Roger Shuler, et al v. Liberty Duke, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellants Carol Shuler and Roger Shuler. Decision: Reversed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-15853

Date Filed: 08/23/2017

Page: 1 of 2

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-15853
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cv-00501-RDP

ROGER SHULER,
CAROL SHULER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
LIBERTY DUKE,
CHRISTINA CROW,
JINKS CROW & DICKSON,
law firm,
ROB RILEY,
JAY MURRILL, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(August 23, 2017)

Case: 16-15853

Date Filed: 08/23/2017

Page: 2 of 2

Before WILSON, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Pro see appellants, Roger and Carol Shuler (the Shulers), appeal the district
court’s sua sponte dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on a failure to
prosecute because the Shulers did not serve the complaint on the defendants within
the proper timeframe. On appeal, the Shulers argue that the district court should
have effectuated service for them because they received “partial” in forma
pauperis (IFP) status. Alternatively, they argue that the court should have granted
them an extension of time to serve the defendants.
We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to effect service
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) for an abuse of discretion. Richardson v. Johnson, 598
F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). “We affirm unless we find that the
district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal
standard.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Without addressing the merits of the appeal, we reverse the district court’s
dismissal because it should have effectuated service for the Shulers, who had IFP
status. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3), the district court must order that service be
made by either a United States marshal, a deputy marshal, or by any person
specially appointed by the court when the litigant is proceeding under IFP status.
REVERSED.
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