
of a single act or transaction.”).

If the same act or transaction violates two

statutory provisions, courts must first determine whether the legislature clearly
intended each violation to be a separate offense with separate punishments. See id.
at 1371–72. When legislative intent is unclear, we apply the “same elements” test
established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). United
States v. Smith, 532 F.3d 1125, 1128 (11th Cir. 2008). “Under this test, two
offenses are different for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis if each requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Section 924(c) provides that “any person who, during and in relation to any
crime of violence . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the
but not all, double-jeopardy challenges). However, we would engage in a similar doublejeopardy analysis to determine if Richards waived his argument, see Smith, 532 F.3d at 1128–29,
and Richards is not entitled to relief on the merits in any event, so we proceed directly to the
merits.
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United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime,
possesses a firearm” shall be sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment
depending on the facts. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). A minimum penalty of 10 years
applies if the firearm was discharged, while a lesser penalty applies if the firearm
was brandished or merely possessed. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). In the case of a
“second or subsequent” § 924(c) conviction, the defendant must be sentenced to at
least 25 years. Id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i). This enhanced penalty provision “applies to
multiple offenses, even if the offenses are charged in a single indictment.” United
States v. Hamilton, 953 F.2d 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v.
Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1542, 1545–46 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Notably, the penalties for violating § 924(c) must be “stacked.” That is,
each term of imprisonment for a § 924(c) offense must be imposed consecutive to
the term of imprisonment for any other offense, including the underlying predicate
offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
Here, Richards has not shown that the district court erroneously imposed
multiple punishments for the two § 924(c) convictions. Richards first argues that
his conviction on Count 5 cannot stand because he was not convicted of the
predicate carjacking offense. But a “conviction under section 924(c) does not
require either that the defendant be convicted of or charged with the predicate
offense.” United States v. Frye, 402 F.3d 1123, 1127 (11th Cir. 2005). Instead,
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§ 924(c) “requires only that the drug trafficking crime be one that ‘may be
prosecuted.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). Richards admitted as part of
his guilty plea that he in fact committed the offense of carjacking, even if he was
not convicted of that offense.

Thus, the fact that he was not convicted of

carjacking does not undermine his § 924(c) conviction for discharging a firearm
during and in relation to the predicate offense of carjacking. See id. at 1127–28.
Richards’s second contention—that it violates the Double Jeopardy Clause
to base multiple § 924(c) convictions on the same predicate offense—is misguided
because his two § 924(c) convictions rest on distinct predicate offenses.
In Rahim, we held that two or more convictions under § 924(c) can arise
from the same course of conduct when the convictions are based are distinct
predicate crimes. 431 F.3d at 757–58 (declining to “reach the issue whether
predicate offenses consisting of ‘virtually the same conduct’ can support multiple
924(c) convictions”).

And multiple § 924(c) convictions do not violate the

Double Jeopardy Clause so long as “each of the two offenses charged requires
proof of an additional fact”—the predicate crime—“which the other does not.”
Id. at 758 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in Rahim, we held that the
defendant’s multiple § 924(c) convictions for (1) use of a firearm during a robbery
and (2) use of a firearm during a carjacking, did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause, even though they arose from a single course of conduct, because each
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conviction required proof of a different predicate crime of violence. Id.
Here, Richards’s multiple § 924(c) convictions do not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Even though his convictions arose out of the same course of
conduct, each conviction required proof of an element the other does not. See id at
757–58; see also Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. Specifically, Count 3 charged
Richards with discharging a firearm during and in relation to and in furtherance of
the predicate crime of selling methamphetamine. Count 5 charged Richards with
discharging a firearm during and in relation to and in furtherance of the predicate
crime of carjacking. Thus, Richards is incorrect that his § 924(c) convictions were
based on the same predicate offense. And because his § 924(c) convictions rest on
distinct predicate offenses, no double-jeopardy violation occurred. See Rahim, 431
F.3d at 758.
In sum, the district court properly concluded that Richards’s multiple
§ 924(c) convictions did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because they were
based on distinct predicate offenses. For that reason, we likewise find no error in
the court’s imposition of multiple, consecutive terms of imprisonment, as directed
by the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i), (D)(ii). Accordingly, Richards’s
convictions and total sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.

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