Angel Sanchez v. U.S. Attorney General

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Petitioner Angel Alpizar Sanchez. Decision: Petition Dismissed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. Motion for initial hearing en banc filed by Petitioner Angel Alpizar Sanchez is DENIED. [8059898-2]. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-15345

Date Filed: 07/28/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-15345
Non-Argument Calendar
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Agency No. A087-578-230

ANGEL ALPIZAR SANCHEZ,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(July 28, 2017)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Date Filed: 07/28/2017

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Angel Alpizar Sanchez petitions this Court for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) denial of his application for cancellation of
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). After careful consideration, we deny his
petition for review. 1
I.
Sanchez is a native and citizen of Mexico. In 1998, he came to the United
States unlawfully. Over a decade later, the Department of Homeland Security
served Sanchez with a Notice to Appear that charged him with removability under
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). At a
hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Sanchez conceded the charge of
removability but requested cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1). That
statute gives the Attorney General discretion to cancel the removal of an alien who
demonstrates, among other things, that removal would result in “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative. Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D); see
Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2006). The IJ denied
his application for cancellation of removal. The IJ found Sanchez failed to show
that his removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to
his family.

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We also deny Sanchez’s motion for initial en banc hearing.
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The BIA then affirmed the IJ’s decision. It acknowledged that Sanchez’s
“removal would adversely affect his family,” but found that “the level of hardship
falls short of the exceptional and extremely unusual standard” set out in
§ 1229b(b)(1). Sanchez now petitions for review in this Court.
II.
Under the INA, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s
denial of discretionary relief in immigration proceedings, including its denial of an
application for cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). In Martinez,
we held that this jurisdictional bar precludes our review of the BIA’s determination
that an applicant has failed to satisfy the “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” requirement of § 1229b(b)(1). 446 F.3d at 1222–23. Sanchez
acknowledges our decision in Martinez but argues it was wrongly decided.
However, we are bound by Martinez under our prior panel precedent rule “unless
and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court.” United
States v. Brown, 342 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003). We therefore do not have
jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary determination that Sanchez did not
meet the hardship standard for cancellation of removal. See Martinez, 446 F.3d at
1222–23.
Despite the jurisdictional bar in § 1252(a)(2)(B), we retain jurisdiction to
review “constitutional claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
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Sanchez argues the IJ made factual errors that are “sufficiently severe to []
constitute reviewable errors of law.” More specifically, he says the IJ considered
facts outside the record; overlooked Sanchez’s inability to immigrate in the
foreseeable future; and discounted the significance of his wife’s inability to
immigrate in the foreseeable future. However, Sanchez never presented these
arguments to the BIA, and “we lack jurisdiction to consider claims that have not
been raised before the BIA.” Sundar v. INS, 328 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir.
2003); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may review a final order of
removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to
the alien as of right.”). Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider Sanchez’s
purported legal claims.
PETITION DISMISSED.

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