Martha Edgerton v. City of Plantation

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Martha Mae Edgerton. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-16064

Date Filed: 03/14/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-16064
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:14-cv-61472-WPD

MARTHA MAE EDGERTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF PLANTATION,
Defendant-Appellee,
JEFFREY JONES, et al.,
Defendants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(March 14, 2017)

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Before HULL, WILSON and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Martha Edgerton appeals pro se the summary judgment in favor of the City
of Plantation and against her complaint of employment discrimination on the basis
of race, sex, and retaliation. Edgerton argues that she presented sufficient evidence
of pervasive racial and sexual harassment to support her complaint of a hostile
work environment and of retaliation. We affirm.
We review a summary judgment de novo. Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337,
1341 (11th Cir. 2011). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment should be granted when the movant
establishes that there is no genuine dispute of a material fact and that it is entitled
to a judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Id.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee with respect to the “terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of” her race or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
To establish a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, an employee must
prove that she belongs to a protected group; that she has been subject to
unwelcome harassment; that the harassment was based on a protected ground, such
as race or sex; that the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to alter the
terms and conditions of her employment; and that her employer is responsible for
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the harassment under a theory of vicarious or direct liability. Miller v. Kenworth of
Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). The requirement that the
harassment be “severe or pervasive” contains both an objective and a subjective
component. Id. at 1276. “Thus, to be actionable, this behavior must result in both
an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and an
environment that the victim subjectively perceives . . . to be abusive.” Id.
(quotations omitted). In evaluating the objective severity of the alleged harassment,
we consider the frequency of the conduct; its severity; whether the conduct was
threatening or humiliating, or was instead an isolated offensive utterance; and
whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with the employee’s performance. Id.
at 1276; compare id. at 1276–77 (finding severe or pervasive conditions where
coworkers called plaintiff racially offensive names three to four times per day; the
remarks were hostile in nature because they were typically made while the
coworkers were arguing with plaintiff or berating him for his job performance)
with McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1379 (11th Cir. 2008) (instances of
racially derogatory language over a period of two-and-a-half years were “too
sporadic and isolated” to qualify as severe or pervasive).
Title VII also prohibits an employer from discriminating against an
employee “because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
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or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir. 1995). An employee may establish a
prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation by proving that she engaged in
protected activity under Title VII; that she suffered a materially adverse action; and
that there was a causal connection between the two events. Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate
Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2012). We recognize a cause of
action for a retaliatory hostile work environment. See Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d
1299, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012). The employee must prove that the retaliation
produced an objective injury or harm, such that it “might have dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 77 (2006). The
retaliatory acts must be material or significant and not trivial. Id. at 68.
The district court committed no reversible error when it entered summary
judgment in favor of the City and against Edgerton’s complaint of racial and sexual
harassment. Edgerton alleged that she was racially or sexually harassed at most
about once a month, but several of the alleged incidents were not harassing. For
example, Edgerton complained, “Robert Krogman aggressively confronted me at
the copier/printer workstation area by physically snatching papers from my hand.”
She also alleged that Krogman called her to his cubicle and showed her a “pin-up”
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of his wife in a bikini. And Edgerton alleged that “Mr. Jones made a comment that,
you know, ‘The founding fathers paved the way for people in this country.”
Edgerton also complained that Richard Maher left a Rosemary plant on her desk
and said, “Now you have to date me.” And she complained about overhearing
Jones tell a crew worker that he was “dicking around,” but Edgerton offered no
evidence that Jones’s comments were directed toward her. Edgerton was never
threatened. Any offensive conduct was isolated and appears to have occurred
during a relatively small part of her workday. These incidents do not establish a
hostile work environment.
The district court also did not err when it granted summary judgment in
favor of the City and against Edgerton’s complaint of a retaliatory hostile work
environment. Edgerton offered no evidence to support her argument that she was
harassed with increasing frequency or that she received threats of bodily harm after
complaining of discrimination. She instead identified the same harassing behavior
as occurring both before and after her complaint.
Edgerton also argues for the first time that she received ineffective
assistance of counsel and that the City engaged in misconduct before the district
court, but we ordinarily will not review arguments raised for the first time on
appeal. Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1994). And no exception
to that general rule applies here.
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AFFIRMED.

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